PADAJA’s
Regional Air-Defence Network
Command-and-control at the regional
level is provided by the IRIADF’s or Khatam
al-Anbiya Air-Defence HQ’s (PADAJA) nine regional commands, each headquartered
in a sector operations center (SOC). These are sometimes referred to as
divisions. Each region has authority over a number of air-defence groups—each
equivalent to a Brigade—and independent sites for radars. The regional commands
are as follows:
1) Northern
Region: Headquartered
in Teheran, it spans part or all of the Teheran, Alborz, and Mazandaran
provinces.
2) Central
Region: Headquartered
in Isfahan, it spans part or all of the Isfahan, Qom, and Markazi provinces.
Its command is co-located with that of TAB-8.
3) Northwest
Region: Headquartered
in Tabriz, it spans East and West Azerbaijan, Ardebil, Zanjan, and part of
Kurdistan province. Its command is co-located with that of TAB-2.
4) Western
Region: Headquartered
in Hamedan, it spans parts of Kurdistan and Markazi provinces, as well as
Hamedan, Kermanshah, Ilam, and Lorestan. Its command is co-located with that of
TAB-3.
5) Southwest
Region: Headquartered
at an unknown location—likely co-located with existing air bases at Omidiyeh or
Dezful—it spans the Khuzestan province and parts of nearby Kohgiluyeh va Boyer
Ahmed. It includes at least four groups (Ahvaz, Dezful, Omidiyeh, Behbahan). It
is frequently referred to as the 4th Air-Defence Region.
6) Southern
Region: Headquartered
in Bandar Bushehr, it spans the Bushehr and Shiraz provinces, as well as Kharg
Island.
7) Southeast
Region: Headquartered
in Bandar Abbas, it spans the Hormozgan province, and part of Sestan-Baluchistan,
as well as the Strait of Hormuz and surrounding islands. It is frequently
referred to as the 6th Air-Defence Region.
8) Eastern
Region: Headquartered
in Birjand, it spans South Khorasan, parts of Sestan-Baluchistan and Razavi
Khorasan, and all of the Yazd and Kerman provinces.
9) Northeast
Region: Headquartered
in Mashhad, it spans the Razavi and North Khorasan provinces, as well as parts
of Golestan. Its command is located at TAB-14.
During the days of
monarchy in the 1970s, the ground-based air-defence network comprised MIM-23A/B
Hawk MR-SAMs (150 missiles acquired in 1966, 39 launchers and 1,811 missiles
worth $687 million acquired between 1974 and 1979), and 81 Rapier
SHORADS launchers with 2,450 missiles. During the Iran-Iraq War, 25
Hawk launchers and 235 missiles were delivered by the US via Israel in 1986
under the Iran-Contra deal.
Ground-based air-defence cannons
in-service included 100 Oerlikon Contraves GDF-003 35mm systems procured in
1975 with related 50 Super-Fledermaus fire-control radars, 100 ZSU-57-2 SPAAGs
procured from the USSR in 1967 along with 200 second-hand ZSU-23-4 Schilka
SPAAGs between 1973 and 1978.
In the late 1980s, Iran also fielded seven Almaz S-200VE
Vega LR-SAM Batteries (comprising 42 launchers) with a range of up to 200nm, covering much of the western, central and southern
portions of the nation. 10 more S-200VE
Batteries were
procured from Ukraine in 1992.
Throughout the 1990s,
Iran also procured seven HQ-2J
(Sayyad-1) MR-SAM Batteries with 356 missiles and three JY-14 radars from China
between 1999 and 2001; two self-propelled
2K12/Kvadrat Batteries with 120 3M9
MR-SAMs in 1995-1996, and 29 Tor-M1E TELs and 750 9M338 missiles
(for seven Batteries) worth $700 million in early December 2005—all from Russia.
This was
followed by the procurement of four S-300PS LR-SAM Batteries (two each from
Belarus and Croatia), using 5V55KD missiles) along with related 30N6 and Nebo
SVU VHF radars, 36D6 surveillance radars, 76N6 low-altitude detection radars, 30N6
fire-control systems and 5P85-1 launch vehicles.
In 2007, Iran ordered four S-300PMU2 LR-SAM batteries with 150 48N6 missiles
worth $800 million from Russia. These
were delivered between July and October 2016 and were test-fired in-country
on March 4, 2017 during EX Damavand.
Also
procured were two 1L119 Nebo SVU mobile
solid-state digital VHF-band radars from Russia in 2007 and 2010, and
two Kvant 1L222 Avtobaza radar jamming and deception systems in 2011,
which operate over the Ku and X bands (8-18 GHz frequency range)and whose
effective range is 150km. Each Avtobaza covers a 360-degree hemisphere,
monitoring up to 60 targets simultaneously.
In the VSHORADS/MANPADS and SHORADS
arenas, Iran procured from China 500 HN-5A
missiles between 1986 and 1988, 1,100 QW-1s (Misagh-1/Vanguard) between 1996
and 2006, and 650 QW-2/Misagh-2 between 2006 and 2015, and six Batteries of Shahab Thaqeb/FM-80 SHORADS with 250
missiles.
As far as domestic
innovations go, a motorised version of the ZSU-57-2, called ‘Bahaman’
has been developed. This system comprises two 57mm air-cooled S-68 guns that
are fed from magazines. Each magazine holds four rounds. The Bahaman fires
fragmentation-tracers against airborne targets and armour-piercing tracers against
ground-based targets.
For defence
against land-attack cruise missiles (LACM), Iran contracted China’s Sichuan
Hua King Machinery Manufacturing Co to develop the ‘Asefeh’ 3-barrel 23mm
cannon that has a rate of fire of 1,500 rounds per minute. It fires both 23 x
115 or 23 x 152 cartridges. The 23 x 152 round is licence-manufactured by the
Iranian Defence Industries Organisation (DIO) and is used with the ZU-23-2
family of light anti-aircraft guns. It has an average overall length of 237mm
and a belt diameter of 35mm. The use of a larger
round and heavier projectile with the ‘Asefeh’ produces a higher recoil force. The
23 x 152 case is belted. The ‘Asefeh’ entered service in late 2013.
In the early 1990s,
Teheran decided to replace its MIM-23 and HQ-2J MR-SAMs with a new-generation
system that could be used for both ground-based air-defence as well as naval
air-defence. Accordingly, some examples of the IRIN’s in-stock RIM-66 Standard
MR-SAMs (128 of which were procured between 1976 and 1978) were supplied to
both Russia and China for re-engineering.
In Russia, the Tikhomirov Scientific
Research Institute of Instrument Design (NIIP),
the Novator Design Bureau, the Altair Design Bureau, the Dolgoprudniy
Scientific and Production Plant, MNII
Agat and Mariyskiy Machine-Building Plant
were tasked with developing the two variants of the MR-SAM.
In China, the China
National Precision Machinery Import-Export Corp (CPMIEC) led the re-engineering
effort. The Russian end-products were the Buk-M1E for ground forces, and the
naval 3S90E Shtil-1—both of which used the 9M317ME
missile.
In Iran, this system became known as ‘Ra’ad’ (Thunder) while the missile was called ‘Ta’er-2’.
CPMIEC’s solution was the LY-80 family of vertically-launched MR-SAMs.
Following competitive evaluations, Iran selected CPMIEC’s solution and thus was
born the ‘Sayyad-2’ MR-SAM for ground-based air-defence, and the LY-80N
naval variant, known in Iran as ‘Mehrab’.
CPMIEC
has in the previous decade also supplied 24 S-band target detection radars (the
same used by China’s LY-60 SHORADS) for replacing the Oerlikon
Contraves-supplied Skyguard/Super Fledermaus fire-control systems. This is
known in Iran as the ‘Kashef-1’ radar.
As for the much-touted Bavar-373 air-defence system, it is in reality a
trilateral industrial cooperation project involving China, North Korea and Iran
that had commenced way back in 2004. While CETC Int’l of China has developed
and supplied the Qamar active
phased-array engagement radar and the YLC-2V ‘Meraj’ 3-D S-band early
warning radar, the Sayyad-3 LR-SAM is a
re-engineered HQ-9 missile produced by North Korea for its Pon’gae-5/KN-06 LR-SAM system). The complete Bavar-373 system will be
ready for service-induction by 2020.
As an interim
measure, the PADAJA
has undertaken a limited upgrade of its stockpiles of MIM-23 MR-SAMs. Known as
the ‘Mersad’ air-defence system, each Battery
uses four types of radars.
The target detection radar, called ‘Kavosh’, is an upgraded clone of the
original MPQ-50 and its maximum range has been increased to 150km and an IFF transponder has
been added. A new continuous-wave acquisition radar called ‘Jouiya’ is used to detect and track low-altitude
airborne targets.
The high-power illuminator (called ‘Hadi’) is an upgraded version of the MPQ-46,
with an additional optronic tracker being attached. For area air-defence, the Mersad
uses a 250km-range ‘Hafez’ early warning radar. The re-lifed missiles
are now called ‘Shaheen’.
On May 25, 2014 the PADAJA unveilled two new systems. These were: 1) ‘Fakour’ fibre-optic command-and-control
system, which is responsible for gathering, fusing, and distributing tactical
information within the IRIADF’s sectors. 2) The ‘Rasool’ secure communications system, which is responsible for
linking the Matla ul-Fajr and Fath-14 VHF-band radars with other elements of
the air-defence network.
The Fakour is employed as a command-post for fusing
and distributing sensor information at the tactical-level. This means gathering
data from a range of active/passive sensors, which is next fuzed to produce a
unified situational awareness picture of the airspace that in turn can be used
to cue airborne and ground-based air-defence weapons. Based on
descriptions of the Fakour’s compatibility with the IRIADF’s
sector-operations-centres (SOC), it can be inferred that the Fakour will be
deployed within existing SOCs. The Fakour itself comprises three elements: The Operations Section, which is mounted on
a large containerised trailer, and is responsible for processing received data
and using it to plan and coordinate subordinate operations through seven workstations.
The Communications Section, which is
mounted on a smaller containerised trailer and is responsible for signals
reception and transmission. This helps protect the operations section by
allowing it to function without emitting. For intra-system communications, the
different sections are linked by fibre-optic or conventional cables, and for
external communications this section is equipped with HF, VHF, UHF, AM/FM, and
microwave radios, which can be used for audio and data transfer (at a reported
rate of 32mbit/s). The Communications-Relay
Section is equipped with a truck-mounted microwave relay station. All
elements of Fakour were supplied by China’s CETC Int’l.
The ‘Rasool’ is a fibre-optic communications
node associated with VHF-band target acquisition radars. It can be used to
integrate the radar with other elements of a local air-defence network, or with
distant command-and-control centres. The Matla ul-Fajr radar family
includes the MuF-1 and MuF-2, which are upgraded derivatives of the Soviet-era
P-12/18 radars. Both operate in the VHF bandwidth, which has led to them being
described as counter-stealth radars. They are visually characterised by their
distinctive Yagi-style antennae arranged in rows on a retractable mast mounted
on a containerised trailer. The MuF-1 is a 2-D (range, azimuth) radar
with a maximum range of 300km and altitude of 20km. It is characterised by its
12 antennae arrayed in two rows of six. The MuF-2 is a 3-D (range, azimuth,
height) radar with a maximum range of 480km. It is characterised by its 32
antennae arrayed in four rows of eight.
The ‘Rasool’ comprises two
vehicles: a communications shelter, and a relay station. The latter is the same
as the one used with the Fakour, and comprises a truck-mounted microwave
station (32 mbit/s capacity). The communications shelter, mounted on an Iveco 4
x 4, is fitted with HF, VHF, UHF, and microwave radios, and associated
encryption and recording hard/software.
Linking the Rasool with the radar
itself is via fibre-optic wiring. An example of how the Rasool is employed
can be found at the Fordow fuel enrichment plant (FFEP), and the air-defence
group assigned to protect it. Assets deployed for the FFEP’s point-defence
include one MuF-1 radar for two half-strength MIM-23 Batteries, and a handful
of ZU-23-2 Batteries, plus a small truck fitted with a mast-mounted microwave
transmitter, and a larger containerised Battary command port trailer, which itself
is linked to a smaller container with an unknown roof-mounted
transmitter/receiver.
Presently, the PADAJA exercises
command-and-control over 24 air-defence radar
stations and 41 active SAM sites inside Iran. The HQ-2J sites are shown
in red, MIM-23 sites are orange, S-200VE sites are purple, 2K12/Kvadrat
sites are bright green, and Tor-M1E sites are faded green. There are seven active
HQ-2J sites, 22 active MIM-23 sites. seven active S-200VE sites, six SAM
deployment locations with two sites occupied by 2K12/Kvadrat Batteries, with the
remaining four being occupied by Tor-M1Es.
In addition, there are 31
unoccupied, prepared HQ-2J sites, and seven S-200VE Batteries spread throughout
the country. The four northernmost S-200VE sites are positioned to defend the
northern borders and the region surrounding the capital of Teheran. A fifth
site is for defending facilities in and around Isfahan in central Iran,
including the Natanz nuclear facility.
The last two sites are at Bandar Abbas
and Bushehr and provide coverage over the Strait of Hormuz and the northern
half of the Persian Gulf, respectively. There are five key areas defended by
MR-SAM systems: Teheran, Isfahan, Natanz, Bushehr, and Bandar Abbas. HQ-2J
sites are currently 33% occupied, with MIM-23 sites being approximately 50%
occupied. Teheran is defended by five MIM-23 sites, two HQ-2J Batteries, and a
2K12/Kvadrat Battery.
There are also four empty sites in the same area. The
southwestern two sites are prepared for HQ-2Js, while the northwest and southeast
sites are prepared for MIM-23s. Were the empty sites to be occupied, they would
form an inner MIM-23 barrier and an outer HQ-2J barrier oriented to defend
against threats from the west and south.
However, this layout is a legacy
leftover from the Iran-Iraq War. Two S-200VE sites are also in the vicinity,
and the other two S-200VE sites to the east and west also provide limited
coverage of the capital. There are two MIM-23 sites and one HQ-2J site in the
vicinity of Isfahan. One of the MIM-23 sites, as well as the S-200VE site in
the area, is located on the grounds of TAB-8, with the MIM-23 site situated to
provide point-defence of the air base. The HQ-2J site and the remaining MIM-23
site are located south of Isfahan proper. An empty MIM-23 site is also located
in Isfahan, representing a dispersal site for the Battery at TAB-8.
Nuclear-related industrial facilities
near Natanz are afforded layered, hierarchical air-defence coverage by SHORADS
and MR-SAMs. Natanz is defended by one HQ-2J site, three MIM-23 sites, one 2K12/Kvadrat
battery, and four Tor-M1E TELARs. The SHORADS and MR-SAMs were first deployed
between September 2006 and September 2009. The Bushehr region is defended by
four MIM-23 sites and an HQ-2J Battery. Two MIM-23 sites are located on the
grounds of the Bushehr military complex, with a third site being located
offshore on Kharg Island, while the HQ-2J Battery is located further inland
from the military complex nearer to Choghadak. TAB-6 is also home to an S-200VE
Battery. There are three unoccupied HQ-2J sites and a single unoccupied MIM-23
site in the area as well. Three unoccupied sites are situated around the
nuclear complex, perhaps suggesting that any weapons-related work has been
moved from the facility to one of the various inland nuclear R & D
locations, such as Natanz. This would appear to be a sensible course of action,
given the serious vulnerability of the coastal Bushehr nuclear facility to
enemy activity approaching from the Persian Gulf region. The remaining
unoccupied HQ-2J site is located on an islet northeast of Kharg Island. Bandar
Abbas is defended by one HQ-2J Battery and one MIM-23 Battery. There is also an
S-200VE site in the region.
