Compendium Of Indian Army's Cross-LoC ‘Jawaabi Karavaee’ (Retaliatory Action) Raids Since 1998

On the night of March 26-27, 1998 the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) had massacred 29 Hindu villagers at Prankote and Dhakikot by slitting the throats of their victims, which included women and infants. In late April 1998 the massacre of 21 villagers in Binda Mohri Sehri, 600 metres across the Line of Control (LoC) inside PoK, and the bombing in June of a Lahore-bound train, shortly after an explosion in Jammu, are both believed by Pakistan to have been carried out by Indian security agencies. Pakistan admitted on May 4, 1998 that an Indian Army (IA) special operations forces unit had killed 22 civilians at the village of Binda Mohri Sehri in Bandala, in the Chhamb sector. Two villagers were decapitated and the eyes of several others were allegedly gouged out by the raiders, who comprised a dozen men, all dressed in black. They struck in the middle of the night and dropped leaflets to mark the attack. “Vengeance Brigade,” one leaflet said. “Evil deeds bear evil fruit,” said another. “Ten eyes for one eye, one jaw for a single tooth,” said a third. The Pakistan Army (PA) claimed to have recovered an India-made HMT wrist-watch from the scene of the carnage, along with a hand-written note which asked: “How does your own blood feel?”

In late 1999 the IA’s Capt. Gurjinder Singh Suri, posted on the LoC with 12 Bihar Regiment as the Platoon Commander of a ‘Ghaatak’ team, which was deployed on the Faulad Post. On November 9, 1999, the PA launched an attack on the Post, preceded by a heavy artillery bombardment. The PA’s attack was repulsed and Capt. Gurjinder deployed his men to deal with any reinforcements or interference by the enemy. He then launched the operation to clear the enemy bunkers one by one along with his comrades and in this process, one of his soldiers got injured badly. Leading from the front, Capt. Gurjinder dashed forward and killed two enemy soldiers with his AK-47 SLR and silenced the machine gun of the enemy. However, during the process, Capt. Gurjinder received a burst of gunfire in his arm. Unmindful of his injury, he continued to lead his men and lobbed two hand-grenades into a bunker. He then entered the bunker while spraying bullets and killed one more PA soldier. At this point, he was hit by an RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade and was critically wounded. Despite his injuries, he declined to be evacuated and continued to exhort his men till he breathed his last. He was posthumously awarded the Maha Vir Chakra, India’s second-highest military gallantry award. His memorial is available here:

https://www.honourpoint.in/profile/captain-gurjinder-singh-suri-mvc/

On the night of January 21-22, 2000, in a raid authorised by then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and conducted by India’s 9 SF (Para), seven PA soldiers were captured in a raid on a post in the Nadala enclave, across the Kishanganga (Neelam) River. The seven soldiers, wounded in fire, were tied up and dragged across a ravine running across the LoC. The bodies were returned, according to Pakistan’s complaint to UNMOGIP, bearing signs of brutal torture.  This raid was intended to avenge the killing of Capt. Saurabh Kalia, and five soldiers–sepoys Bhanwar Lal Bagaria, Arjun Ram, Bhika Ram, Moola Ram and Naresh Singh–of the 4 Jat Regiment.

On the night of February 24/25, 2000, the IA, as part of a retaliatory cross-LoC raid (to avenge the death of an IA officer who was killed while patrolling along the LoC and whose body was taken across the LoC to Kotli), killed 14 residents in the village of Lanjot in PoK’s Nakyal sector after its SF (Para) forces had crossed the LoC. They returned to the Indian side and threw the severed heads of three of them at the PA soldiers manning their side of the LoC. This cross-LoC raid began at around midnight when the IA commenced an artillery bombardment with mortar shells in order to forcibly confine the local residents to their homes. Next came the attack on the targetted house, where the annual Khatam (complete recitation of the Quran in one sitting) was then taking place. Eight of the 14 killed were of the immediate family (most of who were serving with the PA at that time), while the others were cousins, uncles and aunts. The heads of three men were cut off while another’s arm was chopped off and the latter was taken back across the LoC as a souvenir. There were two girls who were hiding underneath a blanket, and thus they went unnoticed. Two other children died on the way to the hospital in Kotli, City, while 12 others died on-the-spot in the house.

In retaliation, in the early hours of February 27, 2000, Muhammad Ilyas Kashmiri of the JeM (formed after breaking up with the Harkat-ul Jihad-i-Islami, or HuJI) along with 25 HuJI combatants attacked the IA’s Ashok listening post in the Nakyal sector at Nowshera, Rajouri district, and ambushed and killed seven IA soldiers, and beheaded 24 year-old Sepoy Bhausaheb Maruti Talekar of the 17 Maratha Light Infantry and left behind his decapitated body. Talekar’s severed head was then paraded in the bazaars of Kotli in PoK. Soon thereafter, Ilyas was felicitated by the then COAS of the PA, Gen Gen Pervez Musharraf, and rewarded with Pakistani Rs.1 lakh for bringing back “the head of an Indian soldier” (Ilyas was reportedly killed on June 3, 2011 by a CIA-mounted drone strike against a compound in the Ghwakhwa area of South Waziristan).

On March 2, 2000 when LeT militants massacred 35 Sikhs in Chattisinghpora, a raiding team from 9 SF (Para) was sanctioned by PM Vajpayee to carry out a raid inside Pakistan. Led by a Major, the team went into Pakistan and came back after killing over 28 Pakistani soldiers and militants.

On September 18, 2003 Indian troops, Pakistan alleged, killed a JCO, or junior commissioned officer, and three soldiers in a raid on a post in the Baroh sector, near Bhimber Gali in Poonch. The raiders, it told UNMOGIP, decapitated one soldier and carried his head off as a trophy.

On June 5, 2008, the PA’s troops attacked the Kranti border observation post near Salhotri village in Poonch, killing 2/8 Gurkha Regiment soldier Jawashwar Chhame. The retaliation, when it came on June 19, 2008, was savage: Pakistani officials have since alleged that IA troops beheaded a PA soldier and carried his head across in the Bhattal sector in Poonch district. Four Pakistani soldiers, UNMOGIP was told, had also died in the cross-LoC raid.

On the afternoon of July 30, 2011, the PA’s Border Action Team (BAT) struck a remote post near Karnah in Gugaldhar Ridge in Kupwara. The IA subsequently hushed up the beheading of Havildar Jaipal Singh Adhikari and Lance Naik Devender Singh of 19 Rajput Regiment. The BAT stormed the post while a handing-taking over process was on between 19 Rajput and 20 Kumaon in 28 Division’s area of responsibility, and conducted the beheadings and took the heads along with them to the other side. The BAT had used rafts to penetrate India’s defences along the LoC. The bodies of the two dead soldiers were sent to their families in Uttarakhand in sealed caskets as they were badly mutilated, and cremated as such. A few days after the beheading, the IA discovered a video-clip from a Pakistani terrorist who was killed in an encounter while crossing into J & K, showing Pakistanis standing around the severed heads of Adhikari and Singh displayed on a raised platform. After repeated recce over a two-month period, the IA launched the retaliatory OP Ginger on August 30. Five Indian and three Pakistani soldiers were killed in an unrelated  shooting between August 30 and September 1, 2011 across the LoC at the Keran sector in Kupwara district/Neelum Valley. On the night of August 31, an Indian border post was fired at by Pakistani troops.

On August 30, 2011 three PA soldiers, including a JCO, were beheaded in an IA cross-LoC raid on a post in the Sharda sector, across the Neelam Valley in Kel. Maj Gen S K Chakravorty, the then GOC of 28 Division, had planned and executed this operation. To carry it out, at least seven reconnaissance—ground-level and aerial surveillance conducted by Searcher Mk.2 MALE-UAVs—missions were carried out to identify potential targets. Consequently, three PA posts were determined to be vulnerable: Police Chowki, a PA post near Jor, and the Hifazat and Lashdat lodging points. The mission was to spring an ambush on Police Chowki to inflict maximum casualty. Different teams for ambush, demolition, surgical strikes and surveillance were constituted. The operation was deliberately planned for being conducted just a day before Eid-ul-Fitr as it was the time when the PA least expected a retaliation. About 25 soldiers from the SF (Para) reached their launch-pad at 3pm on August 29 and hid there until 10pm. They then crossed the LoC to reach close to Police Chowki. By 4am on August 30, the planned day of the attack, the ambush team was deep within enemy territory waiting to strike. Over the next hour, claymore mines were placed around the area and the raiding party took positions for the ambush, waiting for clearance through a secure communications channel. At 7am on August 30, the raiders saw four PA soldiers, led by a JCO, walking towards the ambush site. They waited till the Pakistanis reached the site, then detonated the mines. In the explosions all four were grieviously injured. The IA raiders then lobbed grenades and fired at them. One of the PA soldiers fell into a stream that ran below. The raiders then rushed to chop off the heads of the other three dead PA soldiers. They also took away their rank insignia, weapons and other personal items. The raiders then planted pressure-IEDs beneath one of the bodies, primed to explode when anyone attempted to lift the body. Hearing the explosions, two PA soldiers rushed from their post but were killed by a second raiding team waiting near the ambush site. Two other PA soldiers tried to trap the second team but a third raiding team covering them from behind eliminated the two. While the IA raiders were exfiltrating, another group of PA soldiers were spotted moving from Police Chowki towards the ambush site. Soon they heard loud explosions, indicating the triggering of the pressure-IEDs planted under the body. At least two to three more PA soldiers were killed in that blast. The operation had lasted 45 minutes, and the IA team left the area by 7.45am to head back across the LoC. The first team reached an IA post at 12pm and the last party by 2.30pm. They had been inside enemy territory for about 48 hours, including for reconnaissance. At least eight PA troops had been killed and another two or three more may have been fatally injured in the action. Three Pakistani heads—of Subedar Parvez, Havildar Aftab and Naik Imran—three AK-47s and other weapons were among the trophies carried back by the SF (Para) raiders. But this was not without the heart-pounding moments. 28 Division HQ got a message on its secure line that one of the IA raiders had accidentally stepped over a landmine and blew his finger while exfiltrating. He came back safely with his buddies. The severed Pakistani heads were photographed, and buried on the instructions of senior officers. Two days later, the then GOC of XV Corps turned up and asked the team about the heads. When he came to know that they had been buried, he was furious and asked the SF (Para) to dig up the heads, burn them and throw the ashes into the Kishenganga, so that no DNA traces are left behind. Those instructions were complied with.

On January 8, 2013 a 15-member BAT of the PA, wearing black combat uniforms, crossed the LoC from in Krishna Ghati sector (falling under 10 Infantry Brigade in Mendhar, Poonch district). Earlier, this BAT had been stationed at Barmoch BOP in PoK across Atma Post (manned by 13 Rajputana Rifles) a fortnight before and was watching the daily movements of IA personnel. On that day, Lance-Naik Hem Raj and Lance-Naik Sudhakar Naik of 13 Rajputana Rifles were on a routine area domination patrol in Barasingha in Mendhar sector, 200km north of Jammu. Daybreak was still several hours away, the night was dark, the fog thick, and visibility almost zero. Patrolling there involved walking around over a stretch that was beyond the fence that protected India-held territory. Every border sector had been divided into grids, each under a commanding officer. There were four to seven forward posts (beyond the fence) every kilometre, with five to eight soldiers in each. The posts were alerted about the patrols; while on patrol, the scouts did not talk, smoke, use flashlight or carry cellphones. They did not even use aftershave, the smell of which could be picked up by dogs accompanying the Jihadists. The patrol that included Hemraj and Sudhakar was playing safe, by not venturing far beyond the fence. They mostly remained nearly 500 metres short of the LoC. The party had seven troopers and as per the decades-old practice, and had divided themselves into three pairs, with the commander attaching himself to one. Each pair was to remain within line-of-sight of another, but that was impossible in the thick fog and the thick woods. The result: the pair that was to keep Hemraj and Sudhakar in its line-of-sight did not see who were shooting at them in the fog; they only heard reports of automatic firearms firing away. As the second pair leapt for cover, before rushing to reinforce Hemraj and Sudhakar, they, too, came under fire. This fire, they realised, was not coming from the woods, unlike the bullets that had felled Hemraj and Sudhakar. This was cover-fire, coming from the hilltops on the Pakistani side of the LoC. Very unlike jihadis, and very much military-like. The Jihadi infiltrators would have fired at everyone in sight. Here, the enemy was killing only two; the cover-fire was being provided only to keep the rest of the patrolmen away. The intention was to kill two, and only two, and then seize their bodies. IA posts returned fire and the exchange lasted several hours, well past daybreak. As the fog cleared by 10.30am, a couple of remaining IA patrolmen saw the enemy—clad in dark black, the uniform of the PA’s Special Service Group (SSG), known as the Black Storks. The cover fire, the patrolmen knew, was being provided by 29 Baloch Regiment, which had been there for several months. As the firing finally ended at 11:32am, the sight in front froze them. Hemraj and Sudhakar lay dead and frozen in pools of blood, far away from each other. Sudhakar’s head was missing; Hemraj had deep slashes on his neck, indicating a failed beheading bid. This happened between Chhatri and Atma posts in Mankote area of Krishna Ghati. The beheading was done by one Mohammad Anwar Faiz alias Azhar, a resident of Jabbar Mohalla of village Sher Khan (Rawlakote) who also was the local guide for the SSG. He ran a shop in Barmoch Gali in PoK, and he was also involved in the beheading of an IA Captain in 1996 in the same Mendhar area. (A divisional commander of the LeT and a Pakistani national, he was killed on July 13, 2015 at Rajouri.  A group of four LeT fidayeens, all Pakistanis, tried to infiltrate and wore combat dresses at 3.30am during heavy rains by crossing Panjal Nullah close to the village of Sagra Balnoi in Mankot sector of Poonch district. Alert IA personnel of 25 Division intercepted the fidayeens and opened firing, leading to heavy exchange of firing that continued for 90 minutes during which Faiz was eliminated, while three others escaped back to PoK).

Till January 9, the BAT was camping at Tattapani and was also involved in planting anti-personal mines in Helmet, Chattri, Dayal Top, Atma and Rocket BOPs of the IA’s 10 Infantry Brigade. The consequent phone call was short and sombre. Lt Gen Vinod Bhatia, the IA’s then DGMO, spared pleasantries and told his Pakistani counterpart, Maj Gen Ashfaq Nadeem, that India did not want to escalate tensions, but Pakistan had to respect the LoC. Before he hung up, Lt Gen Bhatia reiterated that Pakistan must probe and take appropriate action against its soldiers who had violated the LoC and mutilated the bodies of two Indian soldiers. This was the third hotline call between the two DGMOs since a localised confrontation had begun on January 6. While the IA had immediately retaliated with increased mortar-based artillery firepower, New Delhi tried to stop tensions from spiralling out of control. It advised the IA to stay calm. However, it was aware of the anguish and anger within the IA over the mutilations. The then Indian PM Dr Manmohan Singh chose the Army Day celebration at the Indian Army COAS’ residence on January 15 to send a strong message to Islamabad: “After this dastardly act, there can’t be business as usual with Pakistan,” he said. “Those who are responsible for this must be brought to book. I hope Pakistan realises this.” What this meant was that payback time was guaranteed at a time and place of the IA’s choosing. And this payback came on July 28, 2013 when the IA carried out a retaliatory low-intensity, shallow cross-LoC raid. It later emerged that between that date and early August, PoK residents Zafran Ghulam Sarwar, Wajid Akbar, Mohammad Wajid Akbar and Mohammad Faisal left their homes in the Neelam Valley, and never came back. Pakistan subsequently claimed that they were innocent herb collectors, who were kidnapped by IA special operations combatants during a cross-LoC raid. The IA only admitted that five unidentified men were shot dead by IA troops in the same area, about 500 metres on the Indian side of the LoC after they were suspected of being guides for Jihadists wanting to corss the LoC.

On August 6, 2013 PA troops killed five Indian soldiers in a cross-LoC strike in Poonch. The five Indian soldiers were sitting ducks in a well-planned ambush by a BAT about 450 metres inside Indian territory. 14 Maratha Light Infantry (MLI) had just arrived in the Sarla battalion area of the 93 Infantry Brigade, stationed along the LoC north of Poonch, to relieve 21 Bihar Regiment. An IA patrol headed out from Cheetah, a post 7km west of Poonch, along the Betaad nullah, or moutain stream, which heads towards the LoC. They were headed for Delta, an occasionally-occupied position half-way to another major post, code-named Begum. These IA posts guarded the areas around the village of Khari Karmara, facing the PoK village of Bandi Abbaspur. 21 Bihar Regiment’s Shambhu Sharan Rai, Vijaykumar Ray, Premnath Singh and Raghunandan Prasad, and 14 MLI’s Pundlik Mane and Sambhaji Kute, were sent out on a patrol to familiarise the newcomers with the terrain. Elsewhere on the LoC, troops would have been extremely cautious about resting in the course of a patrol. The troops had no reason to expect trouble, though: the Chakan-da-Bagh sector, home to a trading post where cross-LoC trade is conducted, had long been peaceful. Late on that fateful night, the men bivouaced at a position some 450 metres across the border fencing that runs some distance away. Kute was put on guard duty, while the other men rested. Kute, the only survivor, later said that he saw the patrol come under fire from multiple directions. He was, however, unable to provide substantial further detail—bar saying he thought some 20 men, some in uniform—had executed the pre-dawn ambush. Forensics later showed that the slain men were killed with single shots, fired at almost point-blank range, evidence of a surgical, well-planned ambush. Kute’s less-than-complete testimony led the then Indian Defence Minister A K Antony to issue an ambiguously-worded statement soon after the attack, saying that it was carried out by “20 heavily armed terrorists along with persons dressed in PA uniforms”. Antony’s statement appeared to refute an earlier statement by the IA, saying the killings were carried out by terrorists “along with soldiers of the PA”. Earlier in January, after the beheading of Lance-Naik Sudhakar Naik, Antony had expressly charged Pakistan’s SSG with the outrage. Following protests in Parliament, Antony issued a fresh statement blaming the PA for the killing. IA officials claimed that elements of the 801 Mujahid Battalion were also involved in this attack. Subsequently, 21 Bihar Regiment’s Commanding Officer Col C S Kabsuri, under whose command the patrol team operated; 91 Infantry Brigade’s Commander Brigadier S K Acharya, who was Kabsuri’s immediate boss and Acharya’s boss and 25 Infantry Division GOC Maj Gen V P Singh—were in the  gunsights of a Court of Inquiry probing the incident. So was the GOC of the Nagrota-based XVI Corps, Lt Gen B S Hooda, who was then commanding these officers.

On January 13, 2014 the then COAS of the IA,  Gen. Bikram Singh said that a strong reply had been given to last year’s cross-LoC raids by Pakistan, referring to reports that 10 Pakistani soldiers had been killed in an IA-staged cross-LoC surgical strike.

In the early hours of September 18, 2016 four Fidayeen terrorists of the LeT attacked the rear office of an infantry battalion of the IA’s 12 Infantry Brigade HQ in Uri, which killed 20 IA Jawans. The terrorists were using two sets of ICOM of Japan-made wireless sets, which were inscribed with the words ‘bilkul naya’ (brand new) in Urdu and ‘new’ in English. The wireless sets were among 48 items, including two map sheets, seized from the attack site. While one of the map sheets was burnt, the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) went about deciphering four coordinates mentioned on the other—8440, 8605, 2842 and 3007. Also recovered was a mobile phone made by Indian firm I-KALL, plus two GPS locators built by US-based Garmin (with pre-fed coordinates of two locations—Galwama and Rafiabad, Muzaffarabad—at least 6km from the LoC). The terrorists also carried packets of juice made in Karachi. Twenty-six wrappers of high-protein chocolate bars, six Red Bull cans, three empty packets of ORS and other medicines with 'Made in Pakistan' stamp were recovered as well. A mission plan that was annotated in Pashto was also recovered and it revealed that the terrorists were to kill unarmed IA troops, then storm a medical aid unit near the Brigade administrative block and blow themselves up in the officers’ mess. The plan deciphered by military experts indicated that the terrorists were drawn from the banned terror group, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) that recently started working under JeM’s command and calls itself ‘Guardians of the Prophet’. The Fidayeen aquad attacked the administrative block where unarmed soldiers were refilling diesel in barrels from fuel tanks. The terrorists lobbed 17 hand-grenades in three minutes, which ignited the dump and resulted in a massive fire burning barracks and tents in a 150-metre radius. Three of the four terrorists were in their early 20s. Together, they had taken nearly 169 bullet hits—their intestines, chest and arms were riddled with bullet holes.

The IA had since 2008 been monitoring the following launch-pads used by the PA to infiltrate its ‘Sarkari Jihadi’ detachments into Jammu & Kashmir: from Bhimber Gali towards Shopian and Anantnag; from Leepa towards Baramula; from Jura towards Sopore; from Athmuqam towards Kupwara; from Dudhnial, Tejian, Shardi, Tattapani and Kel towards Machhal; and from Saonar and Sardari towards Kupwara and Sopore. Finally, eight launch-pads spread over a linear 250km frontage and located at Athmuqam, Dudhnial, Chalhana, Leepa, Kel and Tattapani were chosen for targetted for destruction. They were across the areas under the jurisdiction of 19 Division (in Uri), 28 Division (in Kupwara) and 25 Division (in Rajouri). A couple of IA strike-teams slipped out between the Beloni and Nangi Tekri battalion areas in Poonch sector south of the Pir Panjal and across the Tutmari Gali in the Nowgam sector after sunset on September 28, 2016. By 2am, the teams were on the following targets:

Target-1: Dudhnial, Neelum Valley 34 42 09.97 N, 74 06 28.75 E

Target-2: Mundakal, Leepa Bulge 34 17 21.1 N, 73 55 25.7 E

Target-3: Athmuqam, Keran Sector 34 34 48.65 N, 73 57 01.09 E

Targets 4, 5 and 6 were diversionary in nature.

For targets 1, 2 and 3, Instalaza C-90 LAW & 40mm UBGLs were employed by 4 and 9 SF (Para). For targets 4, 5 and 6, AGS-30 AGLs, 7.62mm MMGs, 12.7mm HMGs and 81mm/120mm mortars were employed.

In the Leepa Valley, the IA’s SF (Para) combatants crossed the LoC and positioned themselves on ridges directly overlooking the village of Mundakali. Two PA observation posts (OP) and a makeshift mosque located at some distance east of the village were destroyed at 5am. Two other posts higher up in the mountains were also hit. At least four PA soldiers were injured in the attack, which lasted from 5am until 8am. A similar advance by the SF (Para) in the Dudhnial area of Neelum Valley further north was conducted. LeT camps in the Khairati Bagh village of Leepa Valley and the western end of Dudhnial village in the Neelum Valley had been hit. Two PA soldiers were killed in diversionary attacks—one in Poonch, and one in Bhimber sector, further south. A total of nine PA soldiers were injured in these cross-LoC raids. Another diversionary attack occured in the Madarpur-Titrinot region of Poonch sector, where a PA OP was destroyed and one soldier killed between 4.30am & 6am. Terror laubch-pads in the Samahni-Mandhole area of Bhimber or in Tattapani of the Poonch-Kotli area could not be attacked since they were located behind ridges that serve as a natural barrier against direct-fire. In Leepa, six wooden structures housing terrorists between the villages of Channian and Mundakali were not targetted, since a ridge that runs along the east bank of the nearby stream covered them from the IA positions on the LoC. Likewise, in Neelum, most terrorist camps—such as the ones at Jhambar, Dosut and in the Gurez Valley area further east—were located in the valleys below at a safe distance from the LoC and were therefore not targetted by the IA’s cross-LoC assault teams. According to the PA, an exchange of fire between PA and IA troops began at 2:30am on September 29 and continued till 8am in the Bhimber, Hot Spring, Kel and Leepa sectors inside PoK. Hot Springs, Kel and Leepa come under the jurisdiction of the IA’s XV Corps, while Bhimber Gali comes under the XVI Corps. Subsequent independent reportage (by both the BBC & The Indian Express) revealed that an IA ground assault did occur in the Madarpur-Titrinot region of Poonch sector, west of Srinagar, where a PA post was destroyed and one soldier killed. In Leepa valley to the north, the IA’s combatants crossed the LoC and set themselves up on ridges directly overlooking the village of Mundakali. A PA post located at some distance east of the village was hit. Two other posts higher up in the mountains were also hit. At least four PA soldiers were injured in the attack, which lasted from 5am until 8am. A similar advance by the IA in the Dudhnial area of Neelum valley further north was beaten back by the PA. At least one PA soldier was injured there. Two PA soldiers were killed in the attacks--one in Poonch, and one in Bhimber sector, further south. A total of nine soldiers were injured in the IA’s assaults. In Leepa, the IA’s combatants first opened fire in the valley at around 5am, hitting a PA post near Mundakali village and blowing up a mosque adjacent to it. A PA soldier who was preparing for pre-dawn prayers was hit and injured. Fire was also directed at two other posts higher up in the hills, one of which served as the PA’s forward headquarters in Leepa. Bunkers at these posts were partly destroyed and their communications system was paralysed for some time. This meant that PA troops stationed down in the valley and at the Brigade HQ took a while to realise what was going on. The soldier who was injured at the Mundakali post was given first-aid by villagers, and then transported to the military-run hospital in Leepa on a motorbike. Nearly two dozen villagers helped put out the fire that had engulfed the mosque. The PA did not take long to get their act together and fired back from the remaining bunkers, pushing the IA’s combatants back from the ridges overlooking the Valley.

At Dudhnial in the Neelum Valley, the action took place further up in the mountains, away from the village. A few villagers were awakened by gunfire. There, the IA’s combatants had advanced well beyond the LoC when their movements were detected and were fired upon. Two local eyewitnesses who visited Dudhnial, a small hamlet some 4km across the LoC from India’s nearest forward post, Gulab, ahead of the town of Kupwara, reported seeing a gutted building across the Al-Haawi bridge from the hamlet’s main bazaar, where both a military outpost and a compound used by the LeT were sited. Al-Haawi bridge is the last point where infiltrating Jihadists are loaded with supplies before beginning their climb up to the LoC towards Kupwara. Local residents revealed that loud explosions—possibly rounds fired from Instalaza C-90 LAWs—were heard from across the Al-Haawi bridge late in the night, along with intense small-arms fire. Five, perhaps six, dead-bodies were loaded on to a truck early next morning, and possibly transported to the nearest major LeT camp at Chalhana, across the Neelum River from Tithwal, on the Indian side of the LoC. The subsequent Friday prayers at a LeT-affiliated mosque in Chalhana, ended with a cleric vowing to avenge the deaths of the men killed the previous day. The LeT Jihadists gathered there were blaming the PA for failing to defend the LoC. In Leepa, some five or six wooden structures housing terrorists between the villages of Channian and Mundakali had not been targetted. A ridge that runs along the east bank of the nearby stream covers them from the IA’s positions along the LoC. Likewise, in Neelum, most terrorist camps-such as the ones at Jhambar, Dosut, and in the Gurez Valley area further east-are located in the valleys below, at a safe distance from the LoC. The LeT’s launch-pad dwellings in the Khairati Bagh village of Leepa Valley and the western end of Dudhnial village in Neelum Valley were attacked and hit. At Dudhnial, some local residents who helped carry military munitions to the PA’s forward posts the weekend following the IA’s cross-LoC strikes said that they had seen one or two damaged structures close to a PA post near the LoC. Following the strikes, there was an increased influx of Jihadists in the Valley.

At Leepa, a complex of some 25 hamlets located at the bottom of the Qazi Nag stream flowing down from the mountains above Naugam, on the Indian side of the LoC, was among the “launch-pads” targetted in the cross-LoC raids. Local villagers there saw a LeT-occupied three-storied wooden building destroyed near the hamlet of Khairati Bagh. Three or four LeT personnel were thought to have been killed in this raid, while the others fled into the adjoining forests after the firing began. Interestingly, the Jamaat-ud-Dawa’s charitable wing, the Falah-i-Insaniyat Foundation, had held a major eye-surgery camp in Khairati Bagh in August, using the opportunity to deliver speeches on alleged atrocities committed by IA soldiers in Kashmir. Khairati Bagh was, until 2003, a major LeT base, which was slowly scaled down once the unwritten LoC ceasefire went into place in November 2003 and the LeT’s cross-LoC operations slowly declined. It remains, though, of key importance to the LeT, offering multiple lines of access into northern Kashmir through Chowkibal and the Bangas Bowl. Fire and explosions were also heard from the east bank of the Neelum River in Athmuqam, the district headquarters. The fighting appeared to have taken place near PA camps along the Katha Nar stream that empties into the Neelum River just north of the town. A bustling town that serves as a hub for tourism and commerce, Athmuqam is also a major military hub, with several PA facilities located on ridges along the east bank of the river, sheltered from the IA’s field artillery bombardments. The ghost villages of Bicchwal and Bugna, almost entirely abandoned by their residents who fled when terrorism in the Kashmir Valley began in 1990, are barely 2km from Salkhanna, the first village on the Pakistani side of the LoC, and the last loading point for jihadist infiltrators. A local eyewitness who visited the Neelum District Hospital in Athmuqam said he heard that several LeT personnel had been killed and injured, but said no bodies had been buried locally.

Down south, in the Poonch, Kotli and Bhimber areas, it was more or less the same story: IA’s combatants coming forward from their positions on the LoC, taking unsuspecting PA soldiers by surprise both due to the suddenness of the attack and the intensity of the fire and then pulling back once the PA had a chance to respond. Unprepared, and having a numerical disadvantage generally, the PA soldiers made use of their firepower to the fullest, exhausting their ammunition. In the days following the attack, hundreds of villagers in PoK were pressed into service for hauling artillery shells and other ammunition to the PA’s border posts to replenish their supplies. The Jihadists continued to maintain safe houses in bigger cities like Muzaffarabad. But they shifted their launch-pad dwellings near the PA’s garrisons along the LoC and away from the villages. There were no reports of any of the terrorist camps in the Samahni area of Bhimber or in the Poonch-Kotli area having been hit. Such camps were mostly located behind ridges that serve as a natural barrier against direct Indian fire.

On October 28, 2016 Pakistan-origin Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) terrorists, assisted by covering fire from PA troops, conducted a cross-LoC attack in Machchil sector of Kupwara district. The terrorist killed IA trooper 17 Sikh Regiment’s Mandeep Singh, 26, and beheaded his body before fleeing back. Singh’s mutilated corpse was discovered after he got separated from his patrol near the LoC ahead of Kala Post, one of several IA forward positions in the volatile Machchil sector. In retaliation, the IA destroyed a PA Company HQ and four military posts on October 29. At least 20 Pakistani soldiers were reported to be killed in the attack.

On November 22, 2016 IA Rifleman Prabhu Singh was beheaded by a BAT of the PA’s SSG at Machchil, while two other IA soldiers were ambushed and killed. An abandoned (and subsequently recovered) night-vision monocle used by the BAT was likely transferred by the United States to the PA for use in combating terrorists of the Pakistani Taliban along the Durand. This is not the first time that such nigh-vision devices with the marking ‘US Government Property’ had been recovered in counter-terrorism operations inside J & K. An unidentified IA officer who was deployed near Machchil in 2015, later revealed that his unit, which had eliminated four terrorists in an encounter at that time, had recovered an identical device. Other than the night-vision device, there were other clear indicators of a Pakistani hand in the attacks. A medical gauze recovered was marked ‘Pakistan Defence Forces’, while medicines had markings of manufacturing plants in Lahore, Karachi and Multan on them. Other equipment recovered included a tactical radio-set, several ammunition cartridges, wire cutters, food items, binoculars and sleeping bags.

Skirmishing in the Rajouri-Poonch belt had led to the April 1 killing of Naib Subedar S Sanayaima Som by an IED that was believed to have been laid by a PA raiding party.

On May 1, 2017 two IA soldiers were beheaded and another injured in a SSG/BAT operation in the Krishna Ghati sector in Poonch district. While PA troops were targetting two forward posts of the IA with RPG-7s and 60mm mortars, the SSG/BAT attackers moved in and beheaded BSF Head Constable Prem Sagar and IA Subedar Paramjeet Singh. The SSG/BAT attackers had monitored the IA patrol that left Kirpan Post, manned by the BSF’s 200 Battalion, early in the morning, in a routine search for IEDs, knowing it would take cover in the nearest available space when heavy machine guns and RPG-7s are fired from across the LoC. The killing, which was over inside just a few minutes, had been authorised by the PA’s COAS, Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa, following a visit to PA positions in Haji Pir on April 30, 2017. Local PA commanders had underlined the need for reprisal strikes following the killing of seven to ten soldiers in an April 17, 2017 IA field artillery assault targetting PA posts across a large swathe of the LoC in Poonch and Rajouri. Up to 10 PA soldiers were then killed or injured in fire directed at a position identified on IA maps by the codename Pimple, facing Kirpan Post. Four civilians—Mohammad Shakil, Ishrat Bibi, Irum Younas and Atif Majeed—were, however, reported to have been injured in Kotli and Bhimber districts because of IA shelling across the LoC that day. Lt Gen Nadeem Raza, who was then commanding the PA’s X Corps, had pushed back against concerns that the retaliatory action could lead to escalation on the LoC, along with Maj Gen Azhar Abbas, the then GOC of the PA’s Murree-based 12 Infantry Division, the formation whose units had been at the receiving end of the artillery duels on the LoC since 2016.

The IA on May 26, 2017 avenged the May 1 beheadings by killing two personnel of a SSG/BAT team even as it foiled an attack in Uri by the LeT.

On May 29, the IA’s SF (Para) foiled an attack by a PA SSG/BAT squad and killed two members of this squad along the LoC in the Uri sector.

 

On June 22, 2017 afternoon (2pm) two IA soldiers of an area domination patrol were killed in an ambush near the LoC, less than 10km from the town of Poonch. The ambush, carried out by seven SSG/BAT combatants in the midst of intense mortar and small arms exchanges that raged through the day, targetted an IA patrol operating near Gurunj Post, close to the village of Khari Karmara. During the attack, the PA’s troops resorted to firing in Gulpur-Karmara-Chakan-Da-Bagh area along the LoC. At least one SSG/BAT infiltrator was shot dead in Gulpur sector of Poonch district and another injured during the course of the fire exchange, which claimed the lives of 34-year-old Naik Sandip Sarjerao Jadhav of Aurangabad and 24-year-old Sepoy Savan Balku Mane of Kolhapur, and serving with the 15 Maratha Light Infantry. The PA’s covering fire continued till 3.30pm. This ambush—the third of its kind attempted in Poonch in 2017—began at 12.55pm. The month before, the IA had released a video of its troops destroying a PA bunker in the Naushera sector, which was shot just a week after Naib Subedar Paramjeet Singh and BSF Head Constable Prem Sagar were beheaded near Kirpan Post, in the Krishna Ghati sector. Krishna Ghati, one of the few sectors along the LoC where PA troops have positional advantage, had seen intense skirmishing since September 2016. The SSG/BAT combatants were armed with special daggers and headband cameras to mutilate and record the attack on the IA patrol party after ingressing 600 metres across the LoC. Arms, ammunition and other war-like stores including one AK-47, three magazines and two hand- grenades, besides dresses and bags were recovered. The slain SSG/BAT combatant was wearing a headband with camera on his head to record the action and possible mutilations of the IA’s Jawans.

On July 16, 2017 in retaliation for the PA snipers killing two IA soldiers a few days ago, the IA targetted a truck of the PA moving along the Neelum Valley at Shahkot near Athmuqam. The vehicle fell into the river, with four PA soldiers drowning as a result.

On the night of December 25-26, 2017 a small team of six IA Ghaatak combatants surreptitiously crossed the LoC in the Rawlakot-Rukh Chakri sector of PoK to kill at least three PA soldiers (including a Major) and injure a few others. The limited ‘tit-for-tat’ operation was carried out to avenge the killing of four IA soldiers, including Major Moharkar Prafulla Ambadas, by a SSG/BAT at Keri in Rajouri sector of J & K on the afternoon of December 23. ‘Jawabi Karavaee’ (retaliatory action) was required for establishing moral ascendancy. It was a localised, selective targetting cross-LoC raid around 300 metres inside PoK. A patrol from the 59 Baluch Regiment, under the PA’s Rawlakot-based 2 AJK Mujahid Brigade, was first hit and left stunned by an IED that had been placed earlier by the Ghaataks. The Ghaataks, who were lying in wait, next opened fire to maximise the damage before swiftly returning to their own side of the LoC, with the IA’s posts giving them covering fire.

On September 18, 2018 in the Ramgarh sector of Samba district in Jammu, Border Security Force (BSF) Jawan Narendra Kumar was abducted and butchered by a SSG/BAT squad. Kumar’s throat was slit and his eyes gouged out. The JeM on October 18 released pictures of Kumar’s belongings on social media that included his bullet-proof jacket, five magazines INSAS rifle and his mobile phone.

On October 21, 2018 an IA patrol team was ambushed by a group of heavily-armed SSG/BAT from Pakistan in Sunderbani Sector in Rajouri district, killing three IA soldiers—Havildar Kaushal Kumar of Nowshera, Lance Naik Ranjeet Singh of Doda and Rifleman Rajat Kumar Basan of Pallanwala—and seriously injuring a fourth. The incident took place at about 1.45pm. The IA’s soldiers immediately took positions and eliminated two SSG/BAT members. The IA’s ‘Jawabi Karavaee’ (retaliatory action) took place on October 23, when a cross-LoC fire-assault was launched against the PA’s administrative HQ in Hajira area, which also targetted about three terrorist sanctuaries. This action came days after the PA had also pounded the IA’s 93 Infantry Brigade HQ and an IA camp in Poonch on October 23, 2018. The IA used both 120mm mortars and 105mm light artillery ammunition and pounded the PA’s administrative HQ with nearly 12 rounds in the wee hours of the day. The IA Indian had exercised restraint, and avoided targetting the civilian population in PoK towns in close proximity of LoC like Hajira, Bandi Gopalpur, Nakyal, Samanhi and Khuiratta despite the fact that the PA has settled Punjab-origin ex-servicemen and retired government servants much to the chagrin of the disconcerted local populace there.

In the pre-dawn hours of December 30, 2018 combatants of the the IA’s 19 Infantry Division thwarted yet another ‘treacherous attempt’ by the PA’s SSG/BAT to launch a strike on an IA post located amidst thick forests along the LoC at Naugam sector in Kupwara district and killed two intruders. The subsequent recovery by the IA of abandoned arms and ammunition indicated that the PA intended to carry out a “gruesome attack” in that sector. The SSG/BAT intruders were wearing combat uniform like regular and carrying stores with Pakistani markings. Some of the intruders were also seen in BSF and old-pattern IA uniforms as part of a deception. They had intruded well-equipped with IEDs, incendiary materials, explosives, and a plethora of arms and ammunition. They were assisted by heavy covering fire of high-calibre 12.7mm heavy machine guns, 60mm mortars and RPG-7 rocket launchers from the opposing PA posts. Their movement was nonetheless detected by the IA’s LoC surveillance sensors and ther subsequent firefight lasted a few hours. The IA subsequently contacted the PA so that the latter could claim and take back the bodies of the two killed intruders.