On the night of March 26-27, 1998 the Pakistan-based
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) had massacred 29 Hindu villagers at Prankote and Dhakikot by slitting the throats of their
victims, which included women and infants. In
late April 1998 the massacre of 21
villagers in Binda Mohri Sehri, 600 metres across the Line of Control (LoC)
inside PoK, and the bombing in June of a
Lahore-bound train, shortly after an explosion in Jammu, are both believed by
Pakistan to have been carried out by Indian security agencies. Pakistan
admitted on May 4, 1998 that an Indian Army (IA) special operations
forces unit had killed 22 civilians at the village of Binda Mohri Sehri in Bandala, in the Chhamb sector. Two villagers
were decapitated and the eyes of several others were allegedly gouged out by
the raiders, who comprised a dozen men, all
dressed in black. They struck in the middle of the night and dropped leaflets
to mark the attack. “Vengeance Brigade,” one leaflet said. “Evil deeds bear
evil fruit,” said another. “Ten eyes for one eye, one jaw for a single tooth,”
said a third. The Pakistan
Army (PA) claimed to have recovered an India-made HMT wrist-watch from the scene of the
carnage, along with a hand-written note which asked: “How does your own blood feel?”
In late 1999 the IA’s Capt. Gurjinder Singh Suri, posted on the LoC with 12
Bihar Regiment as the Platoon Commander of a ‘Ghaatak’ team, which was
deployed on the Faulad Post. On November
9, 1999, the PA launched an attack on the Post, preceded by a heavy artillery
bombardment. The PA’s attack was repulsed and Capt. Gurjinder deployed his men
to deal with any reinforcements or interference by the enemy. He then launched
the operation to clear the enemy bunkers one by one along with his comrades and
in this process, one of his soldiers got injured badly. Leading from the front,
Capt. Gurjinder dashed forward and killed two enemy soldiers with his AK-47 SLR
and silenced the machine gun of the enemy. However, during the process, Capt.
Gurjinder received a burst of gunfire in his arm. Unmindful of his injury, he
continued to lead his men and lobbed two hand-grenades into a bunker. He then
entered the bunker while spraying bullets and killed one more PA soldier. At this
point, he was hit by an RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade and was critically
wounded. Despite his injuries, he declined to be evacuated and continued to
exhort his men till he breathed his last. He
was posthumously awarded the Maha Vir Chakra, India’s second-highest military
gallantry award. His memorial is available here:
https://www.honourpoint.in/profile/captain-gurjinder-singh-suri-mvc/
On the night of January 21-22, 2000, in a raid authorised by
then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and conducted by India’s 9 SF (Para),
seven PA soldiers were captured in a raid on a
post in the Nadala enclave, across the Kishanganga (Neelam) River. The seven
soldiers, wounded in fire, were tied up and dragged across a ravine running
across the LoC. The bodies were returned, according to Pakistan’s complaint to
UNMOGIP, bearing signs of brutal torture. This
raid was intended to avenge the killing of Capt. Saurabh Kalia, and five
soldiers–sepoys Bhanwar Lal Bagaria, Arjun Ram, Bhika Ram, Moola Ram and Naresh
Singh–of the 4 Jat Regiment.
On the night of February 24/25, 2000, the IA, as part of a retaliatory cross-LoC
raid (to avenge the death of an IA officer who was killed while patrolling
along the LoC and whose body was taken across the LoC to Kotli), killed 14
residents in the village of Lanjot in PoK’s Nakyal sector after its SF (Para)
forces had crossed the LoC. They returned to the Indian side and threw the
severed heads of three of them at the PA soldiers manning their side of the
LoC. This cross-LoC raid began at around
midnight when the IA commenced an artillery bombardment with mortar shells in
order to forcibly confine the local residents to their homes. Next came the
attack on the targetted house, where the annual Khatam (complete recitation of the Quran in one sitting) was then
taking place. Eight of the 14 killed were of the immediate family (most of who
were serving with the PA at that time), while the others were cousins, uncles
and aunts. The heads of three men were cut off while another’s arm was chopped
off and the latter was taken back across the LoC as a souvenir. There were two
girls who were hiding underneath a blanket, and thus they went unnoticed. Two
other children died on the way to the hospital in Kotli, City, while 12 others
died on-the-spot in the house.
In retaliation, in the
early hours of February 27, 2000, Muhammad Ilyas
Kashmiri of the JeM (formed after breaking up with the Harkat-ul
Jihad-i-Islami, or HuJI) along with 25 HuJI
combatants attacked the IA’s Ashok
listening post in the Nakyal sector at Nowshera, Rajouri district, and
ambushed and killed seven IA soldiers, and beheaded 24 year-old Sepoy Bhausaheb
Maruti Talekar of the 17 Maratha Light Infantry
and left behind his decapitated body. Talekar’s severed head
was then paraded in the bazaars of Kotli in PoK. Soon thereafter, Ilyas was felicitated
by the then COAS of the PA, Gen Gen Pervez Musharraf, and rewarded with
Pakistani Rs.1 lakh for bringing back “the head of an Indian soldier” (Ilyas
was reportedly killed on June 3, 2011 by a CIA-mounted drone strike against a
compound in the Ghwakhwa area of South Waziristan).
On March 2, 2000 when LeT militants massacred 35 Sikhs in
Chattisinghpora, a raiding team from 9 SF (Para)
was sanctioned by PM Vajpayee to carry out a raid inside Pakistan. Led by a
Major, the team went into Pakistan and came back after killing over 28
Pakistani soldiers and militants.
On
September 18, 2003 Indian troops,
Pakistan alleged, killed a JCO, or junior commissioned officer, and three
soldiers in a raid on a post in the Baroh sector, near Bhimber Gali in Poonch.
The raiders, it told UNMOGIP, decapitated one soldier and carried his head off
as a trophy.
On June 5, 2008, the PA’s
troops attacked the Kranti border observation post near Salhotri village in
Poonch, killing 2/8 Gurkha Regiment soldier Jawashwar Chhame. The retaliation,
when it came on June 19, 2008, was
savage: Pakistani officials have since alleged that IA troops beheaded a PA soldier
and carried his head across in the Bhattal sector in Poonch district. Four Pakistani soldiers, UNMOGIP was told, had also died
in the cross-LoC raid.
On the afternoon of July 30, 2011, the PA’s
Border Action Team (BAT) struck a remote post near Karnah in Gugaldhar Ridge in
Kupwara. The IA subsequently hushed up the beheading of Havildar Jaipal Singh
Adhikari and Lance Naik Devender Singh of 19 Rajput Regiment. The BAT stormed
the post while a handing-taking over process was on between 19 Rajput and 20
Kumaon in 28 Division’s area of responsibility, and conducted the beheadings
and took the heads along with them to the other side. The BAT had used rafts to
penetrate India’s defences along the LoC. The bodies of the two dead soldiers
were sent to their families in Uttarakhand in sealed caskets as they were badly
mutilated, and cremated as such. A few days after the beheading, the IA
discovered a video-clip from a Pakistani terrorist who was killed in an
encounter while crossing into J & K, showing Pakistanis standing around the
severed heads of Adhikari and Singh displayed on a raised platform. After
repeated recce over a two-month period, the IA launched the retaliatory OP Ginger on August 30. Five Indian and
three Pakistani soldiers were killed in an unrelated shooting between August 30 and September 1,
2011 across the LoC at the Keran sector in Kupwara district/Neelum
Valley. On the night of August 31,
an Indian border post was fired at by Pakistani troops.
On August
30, 2011 three PA soldiers, including a JCO, were beheaded in an IA cross-LoC
raid on a post in the Sharda sector, across the
Neelam Valley in Kel. Maj Gen S K Chakravorty, the then GOC of 28
Division, had planned and executed this operation. To carry it out, at least
seven reconnaissance—ground-level and aerial surveillance conducted by Searcher
Mk.2 MALE-UAVs—missions were carried out to identify potential targets.
Consequently, three PA posts were determined to be vulnerable: Police Chowki, a
PA post near Jor, and the Hifazat and Lashdat lodging points. The mission was
to spring an ambush on Police Chowki to inflict maximum casualty. Different teams for ambush,
demolition, surgical strikes and surveillance were constituted. The operation
was deliberately planned for being conducted just a day before Eid-ul-Fitr as
it was the time when the PA least expected a retaliation. About 25 soldiers
from the SF (Para) reached their launch-pad at 3pm on August 29 and hid there
until 10pm. They then crossed the LoC to reach close to Police Chowki. By 4am
on August 30, the planned day of the attack, the ambush team was deep within
enemy territory waiting to strike. Over the next hour, claymore mines were
placed around the area and the raiding party took positions for the ambush,
waiting for clearance through a secure communications channel. At 7am on August
30, the raiders saw four PA soldiers, led by a JCO, walking towards the ambush
site. They waited till the Pakistanis reached the site, then detonated the
mines. In the explosions all four were grieviously injured. The IA raiders then
lobbed grenades and fired at them. One of the PA soldiers fell into a stream
that ran below. The raiders then rushed to chop off the heads of the other
three dead PA soldiers. They also took away their rank insignia, weapons and
other personal items. The raiders then planted pressure-IEDs beneath one of the
bodies, primed to explode when anyone attempted to lift the body. Hearing the
explosions, two PA soldiers rushed from their post but were killed by a second
raiding team waiting near the ambush site. Two other PA soldiers tried to trap
the second team but a third raiding team covering them from behind eliminated
the two. While the IA raiders were exfiltrating, another group of PA soldiers
were spotted moving from Police Chowki towards the ambush site. Soon they heard
loud explosions, indicating the triggering of the pressure-IEDs planted under
the body. At least two to three more PA soldiers were killed in that blast. The
operation had lasted 45 minutes, and the IA team left the area by 7.45am to
head back across the LoC. The first team reached an IA post at 12pm and the
last party by 2.30pm. They had been inside enemy territory for about 48 hours,
including for reconnaissance. At least eight PA troops had been killed and
another two or three more may have been fatally injured in the action. Three
Pakistani heads—of Subedar Parvez, Havildar Aftab and Naik Imran—three AK-47s
and other weapons were among the trophies carried back by the SF (Para)
raiders. But this was not without the heart-pounding moments. 28 Division HQ
got a message on its secure line that one of the IA raiders had accidentally
stepped over a landmine and blew his finger while exfiltrating. He came back
safely with his buddies. The severed Pakistani heads were photographed, and
buried on the instructions of senior officers. Two days later, the then GOC of
XV Corps turned up and asked the team about the heads. When he came to know
that they had been buried, he was furious and asked the SF (Para) to dig up the
heads, burn them and throw the ashes into the Kishenganga, so that no DNA
traces are left behind. Those instructions were complied with.
On January
8, 2013 a 15-member BAT of the PA, wearing black combat uniforms, crossed
the LoC from in Krishna Ghati sector (falling under 10 Infantry Brigade in
Mendhar, Poonch district). Earlier, this BAT had been stationed at Barmoch BOP
in PoK across Atma Post (manned by 13 Rajputana Rifles) a fortnight before and
was watching the daily movements of IA personnel. On that day, Lance-Naik Hem
Raj and Lance-Naik Sudhakar Naik of 13 Rajputana Rifles
were on a routine area domination patrol in Barasingha in Mendhar sector, 200km
north of Jammu. Daybreak was still several hours away, the night was dark, the
fog thick, and visibility almost zero. Patrolling there involved walking around
over a stretch that was beyond the fence that protected India-held territory.
Every border sector had been divided into grids, each under a commanding
officer. There were four to seven forward posts (beyond the fence) every
kilometre, with five to eight soldiers in each. The posts were alerted about
the patrols; while on patrol, the scouts did not talk, smoke, use flashlight or
carry cellphones. They did not even use aftershave, the smell of which could be
picked up by dogs accompanying the Jihadists. The patrol that included Hemraj and
Sudhakar was playing safe, by not venturing far beyond the fence. They mostly
remained nearly 500 metres short of the LoC. The party had seven troopers and
as per the decades-old practice, and had divided themselves into three pairs,
with the commander attaching himself to one. Each pair was to remain within
line-of-sight of another, but that was impossible in the thick fog and the
thick woods. The result: the pair that was to keep Hemraj and Sudhakar in its
line-of-sight did not see who were shooting at them in the fog; they only heard
reports of automatic firearms firing away. As the second pair leapt for cover,
before rushing to reinforce Hemraj and Sudhakar, they, too, came under fire.
This fire, they realised, was not coming from the woods, unlike the bullets
that had felled Hemraj and Sudhakar. This was cover-fire, coming from the
hilltops on the Pakistani side of the LoC. Very unlike jihadis, and very much
military-like. The Jihadi infiltrators would have fired at everyone in sight.
Here, the enemy was killing only two; the cover-fire was being provided only to
keep the rest of the patrolmen away. The intention was to kill two, and only
two, and then seize their bodies. IA posts returned fire and the exchange
lasted several hours, well past daybreak. As the fog cleared by 10.30am, a
couple of remaining IA patrolmen saw the enemy—clad in dark black, the uniform
of the PA’s Special Service Group (SSG), known as the Black Storks. The cover
fire, the patrolmen knew, was being provided by 29 Baloch Regiment, which had
been there for several months. As the firing finally ended at 11:32am, the
sight in front froze them. Hemraj and Sudhakar lay dead and frozen in pools of
blood, far away from each other. Sudhakar’s head was missing; Hemraj had deep
slashes on his neck, indicating a failed beheading bid. This
happened between Chhatri and Atma posts in Mankote area of Krishna Ghati. The beheading
was done by one Mohammad Anwar Faiz alias Azhar,
a resident of Jabbar Mohalla of village Sher Khan (Rawlakote) who also was the
local guide for the SSG. He ran a shop in Barmoch Gali in PoK, and he was also
involved in the beheading of an IA Captain in 1996 in the same Mendhar area. (A
divisional commander of the LeT and a Pakistani national, he was killed on July 13, 2015 at Rajouri. A group of four LeT fidayeens, all
Pakistanis, tried to infiltrate and wore combat dresses at 3.30am during heavy
rains by crossing Panjal Nullah close to the village of Sagra Balnoi in Mankot
sector of Poonch district. Alert IA personnel of 25 Division intercepted the
fidayeens and opened firing, leading to heavy exchange of firing that continued
for 90 minutes during which Faiz was eliminated, while three others escaped
back to PoK).
Till January 9, the BAT was camping
at Tattapani and was also involved in planting anti-personal mines in Helmet,
Chattri, Dayal Top, Atma and Rocket BOPs of the IA’s 10 Infantry Brigade. The consequent phone call was short and sombre. Lt Gen
Vinod Bhatia, the IA’s then DGMO, spared pleasantries and told his Pakistani
counterpart, Maj Gen Ashfaq Nadeem, that India did not want to escalate
tensions, but Pakistan had to respect the LoC. Before he hung up, Lt Gen Bhatia
reiterated that Pakistan must probe and take appropriate action against its
soldiers who had violated the LoC and mutilated the bodies of two Indian
soldiers. This was the third hotline call between the two DGMOs since a
localised confrontation had begun on January 6. While the IA had immediately
retaliated with increased mortar-based artillery firepower, New Delhi tried to
stop tensions from spiralling out of control. It advised the IA to stay calm.
However, it was aware of the anguish and anger within the IA over the
mutilations. The then Indian PM Dr Manmohan Singh chose the Army Day
celebration at the Indian Army COAS’ residence on January 15 to send a strong
message to Islamabad: “After this dastardly act, there can’t be business as
usual with Pakistan,” he said. “Those who are responsible for this must be
brought to book. I hope Pakistan realises this.” What this meant was that
payback time was guaranteed at a time and place of the IA’s choosing. And this
payback came on July 28, 2013 when the IA
carried out a retaliatory low-intensity, shallow cross-LoC raid. It later
emerged that between that date and early August, PoK residents Zafran
Ghulam Sarwar, Wajid Akbar, Mohammad Wajid Akbar and Mohammad Faisal left their
homes in the Neelam Valley, and never came back. Pakistan subsequently claimed that they
were innocent herb collectors, who were kidnapped by IA special operations
combatants during a cross-LoC raid. The IA only admitted that five unidentified
men were shot dead by IA troops in the same area, about 500 metres on the Indian
side of the LoC after they were suspected of being guides for Jihadists wanting
to corss the LoC.
On August 6, 2013 PA troops
killed five Indian soldiers in a cross-LoC strike in Poonch. The five Indian
soldiers were sitting ducks in a well-planned ambush by a BAT about 450 metres
inside Indian territory. 14 Maratha Light Infantry (MLI) had just arrived in
the Sarla battalion area of the 93 Infantry Brigade, stationed along the LoC
north of Poonch, to relieve 21 Bihar Regiment. An IA patrol headed out from
Cheetah, a post 7km west of Poonch, along the Betaad nullah, or moutain stream,
which heads towards the LoC. They were headed for Delta, an
occasionally-occupied position half-way to another major post, code-named
Begum. These IA posts guarded the areas around the village of Khari Karmara,
facing the PoK village of Bandi Abbaspur. 21 Bihar
Regiment’s Shambhu Sharan Rai, Vijaykumar Ray, Premnath Singh and Raghunandan
Prasad, and 14 MLI’s Pundlik Mane and Sambhaji Kute, were sent out on a patrol
to familiarise the newcomers with the terrain. Elsewhere on the LoC, troops
would have been extremely cautious about resting in the course of a patrol. The
troops had no reason to expect trouble, though: the Chakan-da-Bagh sector, home
to a trading post where cross-LoC trade is conducted, had long been peaceful.
Late on that fateful night, the men bivouaced at a position some 450 metres
across the border fencing that runs some distance away. Kute was put on guard
duty, while the other men rested. Kute, the only survivor, later said that he
saw the patrol come under fire from multiple directions. He was, however,
unable to provide substantial further detail—bar saying he thought some 20 men,
some in uniform—had executed the pre-dawn ambush. Forensics later showed that
the slain men were killed with single shots, fired at almost point-blank range,
evidence of a surgical, well-planned ambush. Kute’s less-than-complete
testimony led the then Indian Defence Minister A K Antony to issue an
ambiguously-worded statement soon after the attack, saying that it was carried
out by “20 heavily armed terrorists along with persons dressed in PA uniforms”.
Antony’s statement appeared to refute an earlier statement by the IA, saying
the killings were carried out by terrorists “along with soldiers of the PA”.
Earlier in January, after the beheading of Lance-Naik Sudhakar Naik, Antony had
expressly charged Pakistan’s SSG with the outrage. Following protests in
Parliament, Antony issued a fresh statement blaming the PA for the killing. IA
officials claimed that elements of the 801 Mujahid Battalion were also involved
in this attack. Subsequently, 21 Bihar Regiment’s
Commanding Officer Col C S Kabsuri, under whose command the patrol team
operated; 91 Infantry Brigade’s Commander Brigadier S K Acharya, who was
Kabsuri’s immediate boss and Acharya’s boss and 25 Infantry Division GOC Maj
Gen V P Singh—were in the gunsights of a Court of Inquiry probing the
incident. So was the GOC of the Nagrota-based XVI Corps, Lt Gen B S Hooda, who
was then commanding these officers.
On January
13, 2014 the then COAS of the IA,
Gen. Bikram Singh said that a strong reply had been given to last year’s
cross-LoC raids by Pakistan, referring to reports that 10 Pakistani soldiers had
been killed in an IA-staged cross-LoC surgical strike.
In the early hours of September 18, 2016 four Fidayeen
terrorists of the LeT attacked the
rear office of an infantry battalion of the IA’s 12 Infantry Brigade HQ in Uri,
which killed 20 IA Jawans. The terrorists were using two sets of ICOM of Japan-made wireless sets, which were inscribed with the words ‘bilkul naya’ (brand new) in Urdu and ‘new’
in English. The wireless sets were among 48 items, including two map sheets,
seized from the attack site. While one of the map sheets was burnt, the
National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) went about deciphering four
coordinates mentioned on the other—8440, 8605, 2842 and 3007. Also recovered
was a mobile phone made by Indian firm I-KALL, plus two GPS locators built by
US-based Garmin (with pre-fed coordinates of two locations—Galwama and Rafiabad,
Muzaffarabad—at least 6km from the LoC). The terrorists also carried packets of
juice made in Karachi. Twenty-six wrappers of high-protein chocolate bars, six Red Bull cans,
three empty packets of ORS and other medicines with 'Made in Pakistan' stamp
were recovered as well. A mission plan that was annotated in Pashto was also recovered and
it revealed that the terrorists were to
kill unarmed IA troops, then storm a medical aid unit near the Brigade
administrative block and blow themselves up in the officers’ mess. The plan deciphered by military experts indicated that
the terrorists were drawn from the banned terror group, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
(SSP) that recently started working under JeM’s command and calls itself
‘Guardians of the Prophet’. The Fidayeen aquad attacked the administrative
block where unarmed soldiers were refilling diesel in barrels from fuel tanks.
The terrorists lobbed 17 hand-grenades in three minutes, which ignited the dump and
resulted in a massive fire burning barracks and tents in a 150-metre radius. Three of the four terrorists were in their early 20s. Together, they had taken
nearly 169 bullet hits—their intestines, chest and arms were riddled with
bullet holes.
The IA had since 2008 been monitoring
the following launch-pads used by the PA to infiltrate its ‘Sarkari Jihadi’
detachments into Jammu & Kashmir: from Bhimber Gali towards Shopian and
Anantnag; from Leepa towards Baramula; from Jura towards Sopore; from Athmuqam
towards Kupwara; from Dudhnial, Tejian, Shardi, Tattapani and Kel towards
Machhal; and from Saonar and Sardari towards Kupwara and Sopore. Finally, eight
launch-pads spread over a linear 250km frontage and located at Athmuqam,
Dudhnial, Chalhana, Leepa, Kel and Tattapani were chosen for targetted for
destruction. They were across the areas under the jurisdiction of 19 Division
(in Uri), 28 Division (in Kupwara) and 25 Division (in Rajouri). A couple of IA
strike-teams slipped out between the Beloni and Nangi Tekri battalion areas in
Poonch sector south of the Pir Panjal and across the Tutmari Gali in the Nowgam
sector after sunset on September 28,
2016. By 2am, the teams were on the following targets:
Target-1:
Dudhnial, Neelum Valley 34 42 09.97 N, 74 06 28.75 E
Target-2:
Mundakal, Leepa Bulge 34 17 21.1 N, 73 55 25.7 E
Target-3:
Athmuqam, Keran Sector 34 34 48.65 N, 73 57 01.09 E
Targets
4, 5 and 6 were diversionary in nature.
For targets 1, 2 and 3, Instalaza C-90
LAW & 40mm UBGLs were employed by 4 and 9 SF (Para). For targets 4, 5 and
6, AGS-30 AGLs, 7.62mm MMGs, 12.7mm HMGs and 81mm/120mm mortars were
employed.
In the Leepa Valley, the IA’s SF (Para)
combatants crossed the LoC and positioned themselves on ridges directly
overlooking the village of Mundakali. Two PA observation posts (OP) and a
makeshift mosque located at some distance east of the village were destroyed at
5am. Two other posts higher up in the mountains were also hit. At least four PA
soldiers were injured in the attack, which lasted from 5am until 8am. A similar
advance by the SF (Para) in the Dudhnial area of Neelum Valley further north
was conducted. LeT camps in the Khairati Bagh village of Leepa Valley and the
western end of Dudhnial village in the Neelum Valley had been hit. Two PA
soldiers were killed in diversionary attacks—one in Poonch, and one in Bhimber
sector, further south. A total of nine PA soldiers were injured in these
cross-LoC raids. Another diversionary attack occured in the Madarpur-Titrinot
region of Poonch sector, where a PA OP was destroyed and one soldier killed
between 4.30am & 6am. Terror laubch-pads in the Samahni-Mandhole area of
Bhimber or in Tattapani of the Poonch-Kotli area could not be attacked since
they were located behind ridges that serve as a natural barrier against
direct-fire. In Leepa, six wooden structures housing terrorists between the
villages of Channian and Mundakali were not targetted, since a ridge that runs
along the east bank of the nearby stream covered them from the IA positions on
the LoC. Likewise, in Neelum, most terrorist camps—such as the ones at Jhambar,
Dosut and in the Gurez Valley area further east—were located in the valleys
below at a safe distance from the LoC and were therefore not targetted by the
IA’s cross-LoC assault teams. According to the
PA, an exchange of fire between PA and IA troops began at 2:30am on September
29 and continued till 8am in the Bhimber, Hot Spring, Kel and Leepa sectors
inside PoK. Hot Springs, Kel and Leepa come under the jurisdiction of the IA’s
XV Corps, while Bhimber Gali comes under the XVI Corps. Subsequent independent
reportage (by both the BBC & The Indian Express)
revealed that an IA ground assault did occur in the Madarpur-Titrinot region of
Poonch sector, west of Srinagar, where a PA post was destroyed and one soldier
killed. In Leepa valley to the north, the IA’s combatants crossed the LoC and
set themselves up on ridges directly overlooking the village of Mundakali. A PA
post located at some distance east of the village was hit. Two other posts
higher up in the mountains were also hit. At least four PA soldiers were
injured in the attack, which lasted from 5am until 8am. A similar advance by
the IA in the Dudhnial area of Neelum valley further north was beaten back by
the PA. At least one PA soldier was injured there. Two PA soldiers were killed
in the attacks--one in Poonch, and one in Bhimber sector, further south. A
total of nine soldiers were injured in the IA’s assaults. In Leepa, the IA’s
combatants first opened fire in the valley at around 5am, hitting a PA post
near Mundakali village and blowing up a mosque adjacent to it. A PA soldier who
was preparing for pre-dawn prayers was hit and injured. Fire was also directed
at two other posts higher up in the hills, one of which served as the PA’s forward
headquarters in Leepa. Bunkers at these posts were partly destroyed and their
communications system was paralysed for some time. This meant that PA troops
stationed down in the valley and at the Brigade HQ took a while to realise what
was going on. The soldier who was injured at the Mundakali post was given
first-aid by villagers, and then transported to the military-run hospital in
Leepa on a motorbike. Nearly two dozen villagers helped put out the fire that
had engulfed the mosque. The PA did not take long to get their act together and
fired back from the remaining bunkers, pushing the IA’s combatants back from
the ridges overlooking the Valley.
At Dudhnial in the Neelum Valley, the
action took place further up in the mountains, away from the village. A few
villagers were awakened by gunfire. There, the IA’s combatants had advanced
well beyond the LoC when their movements were detected and were fired upon. Two
local eyewitnesses who visited Dudhnial, a small hamlet some 4km across the LoC
from India’s nearest forward post, Gulab, ahead of the town of Kupwara,
reported seeing a gutted building across the Al-Haawi bridge from the hamlet’s
main bazaar, where both a military outpost and a compound used by the LeT were sited. Al-Haawi bridge is
the last point where infiltrating Jihadists are loaded with supplies before
beginning their climb up to the LoC towards Kupwara. Local residents revealed that
loud explosions—possibly rounds fired from Instalaza C-90 LAWs—were heard from
across the Al-Haawi bridge late in the night, along with intense small-arms
fire. Five, perhaps six, dead-bodies were loaded on to a truck early next
morning, and possibly transported to the nearest major LeT camp at Chalhana,
across the Neelum River from Tithwal, on the Indian side of the LoC. The
subsequent Friday prayers at a LeT-affiliated mosque in Chalhana, ended with a
cleric vowing to avenge the deaths of the men killed the previous day. The LeT
Jihadists gathered there were blaming the PA for failing to defend the LoC. In
Leepa, some five or six wooden structures housing terrorists between the
villages of Channian and Mundakali had not been targetted. A ridge that runs
along the east bank of the nearby stream covers them from the IA’s positions
along the LoC. Likewise, in Neelum, most terrorist camps-such as the ones at
Jhambar, Dosut, and in the Gurez Valley area further east-are located in the
valleys below, at a safe distance from the LoC. The LeT’s launch-pad dwellings in
the Khairati Bagh village of Leepa Valley and the western end of Dudhnial village
in Neelum Valley were attacked and hit. At Dudhnial, some local residents who
helped carry military munitions to the PA’s forward posts the weekend following
the IA’s cross-LoC strikes said that they had seen one or two damaged structures
close to a PA post near the LoC. Following the strikes, there was an increased
influx of Jihadists in the Valley.
At Leepa, a complex of some 25 hamlets
located at the bottom of the Qazi Nag stream flowing down from the mountains
above Naugam, on the Indian side of the LoC, was among the “launch-pads” targetted
in the cross-LoC raids. Local villagers there saw a LeT-occupied three-storied
wooden building destroyed near the hamlet of Khairati Bagh. Three or four LeT
personnel were thought to have been killed in this raid, while the others fled
into the adjoining forests after the firing began. Interestingly, the
Jamaat-ud-Dawa’s charitable wing, the Falah-i-Insaniyat Foundation, had held a
major eye-surgery camp in Khairati Bagh in August, using the opportunity to
deliver speeches on alleged atrocities committed by IA soldiers in Kashmir. Khairati
Bagh was, until 2003, a major LeT base, which was slowly scaled down once the unwritten
LoC ceasefire went into place in November 2003 and the LeT’s cross-LoC
operations slowly declined. It remains, though, of key importance to
the LeT, offering multiple lines of access into northern Kashmir through Chowkibal and the Bangas Bowl.
Fire and explosions were also heard from the east bank of the Neelum River in
Athmuqam, the district headquarters. The fighting appeared to have taken place
near PA camps along the Katha Nar stream that empties into the Neelum River
just north of the town. A bustling town that serves as a hub for tourism and
commerce, Athmuqam is also a major military hub, with several PA facilities located
on ridges along the east bank of the river, sheltered from the IA’s field artillery
bombardments. The ghost villages of Bicchwal and Bugna, almost entirely
abandoned by their residents who fled when terrorism in the Kashmir Valley
began in 1990, are barely 2km from Salkhanna, the first village on the
Pakistani side of the LoC, and the last loading point for jihadist
infiltrators. A local eyewitness who visited the Neelum District Hospital in
Athmuqam said he heard that several LeT personnel had been killed and injured,
but said no bodies had been buried locally.
Down south, in the Poonch, Kotli and Bhimber
areas, it was more or less the same story: IA’s combatants coming forward from
their positions on the LoC, taking unsuspecting PA soldiers by surprise both
due to the suddenness of the attack and the intensity of the fire and then pulling
back once the PA had a chance to respond. Unprepared, and having a numerical
disadvantage generally, the PA soldiers made use of their firepower to the
fullest, exhausting their ammunition. In the days following the attack,
hundreds of villagers in PoK were pressed into service for hauling artillery
shells and other ammunition to the PA’s border posts to replenish their
supplies. The Jihadists continued to maintain safe houses in bigger cities like
Muzaffarabad. But they shifted their launch-pad dwellings near the PA’s garrisons
along the LoC and away from the villages. There were no reports of any of the terrorist
camps in the Samahni area of Bhimber or in the Poonch-Kotli area having been
hit. Such camps were mostly located behind ridges that serve as a natural
barrier against direct Indian fire.
On October 28, 2016 Pakistan-origin
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) terrorists, assisted by covering fire
from PA troops, conducted a cross-LoC attack in Machchil sector of Kupwara
district. The terrorist killed IA trooper 17 Sikh Regiment’s Mandeep
Singh, 26, and beheaded his body before fleeing back. Singh’s
mutilated corpse was discovered after he got separated from his patrol near the
LoC ahead of Kala Post, one of several IA forward positions in the volatile
Machchil sector. In retaliation, the IA destroyed a PA Company HQ and four military
posts on October 29. At least 20
Pakistani soldiers were reported to be killed in the attack.
On November 22, 2016 IA Rifleman
Prabhu Singh was beheaded by a BAT of the PA’s SSG at Machchil, while two other
IA soldiers were ambushed and killed. An abandoned (and subsequently
recovered) night-vision monocle used by the BAT was
likely transferred by the United States to the PA for use in combating terrorists
of the Pakistani Taliban along the Durand. This is not the first time that such
nigh-vision devices with the marking ‘US Government Property’ had been
recovered in counter-terrorism operations inside J & K. An unidentified IA officer
who was deployed near Machchil in 2015, later revealed that his unit, which had
eliminated four terrorists in an encounter at that time, had recovered an
identical device. Other than the
night-vision device, there were other clear indicators of a Pakistani hand in
the attacks. A medical gauze recovered was marked ‘Pakistan Defence Forces’,
while medicines had markings of manufacturing plants in Lahore, Karachi and
Multan on them. Other equipment recovered included a tactical radio-set,
several ammunition cartridges, wire cutters, food items, binoculars and
sleeping bags.
Skirmishing in the Rajouri-Poonch belt
had led to the April 1 killing of
Naib Subedar S Sanayaima Som by an IED that was believed to have been laid by a
PA raiding party.
On May 1, 2017 two IA soldiers were beheaded and another injured in a SSG/BAT
operation in the Krishna Ghati sector in Poonch district. While PA troops were
targetting two forward posts of the IA with
RPG-7s and 60mm mortars, the SSG/BAT attackers moved in and beheaded BSF Head
Constable Prem Sagar and IA Subedar Paramjeet Singh. The SSG/BAT attackers had monitored the IA
patrol that left Kirpan Post, manned by the BSF’s 200 Battalion, early in the
morning, in a routine search for IEDs, knowing it would take cover in the
nearest available space when heavy machine guns and RPG-7s are fired from
across the LoC. The killing, which was over inside just a few minutes, had been
authorised by the PA’s COAS, Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa, following a visit to PA
positions in Haji Pir on April 30, 2017. Local PA commanders had underlined the
need for reprisal strikes following the killing of seven to ten soldiers in an April 17, 2017 IA field artillery
assault targetting PA posts across a large swathe of the LoC in Poonch and
Rajouri. Up to 10 PA soldiers were then killed or injured in fire directed at a
position identified on IA maps by the codename Pimple, facing Kirpan Post. Four
civilians—Mohammad Shakil, Ishrat Bibi, Irum Younas and Atif Majeed—were,
however, reported to have been injured in Kotli and Bhimber districts because
of IA shelling across the LoC that day. Lt Gen Nadeem Raza, who was then commanding
the PA’s X Corps, had pushed back against concerns that the retaliatory action
could lead to escalation on the LoC, along with Maj Gen Azhar Abbas, the then
GOC of the PA’s Murree-based 12 Infantry Division, the formation whose units
had been at the receiving end of the artillery duels on the LoC since 2016.
The IA on May
26, 2017 avenged the May 1 beheadings by killing two personnel
of a SSG/BAT team even as it foiled an attack in Uri by the LeT.
On May
29, the IA’s SF (Para) foiled an attack by a PA SSG/BAT squad and killed
two members of this squad along the LoC in the Uri sector.
On June 22, 2017 afternoon (2pm) two IA soldiers of an area
domination patrol were killed in an ambush near the LoC, less than 10km from
the town of Poonch. The ambush, carried out by seven SSG/BAT combatants in the
midst of intense mortar and small arms exchanges that raged through the day,
targetted an IA patrol operating near Gurunj Post, close to the village of
Khari Karmara. During the attack, the PA’s
troops resorted to firing in Gulpur-Karmara-Chakan-Da-Bagh area along the LoC. At least one SSG/BAT
infiltrator was shot dead in Gulpur sector of
Poonch district and another injured during the course of the fire
exchange, which claimed the lives of 34-year-old Naik Sandip Sarjerao Jadhav of
Aurangabad and 24-year-old Sepoy Savan Balku Mane of Kolhapur, and serving with
the 15 Maratha Light Infantry. The PA’s covering
fire continued till 3.30pm. This ambush—the third of its kind attempted
in Poonch in 2017—began at 12.55pm. The month before, the IA had released a
video of its troops destroying a PA bunker in the Naushera sector, which was
shot just a week after Naib Subedar Paramjeet Singh and BSF Head Constable Prem
Sagar were beheaded near Kirpan Post, in the Krishna Ghati sector. Krishna
Ghati, one of the few sectors along the LoC where PA troops have positional
advantage, had seen intense skirmishing since September 2016. The SSG/BAT
combatants were armed with special daggers and
headband cameras to mutilate and record the attack on the IA patrol party after ingressing 600 metres
across the LoC. Arms, ammunition and
other war-like stores including one AK-47, three magazines and two hand-
grenades, besides dresses and bags were recovered. The slain SSG/BAT combatant
was wearing a headband with camera on his head to record the action and
possible mutilations of the IA’s Jawans.
On July
16, 2017 in retaliation for the PA snipers killing two IA soldiers a few
days ago, the IA targetted a truck of the PA moving along the Neelum Valley at
Shahkot near Athmuqam. The vehicle fell into the
river, with four PA soldiers drowning as a result.
On
the night of December
25-26, 2017 a small team of six IA Ghaatak combatants surreptitiously crossed
the LoC in the Rawlakot-Rukh Chakri sector of PoK to kill at least three PA
soldiers (including a Major) and injure a few others. The limited ‘tit-for-tat’ operation was carried out to
avenge the killing of four IA soldiers, including Major Moharkar Prafulla
Ambadas, by a SSG/BAT at Keri in Rajouri sector of J & K on the afternoon
of December 23. ‘Jawabi Karavaee’
(retaliatory action) was required for establishing moral ascendancy. It was a
localised, selective targetting cross-LoC raid around 300 metres inside PoK. A
patrol from the 59 Baluch Regiment, under the PA’s Rawlakot-based 2 AJK Mujahid
Brigade, was first hit and left stunned by an IED that had been placed earlier by
the Ghaataks. The Ghaataks, who were
lying in wait, next opened fire to maximise the damage before swiftly
returning to their own side of the LoC, with the IA’s posts giving them
covering fire.
On September
18, 2018 in the Ramgarh sector of Samba district in Jammu, Border
Security Force (BSF) Jawan Narendra Kumar was abducted and butchered by a SSG/BAT squad. Kumar’s throat was slit and his eyes gouged out. The
JeM on October 18 released pictures of Kumar’s belongings on social media that
included his bullet-proof jacket, five magazines INSAS rifle and his mobile
phone.
On October
21, 2018 an IA patrol team was ambushed by a group of heavily-armed SSG/BAT
from Pakistan in Sunderbani Sector in Rajouri district, killing three IA soldiers—Havildar
Kaushal Kumar of Nowshera, Lance Naik Ranjeet Singh of Doda and Rifleman Rajat
Kumar Basan of Pallanwala—and seriously injuring a fourth. The incident took
place at about 1.45pm. The IA’s soldiers immediately took positions and
eliminated two SSG/BAT members. The IA’s ‘Jawabi Karavaee’ (retaliatory action) took place on October 23, when a cross-LoC fire-assault was launched
against the PA’s administrative HQ in Hajira area, which also targetted about
three terrorist sanctuaries. This action came days after the PA had also
pounded the IA’s 93 Infantry Brigade HQ and an IA camp in Poonch on October 23,
2018. The IA used both 120mm mortars and 105mm light artillery ammunition and
pounded the PA’s administrative HQ with nearly 12 rounds in the wee hours of
the day. The IA Indian had exercised restraint,
and avoided targetting the civilian population in PoK towns in close proximity
of LoC like Hajira, Bandi Gopalpur, Nakyal, Samanhi and Khuiratta despite the
fact that the PA has settled Punjab-origin ex-servicemen and retired government
servants much to the chagrin of the disconcerted local populace there.
In the pre-dawn hours of December 30, 2018 combatants of the the
IA’s 19 Infantry Division thwarted yet another ‘treacherous attempt’ by the
PA’s SSG/BAT to launch a strike on an IA post located amidst thick forests along
the LoC at Naugam sector in Kupwara district and killed two intruders. The
subsequent recovery by the IA of abandoned arms and ammunition indicated that
the PA intended to carry out a “gruesome attack” in that sector. The SSG/BAT
intruders were wearing combat uniform like regular and carrying stores with
Pakistani markings. Some of the intruders were also seen in BSF and old-pattern
IA uniforms as part of a deception. They had intruded well-equipped with IEDs,
incendiary materials, explosives, and a plethora of arms and ammunition. They
were assisted by heavy covering fire of high-calibre 12.7mm heavy machine guns,
60mm mortars and RPG-7 rocket launchers from the opposing PA posts. Their movement
was nonetheless detected by the IA’s LoC surveillance sensors and ther
subsequent firefight lasted a few hours. The IA subsequently contacted the PA
so that the latter could claim and take back the bodies of the two killed
intruders.
