Those Were The Days!

Back in 1981, the Indian Air Force (IAF) had attained two critical milestones: service-induction in April of its first BVR combat-capable air superiority combat aircraft—the MiG-23MF—and the raising of two such squadrons, the No.223 ‘Tridents’ and the No.224 ‘Warlords’ (raised on July 4, 1983); and the service-induction of eight MiG-25R ‘Garuda’ recce platforms on August 8 that year. The MiG-23MFs were then armed with Vympel R-23R and R-23T beyond visual range air-to-air missiles (BVRAAM) and were housed at Adampur AFS near Jalandhar, Punjab. The MiG-25Rs were based at Bareilly AFS in Uttar Pradesh and were inducted into service on August 17, 1981. The first operational MiG-25R sortie was flown on August 25, 1981, with Wg Cdr A J Singh, the then CO of 102 ‘Trisonics’ Sqn and the then CAS of the IAF, ACM Idris Hasan Latif being the pilots.

One of the principal missions of the MiG-23MFs between 1981 and 1997 was to escort the IAF’s English Electric Canberra PR.57 recce aircraft belonging to No.106 ‘Lynx’ Sqn during both summertime and in autumn for photo-reconnaissance sorties over Skardu Airport. Such missions were already clouded in secrecy, with the MiG-23MF pilots being informed only a day earlier in the afternoon that the following morning they were to escort a Canberra PR.57 on a mission ‘up north’, with the actual details being released only four hours before takeoff. One such mission took place in April 1988, with Wing Commander ‘Cheech’ Brar and his wingman took off from Adampur and carried out an aerial rendezvous with the Canberra PR.57 well before arriving at the LoC, which had also taken off from Adampur. Cruising at 26,000 feet, the three aircraft headed north of the Burzil Range that separates the Kashmir Valley from Gilgit-Baltistan. Using the Nun Kun peak as the navigational reference point, the three aircraft then reduced altitude to 500 feet above the terrain soon after crossing the range for terrain-masking purposes. Since Skardu lay 150km away from the nearest point of the LoC any aircraft cruising at a speed of 700kph could reach Skardu within 13 minutes. The Canberra PR.57’s tasking was to make a sole high-speed overflight of Skardu Airport and then head back southwards, while the MiG-23MFs were tasked to provide visual air cover and prevent interceptions by any Pakistan Air Force (PAF) F-16As that were then known to be making periodic seasonal deployments to Skardu.

But unknown to ‘Cheech’ Brar, an identical mission had been launched from Adampur with another flight comprising two MiG-23MFs and one Canberra PR.57 on that day, but from a different ‘run-in’ direction. After flying along the Nubra Valley in the Siachen Glacier area at an altitude of 26,000 feet, this second photo-recce flight crossed Kumar FLB and headed on a westerly course, crossed the Bilafond La area and dropped altitude to 500 feet over the terrain and headed for Skardu. ‘Cheech’ Brar’s wingman was the first to spot this second flight coming in from the east and was tempted to raise the alarm about incoming ‘bogeys’. But after deciding to wait for another few seconds, he recognised the incoming platforms as MiG-23MFs as well and decided not to break radio silence. Both photo-recce missions were thus successfully conducted.

During another such mission, the MiG-23MFs and Canberra PR.57s noticed two F-16s parked on the tarmac in Skardu. There were also two interdiction missions that used to be carried out every year in this period that involved both MiG-23MFs and MiG-23BNs. However, the PAF never bothered to attempt any interceptions with its F-16s for two reasons: there were no airspace surveillance radars on permanent deployment at Skardu, thereby no early warning about airspace intrusions/violations was available; and the PAF until 2005 did not possess any BVR air combat capability and hence were always vary of engaging any IAF combat aircraft flying over PoK. Hence, all such IAF missions flown over PoK were described as ‘milk runs’. The IAF’s MiG-25Rs (each equipped with twin AM-70 LOROP cameras), on the other hand, conducted at least two high-altitude photo-recce sorties well inside Gilgit every year between 1981 and 1997, but they never required any escorting air superiority combat aircraft and instead always flew solo.

Indian Army’s EX TRIDENT & 

OP HAMMERHEAD Explained

The operational planners at the Indian Army’s HQ Northern Command, when planning for OP MEGHDOOT, had originally advocated advancing down further west of the Saltoro Ridge, pushing through the Bilafond La Glacier, to reach and capture the town of Gyari, which was the gateway to the approaches to Skardu. However, such plans were shot down due to fears of logistical overreach and conflict escalation. However, EX TRIDENT, conducted in August 1986, involved a rehearsal by the Indian Army’s 19 Infantry Division to advance into PoK via the Burzil Pass, while the main offensive advance through Kargil was to be carried out by the fully acclimatised 3 ‘Trishul’ Mountain Division and 28 Infantry Division. To replace 3 Mountain Division in the defensive role in Ladakh, 6 Mountain Division was flown into Ladakh from Barielly, with the IAF logging in 70 IL-76MD air transportation sorties for this airlift. During the summertime of 1987, the Indian Army’s then COAS, Gen K. Sundarji, had decided to militarily resolve the Siachen Glacier imbroglio and to this end, he asked the then CO of the Army’s 50 Independent Parachute Brigade, Brig Sapatnekar, to plan an audacious air-assault operation against Khapalu, about 60km north of the LoC. Codenamed OP HAMMERHEAD, its principal aim was to sever the Pakistan Army’s lines of communications stretching out eastwards towards Goma and Gyari. Next, the paratroopers were to link up with Indian Army formations advancing from Chalunkha and ultimately capturing the major Pakistani logistics/administrative hubs like Dansum and Gyari. However, such a bold plan eventually proved to be impractical, unsustainable and risky on three counts: the Parachute Brigade’s parachutes were not built for paradrops at high altitudes and consequently their rates of descent would have been much higher, thereby endangering the lives of the paratroopers; the envisaged timeframe for the link-up between the paratroopers and the advancing friendly ground forces was not achievable in the absence of supporting air-droppable indirect fire-assault assets, which would be required if the adversary offered concentrated ripostes; and lastly the IAF found it impossible to undertake a simultaneous two-Battalion air-drop by IL-76MDs and air-maintenance with An-32Bs and Mi-17 helicopters at a time when its air transportation assets were fully committed to supporting the IPKF’s OP PAWAN in Sri Lanka and OP FALCON in northwestern Arunachal Pradesh.

Customised MiG-29UPGs For IAF

The 21 MiG-29UPG M-MRCAs that are expected to be ordered for the IAF next month will be of a hybrid design that will feature the same strengthened landing gears as those used by the Indian Navy’s aircraft carrier-based MiG-29Ks. Such a design modification, easily achievable by the Russian OEM, has been specified by the IAF due to its eagerness for deploying the customised MiG-29UPGs to Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO), where the existing 3km-long sandy airstrip at an altitude of 12,037 feet is now being converted into an asphalted, reinforced runway. This will, by late 2021, transform the existing ALG at DBO into a full-fledged forward operating air base that will be capable of fully instrumented landings and takeoffs. Since landings by MRCAs at such high-altitude forward air bases involves a much higher rate of descent, the probability of hard landings cannot be ruled out and consequently strengthened landing gears are imperative. The Rafale M-MRCAs too feature such strengthened landing gears and thus they too will be able to operate out of DBO forward air base.