Increasing Sub-Conventional Threats Systematically Blunting India’s Conventional Deterrence

Ever since the Indian Army (IA) completed fencing of the 550km-stretch of the Line of Actual Control (LoC) fencing in the Kashmir Valley and Jammu region of Jammu & Kashmir Union Territory on September 30, 2004, terrorist infiltrations across the LoC had been reduced to single-digit levels per annum till 2012. Since then, the bulk of the infiltrations into both J & K UT and northern Punjab have taken place within the Ravi-Chenab corridor, especially along the India-Pakistan Working Boundary (WB) and the Chicken’s Neck area in particular, and along the riverine stretches of the India-Pakistan international boundary or IB (around the Shakargarh Bulge/Salient)—these being the districts of Amritsar, Tarn Taran, Gurdaspur, Pathankot, Fazilka and Ferozepur.

It is now important to understand the various territorial boundary/frontier references. The J & K UT has 734km of LoC running through Jammu, Kashmir and the UT of Ladakh from Kargil to Malu (Akhnoor) in Jammu district, while it has 190km of IB from Malu to Punjab running through Jammu, Samba and Kathua districts. The IB between India and Pakistan spans 2,175km. The WB spans 202km, the LoC spans 797km, and the Line of Actual Contact (LAC)—which India calls the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL)—from map-grid reference NJ-9842 till Indra Kol—spans 108km. The LoC runs from a place called Sangam close to Chhamb (which lies on the west bank of the Munnawar Tawi River) all the way up north to NJ-9842 in Ladakh, following which the AGPL takes over. The WB lies in Jammu Division between Boundary Pillar 19 and Sangam i.e. between Jammu and Sialkot), which was part of the erstwhile princely state of J & K. It is this stretch that is known in India as the IB, while Pakistan refers to it as the WB, since it maintains that the border agreement (the so-called standstill agreement of August 15, 1947) was inked between the princely state of J & K and Pakistan, and not between India and Pakistan. The Shakargarh Bulge/Salient (which is Pakistani territory) and runs along the IB, is 45km x 45km in size. The bulge joins Indian territory with a 40km distance in between both countries and touches India’s National Highway-1, which is the lifeline of the entire Kashmir Valley. If Pakistan Army (PA) troops manage to get operational in three to four days at the tip of this Bulge/Salient, the NH-1 could be cut of totally, rendering the entire north of India paralysed, as all supplies and winter stocking in the Valley is done by this route, for Indian troops.

Chicken’s Neck is the name given to the territory lying between the two branches of the River Chenab and it is a dagger-shaped salient in J & K that allows the PA an easy access to the bridge at Akhnoor in Jammu, as well as to the Chhamb-Jaurian sector. Measuring about 170 sq km, it is bound by the River Chenab in the west, and by the River Chandra Bhaga, or Ghag Nala in the east. Ferries in Saidpur, Gondal, Majwal and Gangwal areas connect it with the Sialkot sector. Being an open area in the plains, it is excellent for the conduct of swift, offensive manoeuvre warfare by the IA. However, for Pakistan, this area is indefensible by conventional means, as it is surrounded by India from three sides and back in December 1971, was captured by the IA’s 26 Infantry Division within a 48-hour period.

Thus far, since May 2008, three distinct patterns have been noticed with regard to the ways and means employed for covert infiltrations by groups of Pakistani ‘Fidayeen’ terrorists into northern Punjab, the Jammu plains and the Kashmir Valley: infiltration through riverine terrain and along the courses of the rivers and rivulets (nallahs) flowing through Punjab and Jammu; infiltration through underground tunnels dug beneath the WB; and the increasing use of China-made hexaCopters flying over the IB in both northern Punjab and southern Jammu for ferrying in weapons, explosives and narcotics stockpiles.

Infiltration Through Riverine Terrain

Though a large portion of the India-Pakistan border on the 553km Gurdaspur-Jammu sector is fenced, there are several gaps caused by the Ravi River and season rivulets that cut into the IB and WB. Gurdaspur shares a long, zig-zagging border with Pakistan. It is easy to infiltrate from this stretch as compared to the heavily-mined, fenced and guarded LoC. A dense fog in winters makes border surveillance an added challenge. As the border terrain is broken and forested, the rivulet beds provide an ideal cover for terrorists who can sneak in and reach the busy NH-44 highway that snakes along the border. This enables terrorists to hijack vehicles and mount rapid strikes. There are many gaps in the fencing on this stretch because of rivers flowing in and out of India. For example, the Ujjh River enters and exits many times on this stretch. Some of the gaps are as wide as 30 feet. It is not difficult to cross this stretch as the rivers are shallow (with water reaching just above the knee) and large parts of the riverbed are dry. In addition, large gaps due to monsoon floods disrupt the availability of the electrified fencing, which runs along the IB and WB in Punjab and Jammu. Hundreds of metres of fence come down every year and the Sarkanda grass, which springs up after the rains provides infiltrators plenty of cover. In Jammu, the entire Kathua district is profusely drained by numerous ephemeral and small perennial streams, which originate from northern mountainous region and are flowing in a southwestern direction. The perennial River Ravi that is a sub-basin to Indus River along with its tributaries viz Ujjh, Tarnah, Sewa and Bein drains the district. Apart from the major drainage systems, there are a number of seasonal streams (khads) traversing the whole district. They carry huge loads of boulders, pebbles, sand and silt during monsoon. They also generate flash floods immediately after rains, causing extensive damage downstream.

Instances of terror-attacks staged after riverine infiltrations included the terror-attack on the family quarters in the cantonment at Kali Mandi in Samba on May 11, 2008 in which left six people, including a photojournalist, two army jawans and two women dead; the September 26, 2013 terror-attack at 6.45am by a three-man JeM ‘Fidayeen’ squad of the Jaish-e-Mohammad’s (JeM) Shohada Brigade on the Hiranagar Police Station barely 7km from the WB, after the terrorists had commandeered a truck and took to the Pathankot-Jammu Highway and then they opened fire in Samba town against the IA’s 16 Cavalry Regiment in the Mesar area of the Samba-based 168 Infantry Brigade; the attack by a six-member ‘Fidayeen’ squad on December 5, 2014 on the IA’s 12 Brigade HQ at Mohura, Uri; an attack by a two-member ‘Fidayeen’ team on March 20, 2015 on Rajbagh Police Station police in Jammu’s Kathua district, with the recoveries including two AK-47 SLRs (one of them fitted with UBGL), two daggers; 13 hand-grenades; one China-made Star pistol, two UBGL rounds, 12 AK magazines, and one water-floating bag (used for infiltrating via riverine areas after crawling through an 80-metre-long tunnel under farmlands to cross the WB; a two-member ‘Fidayeen’ team striking for the second time in as many days on March 21, 2015 on an IA camp in the Meshwara area of Samba around 5:50am; the July 27, 2015 attack by three ‘Fidayeen’ terrorists on a bus and then attacking the Dina Nagar Police Station in Punjab’s Gurdaspur district; the attack by four ‘Fidayeen’ terrorists on January 2, 2016 at the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) Pathankot air base in Punjab’s Pathankot dfistrict; the attack on September 18, 2016 by four JeM ‘Fidayeen’ terrorists on the IA’s 12 Brigade in Uri sector on September 18, 2016 in which 19 IA soldiers (15 from 6 Bihar Battalion and three from 10 Dogra battalion) lost their lives; the attack on November 26, 2016 by four ‘Fidayeen’ terrorists (four local Kashmiri JeM members, namely Mohd. Ashiq Baba alias Mohd. Ashaq, Syed Munir-Ul-Hassan Qadri, Tariq Ahmad Dar and Ashraf Hamid Khandey, had facilitated a group of three heavily armed Pakistani terrorists—Khalid alias Abu Hissam, Numan and Aadil--and transported them from the WB in the Samba-Kathua sector to Hotel Jagdamba in Jammu and subsequently to Nagrota in their vehicles) on the IA’s 166 Medium Regiment at Nagrota; and the attack by four ‘Fidayeen’ Terrorists on February 10, 2018 on the sprawling camp of the 36 Brigade of the IA’s Jammu & Kashmir Light Infantry before dawn at Sunjwan in Jammu.

Of these, irrefutable forensic evidence of JeM-perpetrated terror-attacks has been garnered from only the July 27, 2015 and January 2, 2016 terror-attacks. Regarding the former, data shared by the US Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) with India’s Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) under the auspices of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) has revealed that the ‘Fidayeen’ unit had been stationed in the town of Gharota (in Shakargarh), facing Bamiyal. Forensic analysis by the FBI of the Garmin GPS navigation locator device used by the terrorists showed that the device was first fed with data on July 21, 2015 at Sargodha, a town 94km from Faisalabad. The data also showed that the terrorists had departed from a safe-house on the fringes of Gharota.  On the intervening night of July 26 and 27, they penetrated the IB near Alowal where the Ravi River makes a series of sweeping bends and then, travelling due east, they crossed a tributary of the Ravi River and reached Bamiyal town. From there, they caught an early morning bus that took them to the NH-1A highway, which links Punjab with J & K and on to Hiranagar, passing several Punjab State Police checkpoints along the way and eventually arrived at Dinanagar town, which is just 12km from the IB, 25km from Jammu and 235km from Chandigarh. Dinanagar is also on the 1,526km-long NH-15 that connects Pathankot in the north and Samakhiali in Gujarat. The retrieved pre-programmed GPS waypoint navigation data revealed that the terrorists had three targets. The first was the Dinanagar-Pathankot railway track on which five IEDs were subsequently found strapped. Dinanagar Police Station, where the encounters took place resulting in the terrorists being killed, was the second on the hit list. The terrorists were expected to eventually proceed to the high-profile targets of bungalows of the District Magistrate and the SP in the Civil Lines area of the town for what could have been a deadly climax. India had approached the FBI to help identify the Night Vision Device (NVD) used by the three terrorists.

The JeM terrorists who struck at the air base in Pathankot in the early hours of January 2, 2016 had entered the defence installation during the afternoon of January 1 and had spoken in Multani dialect, commonly used in the districts of Multan, Lodhran and Bahawalpur in southern Punjab region of Pakistan. Items recovered included a China-made wireless set similar to the one recovered from Rajbagh Police Station on March 21, 2015, and US Army-issued binoculars. The FBI supplied the cellphone call details of two numbers: 92-3017775253 and 92-3000597212. One of the first calls made by the terrorists to 92-3000597212 was at 9.12pm on December 31, 2015 from a location near the air base. In all, the FBI handed over evidence, comprising more than 1,000 pages of chats and conversations between the JeM’s handler Kashif Jaan and the four ‘Fidayeen’ who were eventually killed (identified as Nasir Hussain from Punjab, Abu Bakar from Gujranwala and Umar Farooq and Abdul Qayum from Sindh). The documents also included Kashif Jaan’s conversations with other Pakistan-based JeM office-bearers, apart from other exchanges over a period of time. Apart from chats on WhatsApp and other platforms, Jaan was using a Facebook account connected to the same mobile number that the attackers had called from Pathankot after abducting Punjab police SP Salwinder Singh. The terrorists had also called another number in Pakistan connected to a Facebook account of ‘Mulla Daadullah’. These accounts, operated by Jaan, were accessed before and around the time of the terror-attack using IP addresses of Pakistan-based telecommunications service-providers (Telenor and Pakistan TeleCommunications Company Ltd). These Facebook pages also contained jihadi material and videos and comments condemning the arrest of JeM cadres in Pakistan. The terrorists had also called numbers connected to Al-Rahmat Trust—the JeM’s financial arm.

Infiltrations Via Tunnels Dug Beneath WB

As far as infiltrations using tunnels dug beneath the WB go, the first such tunnel was uncovered on July 28, 2012 by the Border Security Force (BSF), which was constructed about 25 feet deep in the Samba sector. It was detected after an area caved-in near the border fencing. It had been dug out between two sides along the WB on India’s Chillayari BoP and Pakistan’s Lumberiyal BoP. It had air-supply through a 2-inch pipe. The tunnel was discovered accidentally by a farmer of Chachwal village on the evening of July 27 while working in his fields, when he saw the land sunk at three straight points due to monsoon rains. A joint team of the Geological Survey of India (GSI) and BSF later unearthed a total length of about 540 metres of the tunnel dug into the Indian side from the Zero Line (where the boundary pillars lie) and reportedly found its exit point about 500 metres short of Chechwal. On May 2014, the BSF found a caved-in portion of another tunnel in Chillyari border belt in Samba district, which was found 23 metres inside Indian territory. On August 2014, a tunnel, which was approximately 130 to 150 metres in length along the WB and had originated on the Pakistan side, was discovered in Jammu’s Pallanwala sector. On March 4, 2016, a 10 feet-deep tunnel was found concealed by elephant grass (Sarkanda) in the Ranbir Singh Pura sector near Allah Mai De Kothey BoP. On February 13, 2017, a tunnel dug underneath the WB was discovered in the Ramgarh sector. On September 30, 2017, the BSF unearthed a 14-feet-long tunnel in the Arnia sector of Jammu. The unfinished tunnel approximately had a length of 14 metres, height of three feet and two-and-a-half-feet width on the slope of bank at Dhamalla nulla (stream) ahead of the border fence. Items recovered from the location included a US-made compass, two magazines, 60 rounds of ammunition, a hand-grenade, and other items and most of these items were carrying the marking of Pakistan. On July 13, 2018, a 30-metre-long tunnel was uncovered BSF in the Ranbir Singh Pura sector of Jammu district. The tunnel was approximately 10 feet below the ground and had a length of 30 metres. Five JeM operatives, including the perpetrators of the February 14, 2019 Pulwama terror-attack, had crossed over to India in April 2018 using this tunnel. On August 27, 2020, the BSF detected the latest trans-border tunnel in the Samba sector’s Basantar area. The approximately 20 feet-long and three-four feet wide tunnel was 25 feet underground. Pakistan-made sandbags with Shakargarh/Karachi written were also found at the mouth of the tunnel to hide it. The place of opening of the tunnel was around 170 metres from the WB towards the Indian side in the field of a local farmer. A BSF patrol had detected the tunnel 50 metres from the border fence on the Indian side. The nearest Pakistani BoP is about 400 metres from the tunnel.

Terror-attacks staged by ‘Fidayeens’ who had entered India through such tunnels included the attack by two terrorists on October 3, 2016 on two adjoining camps of the IA’s 46 Rashtriya Rifles and the BSF’s 40 Battalion at Baramulla, following which a A GPS navigation locator and a compass were recovered from the slain terrorists; an attack on April 27, 2017 by a two-member ‘Fidayeen’ squad against an IA garrison at Panjgaon of Chowkibal in Kupwara district; an attack on August 26, 2017 by a three-member ‘Fidayeen’ squad against the District Police Lines in Pulwama district; an attack on the Lethpora CRPF camp in South Kashmir’s Pampore village in Pulwama district on December 30, 2017, in which four JeM terrorists—two of them Pakistanis—were killed during the 36-hour-long gunfight along with locals Manzoor Ahmad Baba, and Fardeen Ahmad Khanday; the attack on a BSF camp outside Srinagar Airport on July 13, 2018 (a similar attempt by three JeM ‘Fidayeen’ terrorists was thwarted by the security forces on October 3, 2017; the August 2018 attack by three JeM Fidayeen members on the J & K Police Station in Pulwama.

These terror-squads were all transported to the hinterland of J & K UT by local facilitators using their own vehicles. However, quite a few of them were successfully intercepted as well. For instance, on September 13, 2018 three JeM ‘Fidayeens’ who had crossed the WB via Tarnah Nallah and were picked up in Samba were killed in an encounter in Reasi district a day after they fired on a Police party and escaped. After several hours of gunfire, the three men were neutralised. The forces attempted to capture the third terrorist alive, but he was killed too. Truck driver Riaz Ahmed of Pulwama district and his helper Mohmmad Iqbal of Budgam, who were arrested when the three terrorists were intercepted at the Domail-Jhajjar Kotli highway belt, later admitted that they had helped the JeM five times in the past when it came to smuggling Fidayeen squads inside trucks. A cordon-and-search operation (CASO) to track down the JeM terrorists was launched in the Jhajjar-Kotli forest belt in Reasi district after the firefight with the Police. It was late on the night of September 12 when an informant informed the local Military Intelligence (MI) unit that the terrorists were possibly inside a house in Tirthi village. The two to three houses that are part of Ward No.6 in Tirthi belong to people from a minority community. What raised suspicion was the crying and unusual noises coming from the houses. The local MI unit assessed the input and advised contacting a nearby security forces (SF) column, which issued the CASO. The SF team nearest the house was contacted and shown a path to the exact two-three houses. Once the security team crossed a narrow nallah and started moving towards the houses, terrorists from one of the houses started firing at the SF party. It was later discovered that the terrorists who were on the move forcefully took refuge in a house owned by Ishwar Dass, a former serviceman in Ward No.5 of Jhajjar Kotli. The terrorists came at around 8pm demanding clothes to change from their combat dress. They also demanded food and water and left around 9.10pm. They soon moved to another residence in Ward No.6. According to MI, a group of four to five terrorists had infiltrated past the Lam-based Battalion of the IA’s 80 Infantry Brigade in Naushera on the night of September 2. The group travelled in a vehicle till the outskirts of Naushera. On September 4, 2018 they were sighted by some school students at Langar, after which a search operation was launched by J & K Police and the IA. Once the terrorists were detected, they ran out of options and cancelled their plan to head towards Naushera city. In order to avoid being detected, they moved along Jambhir Nallah and reached Bareri. Five days before the encounter they were spotted and another search operation was swiftly launched following inputs of suspicious movement in Bareri. It is most likely that the group had considered travelling to Lamberi in a vehicle. On September 9, 2018 the group was reported to be in Lamberi and was waiting for the guide to take them up to Mohar. The exact location of the group was reported by human intelligence (HUMINT) and another search operation was launched. During the search, the group got split into two sub-groups. One of these sub-groups comprising two terrorists with a cellphone was able to escape the cordon, leaving behind a sub-group of three that had no cellphone, but radio sets. The cordon was lifted by the evening of September 10. Security forces put up stops at roads leading towards Kalakot and Naushera. An urgent assessment was conducted as it was suspected that by this time the group had started moving towards Nihari Tawi River. However, it is believed that the group of three had left the place by then. Based on an intercept received, it was assessed that the sub-group would have boarded a vehicle for Jammu. Another intercept suggests that they were instructed to move towards the IA’s 10 Infantry Division HQ. After reaching Jammu on January 12 morning, the group boarded a civil truck with the number plate JK-03F-1476 and paid Rs.20,000 to the driver to ferry the armed men ahead. The group was next sighted at a Dhaba. The truck was subsequently intercepted at a ‘Nakka’ near Jhajjar Kotli, which finally led to the terrorists’ being slain. But the J & K Police gave another assessment. According to it, the infiltration took place on the night of September 11 between Kathua and Samba. The terrorists reached the National Highway near Chal Dayala and were picked up by a truck. On September 12 at about 8am in the morning a J & K Police party signalled a truck with the number plate JK-03F-1476, which was on its way from Jammu to Srinagar, to stop. The three terrorists who were boarding the truck opened fire. The truck driver was the brother to one of the dead terrorists and was an OGW himself. The truck took them ahead as a new bus driver and conductor took over the vehicle near the Bann Toll Plaza. Then they stopped at Jhajjar-Kotli to have breakfast when a J & K Police cop came to check the truck as part of a routine practice. The terrorists panicked, opened fire and fled the spot. Security forces then used drones and helicopters during the operation to track the three JeM terrorists who were between the ages of 18 and 22 years.

On September 12, 2019 four AK-56 and two AK-47 rifles along with six magazines and 180 live rounds were seized after the J & K Police intercepted a truck at 8am on the Jammu-Pathankot Highway near the Punjab-J & K border in Lakhanpur and arrested three residents (who belong to Pulwama and Budgam districts) of J & K. The truck was on its way to Kashmir from Bamiyal.

On January 31, 2020 three JeM ‘Fidayeens’ had entered from the WB in Hiragnagar in Kathua district 56km east of Jammu and were on their way to the Kashmir Valley by hiding inside an L-shaped cavity of a truck (JK-03F-1478) laden with goods. They were caught at the Bann Toll Plaza at Nagrota and were carrying one Colt M-4 carbine, AK-47 assault rifles, armour-piercing steel core ammunition, IEDs, grenades, pistols, satellite phone, wireless communication system, and a GPS navigation locator. The J & K Police nabbed Sameer Ahmed Dar alive from the encounter site. He is the cousin of the February 2019 Pulwama suicide-bomber Adil Dar. He had managed to establish links with the JeM on WhatsApp by using a virtual private network (VPN) that allows users to circumvent internet censorship to secure connections to the sites an individual wishes to access. It was through WhatsApp that Sameer was directed by the JeM in Pakistan. Sameer is a Master in Geology from Kashmir University. On receipt of the message from JeM, Sameer took his two aides in a truck to Basantar Nallah in Samba sector on the intervening night of January 30-31. He waited at a pre-decided pick-up point and moved towards the Valley after receiving the three JeM terrorists. In December 2019 Sameer had transported a group of three JeM terrorists. An OGW, Shoaib Wani from Karimabad in Pulwama had received those terrorists. One of the three was killed in Pari Tral area of Awantipora along with Qari Yasir. His truck was used to do a legal business transaction like transporting fruits. In December, the truck went to Delhi carrying an apple consignment and on return carried back pomegranates. As soon as Sameer entered Punjab, he used his WhatsApp freely. This is when the GPS coordinates were shared.  In December, with no access to the internet, the plotting was done in Punjab. On return, the terror module would use Google Maps. On dropping the consignment of pomegranates, Sameer picked up large packets of wall-putty. This was used to camouflage the presence of the JeM terrorists inside the cavity of the truck. Towards January-end, the same modus operandi was used. The truck went to Jaipur in Rajasthan and on return, came near the WB.

Infiltrations By HexaCopters

The usage of HexaCopters began last year following the Khalistan Zindabad Force’s (KZF) Pakistan-based chief Ranjeet Singh alias Neeta and his Germany-based associate Gurmeet Singh alias Bagga conducting nearly a dozen supply sorties. On March 11, 2019 the BSF shot down a HexaCopter in the Fazilka sector. One drone was recovered on August 13, 2019 and it was a crashed HexaCopter carrying 21kg payload in Mohawa village of Amritsar district—a mere 1.5km from the IB. The drone model U10 KV100-U, and it had been designed and manufactured by China-based T Motors. The airframe of the drone was called TAROT 680 PRO. Four brick-sized batteries (model Tattu-Made in China) were also found installed in the Hexacopter. Another HexaCopter (out of three) was seized in the burnt condition in September from Jhabal town in Tarn Taran. They were used for ferrying in five AK-47s (along with 16 magazines and 472 rounds of ammunition), four China-made .30 bore ‘Star’ Pistols (along with eight magazines and 72 rounds of ammunition), nine hand-grenades, five Thuraya satellite phones along with their ancillary equipment, two cellphones, two wireless sets and FICN with face-value of Rs.10 lakh—all of which were air-dropped in Rajoke. Between September 9 and 16, 2019 HexaCopters were used for ferrying almost 100kg of arms and ammunition into Punjab. The foreign handlers, Gurmeet Bagga of Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF), and his terrorist associates based in Pakistan, including KZF chief Ranjeet Singh Neeta, who were handling the Indian Punjab-based Akashdeep terror module, had informed Akashdeep and his associates about the crashing of this drone inside Indian territory. They had also shared the coordinates of the crash landing site and further directed Akashdeep to go to the crash site and destroy the drone by burning lest the Punjab Police came to know about it.

On September 22, 2019, the Punjab State Police successfully wound-up the India-based module of this operation, which was active in the Husseiniwallah, Tarn Taran, Ajnala, Fazilka and Khem Karan areas of Punjab. The HexaCopters with 10kg payloads had been flown for almost 7km from their launch-pads at a height of 2,000 feet to deliver their payloads. On both October 7 and 8, 2019 a HexaCopter originating from Pakistan was detected flying over two villages in the Hussainiwala area of Punjab. On October 10, 2019, HexaCopters were cited in two locations in Punjab. The first sighting was reported in Hazarasingh Wala village at 7:20am and later in Tendiwala village at 10:10pm. On January 27, 2020, a HexaCopter flown from Pakistan was shot down by the BSF in Arnia sector, while on June 20, 2020, BSF troops shot down a HexaCopter carrying one M-4 carbine, two loaded magazines (60 rounds), and seven China-irigin hand-grenades near the WB in Jammu’s Kathua district. The HexaCopter was spotted hovering in the vicinity of BoP Pansar around 5.10am by a BSF patrol party, which then shot it down 250 metres inside Indian territory.

One of the major India-based narco-terrorism modules, headed by former IA Naik Rahul Chauhan, was involved in carting 75kg of pure heroin and at least seven pistols between November and December 2019. The module, operating from the Jat Regiment Centre in Uttar Pradesh’s Bareilly, was busted on January 9, 2020. According to Chauhan’s interrogation report, a Pakistani national named Waqar got in touch with him when he was running surveillance drones for the IA in the Naushera sector in July-August 2019. Chauhan was later contacted by another source, identified as Choudhary, over a WhatsApp call from a Germany-based number, and a meeting was set up with Choudhary’s associate in Ambala. During interrogation, Chauhan admitted to operating drones from the border villages of Dhanoa Khurd and Mulaekot to pick up heroin and pistols from Pakistan. He used three drones purchased from Chandini Chowk (Delhi), Ghaziabad and Pune, and made cross-border sorties at the height of 1,200 feet on November 27 and 30, and then on December 8, 9 and 17, 2019. These sorties were made from border villages between 3am and 4am to avoid detection, and the distance covered from the launch area to the pick-up point in Pakistan was between 2.2km and 2.8km, with flying times generally between 14 and 18 minutes. Data gathered from the captured drones showed that the last flight on December 19 was 26 minutes, 54 seconds long. Further investigation revealed that the money used to buy the drones was provided by convicted drug smuggler Lakhwinder Singh (in Amristar Jail since September 2019), and his associates Ajaypal and Dharminder.

Multinational String-Of-Pearls Emerging In Southern IOR & Andaman Sea Through Algorithmic Alliance

Since mid-May, following a series of behind-the-scenes parleys and deliberations, a variety of steps have been taken toward the adoption of a multinational sea-control strategy that aims at nullifying China’s irrational assertiveness within both the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). For instance, in their first virtual Summit-level meeting held in the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, Australia and India on June 4, 2020 elevated their bilateral ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP) and signed seven key accords, including a mutual logistics support agreement that is expected to enable the two countries to access each other’s military bases, including Australia’s Christmas Island, located south of Indonesia’s Island of Java.

This was followed a month later by a three-day official visit to India (from July 26 to 28) of Indonesia’s Defence Minister Gen (Ret’d) Prabowo Subianto during which he and his Indian counterpart Rajnath Singh discussed various ways and means of strengthening the military-to-military and military-industrial ties between the two maritime neighbours.

In particular, India expressed her intention to financially and materially assist Indonesia in transforming the existing naval and air bases at Sabang Island (located northeast of Banda Aceh in Sumatra) into fully operational installations and in return secure access for Indian Navy seaborne and airborne assets to such installations. Indonesia also evinced interest in procuring India-developed integrated platform management systems, combat management systems and hull-mounted sonar suites for a family of shallow-water multi-purpose vessels developed by its state-owned, Surabaya-based shipbuilder PT PAL.

But, as the saying goes, the best is yet to come. And this event will take place between mid-September and end just before Indian Air Force Day (October 8) and will comprise a series of joint services exercises taking place in the Andaman Sea, with a strong emphasis being laid on sea-control being exercised through anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and maritime-strike operations (with both IAF Jaguar IMs armed with AGM-84A Harpoon ASCMs and Su-30MKIs armed with BrahMos-A ASCMs), and the enforcement of maritime exclusion zones (MEZ).

Moreover, apart from the Indian Navy (IN) and Indian Air Force (IAF), the US Navy and Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) too are likely to be invited to take part in these exercises, with the US Navy contributing about four warships from its Yokosuka-based 7th Fleet, and the JMSDF despatching a Kawasaki P-1 LRMR-ASW platform.

Details of this multinational naval exercise will be firmed up during the three-day naval commanders’ biannual conference in New Delhi (from August 19 till 21), which will also be the first naval commanders’ conference since the institution of Department of Military Affairs (DMA) and creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).

And as a curtain-raiser event, three B-2 Spirit stealthy bombers recently deployed from the USAF’s 509th Bomb Wing at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, to Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia in the southern Indian Ocean to support the US Pacific Air Forces’ Bomber Task Force missions. They arrived on August 12 at Diego Garcia on Wednesday after a 29-hour sortie. 

The last time a B-2 task force had deployed to the INDOPACOM region was in January 2019, when three B-2s and about 200 airmen deployed to Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam in Hawaii. Those B-2s were from Whiteman’s 393rd Bomb Squadron, and flew 27 sorties for a total of 171 hours. Their local and long-duration missions included practicing hot-pit refuelling and sorties with the USAF Hawaii Air National Guard’s F-22 Raptors.

The B-2s are always deployed overseas along with their B2SS Extra Large Deployable Aircraft Hangar System, which is a transportable semi-rigid dome structure designed to be rapidly deployed, assembled and made ready to support maintenance on B-2s at forward operating locations. Measuring 250-feet wide by 60-feet high, the structure provides a 1.1 million cubic foot environment that is air conditioned, fully environmentally isolated against chemical and biological attack, and also features a single 10-ton clamshell retractable door.

The last time the B-2s had been deployed to Diego Garcia was on October 6, 2001, when two B-2s took off from Whiteman to fly 36 hours across the Pacific Ocean and up the Indian Ocean into Afghanistan. They struck targets throughout Afghanistan, in conjunction with the Rockwell B-1B Lancer and Boeing B-52 Stratofortress bombers flying out of Diego Garcia, and then returned to the same island, making the entire trip over 40 hours. At Diego Garcia, the B-2 crews exited their aircraft, with engines running, and a fresh crew climbed on board to pilot the aircraft on their 30-hour return-flight to Missouri. By the end of the first three nights, six B-2s flew more than 420 hours, accomplished over 36 aerial refuellings, and returned to Whiteman with no incidents.

The ongoing B-2 deployment in Diego Garcia is aimed at sending a clear message to China about the vulnerabilities of its sea lanes of communications (SLOC) in the Andaman Sea, which falls within the ambit of both the IOR and the INDOPACOM region. In particular, it dashes all hopes about China overcoming its ‘Malacca Dilemma’ by establishing an overland oil/gas supply pipeline via Myanmar for its hinterland-located petrochemical processing infrastructure in the Sichuan and Yunnan provinces, which in turn are designed to provide the great bulk of the POL requirements of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Western, Southern and Eastern Theatre Commands in case a naval blocade is imposed against all the coastal cities of southern and eastern China.

The PLAAF, on its part, has since 2017 built new high-altitude radar stations housing the Type 609 UHF-band airspace surveillance radars at a location north-east of Walong, another near Ruili, and yet another in southern Yunnan close to the China-Laos international border.

It may be recalled that the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) built and operates the Myanmar–China oil pipeline, which bypasses the sea route via the Malacca Strait. This pipeline and a companion natural-gas pipeline transport hydrocarbons from the Bay of Bengal across Myanmar to southwestern China. The gas and oil pipelines run in parallel and start near Kyaukphyu, run through Mandalay, Lashio, and Muse in Myanmar before entering China at the border city of Ruili in Yunnan province. The gas pipeline, the maximum capacity of which is 12 billion cubic metres/year, carries natural gas from Myanmar’s offshore A-1 and A-3 blocks.

This pipeline runs further from Kunming to Guizhou and Guangxi in China and is 2,806km-long in total. The oil pipeline, the maximum capacity of which is 0.24 million bbl/year, transports crude oil carried by tankers from the Middle East. Therefore, a large oil-import port and storage tanks have also been built as an input point of this oil pipeline. The port can receive vessels up to 300,000 deadweight tonnage (DWT) and has storage capacity of 1.2 million cubic metres. This pipeline, which eventually terminates in Kunming, capital of Yunnan Province, has a total length of 771km. The total estimated project costs are US$1.04 billion for the gas pipeline and $1.5 billion for the oil pipeline. Construction of the Myanmar–China oil pipeline and gas pipeline started in June 2010. In June 2013, CNPC announced that the Myanmar section of the gas pipeline was complete and ready for testing while the oil pipeline was 94% complete. In January 2015, Myanmar officially opened a deep-sea port off its western coast and started trial operations.  To be exact, the port and storage tanks are located on the Madae Island. There are 12 storage tanks at the port and the capacity of each tank is 100,000 cubic metres. Myanmar receives $13 million per year and a toll fee of the pipeline (US$1/tonne) from CNPC.

In March 2003, PetroChina and the Sichuan Provincial government agreed to jointly develop a petrochemical complex near Chengdu centred on a cracker producing 800,000tpa (tons per annum) of ethylene. By 2004, PetroChina had completed a feasibility study and an environmental impact assessment report. The project received final approval in 2005. Ground-breaking on the complex took place in the first quarter of 2006 and the construction was completed in December 2012. The petrochemical complex was commissioned in January 2014. The facilities are situated on the outskirts of Chengdu City, Sichuan Province, China. Along with the 800,000tpa of ethylene, the complex produces 450,000tpa of polypropylene (PP), 600,000tpa of paraxylene (PX), 380,000tpa of monoethylene glycol (MEG) and 50,000tpa of ethylene oxide (EO) PetroChina Sichuan Petrochemical Company (PSP) is owned by PetroChina, which has a 51% stake and Chengdu Petrochemicals, which owns the remaining 49%.

The projected upgradation of the IN’s and IAF’s existing air bases at Great Nicobar and Car Nicobar islands, coupled with a parallel upgradation being undertaken at Sabang and Christmas Island, will enable the IN’s P-8I LRMR/ASW platforms and the Royal Australian Air Force’s P-8A Poseidon LRMR/ASW platforms to function in a networked manner for wide-area surveillance stretching from the Ombai-Wetar Strait off Timor Leste all the way westwards via the Lombok and Sunda Straits, all of which are used by the PLA Navy when deploying from the South China Sea into the IOR.

In March 2019, the Indian and US navies had inked a loan agreement and installed two Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) kits at the IN HQ and discussions are still ongoing for more such systems to be installed at a variety of locations and platforms. These kits enable encrypted communications between networked navies, enabling a quantum increase in maritime domain awareness (MDA).

In another development, Israel’s Elbit Systems on August 17 was awarded a contract valued at approximately $27 million by the IN to supply an EHUD rangeless air-to-air combat training system, to be operated from the IN’s shore-based naval air stations along India’s eastern and western seaboards as well as on board aircraft carriers. Product deliveries will be performed over a two-year period, to be followed by three years of availability-based maintenance.

The EHUD ACMI system offers advanced air-to-air combat training capabilities, including features such as real-time hit notification and removal, real-time electronic warfare and air-to-air weapons delivery, simulation and advanced debriefing. The system supports an unlimited number of live networked participants, through Elbit Systems’ data-link protocol that also allows interoperability with existing EHUD ACMI systems operated by the IAF (the first two were procured in the late 1990s while an $18 million contract was inked in December 2010 for two additional systems).

Growing Backlog Of Pending Procurements

However, the IN continues to be devoid of its three cadet training vessels and five naval offshore patrol vessels (NOPV), which were contracted for eight years ago from the Surat-based ABG Shipyard and Pipavav-based Reliance Naval and Engineering Ltd, respectively. Both shipbuilders have filed for bankruptsy.

The IN has a projected requirement for 24 GRP-hulled minehunters (MCMV), but the first procurement exercise that began in 2005, was terminated in 2009. The IN had then sought eight MCMVs through indigenous construction, which was later revised to “acquisition of two from the foreign industrial collaborator and six from an Indian Shipyard”. In 2015, an Expression of Interest (EoI) was sent to Germany’s ThyssenKrupp, Russian Shipyards, South Korea’s Kangnam Corp, Italy’s Intermarine and Spain’s Navantia, while the MoD-owned Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL) was subsequently nominated to construct 12 MCMVs under a Transfer of Technology (ToT) agreement with Kangnam Corp, but due to non-compliance with the ToT requirements (Kangnam itself did not develop any MCMV, but had instead licence-built Intermarine’s Lerichi-class MCMVs and was therefore not authorised to export its MCMV production know-how to anyone else) and over-pricing issues, this procurement exercise too was cancelled in January 2018.

In late 2019, Moscow sent India an unsolicited technical proposal under which the Project 12701 Alexandrite-E (Eksportniy) GRP-hulled MCMVs were offered for licenced-production by GSL. These vessels each have a displacement of 890 tonnes, are 61.6 metres long, 10.3 metres wide and have a draught of 3.1 metres.

Each of the MCMVs are powered by two diesel-engines with a power output of 2,500hp each (the IN prefers to use MTU-supplied engines), producing a speed of 16 Knots, cruise range of 1,500 nautical miles, and an endurance of 10 days. The vessel is manned by a 44-strong crew.

Pending the arrival of the GRP-hulled MCMVs, the IN in February 2019 inked a Rs.306 crore ($42 million) deal with THALES Australia for eight mine countermeasures clip-on influence sweeps. The IN is now equipping its fast interceptor craft (scheduled to be delivered between 2021 and 2022) with these suites, which have infrasonic advanced acoustic generators.

Last May the IN began inducting the four additional P-8I LRMR/AQSW platforms worth $1.1 billion, orders for which were placed in 2016. Final deliveries will be completed by January 2022. This procurement is under an option clause as part of the earlier procurement of eight P-8Is worth $2.1 billion between 2013 and 2015. Against its stated requirement for 24 P-8Is, the IN now plans to procure only six more P-8Is, whose acquisition was approved November 2019, bit now awaits contract signature. The 18 P-8Is will be serving with the 312A Naval Air Squadron, based at Arakkonam in Tamil Nadu.

In June, 2016, the MoD had sent a Letter of Request (LoR) to the US for seeking to purchase 22 MQ-9 Predator B Sea Guardian UAS platforms and related ground-control stations from General Atomics. A request for Information (RFI) was subsequently issued to the US Office of Defense Cooperation on November 14, 2017. Following the signing of the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in September 2018, it was expected that the IN would buy only 12 MQ-9B Sea Guardians (equipped with belly-mounted Raytheon APS-148 SeaVue X-band multi-mode radars) and not 22 of them for $2 billion as planned earlier. However, this plan too has been put on hold and instead the IN is now seeking 10 shipborne BTOL-UAS platforms, for which there are only two realistic contenders.

Northrop Grumman’s MQ-8B Fire Scout’s endurance with full fuel and a baseline 55kg payload is more than 8 hours, and flight time with a 250kg payload is more than 5 hours, and to get more out of the engine the upgraded transmission is rated for 320shp continuous power from the Rolls-Royce 250-C20W turboshaft, with a 5-minute emergency rating of 340shp. The Fire Scout’s primary structure has been strengthened for a design weight of up to 1,545kg, although the maximum take-off gross weight will be 1,430kg. The AWHERO combines Italian OEM Leonardo’s experience in the development of rotary wing platforms and Sistemi Dinamici’s experience. Two modular payload bays carry sensors, including radar (such as the Gabbiano TS Ultra-Light), electro-optical (EO)/infra-red (IR) and light imaging detection and ranging (LiDAR), and communications systems. The payloads can be nose, underbelly or side-mounted. The nose bay can accommodate a 10-inch EO/IR turret or an 8-inch EO/IR turret with radar, while the underbelly and side bays can be used for heavier payloads.

The MoD in August 2017 had issued a global RFI for 123 naval multi-role helicopters and 111 naval multi-utility helicopters, collectively valued at 410 billion. The RFI for procuring the NMRHs and NMUHs were sent to Lockheed Martin (which has acquired Sikorsky) and Bell Helicopter of US, Airbus Helicopters of France, and Russian Helicopters of Russia. Both helicopter-types are required to be licence-built in India under the new Strategic Industrial Partnership policy, announced in May 2019, under which a strategic partner selected only from among domestic private-sector companies is required to tie-up with an overseas OEM. Both the OEM and strategic partner will be selected by the MoD. Since the current exercise is to select the overseas OEMs, the selection of domestic strategic partner will take place later. Domestic companies that are competing to be that strategic partner for both helicopter programmes include Kalyani Group/Bharat Forge Ltd, Reliance Defence & Engineering Ltd, Larsen & Toubro, Mahindra Aerospace, and Tata Advanced Systems Ltd. The 123 shipborne NMRHs worth $7 billion will be in the 9- to 12.5-tonne category, while the 111 NMUHs worth more than $3 billion, will be in the 4.5-tonne category. The preferred solution for the NMUH requirement is the AS-565 MBe from Airbus Helicopters.

It may be recalled that in 2011, the MoD had issued a global Request for Proposal (RFP) for the purchase of an initial 16 NMRHs (part of the then stated requirement for 44 such platforms) in which Sikorsky with its S-70B Seahawk had emerged as the winner against the NHIndustries’ NH-90. However, this procurement exercise was subsequently cancelled and it was only on May 14, 2020 that a contract inked for 24 MH-60R Seahawks after final selection in February 2020. The MH-60R’s weapons package includes Kongsberg’s Naval Strike Missile in its helicopter launched variant (NSM-HL), while the sensor package includes Telephonics’ APS-153(V) multi-mode radar and THALES/Raytheon FLASH/AQS-22 LFDS low-frequency dunking sonar.