The War That Should Never Have Been-1

Behind the much-feted victory in the India-Pakistan limited war of mid-1999 (in the Drass-Kargil-Batalik-Kaksar sectors of Jammu & Kashmir) lurks colossal blunders—bungles which had involved the top hierarchy of the Govt of India as well as the Indian Army (IA) and Indian Air Force (IAF). In a gist, had the political and IA/IAF leadership simply been more alert and alive to the situation, OP Koh-i-Paima (OP Mountain of Resolve)  need not have been launched at all by the Pakistan Army (PA). As it transpired, India plodded into a needless war costing Rs.19.84 billion, and bled itself in terms of sterling men and material, before eking out a redeeming, if costly, military triumph. It eventually took 11 weeks of bitter fighting by brave and under-equipped Indian soldiers at forbidding heights along craggy mountain ridgelines and peaks, and Washington’s considerable influence, to evict the PA intruders. More 1,200 combatants, including 519 IA soldiers, died; another 1,100 were injured, half of them permanently maimed. Yet, for all the to-do surrounding this definitive episode, it is a shame that no questions are being asked-or entertained-at the highest levels, and no answers being given even 20 years after the conduct by India’s military of OP Vijay (of the IA), OP Safed Saagar (of the IAF) and OP Talwar (of the Indian Navy), especially in terms of decision-making failures/deficiencies at the strategic-level, and lessons learnt at the operational and tactical levels. And it is due to this that India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) till this day desists from publishing the official history of this limited war (which ought to include not only detailed reports on the various AirLand battles/campaigns, but also archival records of India’s Ministry of External Affairs and the Cabinet Committee on national Security). 

Consequently, the 20th anniversary of the limited war will be remembered across India in a celebratory manner over three days (July 25-27), with the theme being “Remember, Rejoice and Renew”, instead of “Analyse, Introspect and Learn”. This was pretty much the case 19 years ago as well when the Kargil Committee Report (KCR) was collectively drafted by K Subrahmanyam, Lt Gen K K Hazari, B G Verghese and Satish Chandra. The KCR failed to include (intentionally or otherwise) the most important lesson, which was: past mistakes that are not acknowledged and corrected due to the political more expedient craving for mass euphoria and exhilaration, always tend to repeat themselves. As the following parts of the narrative will reveal below, it was the severely flawed and executed war campaign (as a direct consequence of strategically unsound higher directions of war laid down by the then ruling political establishment) on the western front in late 1971 and the refusal to officially acknowledge it (by not publishing till this day the MoD’s official history of the 1971 India-Pakistan war) that was responsible for sowing the seeds of the limited war in mid-1999.

The following slides reveal that between October and December 1971, there was considerable disagreement between within the military establishment about the operational priorities, this being largely due to the inability of the then political leadership leadership to clearly spell out the higher directions of war/war directives. For instance, there was no clarity on whether to accord greater priority to the capture of Pakistani territory across the International Boundary (IB) or whether to go for maximum territorial grab across the CeaseFire Line (CFL) and the Working Boundary (WB) along the Chicken’s Neck area.

The following slides reveal that back in 1971 there was no dearth of tactical intelligence, thanks to the several East Pakistani Bengalis who had defected from Pakistan’s military and had sought asylum in India. However, at the strategic-level, for inexplicable reasons, no heed was paid to information emanating from several East European Warsaw Pact member-countries (that had in turn acquired the information from sources in China) which had clearly indicated that: 1) Pakistan’s military, against which a 10-year arms embargo had been imposed by the US in 1965, did not possess the resources/hardware assets required for waging multi-front offensive land campaigns on the western front. 2) The PA and PAF would take a considerable time to master the usage of China-origin weapons that were being imported since 1968 as replacements for their US-origin counterparts. 3) Consequently, the PA and PAF would undertake only one offensive campaign, most probably across the CFL against Jammu & Kashmir. 4) The rest of the PA and PAF would hunker down and brace for a defensive war of attrition inside Pakistani territory in order to conserve their war-waging resources/assets and war wastage reserves. Consequently, the IA was forced into adopting an all-out defensive posture all along the IB, WB and CFL, which clearly prevented the IA and IAF from adopting limited and clear-cut offensive joint warfighting objectives that could be quickly achieved during an all-out but short conventional war.

Another reason that remains unexplained to date is why the IAF was denied permission to conduct tactical reconnaissance sorties till December 3, 1971 despite the PAF violating Indian airspace and conducting tactical air recce sorties over northern Punjab and southern Jammu since November 20, and commencing tactical air-strikes inside India out of East Pakistan since November 22. Consequently, the IA was denied vital intelligence inputs that would have possibly enabled it to checkmate the PA’s gamble in both Poonch and Chammb, and the Shakargarh Bulge.

As a result, the AirLand campaigns of the IA and IAF in both Chammb and the Shakargarh were nothing else but slugfest duels with no decisive outcomes on the battlefields, instead of the manoeuvre warfare originally envisaged by the IA's HQ Western Command.

As the evidence above indicates, placing greater emphasis on offensive land campaigns across the IB in 1971 (which produced only diminishing returns) resulted in the IA being forced to accord lesser importance to the mountain warfare campaigns that would have fetched over the following years highly value-added returns. For instance, had the IA HQ authorised its HQ Western Command to allocate greater warfighting resources to its XV Corps for the sake of realising all its envisaged tactical objectives—especially the capture of Olthingthang—then the PA in 1984 would not have been able to set up its firm logistics-support base in Goma for supporting its 323 Brigade along the Baltoro Glacier, and by 1999 would have denied the sprawling firm logistics-support base at Olthingthang from where OP Koh-i-Paima was launched and supported.

Battlefield Gains & Losses of 1971

Frittering Away The Military Gains At Shimla

The then Indian Prime Minister Smt.Indira Gandhi, from a position of strength, now really turned the screws on the dismal Pakistani delegation. She would not budge from her three main demands. First, to recognise the CFL as an International border. Second, to merge Azaad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan into the main body of Pakistan and bury the J & K issue forever, not to be brought up at any international forum. And third and most important: recognise Bangladesh, which would mean accepting the complete defeat of Pakistan and the Two-Nation Theory. Only then would she release the Pakistani POWs and return the captured and occupied territory of what was West Pakistan. Needless to say, the Pakistani delegation could not and would not accept these conditions. The Shimla meeting was, therefore, heading for a total failure. No joint statement or accord was released and the Pakistani delegation prepared to return empty-handed. It was then, at the very last minute, that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto asked Indira for a one-on-one meeting—between only the two of them, behind closed doors. The two leaders were inside for an hour, and then a frowning Bhutto emerged and told the delegation to draw up a joint statement on all other matters like trade, cultural exchange etc. But to leave the main points out. The only one mentioned—and here he got a concession from Indira—was that the CFL would henceforth be termed the ‘Line of Control’ (LoC) for each side and he gave the concession that the J & K issue would not be raised by Pakistan in international forums. What had transpired inside came to light later. Bhutto told Indira that if he accepted her conditions, he would be publicly lynched when he returned to Pakistan. A vacuum would be created, a PA General would take over and start planning his revenge on India as well as the use of military force to release the PoWs. Did she really want that? Or did she prefer to deal with a democratically elected politician and popular leader? In the end he charmed her with his salesmanship and asked her to give him time, promising to recognise Bangladesh in his own way and time. He also got her to compromise on the J & K issue by renaming the CFL as the LoC (just an interim ceasefire line) rather than a permanent international border. He also committed to giving Pakistani Passports to Azaad Kashmiris, thus ending the region’s independent status and making it a de facto part of Pakistan. Now what remained was for Bhutto to make good on his promise to recognise Bangladesh.

(to be concluded)

Case For Combining Indian Navy’s NGMV & NGC Needs Into A Unitary Procurement

Worldwide, the major navies as well as those with littoral warfare missions are getting rid of their existing fleets of FAC-Ms and light multi-role guided-missile corvettes (both armed with anti-ship cruise missiles of various types) and are opting for new-generation guided-missile corvettes (popularly referred to as littoral combatant ship, or LCS) that displace more than 2,500 tonnes and up to 3,500 tonnes. This trend, which is gaining more traction with every passing day, is due to the following:

1) FAC-Ms and light multi-role guided-missile corvettes have their own set of weaknesses that makes them no more effective than larger principal surface combatants. The LCS is capable of all of the peacetime and most of the wartime abilities of the FAC-M and light multi-role guided-missile corvette. Most importantly, the geography of 21st century seapower does not lend itself to low-endurance warships dependent upon isolated fixed bases for support.

2) The new-generation LCS can fulfill many peacetime duties, including presence functions and training with allied/friendly naval forces, which FAC-Ms and light multi-purpose corvettes cannot. While the LCS is a fully deployable warship capable of sustained operations at sea for at least 21 days, FAC-Ms and light multi-role guided-missile corvettes, however, have only an 8-day sustainability at sea and require a significant advanced base from which to resupply and refuel. The LCS can be supported through refuelling and resupply at sea via underway replenishment vessels.

3) In the current constrained fiscal environment, the first priority of the Indian Navy (IN) must remain high-endurance warships capable of extended combat operations at sea without forward base support. A large force of FAC-Ms and light multi-purpose corvettes cannot meet this requirement.  India is a maritime nation with an interest in protecting and securing what political scientist Barry Posen has called the “global commons” of oceanic trade routes. Consequently, regional power projection within the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) requires regionally deployable naval assets rather than limited-endurance and role-specific sub-regionally dependent vessels.

4) Finally, the geography of seapower as understood by maritime nations with regional interests such as India does not support the use of such short-range vessels as FAC-Ms and light multi-purpose corvettes. Such a country must be ready to transfer significant parts of her armed forces seamlessly over great distances. Relatively high-speed, long-range naval task forces capable of sustained regional deployments are therefore the best solution to the problem of geography. FAC-Ms and light multi-purpose corvettes can be moved from one part of the IOR to another, but neither with the speed nor cost-effectiveness of larger LCS-type platforms with better endurance. The fleet of a regional naval power entrusted with the responsibility of being a net security provider throughout the IOR must be able to depart from one location, sail thousands of miles if necessary, arrive in its assigned theatre of operations and attain sea control without reliance on forward land bases, which may be vulnerable or unavailable for use.

The above-mentioned four underpinnings are what must dictate the procurement of replacements for the IN’s existing fleets of 549-tonne Project 1241RE ‘Molniya’ FAC-Ms and the 1,350-tonne Project 25 and 25A light multi-purpose guided-missile corvettes. But that has not been the case thus far. For instance, in February 2015 the IN’s global Request for Information (RFI) for six new-generation missile vessels (NGMV) specified that the vessel should have a displacement of some 1,500 tonnes, must cruise at speeds of more than 35 Knots, and have an endurance of 10 days at sea. The vessel should also carry a minimum of eight multi-role anti-ship cruise/land-attack cruise missiles, be fitted with a point defence missile system (PDMS) and possess a medium-range gun with ‘stealth features’ and having range in excess of 15km.

This was followed in October 2016 by another RFI that was sent by the IN sent to India-based shipyards—both private-owned and state-owned—that called for the supply of seven next-generation corvettes (NGC) capable of offensive attack with anti-ship cruise/land-attack cruise missiles, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations, local naval defence, maritime interdiction operations and visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) missions, with deliveries of these seven vessels beginning from 2023. In terms of weapons fitments, the IN specified the BrahMos-1 missiles, a SAM system, cannon-based remotely-operated close-in weapon system, a medium-range gun with 15km-range, a twin deck-borne light torpedo launch system, and a helicopter deck capable of housing a light twin-engined naval utility helicopter (NUH) or VTOL unmanned aerial system (UAS).

From the above, it becomes clear that the IN remains intellectually stunted by being unwilling to take the required paradigm transformational leap of the type required for the net security provider for the IOR. Sound common sense suggests that the IN should combine its NGMV and NGC requirements by opting for common-hull 3,500-tonne LCS-type vessels (numbering 18 units) that ought to incorporate the following:

1) A 76/62 SRGM of the type already in service with the IN, plus two remotely-operated six-barrelled AK-630M cannons as close-in weapon systems.

Fire-control for all these weapons will be provided by the Pharos radar, which is now being co-developed by THALES of France and India’s Bharat Electronics Ltd.

2) Up to 24 vertically-launched Barak-8 LR-SAMs.

3) Up to 12 dual-tasked, vertically-launched long-range cruise missiles (either BrahMos-1/BrahMos-NG or Nirbhay) equipped with DRDO-developed X-band imaging monopulse active seekers capable of accepting programmable target recognition algorithms for either land-attack or anti-ship strike in real-time.

4) Twin two-tube heavyweight torpedo launchers—one on the port-side and one on the starboard-side of the LCS.

5) Integrated main mast (of the types available from France, The Netherlands, Italy or Russia) that houses all the required types of RF sensors, optronic sensors as well as integrated communications and electronic warfare suites. By resolving the electromagnetic conflicts and line-of-sight obstructions inherent to traditional topside antenna arrangements, the integrated mast aims at delivering an unobstructed field-of-view, reduced radar cross-section; ease of electromagnetic friction and simplifies shipboard integration.

This in turn provides a significant benefit in terms of improved operational performance and availability, shorter shipbuilding time, reduced maintenance requirements and significant savings in below-deck volume. In an integrated mast various antennae are integrated within the design of the mast itself along with the electronic equipment to be “integrated” in the mast as a single unit. The result is a mast that is a structurally self-supporting module.

6) A multi-purpose, remotely-operated rigid-hull inflatable boat (RHIB) capable of carrying either side-scan sonar, or mine-detection sonar, or mine disposal robotic vehicle, or a dunking sonar. Such vehicles are also known as unmanned surface vessels (USV).

7) A stern-mounted helicopter deck capable of accommodating a 10-tonne naval multi-role helicopter and an armed VTOL-UAS that is also equipped with both a search radar and an gimballed optronic sensor suite.

8) A new-generation 360-degree augmented reality wall Combat Information Centre (CIC) housing the combat management system (CMS), which is network-centric and makes extensive use of software-defined radios (SDR).

Potential Contenders

Outside the US, there are only three major shipbuilders that are implementing on-going contracts for supplying LCS-type multi-mission guided-missile corvettes—Naval Forces of France, Fincantieri of Italy, and Russia’s United Shipbuilding Corp.

France’s Naval Forces has bagged contracts for its Gowing-2500 LCS design from Malaysia (six units) and Egypt (four units). The Gowind-2500 LCS incorporates the SETIS CMS (originally developed by DCNS for FREMM guided-missile frigates and GOWIND family of corvettes), the Panoramic Sensors and Intelligence Module (PSIM)—an assembly bringing together the integrated mast with its various instruments as well as the Operational Centre and its associated technical rooms, and a high-degree of integration, automation and conviviality. The 2,600-tonne Gowind-2500 LCS has a length of 102 metres, width of 16 metres, maximum speed of 25 Knots, crew complement of 65, range of 3,700 nautical miles while cruising at 15 Knots, and a combined diesel and diesel (CODAD) propulsion package.

Fincantieri’s LCS design has been ordered by the Qatar Emiri Naval Forces (QENF)—this being for four vessels. Each such LCS will have a full load displacement of 3,250 tonnes, and have a length of 107 metres. The armament suite will comprise dual quad-cell MBDA-supplied Exocet MM-40 Block-III anti-ship cruise missiles, twin Marlin 30-mm remote weapon stations, a 76mm OTOBreda main gun, 16-cell vertical launch system (VLS) for the MBDA-developed Aster-30 long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) and a 21-cell Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) system. In addition, the vessel is fitted with a CODAD propulsion package, and can accommodate 112 people on-board, including 98 crew-members.

From Russia’s United Shipbuilding Corp comes two offers: the Project 20385 multi-mission guided-missile corvette from the St. Petersburg-based Northern Shipyard (Severnaya Verf), a subsidiary of United Shipbuilding Corp; and the Project 20386 multi-mission guided-missile corvette from a partnership of Severnaya Verf Shipyard and Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard.

The Project 20385 multi-mission guided-missile corvette was offered three years ago to the IN for meeting the NGC requirement. This vessel has a displacement of 2,500 tonnes, a length of 106 metres, width of 13 metres, a speed of up to 27 Knots, a cruising range of 3,500nm, an endurance of 15 days, and a crew complement of 99.

The Project 20386 LCS has a full displacement of 3,400 tonnes and is 109 metres long and 13 metres wide. It produces a top speed of 30 Knots, has a cruising range of 5,000nm, crew complement of 80, a combined diesel-electric and gas turbine (CODLOG) propulsion package that integrates two 27,500hp M90FR gas-turbine engines from NPO Saturn, two electric powerpacks with a power output of 2,200hp each, and a 6RP speed-reduction unit.

The Project 20386 LCS comes fitted with a modular armament suite that incorporates either two four-cell 3S-24 inclined launchers with the Kh-35E Uran anti-ship cruise missiles, or containerised launchers with the Kalibr-family of long-range cruise missiles. Air-defence is provided by two eight-cell 3S-97 ‘Redut’ VLS coupled to the Zaslon multifunctional radar that has its active phased-array antenna arrays integrated with the tower-mast construction (I.e. an integrated main mast).

The LCS’ near-field area is protected by two 30mm AK-630M CIWS mounted in pair on the aft superstructure. The LCS is also armed with a nose-mounted A-190-01 100mm naval gun that can be controlled by the Zaslon radar. Also carried are the ‘Paket’ ASW suite with twin four-cell SM-588 launchers for 324mm torpedoes, Minotavr-ISPN-M hull-mounted panoramic sonar, Signa-20380 CMS, and a collapsible stern-mounted helicopter hangar.

When it comes to robotic, remotely-operated vehicles, several options are available from France’s ECA Group and Japan’s Japan's Mitsui E & S Shipbuilding Co. The latter’s vehicle is a high-performance mine-hunting system specifically designed for the steep bathymetry and strong currents around Japan. With a length of 1.8 metres and a weight just below 90Kg, the whole system comes with a control station and cable winch. It is indeed controlled via a “fine optical cable”, allowing the vehicle to achieve speed and good manoeuvrability, while the high-power battery systems (LiSO2 and Li-Ion) provide long endurance. The cable winch with auto-tensioner makes the cable resistance much smaller, contributing to fast target detection. For optical identification at greater depth, the robotic vehicle is fitted with a high-definition camera. The operator can get a clear sight at low light intensity. Thanks to a unique thruster arrangement, the vehicle can approach a target from various angles. Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) selected this robotic vehicle after evaluating other foreign systems including ECA Group’s K-Ster.

For meeting the USV requirement, the Seagull from Elbit Systems of Israel (represented in India by the Kolkata-based Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers) will be the ideal choice. Back in 2017, Elbit Systems, by using SATCOM data-links, demonstrated that the Seagull USV, sailing in Israel’s Haifa Bay, could perform operational ASW missions using control consoles situated some 3,515km away in the UK. Operating the L-3 Ocean Systems-supplied DS-100 HELRAS dipping sonar in conjunction with Elbit Systems’ proprietary software, Seagull performed real-time detections and classification of objects, thereby demonstrating the capability to deter and dissuade hostile undersea activities.

The Seagull demonstration team included two operators—a USV operator and sonar operator. The Seagull is a 12-metre long multi-mission USV that can be operated from a mother-warship or from shore-based stations. It provides multi-mission capabilities, including ASW, mine-hunting and mine-sweeping, electronic warfare (EW), maritime security and underwater commercial missions, by leveraging modular mission system installation options and offering a high level of autonomy. It features inherent C4I capabilities for enhanced situational awareness, and has a mission endurance of more than four days.