The long-term combat effectiveness of any large military
force depends on military production facilities and continued support from its
logistical bases. Destruction of repair facilities, spare parts supplies, and
storage depots serve to degrade the enemy’s combat capability. Usually, there
are too many targets to be eliminated entirely. For example, there may be less
than 10 primary and 20 secondary ammunition storage facilities alone identified
on target-lists; with each being composed of scores of individual storage
bunkers. Consequently, the planners first need to destroy the most threatening
production facilities and stored materiels, then methodically to proceed with
attacks on other storage and production facilities as time and assets would
allow.
Thus far in the post World War-2 era, an
air campaign involving the concurrent/synchronised targetting of all 12
target-sets has been set in motion only once—Operation Desert Storm in
early 1991. Such an AirLand campaign, involving a ‘shaking of the heavens and
splitting the Earth’, literally bombed Iraq back into the stone-age. This was
achieved through a five week-long (43-day) air campaign in which the multinational
coalition flew more than 100,000 sorties and dropped 88,500 tons of munitions. The aerial strike force
was made up of more than 2,250 combat aircraft, which included 1,800 US
aircraft (including those launched from six US Navy Carrier Battle Groups, with
each Group logging some 4,300 combat sorties), the US Marine Corps’ about 240
aircraft (about 9% of the total), and the other coalition partners contributing
more than 600 aircraft (about 25% of the total)—all of which fought against
an Iraqi force of about 550 combat aircraft of which 259 were destroyed (105 being lost in combat, of which 36 were shot down
in aerial combat and of these 22 were downed by AIM-7F Sparrow BVRAAMs
and nine by AIM-9L Sidewinder SRAAMs). In
addition, 68 fixed wing aircraft and 13 helicopters were destroyed while on the
ground, and 137 aircraft were flown to Iran and never returned. A total
of 297 Tomahawk T-LAMs and 35 AGM-86C conventional air launched cruise missiles
(launched from seven B-52Gs) were fired against eight targets in northern Iraq,
including hydroelectric and geothermal power plants near Mosul, and the
telephone exchange in Basra. The classified code-name for this air-strike was
Senior Surprise. Launched during a 10-minute
period from about 100 miles south of the Iraqi-Saudi border near the town of Ar
Ar, 31 of them hit their targets. The US Navy fired 288 TLAMs from 16 warships
and two submarines.
The USAF’s 42 F-117As flew approximately
2% (1,271) of fixed-wing attack sorties,
and struck about 40% of the strategic targets. The 120 F-15 C/Ds flew more
than 5,900 sorties and maintained a 94% mission-capable rate—8% higher than in
peacetime. The 48 F-15Es logged in 2,200 sorties and 95.9% mission-capable
rate—8% higher than in peacetime. The 144 A-10s flew almost 8,100 sorties
and maintained a mission-capable rate of 95.7%--5% above peacetime rates. The 84
F-111s logged 4,000 sorties had a mission-capable rate of 85%--8% higher than
peacetime rates. The 18 EF-111s Ravens
flew 900 sorties with a mission-capable rate of 87.5 %, while and the 48 F-4G
Wild Weasals flew 2,500 sorties with a 87% mission-capable rate. The 249 F-16C/Ds
(including 72 LANTIRN-capable) flew almost 13,500 sorties and maintained a
95.2% mission-capable rate—5 % above its peacetime rate. LANTIRN’s
mission-capable rate was in excess of 98%. The B-52G Stratofortresses flew 1,624 missions, dropped 72,000 weapons, delivered
25,700 tons of munitions on area targets, and had a mission-capable rate
of 81%--2 % higher than its peacetime rate. The B-52Gs dropped 29% of all US bombs and 38% of all USAF bombs during
the war. More than 50 SOF-related aircraft were deployed inside the war
zone at any given time, including helicopters and AC/EC/MC/HC-130s. These flew
more than 830 missions. SOF crews also recovered downed aircrew members and
provided valuable target identification and HUMINT work. The USMC’s participation
included AV-8B Harriers from five units (86 aircraft,
including 26 that operated from LHDs). Altogether, they flew 3,567 sorties
(most of any USMC-type) and five of them were lost in combat and two to
accidents. They delivered 6,000 tons of
munitions. The loss-rate per 1,000 sorties was
1.4 (highest of any strike aircraft). Comparable loss-rates were 0.37 (F-16), 0.69
(A-10) and 0.91 (F-15E). The USMC loss-rate
per fleet was 5.81%. Average bomb-load
per sortie was 3,364 (heavier than that of the F/A-18’s and A-6E’s bomb-loads
at 2,000kg each). Surge rate was 3.5 sorties per day. The USMC’s 20 A6E Intruders logged in 854 sorties, dropped an
average of 4,000 lbs of munitions per sortie, and drooped a total of
1,708 tons of munitions. The 84 F/A-18s (including 12 F-18D Night Attack variants)
flew 5,047 sorties, while the 20 OV-10 Bronco FAC aircraft fleet suffered two
losses (10% of deployed strength) and flew 593 sorties, the 12 EA-6B Prowlers
flew 516 sorties, the 15 KC-130 aerial refuellers flew 1,267 sorties, the 78
AH-1W SeaCobra attack helicopters flew 1,273 sorties (suffering one combat loss
and another to an accident), the 50 UH-1 utility
helicopters flew 1,016 sorties (suffering a single loss to an accident), the 120
CH-46 Sea Knight utility helicopters flew 1,601 sorties and suffered one loss
to an accident, while the 75 CH-53 Sea Stallion heavylift helicopters flew 2,045 sorties.
The Royal Air Force contributed 60
Tornado GR.1s (which flew more than 1,500 operational sorties and suffered
six losses in combat), six Tornado GR.1As for tactical reconnaissance, 18
Tornado F-3s for air-defence, 12 Jaguars (flying 617
combat missions and only seven sorties being lost to unserviceability),
and 12 Buccaneer S.Mk.2Bs that flew 250 sorties, with not one being cancelled
due to unserviceability. They ‘spiked’ a total of 169 LGBs for other aircraft
as well as dropping a total of 48 LGBs of their own. The French Air Force deployed 28 Jaguars that flew 615 sorties in all and were
escorted by Mirage F-1C-200s and Mirage 2000Cs.
Number
of air-to-air missiles fired by US aircraft: 174
Number of
anti-radiation missiles fired by coalition aircraft at Iraqi radars: 2,039
Number of dumb
bombs dropped by coalition aircraft: 210,004, of which 39.336 were cluster
munitions
Number of smart
bombs (LGB/EO) dropped by claoition aircraft: 9,342
Number
of air-to-ground missiles fired by coalition aircraft: 5,930
The opening salvo of OP
Desert Storm was fired by the US Army’s Task Force Normandy’s two
MH-53J Pave Low pathfinder helicopters and eight AH-64 Apaches that fired
a total of 27 AGM-114 Hellfire anti-armour guided-missiles, 100 Hydra-70 rockets
and 4,,000 rounds of 30mm ammunition. During the
first 24 hours of the air campaign, more than 1,300 combat sorties were flown
by fixed-wing aircraft of US and coalition forces, including 812 strike sorties
(these including 100 SEAD/DEAD sorties (firing 200 AGM-88 HARM and ALARM anti-radiation
missiles) against an Iraqi air-defence arsenal that comprised 16,000 SAMs and
7,000 AAA guns). These were backed up by
160 aerial refuelling tankers, three E-3A AWACS and two E-2C Hawkeyes. Of the 812 strike sorties, 300 of them were
tasked to destroy airspace surveillance and military air-traffic management radars
and telecommunications and C3I nodes. Of these 300 sorties, the first wave
comprised 12 stealthy F-117A Night Hawks that successfully evaded
detection from the 60 SAM sites and 3,000 anti-aircraft guns that had encircled
Baghdad. A typical attack against an Iraqi air base saw 20 F-111s, each armed
with four 2,000kb Mk.84 LGBs, making two passes each in an operation spanning
about seven minutes in the target area. This meant an average weapon impact
every five seconds. The Iraqi IADS was decapitated within 36 hours, while
static hardened SAM sites were destroyed within four days. By D + 9, complete
air supremacy was achieved.
About 15% of scheduled strike sorties
during the first 10 days were cancelled due poor visibility or low overcast sky
conditions. Cloud ceilings of 5,000 feet to 7,000 feet were common, especially
during the ground campaign’s last few days. These conditions also had a
negative effect on the ability to collect imagery and hindered the BDA process.
Use of air-delivered munitions was affected by high humidity, fog, rain, and
low clouds.
As far as combat-support systems go, 20,401 aerial refuelling sorties dispensed 178 million
gallons of fuel to 60,543 receivers
from USAF 46 KC-10s and 262 KC-1 35s, US Navy KA-6s and tanker-configured S-3s,
KC-130s, and other coalition tankers (Saudi KE-3s, French C-135FRs, and nine RAF
L-1011-500 Tristars and nine VC-10s that flew 381 missions). Altogether, the non-US
aerial refuelling tankers flew more than 4,000 sorties, while the USAF ones
flew more than 15,000 sorties.
AEW & CS platforms like the E-3A
Sentry AWACS flew a total of 7,315 combat hours
or four continuous orbits to control over 3,000 sorties a day, while
maintaining a mission-capable rate of 98%--9% higher than in peacetime. They controlled 31,924 combat sorties and 20,401
aerial refuelling sorties. The USAF’s E-3As manned five orbits (four in
Saudi Arabia and one in Turkey) and the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF( manned one
to three over Saudi Arabia. Two E-8 JSTARS battlespace surveillance aircraft
flew 54 combat sorties and supported 100% of mission taskings with a system
availability rate of more than 80% and a mission-capable rate of 84.5%. JSTARS
tracked everything that moved on the ground. From D-Day to G-Day, JSTARS
operators logged more than 535 hours to locate, identify and target assembly
areas, POL storage sites, ballistic missile launch areas and missile storage
sites, convoys, trucks, armoured vehicles, and even SAM sites and field artillery
emplacements. Coupled with F-16s battlefield air-interdiction platforms, JSTARS
enhanced the kill-box approach to air-interdiction, which proved highly
effective in destroying Iraqi equipment in the Kuwait Theatre of Operations (KTO).
JSTARS thus effectively denied the enemy its night sanctuary and kept continual
pressure on Iraqi ground troops in the KTO. The USAF’s 265 C-141B Starlifter and 85 C-5 Galaxy strategic airlifters, plus
C-130E/Hs and KC-10As when self-deploying) flew 20,500 missions, carried
534,000 passengers, and hauled 542,000 tons of cargo. All in all, the airlifters
moved 4.65 billion ton-miles. Sortie data on platforms like the U-2R,
TR-1 and RC-135 Rivet Joint remain classified.
The multinational coalition
lost 75 aircraft—52 fixed-wing aircraft and 23 helicopters, with 39
fixed-wing aircraft and five helicopters lost in combat. The US lost 28
fixed-wing aircraft and five helicopters; the British lost seven fixed-wing
aircraft; the Saudi Arabians lost two; the Italians lost one; and the Kuwaitis
lost one.
The US Army’s 274 AH-64A Apache attack
helicopters from 15 Battalions fired 1,400 Hellfires (AGM-114A high-trajectory
variant and the AGM-114C lower-trajectory minimum-smoke variant), 30mm high-explosive
and high-explosive/dual-purpose ammunition and Hydra-70 unguided rockets, destroying
278 battle tanks, more than 600 light and armoured vehicles, 100+ pieces of field
artillery, and about 900 other targets. The Apaches made a total of 652
operational flights during 83 missions. They were used primarily for armed
night reconnaissance missions inside the KTO because of their night vision and
videotape capabilities, which provided timely intelligence information to ground
(Division) commanders. Twenty-nine, or 63%, of the 46 missions flown during the
war were armed night reconnaissance missions. The 17 remaining missions
comprised 10 attack, six security (an operation in which Apaches protected
ground forces in a given area), one rescue, and one escort mission. However, the
Apaches did engage enemy targets during 14 of the missions flown during the air
campaign. On one mission against the Iraqi Republican Guards, the 1st
Battalion of the 24th Aviation Brigade (1/24th) destroyed
32 T-72Ms, 60 other armoured vehicles, 38 AAA pieces, 64 wheeled vehicles, and
other miscellaneous targets.
During the 28-hour ground campaign, the Apaches
routinely operated 20km ahead of ground elements and shaped the battlefield
through armed reconnaissance and attack operations. These deep-attack missions
shaped the battlefield and set the terms for close operations. Such deep-attack
operations cleared the way for mass pursuit operations by coalition land forces,
which routed the Iraqi Army. The coalition’s ground offensives thus quickly
turned to exploitation-and-pursuit operations. The tempo of the battle
increased as the battlefield became non-linear. US Army Aviation resources thus
provided the mobility, flexibility and agility required to continue the
pursuit. Attack helicopter units placed continued pressure on the enemy while
steadily increasing the tempo of battle to a point of inundation.
Battlefield awareness is the
key to battlefield dominance. The I/J-band Orchidee system, despite only being
at a prototype stage, was resurrected to become part of Operation Horus,
as the French deployment for the KTO was known. The Orchidee was used to guide
AH-64As of the US Army’s 18th Airborne Corps against massed Iraqi armoured
forces (under the locate, fix and strike tactic). The Orchidee was mounted
on a Eurocopter AS.532UL Super Puma helicopter with a Thomson-CSF Lotar (Le
Centre Thomson d’Applications Radars) 75km-range battlefield surveillance
radar, using an antenna that was retractable for takeoff and landing.
Intelligence data was found to be of high-quality and was immediately
available. This helicopter-borne battlefield surveillance radar proved valuable
for Brigade and Divisional commanders and a vital command-and-control tool for
massed, multi-directional strikes by attack helicopters. A total of 31 missions
were flown: 26 operational and five training. In spite of being restricted to
an altitude of 1,500 feet, the system proved capable of tracking all targets
within a 20 x 20 square kilometre kill-box and of detecting (but not tracking)
targets in a 40 x 40 square kilometre tactical battle area. Used for day and
night operations, beginning on February 3, 1991 the Orchidee was employed in 50
hours of combat operations. Shortly after OP Desert Storm, the Orchidee
programme was formally resurrected by the French Army. The system was re-named
Horizon—the French acronym for helicoptere d’observation radar et
d’investigation sur zone. The Horizon system can effectively be operated in two
modes. In the first, the radar is operated autonomously with on-board data
processing. In the second, one or more helicopters have a secure data-link to
download information to a ground station for real-time processing and
exploitation. The autonomous mode provides considerable flexibility, allowing
the system operator to carry out on-board analysis of the raw radar data. An
encrypted radio-link is used to send the results of the initial appraisal to
the command echelons on the ground. The system can be deployed to a theatre of
operation 1,000km away in less than five hours, and can be operated
immediately. The encrypted radio-link can also be used to uplink information
from the ground, providing the ability to change the mission profile, even once
the helicopter is airborne. It can also be used to provide navigation
information. Plots extracted from the radar are stored in on-board recorders
and are analysed in real-time by the operator on a console in the helicopter’s
main cabin. On the ground, intelligence specialists are able to utilise
synthetic images that show detected traffic overlaid on a digital GIS
map—either as hard-copy or in the form of a transparency.
Subcontinent’s
Historical Track-Record Of Past Air Wars
The air forces of both India and
Pakistan have so far not waged the kind of wars against one another that aimed
at strategic strangulation or limitlessdestruction. In 1971, when Pakistan had
just 19 squadrons against 34 fielded by India, for air-defence of the vulnerable
areas (VA( and vulnerable points (VP( in the northern sector of the western
front, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) flew a total of 1,417 sorties. These
included 1,317 day sorties and 100 night sorties. A total of 11 IAF aircraft
were shot down by PAF combat aircraft (as claimed by the PAF), all while
egressing, after attacking PAF air bases or air-defence radars. For the defence
of VAs and VPs in the southern sector, the PAF flew a total of 253 sorties.
These included 167 day sorties and a measly 23 night sorties from Masroor,
while Talhar generated 63 day sorties. Additionally, 43 combat air-patrol (CAP)
sorties were flown over the tactical battle areas (TBA) in Thar and Kutch.
Neither ingressing nor egressing IAF aircraft could be shot down, in what
turned out to be an almost futile air-defence effort in the south. The Pakistan
Army’s AAA, however, had a fair amount of success in being able to down five
IAF aircraft.
130 sorties (40%) were reported by the PAF
aircrew–in all candour–to be unsuccessful, either due to armament malfunctions
or, because the targets could not be located and bombs were dropped in the general
target vicinity on ‘dead reckoning’. The PAF flew a total of 288 offensive
counter-air sorties, of which 158 were flown during the day and 130 were flown
at night. 81 sorties (28% of the effort) were unsuccessful as the armament
could not be delivered due to one of several reasons, these including inability
to locate the target, armament delivery malfunction or interception by IAF
combat aircraft. Five aircraft were lost during the missions, two during the
day and three at night, amounting to a campaign attrition rate of 1.7%, which
was considered within acceptable limits. Coming to offensive counter-air
operations (10% of the total war effort), effects of the 186 tonnes of ordnance
dropped in the 77 successful night-sorties were mixed. The 12-odd sorties flown
for ‘suppression of enemy air-defences’ did not yield the desired results. Of
the 146 day-sorties (including 35 escorting missions) flown against nine IAF air
bases, damage caused to the runways was generally minor and was usually
repaired within a few hours. The PAF flew a total of 296 sorties in the Shakargarh
Sector, which made up 41% of the PAF’s total tactical air support effort. 183
sorties were considered successful, while 113 sorties were rated as failures.
In Suleimanki Sector, 55 ground attack sorties were flown, of which 33 were
considered successful. In 22 sorties, either no targets could be found or,
bombs were released on dead reckoning with questionable results. In
Hussainiwala Sector, a nominal 29 sorties were flown, and other than a mission
claiming to have targetted the IA’s Firozpur ammunition dump, all were
unsuccessful. 84 CAP sorties were flown. In all, 175 sorties (including 24
night-sorties) were flown in support of the Pakistan Army’s (PA) 18 Division in
Chor, Ramgarh and Kutch Sectors. This formed one quarter of the total air
support effort provided by the PAF during the war. In addition, 40 CAP sorties
were flown. The real success of ground-based
AAA came about over the battlefield, where 17 IAF aircraft were shot down in
Chamb, Shakargarh, Lahore and Suleimanki sectors. The PAF flew 22 day-missions
and 10 night-missions searching for the Indian Navy’s Project 205 FAC-Ms and
other warships, none of which were successful. The PIA airline flew 59 sorties,
while other civilain aircraft flew 68 sorties, all with their own crew.
The IAF’s strategic bombing campaign in
the northern sector did not go beyond the three-odd missions. Interdiction of
the railway system was seen as a far more lucrative exercise, due to the
complete absence of any sort of defences. Also, tactical air-interdiction
promised rapid results, which were of consequence to the on-going land battles,
whereas the strategic strikes required a long-term concerted campaign and were
antithetical to an envisaged short war. The IAF had a free hand in its tactical
air-interdiction campaign against the railway network, along with a few attacks
against targets of strategic importance. Lack of low-level radar cover meant
that the IAF’s intruders came in completely unobserved and unmolested by PAF
combat aircraft. Shortage of AAA assets resulted in these target areas being
unguarded, leaving the IAF’s attackers with little to worry about during weapon
delivery. The railway network on the Sialkot-Shahdara Section, Jhelum-Lahore
Section, Lahore-Sahiwal Section, Shahdara-Lyallpur Section, Kasur-Arifwala
Section, Mandi Sadiqganj-Samasatta Section and Bahawalpur-Lodhran Section was
attacked incessantly. Twenty-five railway stations on these sections were
targetted, with Wazirabad and Kasur receiving as many as five visits each. In
general, the railway sectors selected for attacks were mostly those along which
the Indians expected, or were aware, that the PA’s reinforcements might
materialise. Sixteen trains were also attacked on these sections, while many
track segments were damaged. Five of the attacked trains happened to be of
‘special military’ category. The damage incurred on these trains was, however,
inconsequential. Neither was any PA movement impeded, nor were any vital
supplies interdicted.
Detailed statistics of the air war
effort of both the IAF and PAF can be seen below for comparison purposes.
In what shape did both the air forces
emerge post-1971?
While the loss of East Pakistan and the
birth of Bangladesh as a nation since late 1971 reduced the IAF’s operational
orientation from a three-front scenario to a two-front one, for the PAF it
resulted in a single-front scenario, i.e. its eastern front against India, thus
resulting in the IAF becoming the PAF’s sole and perpetual enemy.
Today, the
PAF can effectively muster only 20 combat-capable squadrons made up of some 300
serviceable combat aircraft (about 400 if reserve Mirage-III/-V airframes and
primary/basic jet trainers are also included), that are supported by three
combat-support squadrons (versus the IAF’s 33 combat squadrons and three
combat-support squadrons).
These include about 45 Chengdu F-7PGs (upgraded with
Selex-Galileo-supplied Grifo-F Mk.2 multi-mode radars), eight FT-7PG
tandem-seat conversion trainers, about 90 Chengdu F-7P Skybolts (fitted with Grifo-F
Mk.1 radars), 13 Chengdu FT-7P Skybolt conversion trainers, 28 Mirage-IIIEAs
and four Mirage-IIIDPs in ROSE-I upgrade configuration, six Mirage-VDFs in ROSE-2
upgrade configuration, 14 Mirage-VEFs in ROSE-3 upgrade configuration, 100
JF-17 Thunders (deliveries continuing), and 45 F-16A/Cs and 31 F-16B/Ds.
Airframes held in reserve include 16
Mirage-IIIEPs, 11 Mirage-IIIELs, seven Mirage-IIIDAs, 11 Mirage-IIIRPs, nine Mirage-VPA3s,
30 Mirage-VPA2s, 28 Mirage-VPAs, and 30 Mirage-VDPA2s.
The entire combat fleet
is spread out among 12 full-fledged air bases and 12 satellite air bases (the
latest being Bholarii, Sindh, plus recent ones in Balochistan that include
airfields in Gwadar, Pasni, Ormara, Dalbandin, Turbat and Panjgur from which both Pakistan
Navy P-3C Orion MR/ASW aircraft and ZDK-03 Karakoram Eagle KE-3 AEW & CS platforms
can operate) that come under the command-and-control of three Air Commands.
The Peshawar-based Northern Air Command
comprises the Kamra-based No.33 Wing that includes the No.14 ‘Tail Choppers’
Sqn (flying JF-17s) and No.25 ‘Night Strike Eagles’ Sqn flying Mirage-VEFs in ROSE-2 upgrade
configuration; and the Peshawar-based No.36 Wing that
includes the No.16 ‘Panthers’ Sqn and No.26 ‘Black Spiders’ Sqn flying JF-17s.
The Sargodha-based Central Air Command comprises the Rafiqui-based No.34 Wing with
No.15 ‘Cobras’ Sqn and No.18 ‘Sharp
Shooters’ Sqn flying Mirage VPAs, No.20 ‘Cheetahs’ Sqn (flying F-7PGs)
and No.27 ‘Zarrars’ Sqn (flying Mirage-VEFs in ROSE-3 upgrade configuration); Sargodha-based
No.38 Wing with its No.9 ‘Griffins’ Sqn,
No.11 ‘Arrows’ (Operational Conversion Unit) Sqn and No.19 ‘Sherdils’ Sqn flying
Block-15 MLU F-16AM/BMs; and No.5 ‘Falcons’ Sqn flying F-16C/D Block-52s from
Jacobabad.
The Masroor-based Southern
Air Command comprises the Samungli-based
No.31 Wing with its No.17 ‘Tigers’ Sqn and No.23 ‘Talons’ Sqn both flying
F-7PGs, plus No.28 ‘Phoenix’ Sqn flying JF-17s; and the Masroor-based No.32 Wing
with its No.2 ‘Minhas’ (equipped with JF-17s) Sqn, No.7 ‘Bandits’ Sqn flying Mirage-IIIEA/DPs in ROSE-I upgrade configuration and
Mirage-VELs), No.8 ‘Haiders’ Sqn (flying Mirage-VPA2/3s), and No.22
‘Ghazis’ (Operational Conversion Unit) Sqn flying Mirage-IIIDF/IIIDA/DL/EL
variants.
All these are supported by the
Kamra-based No.3 ‘Angels’ Sqn with four Saab 2000 AEW & C
platforms, Masroor-based No.4 Sqn with four ZDK-03 Karakoram Eagle KE-3 AEW
& CS platforms, and the Chaklala-based No.10 multi-role tanker transport
(MRTT) Sqn’s four IL-78MKPs. The PAF is now acquiring three additional
Saab 2000 ‘Erieye’ AEW & C aircraft, with the first delivered last December
and the remaining pair arriving later this year. The SEK 1.35 billion contract
for these platforms was inked on May 15, 2017.
The PAF’s Chaklala, Rawalpindi-based Air
Defence Command, through its RABTA integrated command-and-control system, exercises
surveillance, control, and coordination of Pakistan’s airspace and air-defence
identification zone (ADIZ that extends up to 80nm inside Indian airspace).
It
is divided into three regional air commands: HQ NORSEC (Northern Sector) based
at PAF Chaklala and falling under the control of the Northern Air Command; HQ
CENSEC (Central Sector) at Sargodha under the Central Air Command; HQ WESSEC
(Western Sector) based at Samungli (near Quetta, Balochistan) also falling
under the command of Central Air Command; and HQ SOUSEC (Southern Sector) based
at Faisal air base (in Karachi, Sindh) and falling under the control of the
Southern Air Command.
The PAF’s six L-band Lockheed Martin TPS-77s high-power
airspace surveillance radars along with a YLC-2V High Guard 3-D S-Band radar are
located at Korangi Creek, Sakesar, Masroor, Kirana Hills, Rafiqui and Lower
Topa.
The medium-power radars—comprising four L-band Northrop Grumman TPS-63s,
four E.F-band TPS-43G radars and four S-band YLC-6M radars are commanded and
operated by the PAF’s No. 481 Control & Reporting Centre (CRC) based at Lahore,
No. 482 CRC based at Rafiqui, No.483 CRC at Samungli, No. 484 CRC based at Upper
Topa, No.485 CRC at Kirana Hills, and No. 486 CRC based at Chaklala.
The 1980s
vintage 68 SIEMENS-built SILLACS L-Band MPDR-45 (with 45km-range), MPDR-60
(with 60km-range) and MPDR-90 (with 90km-range) low-level gapfiller radars for protecting
the VAs, VPs and air-corridor approaches to the air bases are operated by the No.
242 Sqn, No. 408 Sqn, No. 409 Sqn, No. 410 Sqn, No.471 Sqn, No. 541 Sqn and No.
904 Sqn.
For integral base-air
defence, the PAF had by 2013 taken delivery from MBDA of 10 Batteries of SPADA-2000
SHORADS systems (with another five Batteries being optioned for). Its Euro415
million procurement contract was inked in 2007, and was inclusive of the supply
of 750 missiles and the construction of two product-support facilities
(commissioned in 2009) in Karachi. The first Battery was delivered in February
2010. Each SPADA-2000 Battery includes: a Detection Centre with a RAC-3D radar
with 60km range, and up to four six-round missile launchers. They are backed-up by 40+ Rheinmetall GDF-005 Skyguard-3 air-defence cannons.
Like the PAF, the PA and Pakistan Navy
(PN) too are upgrading their ground-based air-defence assets. For layered
air-defence of its three sprawling Ballistic/cruise missile torage sites in Mangla,
Kirana Hills and Masroor, the PA is now inducting CEIEC-supplied JY-27A
280km-range VHF radars and related TS-504 multi-point troposcatter
communications relay systems, plus NORINCO-supplied CS-RB1 HGR-106 medium-power
210km-range gapfiller radars—all of which will be used by the PA’s three
CPMIEC-supplied LY-80E MR-SAM/LOMADS Regiments and three CPMIEC-supplied FM-90
SHORADS Regiments.
The first FM-90 Battery was handed over on March 16, 2016, while
the first LY-80E Battery was handed over on March 12, 2017. For point
air-defence, the FN-6 VSHORADS in 2014 began replacing the QW-1/QW-2
(Shamelessly renamed as Anza Mk.1/Anza Mk.2) MANPADS.
The PA’s other
battlefield AAA assets include 35mm Oerlikon Contraves GDF-005 cannons with
Ericsson Giraffe radars (200
distributed among eight Brigades), NORINCO-supplied P793 37mm cannons, RBS-70 Rayrider
VSHORADS mounted on M-113 ‘Mouz’ tracked APCs of the Light Air-Defence
Self-Propelled Regiments, plus the newer PG-99s supplied by NORINCO.
The PN’s three Marine Battalions have
inducted into service three CS-RB1 HGR-106 radars, along with NORINCO-supplied
6.8-tonne PG-99 35mm towed anti-aircraft guns and Sichuan Military Electronics
Industries Group Company (SEMIC)’s Type 825 fire-control radars.
The PG-99, a
re-engineered Oerlikon-Contraves GDF-002 of early 1980ss vintage, is
gas-operated and comes with a rate of fire of up to 1,100 rounds/minute, and
the muzzle velocity is up to 1,175 metres/second, together with high aiming
speed, low recoil force and small dispersion. Its engagement range is 4km. The
PG-99 is mounted on a cradle which is designed to carry guns and the mobile
platform. It contains the hydro-mechanical recoil mechanism, which absorbs the
recoil forces. The lower part of the cradle comprises the two-axle chassis and
the outriggers with the leveling spindles for four-point support in the firing
positions. Raising and lowering the levelling spindles and raising the wheels
are done electro-hydraulically, or manually in the case of power failure.
The
gun can be traversed 360 degree and its elevation/depression angles are +92
degree/-5 degree. The Type 825 fire-control system can acquire targets at a
range of up to 40km, track them at a maximum distance of 32km, and identify
them at ranges of up to 6km.
Offensive
Firepower Deliverance By PAF & PA
For its F-16 fleet, the
PAF is authorised by the US to make use of only US-designed bombs and
precision-guided munitions (PGM), like the GBU-12 LGB, Mk.82 high-.low-drag
500lb bombs, Mk.84 2,000lb bomb and PSD-1 cluster bomb. In addition, since 2006
the PAF has obtained 1,600
Enhanced Paveway GBU-12 (500lb) and GBU-24 bombs (2,000lb) with dual laser/GPS
guidance, 800 Mk.82 500lb and Mk-84 2,000lb general-purpose bombs, 500
GBU-31/38 JDAM guidance kits and 700 BLU-109 2,000lb bunker-buster bombs, plus 500 AIM-120C5 AMRAAM and 500
AIM-9M-8/9 Sidewinder air combat missiles.
However, when it comes to its
Mirage-III/V and JF-17 fleets, the PAF has armed them with both US-origin bombs
as well as China-supplied ordnance that includes the FT-6A ‘Takbir’ gliding PGM
with a range-extension kit (REK), CS/BBS1 cluster bomb, 200kg low-drag
runway-cratering bomb called ‘Hafr-2’ (NORINCO-built clone of the Matra
Durandal), 250kg low-drag low-altitude fragmentation bomb, CS/BBF1 250kg
cluster bomb, 500kg low-drag low-altitude fragmentation bomb, CS/BBR1 500kg
aerial incendiary bomb, GB1 500kg LGB, Hijara cluster bomb (clone of the
PSD-1), MAR-1 anti-radiation missile (100 of these, each with 25km-range were procured
from Brazil), Hatf-8/Ra’ad 550km-range air-launched cruise missile and the
Raptor TV-guided gliding PGM and its data-link pod (supplied by DENEL of South
Africa), plus PL-5EII air combat missiles (for the Mirage-III/V and F-7P/PG
fleets) and the PL-5EII and SD-10A air combat missiles for the JF-17s.
For target designation and weapons
delivery, the F-16s make use of 37 Lockheed
Martin-supplied AAQ-33 SNIPER ATP pods, while the JF-17s use the WMD-7 pods
supplied by China’s CETC Int’l. For self-protection, the F-16s make use of 18 ITT
Exelis-supplied ALQ-211(V)9 advanced
integrated defensive EW pods (AIDEWS) without
digital radio- frequency memory (DRFM) and 21 Northrop Grumman ALQ-131
Block-2 jammer pods without DRFM. The JF-17s are equipped with
CETC-supplied KG-300G jammer pods.
For conducting tactical airborne
reconnaissance, the PAF relies on seven DB-110
dual-band (visual/infra-red) LOng Range
Oblique Photography (LOROP) pods that can be carried only by the F-16s. The
first two were delivered in 2009 by Goodrich
Corp, with another five worth $72 million following in 2012. They were
delivered with two fixed ground stations and one mobile ground station, each
equipped with one data-link receiving system (a total of four ground receiving
data-links were delivered).
It was between mid-2008
and late December 2015 that the PAF’s F-16s were extensively used over the
country’s troubled tribal regions in the remote Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA) during low-intensity conflict (LIC) operations. The PAF flew more
than 7,000 day/night strike-sorties in this period, with 5,500 strike-sorties alone being flown between
May 2008 and late 2011 in support of the PA’s OP Sherdil in August 2008,
OP
Sirat-e-Mustaqeem in June 2008, OP Rah-e-Rast in May 2009, OP Brekhna, OP
Eagle Swoop, OP Mountain Scanner and OP
Mountain Sweep between June and September 2009, OP Rah-e-Nijaat in
October 2009, OP Khwakh Ba De Sham in March 2010, and OP Koh-e-Sufaid in July
2011. When the PA turned its attention to South
Waziristan in October 2009, the PAF conducted a seven-day air-strike campaign
in advance. All three of its F-16 squadrons were put through a training programme
over a four-month period. The US-supplied LGBs have been used in 80% of the PAF
air-strikes. More than 12,600 bombs have been dropped to date, and 5,400
targets were destroyed. In support, the PAF also registered more than 700 F-16 recce
sorties with the DB-110 pods.
However, operating extensively
in support of ground-based LIC operations and in uncontested airspace is
unlikely to be of much use when it comes to the issue of mounting
deep-interdiction strike-sorties inside hostile airspace. Consequently, the PAF’s
combat aircraft fleet will, at most, will be able to fly only air-defence and
battlefield air-interdiction sorties during the next round of hostilities with
India. In addition, the PAF has not yet been able to procure rangeless ACMI systems for increasing the proficiency of its combat pilots, despite continuing to make tall claims about having developed an indigenous rangeless ACMI system that never shows up during any of the regular air-exercises the PAF conducts!
Matters
for the PAF will not improve until it takes delivery of up to 80 twin-engined FC-31
stealthy M-MRCAs. Now being developed by China’s Shenyang Aircraft Corp (SAC),
the FC-31 has been designed to carry an eight-tonne
weapons payload (including four precision-guided munitions totalling two tonnes
internally and six tonnes being carried on six external hardpoints). It has a
combat radius of 648 nautical miles (1,200km) and a maximum takeoff weight
(MTOW) of 28 tonnes. The fuselage length is 17.5 metres, while the wingspan is 11.5 metres, and the height is 4.8 metres.
The estimated maximum attainable speed is Mach 1.8, and the powerplant will
comprise two 94kN thrust-rated Klimov RD-93MA
turbofans imported off-the-shelf from Russia’s Moscow-based Chernyshev
Machine-Building Plant, a division of the United Engines Corp (UEC). The RD-93MAs will incorporate full authority digital
engine controls (FADEC) and a gearbox located at the bottom front-end of
the engine casing. The RD-93MA will have a total
technical a service-life of 4,000 hours.
It is for this reason that the PA has,
since the early 1990s, acquired several types of conventional warhead-carrying
ballistic and cruise missiles for use as deep fire-assault weapons capable of
reaching the major cities of western, northern central India. And China
Aerospace Science & Industry Corp (CASIC)
has been Pakistan’s foremost supplier of such missiles, that currently arm the
PA’s 21 Artillery Division HQed at Pano Aqil
in Sindh province (equipped with two Babur LACM Battalions—the 23rd
and 26th Missile Group that are stored at a purpose-built facility
just outside the PAF’s Masroor air base--at a rate of one Battery every year
starting 2009), with each having four Batteries each with six TELs housing 24
LACMs and 72 reloads and 12 other supporting vehicles, all manned by 175
personnel); and the Sargodha-based 22 Artillery
Division.
Pakistan’s quest for acquiring conventional
warhead-carrying missiles began in September 1988, when Islamabad inked a
contract with Beijing for procuring some 80 solid-fuelled single-stage M-11
(Hatf-3/Ghaznavi/CSS-7 Mod 1/DF-11) 280km-range TBMs carried and launched from
MAZ-543 8 x 8 vehicles, and 34 600km-range M-9 (Hatf-4/Shaheen-1/CSS-6/DF-15)
TBMs. These missiles were developed by CPMIEC and China Metallurgical Equipment
Corp (MECC), assembled by the Sanjiang Aerospace Group in Yuanan, 210km west of
Beijing in Hubei province, and the entire contract was serviced by CASIC under
the supervision of China’s state-owned Commission of Science, Technology and
Industry for National Defence (COSTIND). By December 1988, China commenced
deliveries of M-9 and M-11 TBMs, with all remaining deliveries being concluded
by mid-1992.
By early 1990, Pakistan had inked a $516
million turn-key deal with CASIC to establish localised industrial facilities
for licence-building a total of 64 solid-fuelled missiles such as: the
Hatf-3/Ghaznavi/M-11/CSS-7 Mod 1/DF-11 (with a CEP of 250 metres and carrying a
500kg conventional warhead), Hatf-4/Shaheen-1/M-9/CSS-6/DF-15 (with a CEP of 50
metres when carrying a 1-tonne conventional warhead), and another 64
Hatf-2/Abdali/P-12 precision-guided tactical missiles each with a 180km-range,
CEP of 15 metres and carrying a 500kg conventional warhead. While China agreed
to supply the jigs, lathes and moulding/machining/milling tooling required for
fabricating the missile sub-assemblies, it insisted that Pakistan independently
source raw materials like Grade 18Ni (250) maraging steel, nono steel, powder
materials for flame- and plasma-sprayed coatings, corrosion-resistant neodymium
iron boron magnets, ablative liners, beryllium-aluminum alloys that can be cast
into complex shapes that need little or no machining; plus propellant-related
materials like aluminum oxide powder, acrylic acid, ammonium perchlorate,
polybutadiene, monomethyl hydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide.
On August 22, 1994 Pakistan paid CASIC
$15 million for a contract under which the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) 2nd
Artillery Corps was to train Pakistan Army personnel to deploy and launch the Abdali,
Shaheen-1 and Ghaznavi TBMs. A month later, a PLA team of instructors arrived
at Sargodha. Concurrently, work began on building the instrumented 200-hectare
Flight Test Range at Sonmiani, 75km north of Karachi; Sandhak, 50km east of the
Iranian border in Baluchistan province; and at the Ratla Range off the Siwalik
Hills west of Dera Ghazi Khan. In July 1998, the PA conducted its first launch
drills involving a Missile Group of Shaheen-1 TBMs at the Deosai Plains in PoK.
Between January and March 1989, the then
Pakistani PM Benazir Bhutto had decreed that an IRBM be developed by the
Kahuta-based Dr A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) with North Korean
assistance be called Al Zulfikar. The liquid-fuelled single-stage
Hatf-5/Ghauri-1/Nodong-1 IRBMs of North Korean origin was inducted into service
on January 8, 2003 under the 47th Missile Group of the PA’s
Strategic Forces Command (SFC). The Ghauri-1’s pre-surveyed launch pads and
related underground command-and-control bunkers are located at the
Kirana Hills in Punjab province. In June 1992, KRL and PA officials visited
North Korea’s Sanum-dong guided-missile development centre to examine the
Nodong-1. Between August 4 and 7 the same year, North Korea’s then Deputy
Premier-Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam travelled to Pakistan to discuss the
licenced-assembly of Nodong-1s armed with conventional warheads. On May 29 and
30, 1993 Pakistani and Iranian officials were present for Pyongyang’s
test-firing of one Nodong-1. On December 30 the same year, PM Bhutto travelled
to Pyongyang and struck a deal to purchase technical design data of the
Nodong-1 and use it to indigenously develop the Al Zulfikar. In September 1994,
a delegation led by Choe Hui-chong, the then Chairman of North Korea’s State
Commission of Science & Technology travelled to Pakistan and visited KRL.
During this visit, Choe inked a $220 million deal to provide Pakistan with fuel
tanks and liquid-fuelled rocket engines for the Al Zulfikar IRBM, which by then
had been renamed as the Hatf-5/Ghauri-1, along with 12 fully-assembled
Nodong-1s and related launch-control systems valued at $60 million, plus their
fixed-base launch facilities in the Kirana Hills off the PAF’s sprawling air
base at Sargodha. These items were produced by Pyongyang’s 4th
Machine Industry Bureau of the 2nd Economic Committee. By April 1996,
Changgwang Sinyong Corp (aka North Korea Mining Development Trading Corp) began
delivering 12 Ghauri-1s in fully knocked-down condition, plus equipment for
assembling them at a new customised facility built by KRL at Kahuta. The
Ghauri-1’s land-mobile MAZ-543TLM wheeled transporter-erector-launchers were
supplied off-the-shelf by the Sungni General Automotive Factory of the 2nd
Machine Industry Bureau. At the same time, work began on the construction of
related missile test-firing infrastructure near Nowshera in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,
at Dera Ghazi Khan (in the Dallana tribal area near the Suleiman Range), and
the Mashhood Test Firing Range at Tilla Jogian in Punjab’s Jhelum district,
with a monitoring station located at Basti Jarh, some 6km from Dera Ghazi Khan
along the Dera-Quetta road. In December 1997, Pakistan’s then COAS Gen Jehangir
Karamat, accompanied by the then Director of KRL Dr Abdul Qadeer ‘Bhopali’ Khan,
visited North Korea’s 125 Factory where the Ghauri-1/Nodong-1s were being
built. Following this, North Korean IL-76MD transports began making about three
flights a month to Chaklala until January 1998, when the number of flights
increased three-fold. These flights ferried in technical experts and telemetry
crews to KRL between February and March 1998. In September 1998, construction
began with North Korea’s civil engineering assistance of six above-ground
fixed-base Ghauri-1 storage/assembly/launch sites, along with related hardened
underground command-and-control centres in the Kirana Hills.
By May 2002, operational Ghaznavis with conventional warheads were deployed along the
Deosai Plateau, Gujranwala and Mangla, while the Shaheen-1s were deployed to
pre-surveyed launch pads in the Deosai Plateau. The Ghaznavi TBMs were formally
inducted into service on February 22, 2004. Present plans call for the PA to
deploy three Missile Groups each of the Abdali, Ghaznavi, Ghauri-1 and Shaheen-1
(grouped under two separate Artillery Brigades (these being the Masroor-based
Missile Brigade South comprising Missile Groups 25, 35 and 40 and the
Sargodha-based Missile Brigade North comprising the 14, 28 and 47 Missile
Groups) during hostilities, with all such missiles being armed with
conventional HE or FAE-based warheads. Each such Group comprises 18 TELs each
with one ready-to-fire missile and 54 missile reloads. A Group can also be
divided into three Batteries (with six TELs and six missiles plus 24 reloads).
Presently, Missile Groups of the Abdali, Ghaznavi and Shaheen-1 are located at Sargodha
and Manglam while the 180km-range Hatf-9/Nasr MBRLs are stored at the PA’s
Pasrur cantonment.
Increasing
Differentials
And yet, the PAF suffers from several
shortcomings that rend to ensure that in a future round of all-out hostilities
against the IAF, the PAF will succumb within a period of eight days. These
include:
1) The unavailability of the required
quantum of spares-support from the OEMs of the Dassault Mirage-III/V and Chengdu
F-7P/PG fleets of combat aircraft, since these are no longer in series-production
and they have also been phased out of service in both France and China. Consequently,
fast-moving rotables and consumables are quite hard to come by on short-notice,
due to which the PAF has no choice but to conserve the flightworthy lives of
such aircraft by reducing their peacetime training flight sorties and this in
turn reduces aircrew proficiency. Thus, the PAF can today mobilise no more than
17 full-strength flightworthy combat aircraft squadrons at short notice.
2) Series-production of the JF-17A
Thunder L-MRCA by China’s Chengdu Aerospace Corp (CAC) continues at an excruciatingly
slow rate due to greater priority accorded by CAC to the series-production of
the J-10B M-MRCAs for both the PLA Air Force and the PLA Naval Aviation.
3) The refusal by the US to supply air-to-ground
all-weather precision-guided munitions (PGM) like AGM-65 Maverick or Brimstone or
sensor-fuzed cluster munitions or AGM-88 high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARM)
for the PAF’s F-16s—all of which can be used with devastating effect during
battlefield air-interdiction missions.
4) The US refusal to supply Raytheon
AIM-9X Sidewinder within-visual-range air-to-air missiles for the PAF’s P-16s,
which renders the Boeing-supplied Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System totally
worthless.
5) China’s surprising unwillingness to
supply the PAF with the more advanced PL-8 or PL-9C within-visual-range
air-to-air missiles for the PAF’s JF-17As.
6) The PAF’s unsuccessful efforts to
service-induct MR-SAMs like the LY-80E and its reluctant approval for the PA’s
desire to operate such MR-SAM Regiments.
7) The PAF’s unsuccessful efforts to
date to procure twin-engined M-MRCAs required for mounting low-level deep-interdiction
sorties.
8) The PAF being forced to deploy its
AEW & CS platforms as far west as possible (especially in Balochistan) in
order to acquire some depth, due to Pakistan’s peculiar elongated geography.
This prevents the PAF from conducting offensive airborne battle management
taskings deep within Indian airspace, thereby forcing its AEW & CS platforms
to perform only air-defence-related airborne battle management taskings.
9) Lastly, and most importantly, Pakistan’s
steadily sliding economic condition and its growing expenses on securing the
Durand Line along its western frontier, both of which have forced Pakistan’s
armed forces to reduce their war wastage reserve (WWR) stockpiles that will not
last beyond EIGHT days of intense, multi-front warfighting in an all-out war
scenario.
And it is with all of the above that the
PAF will have to confront an IAF that, by 2020, will comprise 32 combat
aircraft squadrons and 39 Helicopter Units. Presently, the IAF can boast of three
Sqns with MiG-29s now being upgraded to UPG standard, nine squadrons with
MiG-21 Bison (reduced to seven by 2020), two squadrons with MiG-21Ms (to be
decommissioned later this year), four squadrons with Jaguar IS
of which 64 are being upgraded to DARIN-3 standard, one squadron with
Jaguar IM for maritime strike, 15 squadrons with Su-30MKI H-MRCAs, three squadrons with Mirage
2000H/TH that are now being upgraded, two squadrons with MiG-27UPG, one squadron
with MiG-27Ms, and half-a-squadron with Tejas Mk.1 L-MRCAs. By 2024, all the
MiG-21 Bisons, MiG-27UPGs and MiG-27Ms will be decommissioned, while one
additional Tejas Mk.1 and two Dassault Rafale M-MRCA squadrons will be raised,
thus leaving the IAF with 30 combat aircraft squadrons against a 20-squadron
combat aircraft fleet strength of the PAF.
The IAF’s force-mix
is quite
lop-sided today and will remain so till the end of this decade, since close to
40% of IAF’s authorised combat force will be comprised of Su-30MKI H-MRCAs, 20%
of upgraded M-MRCAs like the Mirage 2000Is and MiG-29UPG, and the rest with
platforms like the Jaguar IS, MiG-27UPGs, MiG-27Ms and MiG-21 Bisons. The
shortfalls are particularly critical in the tactical interdiction and battlefield
air-interdiction arenas.
The shortfalls
could well have been non-existent had the IAF in 2005 decided to undertake a
deep upgrade for its 125 licence-built MiG-27Ms (equipping five squadrons) and
95 imported MiG-23BNs (equipping three squadrons) by re-engining each of them
with AL-31F turbofans and equipping them with DARIN 3-type mission avionics,
which would have extended their service lives by 20 years.
In terms of force-multiplier
combat-supp[ort systems, the IAF presently possesses only three A-50I PHALCON
and two EMB-145I ‘Netra’ AEW & CS platforms, plus six IL-78MKI aerial
refuellers. For standoff recce, two ELBIT Systems-built CONDOR-2 LOROP pods
were procured in Februaty 2009 for the Jaguar IS, followed by another two worth $82 million in April 2017 for the Rafales. Each CONDOR-2 system includes the pod itself, a wide-band data-link, and fixed and
transportable image exploitation stations and their support equipment. Also
acquired in 2007 were four ELTA Systems-built EL/M-2060P SAR pods for the
Su-30MKI, and two RecceLite pods for the Tejas Mk.1.
As for target
designation pods, the MoD concluded a contract in November 1996 for procurinmg
an initial 15 RAFAEL-supplied Litening-2s at a cost of Rs.95 crore ($27.11
million( for fitment on 30 Jaguar IS and five Mirage-2000H/TH aircraft at a
total cost of Rs.125 crore. Of these, 10 pods were later transferred for use by
the Su-30MKIs. In 2015 another 164 Litening-G4I
pods were ordered for use by Rafale (14 for the 36 Rafales), Su-30MKI, Mirage
2000N and Jaguar IS/DARIN-3 aircraft. and Tejas Mk.1/Mk.1A.
As for EW pods, the MoD
ordered 10
THALES-supplied Barem pods for the Mirage-2000H/TH fleet in 1988. In February
1996, the MoD contracted ELTA Systems for
the procurement of 92 EL/L-8222 pods (82 for the IAF and 10 for the Indian Navy),
at a total cost of $84.84 million, or Rs.280 crore. Of the 82 systems, 50 were
contracted for the MiG-21 Bison and 32 for Jaguar IS (as internally-mounted
suites). Another 90 pods were ordered in 2009 for the Su-30MKI fleet.
The IAF’s 36 Rafales,
built to F3-04T-standard, will each incorporate two RAFAEL-built X-Guard
fibre-optic towed-decoys that can be released
when the aircraft approaches an area saturated with ground-based air-defence
weapons, or when threats from inbound SAMs or AAMs are detected by the Spectra
EW suite. In the latter case, the most suitable countermeasure will be
transmitted to the X-Guard by the Spectra. The X-Guard will then lure the attacking missiles away by creating an attractive
false target signal that will divert the homing missile from the Rafale. The
X-Guard is designed to defeat advanced tracking techniques, including modern ‘Monopulse
and Look on Receive-Only’ (LORO) techniques. The decoy is retrievable and
can be deployed several times during a mission.
Coming to PGMs, the IAF has to date
received 200 of the 17km-range, 520kg KAB-500Kr TV-guided rockets, 2,500 Griffin-3
LGBs, 1,500 KAB-1500LG-FE LGBs, 300 of the 690kg
30km-range Kh-29TE TV-guided missiles, 100 of the 1,130kg, 150km-range PopeyeLite missiles with
imaging infra-red seeker fire-and-update mode plus 20 Pegasus
data-link pods, 250 of the 550kg, 65km-range Spice-1000 (Smart Precise Impact
and Cost Effective guidance kit) missiles, 200 of the 600kg, 110km-range Kh-31P
Krypton ARMs, and 200 of the 40km-range,
315lg Kh-25MP ARMs.
Slated for delivery in future are 400 of
the 100km-range SAAW gliding directed-energy weapons mounted in quad-racks; 50
BrahMos-A supersonic multi-role air-launched cruise missiles; 150 of the 1,300kg, 550km-range SCALP-EG subsonic LACMs and 100 of the 268kg, 93km-range ALARM ARMs (the last two for the
Rafales); and more than 6,000 locally-developed 500kg Precision Guided
High-Speed Low-Drag (PGHSLD) bombs (whose flight-qualifications began on May 22, 2017). Two PGHSLDs, one with sensors,
telemetry, data logger for carriage trials and anoother with GPS and telemetry
were carried out by the IAF’s 32 Wing AF Station in Jodhpur. Using guiding fins and a GPS-aided and FOG-based inertial
navigation system, a PGHSLD can land
within 13 metres (42 feet) of its target. In
future the PGHSLD will be equipped with
wings that unfold in flight to triple the range from 15 miles (24km) to over 45
miles (72km). The modular nature of such a smart kit means that it can be
easily upgraded as technology improves and options such as improved laser
sensors, GPS jamming immunity and an all-weather radar sensors can be added.
The air-launched BrahMos-A and its successor, the BrahMos-NG (now under
development and slated for service-entry by 2023), when used in conjunction
with the SIVA HADF pod, are the principal weapons to be employed against hostile
AEW & CS platforms. Equipped with an imaging X-band SAR seeker, such
missiles when launched from two different directions at any airborne AEW &
CS platform, can cruise at altitudes higher than those of such platforms and
can zero in on their targets through a lofted trajectory in the terminal flight
phase, almost in a top-attack mode.
By early 2021, the IAF
will begin receiving the first of more than 4,000 Nirbhay ground-launched
LACMs. They will be joining the IA’s existing one Regiment of BrahMos-1
Block 1 and two Regiments of BrahMos Block 2 supersonic LACMs, plus a single
Squadron of BrahMos-1 Block 3 top-attack LACMs of the IAF. Each BrahMos-1 Battery
includes five mobile autonomous launchers (MAL) each with three vertical-launch
cannisters, and four Batteries make up a Regiment, accounting for about 70 missiles.
The IA’s 861 Regiment (with BrahMos-1 Block I was raised on June 21, 2007 at a
cost of $83 million, while the 862 Regiment (BrahMos-1 Block 2) was raised in March
2012, and these were followed by the 863
Regiment (BrahMos-1 Block 2) and 864 Regiment (BrahMos-1 Block 2) at a cost of
Rs. 4,300 crore ($644 million). All these Regiments are an integral part
of the IA’s 40th and 41st Artillery Divisions.
The procurement of more
than 200 ground-launched BrahMos-1 Block-3 LACMs for the IAF was cleared
by India’s Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCS) on October 19, 2012 at the cost of $919 million. On
December 9, 2014 the IAF service-inducted the BrahMos-1 Technical Position00a
centre that will house the missiles and launchers for the IAF. While the
IA’s BrahMos-1s are to be used against static/fixed installations like
transportation nodes and battlefield POL and weapons storage dumps (with target
selection being done by the Surveillance and Target Acquisition Fire-Control
Centres (SATA-FCC) by the Artillery Division HQs, the IAF’s BrahMos-1 Block 3s
and Nirbhays will be employed for the destruction of air bases and storage
areas/launch-pads of ballistic/cruise missiles deep inside enemy territory,
such as the PA’s 1st Strategic Missile Group at Mangla, 2nd Strategic
Missile Group at Sargodha, and the 3rd Strategic Missile Group at Khuzdaar.
In fact, this is exactly
what former Indian National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon had alluded to in
his book, titled Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy, where he
had opined that “Circumstances are conceivable in which India might find it
useful to strike first, for instance, against a nuclear weapon state that had
declared that it would certainly use its weapons, and if India was certain that
an adversary’s nuclear weapons launch was imminent.”
What this means in reality
is that if the enemy’s declared intent is of using the nuclear weapons option not at the last moment or
as a last resort, but when the IA’s integrated battle groups (IBG) begin
entering Pakistani territory, then to India this means that her military forces
will have to strike, with superior conventional force, at Pakistan’s nuclear
warhead-armed ballistic/cruise missile storage/launch bases first, and destroy
them, simultaneously or even before the IA’s armour-heavy Strike Corps can reach
their wartime staging areas. But unfortunately, Menon’s opinions were totally
misinterpreted by the likes of a certain Dr Vipin Narang of the US-based MIT,
who have wrongly and perhaps mischievously claimed that Menon’s opinions are
proof of India’s abandonment of the ‘No First Use’ policy with regard to
strategic nuclear deterrence.
