South Asia’s
first aerial engagement in 48 years, which took place on the morning of
February 27 this year, was noteworthy for two reasons. Firstly, the engagements
between the two opposing air forces saw the successful usage of both
beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles (BVRAAM) and short-range air-to-air
missiles (SRAAM), with the former being a first for the skies of South Asia.
Secondly, both opposing air forces engaged one another not only with their
respective multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) fleets, but also with
combat-support platforms like airborne early warning & control (AEW &
CS) aircraft—the world’s first -ever such engagement in the history of aerial
warfare. And it is in these two areas that witnessed outcomes that were not
entirely surprising when analysed in detail, and which will have a profound
impact on both future force modernization projects of both air forces, but also
on the employment of offensive airpower in the next round of limited
hostilities in South Asia.
In the arena of
air combat with BVRAAMs, the Indian Air Force (IAF) had an appreciable head-start
over the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) when in the 1980s it had procured Vympel
R-23R and Matra Super 530D missiles along with its MiG-23MF and Mirage-2000H/TH
combat aircraft, whereas the PAF could procure its first BVRAAMs—the
Raytheon-built AIM-120C-5 AMRAAMs—only in the previous decade. Consequently,
the IAF was expected to have acquired a very degree of proficiency in putting
its present holdings of BVRAAMs to good use by applying innovative tactics. But
surprisingly, this did not turn out to be the case, with the PAF ending up
scoring the first air combat kill with a BVRAAM. On the other hand, the IAF’s
successful employment of the Vympel R-73E SRAAM with the help of the Sura-1
helmet-mounted display system (HMDS) once again proved that even
third-generation legacy-MRCAs—when suitably upgraded—can be lethal tools in the
hands of experienced air warriors. But if the ‘deep upgrade’ efforts are
half-hearted, then a heavy price will have to be paid, which is exactly what
the IAF seems to have now discovered.
Take, for
instance, the MiG-21 Bison upgrade project, which in the late 1990s was meant
to give a new lease of life to 125 of the IAF’s 225 those MiG-21 Bis
light-MRCAs that were scheduled to be phased out on the expiry of their total
technical service-life (TTSL) of 20 years/2,400 flight-hours. Known as the
MiG-21-93 project, it involved the following: extending the TTSL of the
airframe and its Tumansky R-25-300
turbofan (producing 97.1kN thrust with afterburning) for up
to 40 years and 4,000 flying hours; installing the Phazotron NIIR-developed
Kopyo (Spear) multi-mode airborne pulse-Doppler X-band radar (MMR), and a new
navigation-and-attack system developed by THALES of France that included a
TOTEM ring laser gyro-based inertial navigation system (RLG-INS) coupled to a
NSS-100P GPS receiver, ELBIT/El-Op Type 967 heads-up display, a MFD-55 active-matrix
liquid-crystal display (AMLCD), locally-developed Tarang Mk.1 radar warning
receiver (RWR), radar altimeter, hands-on-throttle and stick (HOTAS) controls,
digital flight data recorder, autopilot, and a stores management system. The
entire project was co-developed by RAC MiG, Phazotron-NIIR, GosNIIAS and Sokol
Joint-Stock Company. Thus, the MiG-21 Bison was made capable of airborne target
detection and lock-on range both in look-up and look-down while using R-27R and
R-77/RVV-AE BVRAAMs; ground and sea-surface target detection and improved
communications and navigation aids; airborne target detection and engagement
range in action in the front hemisphere; improved PGM guidance and engagement
capabilities in action against ground targets of any type; track-while-scan
mode with the capability of tracking up to 10 targets and engaging two of them
concurrently; and self-protection through the usage of the ELTA Systems-built
EL/L-8222 high-band self-protection pod, plus newly-installed chaff/flare
countermeasures dispensers. And yet, on the morning of February 27, one such
MiG-21 Bison (armed with two Vympel R-77/RVV-AE BVRAAMs and two R-73E SRAAMs) of
the IAF’s 1 Wing’s No.51 ‘Sword Arms’ Sqn operating out
of Avantipora air base in Jammu &
Kashmir (J & K) was lost to enemy fire. So what went wrong?
Lessons
From The ‘Furball’
At around 9:30am
on February 27, IAF flight controllers noticed a large package of 24 PAF combat
aircraft taking off in a matter of 15 minutes from three different air bases.
These included at least 12 F-16C/Ds. As they approached the Line of Control
(LoC), they split up into two different formations, with airborne battle
management cues being provided by a Saab 2000 AEW & CS platform. The
formations included four Mirage-VPAs, four Mirage-IIIEAs and four JF-17s headed
for the Sundarbani-Rajouri-Naushera sub-sectors; and eight F-16s headed for the
Rajouri-Mendhar sub-sector and Nangi Tekri in Karmara. Pitted against them
were two of the IAF’s upgraded Mirage-2000INs and four MiG-21 Bisons flying
north of the Pir Panjal Range, and four Su-30MKIs to the south of the Range. The main PAF strike force comprised four F-16C/Ds armed with DENEL
Dynamics-supplied Raptor-IID TV-guided gliding munition, while the remaining
four F-16C/Ds and four JF-17s were tasked with the protection of the strike
package while remaining in a rear area over the Mangla Dam near the PoK-Pakistan
Punjab border. Targets selected by the PAF for the air-strikes were the Indian
Army posts at Bhimber Gali (elevation of 5,479 feet), Krishna Ghati Top
(Nangi Tekri) at a height of 4,665 feet, Potha at an elevation of 4,073 feet, and
an ammunition storage area in Narian (belonging to the 25 Infantry Division of
the Indian Army) at an elevation of 2,000 feet. These targets, falling in
India’s Rajouri sector, were deliberately selected for the sake of establishing
Pakistan’s ‘moral; ascendancy’ along this portion of the LoC—given the fact
that it is from these areas that the Indian Army dominates its opposing
adversary’s Battal sector, which is located at lower altitudes.
However, the
moment the intruding PAF F-16s gained altitude for crossing into the areas
southeast of the Pir Panjal Range and approached their designated targets in
Jammu at altitudes varying from 5,000 feet to 10,000 feet in order to launch
the Raptor-IIDs, they were detected by the A-50I PHALCON by 10.25am, which in
turn vectored the airborne MiG-21 Bisons towards their respective intercept
courses. Since these MiG-21 Bisons climbed in the shadow of the Pir Panjal Range,
the PAF’s Saab 2000 AEW & CS platform failed to detect them. This proved to
be a blessing for the IAF, since the PAF’s attacking F-16C/Ds were taken aback
and were forced to launch their Raptor-IIDs in great hurry. The Su-30MKIs
carrying EL/L-8222 airborne self-protection jammer (ASPJ) pods were kept on
standby further down south to engage the four PAF F-16s that were still
orbiting 162km further to the west. It subsequently became evident that the PAF
had no intention of creating a ‘furball’ either over PoK or over southern Jammu
and all it wanted to achieve was to drive home a ‘point’ about the PAF
demonstrating its will, means and capability to stage a ‘retaliatory sneak
attack’ inside Indian territory.
By most
accounts, while cruising at 15,000 feet altitude, the MiG-21 Bison flown by
Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman engaged a PAF F-16D of 19 ‘Sherdils’ Sqn that had approached the Indian Army’s
ammunition depot at Narian in southern Jammu and was exiting that location at
an altitude of 9,000 feet. While the MiG-21 Bison made a shallow dive to get
within R-73E firing range of the F-16, the latter’s pilot was alerted by his
wingman about the impending attack and so he took an evasive measure by going
into a steep climb to about 26,000 feet. By this time Wg Cdr Abhinandan had
skillfully manoeuvred his MiG-21 Bison behind the fleeing F-16 and had
positioned himself at a 60-degree angle of elevation below the F-16 for maximum
head-on impact. He then fired an R-73E, which effortlessly struck the nose-section
of the F-16D. However, even as the R-73E was closing on to its target, the
wingman of the F-16 (Wing Commander Nauman Ali
Khan) moved in from behind and
fired an AIM-120C-5 AMRAAM from a distance of less than 12km, hitting the
centre-fuselage of the MiG-21 Bison. A second AIM-120C-5 that was probably
fired against Wg Cdr Abhinandan’s wingman (who had gotten separated from
him) failed to hit its target and consequently it slammed into Mamankote
Mallas village, Reasi, and caused an explosion that spread splinters and
missile parts within a radius of 100 metres.
The entire aerial engagement lasted for some 90 seconds and ended at around 10:45am. The PAF F-16D was shot down over the Jhangar area of J & K, but its wreckage fell in Khuiratta inside Pakistan-occuiped-Kashmir (PoK), opposite the Lam Valley. The MiG-21 Bison, on the other hand, went down near Horra’n Kotla village, located 7km west of the LoC in PoK’s Bhimber district.
The entire aerial engagement lasted for some 90 seconds and ended at around 10:45am. The PAF F-16D was shot down over the Jhangar area of J & K, but its wreckage fell in Khuiratta inside Pakistan-occuiped-Kashmir (PoK), opposite the Lam Valley. The MiG-21 Bison, on the other hand, went down near Horra’n Kotla village, located 7km west of the LoC in PoK’s Bhimber district.
There are two
probable reasons why Wg Cdr Abhinandan’s
MiG-21 Bison was hit by the AIM-120C-5, while that of his wingman survived the
aerial engagement: the former’s aircraft was not equipped with either a missile
approach warning system, or MAWS (which provides advance warning on inbound
guided-missiles of all types), or the EL/L-8222 high-band self-protection pod,
while the latter had the EL/L-8222 and hence was able to jam the AMRAAM’s
Ku-band active radar seeker. It needs to be noted here that universal air
combat rules call for using one high-band self-protection pod for every two
combat aircraft (comprising the flight leader and his/her wingman). However,
since it is impossible to maintain formation during air combat, it is now
preferable to have internally-mounted high-band self-protection jammers that
can provide assured self-defence.
There are
only three plausible reasons why the PAF preferred to use BVRAAMs instead of
SRAAMs for this aerial engagement: 1) The PAF was unsure whether or
not the IAF’s Su-30MKIs equipped with OLS-30 infra-red search-and-track (IRST)
sensors would join the battle (if they were to, then they would have easily had
the upper hand since they can cruise at higher altitudes from where the R-73E
SRAAM/Sura-1 HMDS combination can be used with devastating effect); 2) The
PAF, devoid of all-aspect SRAAMs that can be guided wide off-boresight by the
Boeing-built Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS), was extremely vary of
initiating within-visual-range engagements due to the guaranteed and
combat-proven lethality and superior engagement envelope of the R-73E
SRAAM/Sura-1 HMDS combination found in the MiG-21 Bison. Thus, even though
equipped with either ITT Corp-built ALQ-211V4 or Northrop Grumman-built ALQ-131V
jamming pods, the pilots of the PAF’s F-16s and JF-17 ‘Thunders’ on February 27
morning knew only too well that once the ‘furball’ started within a
hemispheric air combat ‘bowl’ measuring 10 nautical miles in diameter, MRCAs
like the Mirage-2000N and Su-30MKI (that were airborne at that time) were the
perfect ones to fly. In fact, it is universally acknowledged that thanks to
their superb aerodynamics and all-aspect SRAAM/HMDS combination,
both the Mirage-2000N and Su-30MKI are exceptional platforms for close-in
combat. 3) In the BVR arena, the IAF had a unique edge over the PAF
through the incorporation of a radar finger-printing avionics suite (which is
interfaced with the on-boasrd radar warning receiver sensors) on its fleet of
Su-30MKIs that allows the H-MRCAs to operate in an all-passive non-cooperative
target recognition (NCTR) mode (which none the PAF’s frontline MRCAs possess
till today).
NCTR
Mode: A Vital Force-Multiplier
In essence, the NCTR mode enables a
combat aircraft to approach its opponent/s in all-passive mode while at the
same time maintaining total situational awareness about the range and bearing
of the opposing aircraft whose on-board MMR is operating in the
track-while-scan mode and the subsequent target lock-on mode when firing a
BVRAAM. However, the laws of physics dictate that when the MMR is activated,
the ASPJs have to be switched off for preventing electromagnetic interference
(EMI). This is when the NCTR mode enables an aircraft like the Su-30MKI to
passively lock-on to its opponent and fire BVRAAMs like the R-77 or even IIR-guided
SRAAMs like the R-73E while at the same time keeping its EL/L-8222 ASPJ
activated for completely neutralising hostile BVRAAMs like the AIM-120 AMRAAM.
The hostile MRCA, on the other hand, remains unaware of the approaching BVRAAM
or SRAAM (until it is too late to take evasive action) because it is
illuminating the AMRAAM while at the same time being forced to de-activate its
own integral ASPJ pod.
On the other
hand, the sleek MiG-21 Bison in combination with the R-73E SRAAM/Sura-1 HMDS in
sensor-lock mode proved to be a sure-killer. The R-73E hosts a very capable
infra-red heat-seeker with a greater range and wider off-boresight sensor
cueing capability than the PAF’s Raytheon-supplied AIM-9M-8 Sidewinder. A
simple monocular lens in front of Wg Cdr Abhinandan’s right eye
enabled him to slew the R-73E’s seeker onto his adversary at a high angle off
target and achieve lock-on even though his MiG-21 Bison’s nose was pointed far
away from its target. The Sura-1 comes mounted via a spring-loaded clip to
a modified HGU-55P helmet. The pilot then connects the HMDS to a tester and
adjusts the symbology so that it is centered in the monocle. Once in the
aircraft, the simple act of plugging in the power cord means it is ready for
use. There is no alignment process required with the Joint Helmet-Mounted Cuing
System. It just worked. Being on the shooting end of the equation, one sees
shot opportunities that he/she would never have dreamed of with SRAAMs like the
AIM-9M-8 Sidewinder used by the PAF. Those on the receiving end are equally
less enthused about being shot from angles they could not otherwise train to.
IAF’s MSWS Shortcomings
Where the
IAF’s MRCAs came short of their PAF counterparts was in the arena of
self-protection suites—a situation similar to the one in mid-1999 when only
after Operation Safed Sagar did the IAF decide to equip the bulk of
its USSR-origin aircraft and helicopters with the hitherto-absent chaff/flare
countermeasures dispensers. In the MiG-21 Bison’s case, the lack of
conformally-mounted high-band self-protection hammers and MAWS is hard to
explain, since such fitments have been available to the IAF from Sweden’s
SaabTech, South Africa’s Avitronics and Grintek, and from Denmark’s TERMA since
the mid-1990s. In case of the MiG-29UPG and Su-30MKis too, such
mission-critical fitments have not yet been specified by the IAF, even though
the PAF’s F-16s and JF-17s have had these since the previous decade! It was in
March 1999 that Celsius of Sweden, which also owns SaabTech, bought a 49% share
in Grintek Avitronics, South Africa's biggest passive electronic warfare
development house, for US$4.8 million. And in
March 2011 Cassidian Optronics, part of the defence and security division of
EADS, acquired the majority shareholding in South Africa-based Grintek Ewation
(GEW) Technologies. In October 2014 Cassidian Optronics became
part of Airbus Defence & Space Optronics Airbus Group, which in March 2017
became HENSOLDT Optronics GmbH. Interestingly, on July 17, 2006, the then EADS
and India’s state-owned Defence R & D Organisation’s (DRDO) Bengaluru-based
Defence Avionics Research Establishment (DARE) had inked a Memorandum of
Understanding on the joint development of a MAWS suite (using MILDS-F
AN/AAR-60V2 dual-color IR/UV sensors) for three of the locally-developed
EMB-135I AEW & CS platforms as well as other IAF combat and combat-support
aircraft. Achieving initial operational capability for this suite was planned
for 2011, while state-owned Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) was nominated for
producing 36 MAWS suites, which were to be a part of the
multi-sensor/multi-spectral warning system (MSWS) that also included RWRs and
laser warning receivers.
However,
as of today, only the three EMB-145Is have the MSWS, while none of the existing
IAF combat aircraft fleets have them. While they have been specified for the
projected Super Su-30MKI mid-life deep upgrade programme, what remains
unanswered is why was the MSWS not incorporated into the Su-30MKI procurement
project early in the previous decade itself, and on the 63-unit MiG-29UPG
upgrade project (whose DARE-developed D-29 suite includes only the
DARE-developed and BEL-built R-118 ‘Dhruti’ RWRs and high-band active
transmit/receive units with Vivaldi-type antenna arrays) that commenced in 2010.
In comparison, when Malaysia in 2005 ordered 18 Su-30MKMs, it specified the
fitment of Saab-Grintek Avitronics-supplied MAW-300 MAWS and LWS-310 laser
warners along with the Russia-supplied Pastel L-140-30 RWRs. Incidentally, the
MAW-300, LWS-310 and the RWS-300 RWR from Saab-Grintek Avitronics were specified
early this decade for installation on the ‘Rudra’ helicopter gunships that were
ordered for the IAF and Indian Army’s Aviation Corps from state-owned Hindustan
Aeronautics Ltd (HAL).
Lack
of SDR & TDLs Affected Airborne Battle Management
The introduction
of AEW & CS platforms into the subcontinent by the PAF (four Saab 2000s of the
Kamra-based No.3 Sqn and four CETC of China-supplied ZDK-03 Karakoram Eagle
KE-3s of the Masroor-based No.4 Sqn) in the previous decade, and followed by
the IAF’s procurement of three A-50I PHALCONs from Israel and three
locally-developed EMB-145Is earlier this decade) has seen aircrew of both air
forces act like air-traffic controllers for military aircraft on operations.
Due to this, the AEW & CS platforms have become as proficient in an
offensive role as in a defensive role. In the former, the aircrew on board the
AEW & CS platforms can now guide both combat and combat-support aircraft on
to targets during offensive engagements, be they on land, in the air or at sea.
While doing this, the platforms still maintain their defensive roles by
informing friendly pilots what other aircraft are within their area of operations,
be they friend or foe. The A-50I, for instance, can detect low-flying targets
within a diameter of 400km or 215nm. At medium-altitude, it can detect targets
within 520km or 280nm. Thus, one A-50I cruising at 9,150 metres (30,000 feet)
has a radar coverage of 312,000 square kilometres.
On February 27
morning, in the world’s first-ever aerial engagement in the history
of aerial warfare that involved AEW & CS platforms by both sides, the IAF
maintained a defensive posture, while the PAF went on an offensive limited in
time and depth. While the PAF had two of its Saab 2000 AEW & CS platforms
airborne at that time (with each capable of controlling three combat air patrol
[CAP] interceptions and managing one tactical strike mission at the same time)
over an area south of Islamabad and east of Sargodha, the IAF had one A-50I from the Agra-based No.50 Sqn (capable of controlling
six CAP interceptions and managing three tactical strike missions at the same
time) over Himachal Pradesh and one EMB-145I from the Bhisiana-based No.200 ‘Netra’ Sqn (capable of controlling three CAP
interceptions and managing one tactical strike mission at the same time)
airborne near Pathankot at the same time.
But why did the
IAF not mount barrier-CAPs aimed in-strength against the F-16s and JF-17s? One
plausible reason appears to be the IAF’s laid-down rules of engagement
(emerging from the political directives issued), which discouraged the
initiation of air combat inside PoK’s airspace. And this in turn is most
probably due to the lack of UHF-/L-band two-way tactical data-links (TDL)
on-board the IAF’s fleet of combat aircraft, which prevents the AEW & CS
platforms from providing real-time airborne battle management cues to airborne
IAF combat aircraft while operating inside contested/hostile airspace. Instead,
the AEW & CS platforms are presently transmitting the air situation picture
via VHF bands to ground exploitation centres from where ground-controlled
intercept cues are transmitted within line-of-sight (and consequently over a
very limited distance) to the defending IAF combat aircraft deployed on CAPs. TDLs
required for offensive air operations inside hostile airspace include: the
L-band data-link for two-way line-of-sight communications with AEW & CS
platforms; and a UHF-band SATCOM-based data-link for communicating with
ground-based tactical air-controllers. The TDL thus forms part of the airborne
software-defined radio (SDR) suite, which the IAF had specified for procurement
in the previous decade. While the HAL-developed SDR-2010 has been available
since 2011, it was only last year that the IAF commenced efforts on
procuring 473 + 3,125 SDRs worth Rs.630 crore (including the integral TDL
component) TDLs for achieving real-time connectivity between all IAF
aircraft/helicopters and the Integrated Aerospace Command, Control &
Communications System’s (IACCCS) terrestrial and airborne elements, especially
via the GSAT-7A satellite’s on-board SATCOM transponders. For its 83 projected
Tejas Mk.1A L-MRCAs, the IAF has specified RAFAEL of Israel’s BNET-AR SDR for
installation.
During future
hostilities, there are two possible ways of severely degrading the
effectiveness of the PAF’s AEW & CS platforms: 1) investing in LR-SAMs like the Almaz-Antey
S-400 Triumf ADMS; and 2)
acquiring at least four aircraft equipped with high-power wideband jamming
hardware. Following the signature of a contract on October 5, 2018 that is
valued at US$5.43 billion, the IAF is all set to receive its initial five
squadrons of S-400 Triumf ADMS, with deliveries commencing in late
2020. Plans call for eventually expanding this LR-SAM network into five
Brigades in the following decade, and deploying them for the air-defence
(against hostile AEW & CS platforms and ballistic missiles) of major cities
and industrial corridors located in western and central India. The sector-wise
command-and-control posts of each of these Brigades will be integrated with the
IAF’s already-operational five nodes of the Integrated Air Command,
Control & Communications System (IACCCS) at Barnala (Punjab), Wadsar
(Gujarat), Aya Nagar (Delhi), Jodhpur (Rajasthan) and Ambala (Haryana). Initially,
the S-400 ADMS will come equipped with only the 380km-range 40N6E LR-SAMs,
which were declared by Russia as being ready for series-production following a
series of user-assisted successful test-firings last August. In the following
decade, the 40N6E LR-SAMs will be joined by the 77N6-N and the
77N6-NI LR-SAMs, having top speeds of 7km/second and using Ka
band millimeter-wave active phased-array radar seekers required for
fire-control and guidance of hit-to-kill interceptors.
Airborne
wideband high-power jammers (with the low-bandwidth jamming taking care of
hostile medium-power/high-power airspace surveillance radars; the
mid-band jamming countering the engagement/target illumination radars
used by ground-based surface-to-air defence systems; and the high-band jamming
neutralizing the active seekers of BVRAAMs and SAMs) using active phased-array
transmit-receive modules with microprocessors made of gallium nitride can
generate around ten times the isotropic radiated power of existing airborne
jammers. In addition, the signal itself is cleaner, which means less accidental
interference. Such new-generation jammers can also handle
quadruple the number of assignments and can switch from target to target almost
instantaneously. Also built-in is the ability to collect, analyse and jam new
hostile signals as they emanate, enabling the system to adjust in-flight to
evolving threat profiles, and apply appropriate countermeasures as the
situation develops. Furthermore, its agile jamming flexibility is further
extended by the deliberate choice of open-architecture, solid-state
electronics, which enables quick and easy updates to be made to its on-board
threat library as and when required, to meet new hostile capabilities as they
appear. Such jammers also have the potential ability
to launch a cyber-attack, involving inserting rogue data packets into hostile
ground-based air-defence networks in a so-called “network invasion.” As
effective, broad spectrum jamming increasingly becomes key to survival in the
modern contested airspace, it is therefore imperative that the IAF acquire such
new-generation wideband high-power jammers to help meet the growing capability
demand.
CSAR
Deficiencies
The results of
the Board of Inquiry (BoI) looking into the IAF Mi-17V-5 helicopter crash
that took place in an open field near Garend Kalaan village in Budgam on
February 27 at 10.10am (merely 10 minutes after it took off from
Awantipora, resulting in seven fatalities, including six IAF personnel), are
likely to result in an overhaul of the IAF’s current standard operating
protocols regarding combat search-and-rescue (CSAR) missions. The BoI,
which is looking into all possible angles (inclusive of friendly
surface-to-air fire due to mistaken friend-or-foe identification actions) due
to local eyewitness accounts of hearing a loud explosion in the
air just before the ill-fated Mi-17V-5 went down, indicating the possibility
of some external event causing the crash. Traditionally, personnel recovery
(PR) and CSAR missions have never been considered as one of the core mission
functions of the IAF and it was due to this that the IAF began procuring SARBE
hand-held personal locator beacons from the UK only from the mid-1990s,
followed a decade later by the raising of ‘Garud’ special forces units tasked
with conducting PR/CSAR missions within highly contested operating
environments. As per a RAND Corp study, if the downed aircrew cannot be
recovered in the first 2 hours or so, the recovery probability drops to about
25%, but the probability declines only slowly thereafter with increasing time
on the ground. However, the IASF till this day does not possess the kind of specially-equipped
helicopters required for CSAR missions. Despite the requirement being specified
a decade ago, the IAF only last year began developing a prototype Mi-17V-5 for
the CSAR role (which made its debut as a static exhibit at the Aero India 2019 expo
in Bengaluru last February) by equipping it with an ELBIT Systems-supplied
COMPASS optronic sensor turret and BEL-developed miniature SATCOM antenna and
secure modems. Other elements, like the MSWS suite, GPS receiver, VOL/ILS
receiver, Doppler-based terrain navigation system, IFF transponder, radar
altimeter, attitude heading reference system, and a traffic collision avoidance
system, have yet to be selected.
Overcoming The Damning Shortfalls
When it comes to
airpower projection, the gaping holes are not just limited to the Indian Air
Force’s (IAF) depleting combat aircraft squadron strength, but they also extend
to vital support infrastructure, as well as block obsolescence of guided
air-combat missiles and ground-based air-defence systems of both the IAF and
Indian Army. Three proposals are now awaiting financial clearance in the
current fiscal year: an order for 18 additional licence-assembled Su-30MKI from
state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL); the procurement of up to 50
upgraded MiG-29UPGs from Russia off-the-shelf; and commencement of the Super
Su-30MKI deep-upgrade project. The first was confirmed at the Aero India 2019
expo in Bengaluru last February by Anatoly G Punchuk, Deputy
Director of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, when he
said: “We have received an official request from the IAF for 18 more (semi-knocked-down)
kits just in January this year. We are preparing a commercial offer,” Although.
Punchuk did not confirm the cost of this projected order, it is estimated that
the figure would be a third of the last order for Su-30MKIs from Russia, which
was placed in 2012 and was valued at. Rs.17,246 crore order for an additional
42 Su-30MKIs in semi-knocked-down condition that HAL subsequently had
licence-assembled.
Earlier, in
November 2018, Russia had made an unsolicited offer for the off-the-shelf
supply of up to 34 upgraded MiG-29UBGs, each powered by Klimov RD-33MK
turbofans and using the Phazotron NIIR-supplied Zhuk-M2E multi-mode
fire-control radars. While the IAF has been invited to buy them at a
unit-cost of US$25 million or Rs.175 crore (since they are already
substantially upgraded to the MiG-29SMT standard and have not been flown ever
since they were built in 2008), each of them will cost Rs.285 crore after being
upgraded to the IAF’s specifications. An IAF technical inspection team visited
Russia last January and has since submitted a favourable report to India’s
Ministry of Defence (MoD). The IAF’s existing 69 MiG-29B-12s are presently
being upgraded to the MiG-29UPG-standard under a 2008 contract worth $900
million (Rs.3,850 crore). These are in service with the
Adampur-based 8 Wing’s 47 Black Archers and
223 Tridents squadrons and the Jamnagar-based 33 Wing’s 28 First
Supersonics squadron.
In 2010, the
IAF had issued a Rs.10,200 crore Request for Proposals (RFP) for the
deep-upgrade of 84 of its Su-30MKIs into the Super Su-30MKI configuration.
Negotiations subsequently went into a limbo since Russia’s asking price had
then exceeded the IAF’s estimated budget. The upgrade offer was resurrected
last year during the summit-level talks between Indian PM Narendra Modi and
Russian President Vladimir Putin and a contract is due to be inked later this
year. Meanwhile, Alpha-Tocol has bagged a contracted under the IAF’s ‘Eagle
Eye’ project for installing six fifth-generation R-118 digital radar warning
receivers on each of the IAF’s 148 Su-30MKIs currently based in Lohegaon
(Maharashtra), Bareilly (Uttar Pradesh), Tejpur and Chabua (Assam), Jodhpur
(Rajasthan), Bhisiana and Halwara (Punjab), Bhuj (Gujarat), Sirsa (Haryana),
Kalaikunda and Hashimara (West Bengal) and Thanjavur (Tamil Nadu).
NG-HAS Unavailability
The IAF had
initiated efforts for constructing 108 new generation hardened aircraft
shelters (NG-HAS) for housing its Su-30MKI heavy-/medium-multi-role combat
aircraft (H-/M-MRCA) back in 2012, the cost of which was then pegged at
Rs.5,400 crore. Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) was accorded by the MoD to its
Defence R & D Organisation (DRDO) in December 2012 for evolving the
NG-HAS’s detailed engineering design. SAubsequently, a proposal to rework the
project in three phases by categorising air bases within a distance of 100km,
200km and beyond 200km from the border, respectively, with a gap of two years
in each phase, came under consideration. The first phase was to involve the
construction of 36 NG-HAS requiring a cash outflow of Rs.270 crore. Under this,
the air bases at Pathankot, Srinagar, Udhampur, Bagdogra, Naliya, Hasimara,
Jaisalmer and Uttarlai were to receive top-priority. However, the Cabinet
Committee on National Security (CCNS) approved financial sanctions only at the
end of 2017, while the Union Finance Ministry released the funds only on January
7, 2019. Consequently, the project will now be completed only by 2023. The
IAF’s existing HAS, built to house smaller combat aircraft like the MiG-21
Bison, Jaguar IS, Mirage-2000IN and MiG-29UPG, are tunnel-shaped concrete
structures covered with a layer of earth and protective walls near their
openings, which are supposed to protect aircraft from the effects of blasts in
case of hostile aerial attacks.
E-SHORADS, MR-SAM, QR-SAM & VSHORADS Backlogs
The
DRDO-developed Akash-1 extended short-range air-defence system (E-SHORADS),
whose development began back in 1983, cleared its user-trials only in 2007,
following which the IAF ordered 1,000 missiles and the Indian Army 2,000
missiles. The IAF service-inducted its first Akash-1 Flight in March 2012 upon
completion of nine successful rounds of user-trials, with service commissioning
following in July 2015. Eight Akash-1 squadrons are now in
service, with 125 missiles in each squadron. Another six squadrons, worth
around Rs.3,500 crore, are now in delivery and these will use Akash-1S missiles
fitted with the same indigenously-developed Ku-band active terminal seeker as
that on the indigenous Astra-1 BVRAAM. The Indian Army expressed its desire to
order the Akash-1 in June 2010, but it was only in 2017 that the order for
two regiments (each comprising 288 launchers and 750 missiles) worth Rs.6,000
crore ($2.8 billion) was placed. In terms of hardware content, the Akash-1
is 96% indigenous and sources its components from 330 Indian public-sector and
private-sector industries.
The IAF’s medium-range
surface-to-air missile (MR-SAM) contract that was signed in 2009 had a project
cost of Rs.10,076 crore. Of this, the DRDO’s share, which constituted the
developmental costs, added up to Rs.1,680 crore, while the remaining amount of
Rs.8,396 crore was committed by the IAF towards the guaranteed purchase of the
Barak-8 missiles and other related ground-based fire-control systems. It is
only this year that the IAF will begin inducting an initial nine squadrons of
this land-mobile MR-SAM. On April 6, 2017 Israel Aerospace Industries
(IAI) and the MoD signed a contract worth $1.6 billion for the supply of two
Regiments of Barak-8 MR-SAMs for the Indian Army. Delivery of the first system
will begin within 72 months and will be deployed for operations by 2023. The
order for each MR-SAM regiment or Group, has been pegged at Rs.14,000 crore, or
Rs.6 crore per missile round.
Both the IAF and Indian Army also have a
pressing need for up to 72 land-mobile quick-reaction SAM (QR-SAM) systems, for
which the DRDO has since the earlier part of this decade been working on
developing a QR-SAM variant of the Astra-1 BVRAAM. Production deliveries by the
MoD-owned Bharat Dynamics Ltd and Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) are expected to
commence only by 2022. The requirement for manportable very short-range air-defence
systems (VSHORADS) for the Indian Army and Navy, is worth $5.2 billion and
involves the procurement of 5,175 missiles and 1,276 single and multi-launchers
with stipulated industrial technology transfers. There have been three
contenders over the past nine year—SAABTech of Sweden (offering the RBS-70),
MBDA of France (offering the Mistral) and Rosoboronexport State Corp of Russia
(offering the Igla-S). User-trials began in May 2012 and were completed only
last year, with the Igla-S emerging as the winner.
As for S-125 Pechoras,
30 Sqns were acquired in all, of which 16 are being upgraded and fully
digitised. The $272 million RFP to upgrade 16 IAF S-125 Sqns was issued in May
2016 to Tata Power SED, Larsen & Toubro, Reliance Defence, Offset
India Solutions and a partnership of BDL and BEL. The contract was awarded in
2017 to BDL/BEL, with first deliveries to commence within 42 months of contract
signature. As for SpyDer-SR, the Indian Army has acquired four Regiments worth $250
million to replace all its OSA-AK and Strella-10Ms. The IAF has acquired 18
Firing Units of Spyder-SR LL-QRMs worth $260 million that were contracted for
in September 2009. RFPs for both requirements were issued in mid-2005 to OEMs based in France, Israel, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
BVRAAM/SRAAM Shortfalls
In the aftermath of the
February 26 Balakot air-strikes, the IAF has asked the MoD to urgently purchase
new stockpiles of beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles (BVRAAM) and
short-range air-to-air missiles (SRAAM) due to the prevailing extended levels
of combat preparedness being experienced against Pakistan. The hectic flying
activity by both day and night for ensuring high-levels of operational alert
have led to an increasing number of BVRAAMs and SRAAMs being used in
fully-armed mode, which has reduced their shelf-life from eight years (in case
they are stored in cannisters) to only four sorties of service-life, following
which they have to be zero-lifed by their original equipment manufacturers
(OEM). The IAF is authorised to stockpile up to 4,000 BVRAAMs and 6,000 SRAAMs
and its present inventory holdings include the Vympel R-27ER1/ET1
and R-77/RVV-AE BVRAAMs from both Russia and Ukraine, and Mica-EM BVRAAMs from
MBDA; plus Vympel R-73E SRAAMs from Russia and MBDA-supplied Mica-IR and AIM-132
ASRAAMs.
Anti-Aircraft
Artillery Backlogs
Though the
IAF requires 430 new-generation anti-aircraft cannons and related fire-control
systems worth $400 million for close-in base air-defence, it plans to initially
procure 244 cannons, 228 target acquisition/fire-control radars and
204,000 programmable bullets for 61 Flights—only 18 of which can be delivered
directly from a foreign OEM. Five Indian companies, including Bharat
Forge/Kalyani Defence teamed with BAE Systems, Reliance Defence teamed with
Hanwha Defense Systems of South Korea , Tata Aerospace & Defence, Larsen
& Toubro and the MoD-owned Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) teamed up with BEL
and THALES of France have put in their bids. On the other hand, the Indian
Army requires 938 cannons to replace in-service Bofors L-70 and Russian
ZU-23MM-2B systems, plus 5,05,920 rounds of ammunition, including 1,63,200
smart 3P rounds—all valued at $1.7 billion (Rs.17,000 crore).
The Indian
Army also has a requirement for five Regiments (or 104 units) of
self-propelled cannon-missile systems, 97 ammunition carriers, 39 command
vehicles, 4,928 missiles and 172,260 rounds of ammunition, costing a total of
$1.6 billion. The bidding process took off in 2013, and the candidate weapons
were evaluated throughout 2015 and field-tested in 2017. Contenders
included the Hanwha Defense Systems’ Hybrid K-30 Biho (paired with the
Chiron SAM developed by aerospace manufacturer LIG Nex1), and Russian companies
Almaz-Antey, which offered its upgraded Tunguska system, and KBP Tula, which
offered its Pantsyr system. In October 2018, the Army officially declared
Hanwha Defense Systems as the only qualified company for i8mplementing the
project.
Another
requirement that has acquired greater urgency (due to the Pakistan Army’s
intentions for attacking the Indian Army’s dominating outposts south of the Pir
Panjal Range along the LoC in southern Jammu with remotely-operated quadcopters
armed with improvised explosive devices) is the need for drone countermeasures
systems capable of jamming the two-way data-links of such ‘kamikaze’
quadcopters. Expected to be ordered are a BEL-developed, manportable,
remotely-operated anti-drone jammer that can be coupled with an OFB-developed,
vehicle-mounted 12.7mm remote-control weapon station.
In the deep-upgrade
category, on June 30, 2015 Punj Lloyd and BEL were shortlisted for upgrading
the Army’s 468 ZU-23MM-2B cannons under a $100 million (Rs.670 crore)
project. While Punj Lloyd has partnered with Slovakian defence company EVPU
Defence Punj, BEL has teamed up with OFB. However, no final winner has
been announced as yet. Meanwhile, following a March 2011 contract award, BEL
on November 28, 2014 delivered the first of 48 modernised ZSU-23-4
Schilka self-propelled air-defence weapon systems to the Army.
Have provided the explanation above on how the NCTR mode works. Without understanding it, there will continue to be needless & unwarranted speculation on the roles & tactics of the IAF's airborne Mirage-2000Ns & Su-30MKIs on the morning of February 27, 2019. The above analysis had been published in the June 2019 issue of FORCE magazine.
ReplyDeleteWhy doesn't airforce go for releasing two su 30s to Russian OEM and HAL nashik/11BRD as prototypes for validating super su 30 avionics and hardware and testing beforehand so that whenever final clearance comes from MoD they could quickly carry out the modifications and resume squadron duties
ReplyDeletePrasunda
ReplyDeleteTUSSI GREAT HO SIRJI...Thanks. But getting better bang for bucks should be mandatory for the Defence Services whether expensive Combat Aircraft or Warships or Battle Tanks, etc..
Dear Prasun,
ReplyDeleteIf MiG29UPG hasn't got MAWS along with Sukhoi 30 mki, then at least they should have ASPJ pod. Do they have this? I'm scared.
ReplyDeletehi prasun
wonderfull write up. But its heart rending to knowabout the criminal negligence of the powers to be , who dint care about the MAWS and jammers and ODL. On onside drdo shooting down everythng and promising the sky and then failing to deliver and the concerned person retiring with no accuntability.
so in all truth the awacs are on;y a airborne fighter controler by voice ?? shamefull we buy bill$ worth of awacs and forget the main ling . just like solemnising a wedding without the mangalsutra or wedding ring ??.
i am given to belive the the fighter controller on a US awacs has to just join the target and friendly on his screen with a pen for the data to be immediately transmitted .
And situational awarness of teh whole battle scene in the vicinity for the pilot to have a gods view of what is going on and where is he situated .
so can we take it for granted that the voice chnanae to Abhinandan was jammed as rthe didi in kargil?
My friend WNG CO Perumal who flew the canberra in kargil and got shot with a stinger clearly said his RT was jammed by the pakis and cud not get any comm help.
He was also saying that if an officer suggested something defficient , the higher ups would say , why you so interested ? meaning is there something from you in it on procurement .unfortunately this mind set has been inculcated after the idiot rajiv gandu bofors scandal , followed by every congress defence minister .
pse tell us somethimg that is going ahead to negate this defficiancy in hardware
we seem to be reacting after a loss not proactive or forward thinking like the others
Dear Sir
ReplyDeleteMany Many THANKS to You for your Detailed Explanation.
Now the Questions that Naturally Arise
Are that
1 How Soon can we Take steps To
Overcome our Deficiencies
2 Why could Not We Foresee the
Consequences of Such Capability Gaps
3 If A Repeat of February 27 Happens
How will we handle it and what should be our Retaliation
4 According to Pravin Sawhney PAF is heavily investing in EW systems after February Skirmish
Does that Weaken us Even further
5 The Repeated Emphasis on S 400 and RAFALE shows IAF in a poor light that is As if we cannot do anything till these systems are Inducted
Sir, how effective the ground radars and defense systems were used? It seems that IA and IAF both did not had common plan of defense/attack during the PAF attack? why did not air defense system fired any missile on PAF planes even when they were detected by the radars and PAF had intruded in our airspace?
ReplyDeletewow sir, what a in depth source if information. kinda library of various aerial warfare related things. great thread. thanks for giving so much detailed information. thanks a lot.
ReplyDeleteAs you have told that a lot of things may get fixed quickly may be in 2020 or by 2021. i really hope that this dogfight in Kashmir has proven to be a blessing to IAf in gauging its strengths n weaknesses especially in BVRAAM arena & AD arena. Same lies for Army n i hope govt will provide additional funds to both the forces to buy sufficient number of AD systems for short n medium ranges.
yes it has answered most of my questions regarding that fest, but few remains, which are as follows-
1) sir 1 thing is clear su30mki even being better aircraft then f16 f18 lags in terms of sensors n more actually in terms of weapons. To me Under-performing BVRAAM Russian missiles like R77 are main cause of it, what can we do to improve performance of our Su30mki in this domain to keep edge over adversaries??
2) Astra 2 will have what NEZ?? Can we develop it to have NEZ of 70-80kms keeping weight under limits of 250kg with SFDR?? seeker gonna be only radar one (quite possible to get jammed) or IR cum radar seeker?? Coz if we hv good enough IR on board we can have a much higher kill probability, may be even 100%.
3) u have already told about super su30mki upgrade package etc. Question is since russian AESA tech is still under refinement n may take time to get matured what can be done to improve performance of present radar of aircraft n IRST too? coz am not sure if their new IRST is as good as other counterparts be it French or Americans.
4) Note: we really need rafale's in large qty, this acquisition process has to be fast tracked now. order additional planes withing next 6 months.
5) Given date of Op POK take over before 30/6/2022, what emergency purchases must be made now to equip all the 3 force's with good enough equipment so that they can develop their tacts accordingly??
6) IAF seems clearly loosing edge in absence of good BVRAAMs, MAWS, data links, AD. U mentioned that PAF AWACS can be silent either using S400 or using E/A18 Growler type A/C, can't we shoot them down in battle using Novator k-100??? after all it is LRAAM, n if am not wrong it does have dual channel guidance system like METEOR.
Thanks.
Thank you, Sir, for this detailed explanation. I hope the stakeholders learn these required lessons. One thing is sure, smart planning is missing form this GoI.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QiAxUfX3_vk&t=1944s
ReplyDeleteSir
Whats your opinion on this. First Pravin Sawhney says PAF hold better EW system, but he refuse to name the system.
I think if someone make a claim that that force hold better EW system, then its your responsibility that you name the system. And what are they jamming, they were jamming comms, radar, seekers of BVR. But no explaination.
Then he claim Su-30 doesnt know where to go after takingoff,
such claim means 2 things,
1) that PAF EW system blocked and destroyed the Su-30 INS/GPS system by some weird EM wave/pulse.
2) That AEW&CS/Ground controllers unable to cue the Su-30 toward area of engagement.
But I dont think he got enough braincell to make that 2nd claim, otherwise he gone into details, that what was the problem. Like you explained.
Afterwards, he gone into astonishing claim about standoff weapons, and WVR going extinct and there is no need of CCM (my interpertation of his claim).
If that is the case why all airforces around the world still going for HMDS, IRST or MAWS. Because such avionics full utilization is only in close combat. Not in BVR.
I dont know the current case, but till 2010 most of AF still going for visual ID the aircraft, instead of totally depending on IFF (which I think also happened with PAF duing Abottabad raid of 2011).
If such cases are still prevailing, I dont know how standoff engagements going to overun WVR engagements.
Even 27th Feb engagements showed how quite easily BVR missile can be jammed, one just need Growler type aircrafts with low/mid/high band jammers for totally destrying enemy's BVR capability and even jamming the radars.
And I think we can achieve that with Su-30 mki, where some jets are dedicated for EW.
PrasunDa,
ReplyDeleteIn light of the Feb-27 attack carried out by Pakistan, will you please state what are the various electronic devices, sensors , data link etc that the IAF needs ?
For instance, previously you had stated how S/W defined radios are being procured by the IAF.
Thank You
Prasun sir, it looks like hm amit shah is intentionally allowing the protests to happen..waiting for the remaining structure of the babri masjid to be demolished thus leading to complete exposure of fake secularism champions..wat r ur R.V sessions saying about these ongoing scenarios?? When normalcy is going to come?
ReplyDeleteTo AMIT BISWAS & ASD: had already explained it all here:
ReplyDeletehttp://trishul-trident.blogspot.com/2019/04/how-modernisation-of-iafs-fleet-of.html
To KAUSTAV: VMT. My intention was only to make an objective assessment of the events that had unfolded & what lessons could be drawn from them. This is because a lot of disinformation had been floating around, most of them originating from the ‘desi patrakaars’, as can only be expected. This then gets amplified by the likes of Dr.Christine Fair simply because they are not in possession of the reqd data-points (like the NCTR mode/radar fingerprinting technique), i.e. the ‘unknown-unknowns’ & consequently they end up reaching totally erroneous & scientifically impossible conclusions. Here are 2 examples of the kind of ‘bullshit’ that continue to emanate from the wretched ‘desi patrakaars’:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lmf5OC9o7z4
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zUt1weaOZzo
To RAD: VMT. Standoff airborne wideband jamming (low/medium/high bandwidths) is capable of disrupting HF/VHF/UHF bandwidth spectrum. Hence, be it C-band or L-band or Ku-band or Ka-band, all these can be jammed, if the standoff jamming platform is big enough, like this PLAAF Y-9 Gao Xin (GX) platform:
https://www.janes.com/images/assets/133/87133/1741564_-_main.jpg
Now, does the PAF possess such a platform? No. Can ground-based jammers be used instead? Of course they can, but their effective envelope will be constrained by the horizon. Nor can such jamming be conducted against a solitary airborne target. Consequently, if Wg Cdr Abhinandan’s wingman’s radio comms was not jammed as a result of which he obeyed his orders to turn back, then it stands to reason that even Wg Cdr Abhinandan’s radio comms was not jammed as the two were flying together. The, in a nutshell, says it all. The late Grp Capt Perumal’s Canberra PR-57 was targetted by no less than 10 MANPADS, most of them being the Anza Mk.1. But the one that scored a hit was a FIM-92 Stinger, whose fibre-optic gyro was recovered from the stricken engine & kept by him as a momento. Altogether, close to 100 MANPADS were fired against IAF aircraft before & during OP Safed Sagar in 1999. There was also an instance of an IAF Igla-1 detachment deployed in Turtuk as part of an air ambush detachment furing one such Igla-1 missile against a PA heavy machine-gun nest located at a higher altitude, which effortlessly homed in on the overheated barrel of a HMG & destroyed that HMG nest.
To RAHUL GUPTA: VMT. 1) Things don’t move as fast as they should in India. Hence, it will take at least another 6 years to sort out the critical deficiencies, like SDRs & SDR-based tactical airborne data-links. 2) The armed services can always foresee such gaps, but the civilian bureaucracy & the political ‘netas’ can’t. 3) Matters have changed since then as the Rules of Engagement of 1999-era have since been changed & as a result even the airspace over PoK will no longer be treated as ‘contested’ airspace, but as ‘controlled’ airspace, meaning the IAF’s MRCA-led barrier-CAPs & LR-SAM engagement envelopes now extend well into PoK. 4) There is no proof whatsoever to substantiate that claim. 5) Not quite true, because as I have just explained, it is the adoption of new Rules of Engagement that empower any armed service to optimise the use of its material/technological tools & resources.
To VINOD: It was all due to the deficiencies of the Rules of Engagement, as I’ve explained above. Due to this, data-link network SpYder-SRs were deployed only around air bases & not along the LoC. The Rules of Engagement till last February had mandated that only the airspace under India’s control be protected, thereby leaving the airspace over PoK all along the LoC as being ‘contested’. Consequently, even if India then has S-400 LR-SAMs, they could not have been put to use due to the restrictive Rules of Engagement.
ReplyDeleteTo ASHISH GAUTAM: 1) As I’ve explained several times before, 80km-range or 110km-range R-77 can NEVER be inferior to 70km-range AIM-120C-5 of the type possessed by the PAF. 2) Astra-2 avionics will not be the same as that of Astra-1 in terms of the active terminal seeker since a ka-band seeker is under development. 3) The projected AESA-MMR for the Super Su-30MKI is now almost a mature design & should be available for installation next year. 5) It will have to be force-multipliers, like additional AEW & CS platforms, installation of SDRs & tactical data-links on existing legacy combat platforms, plus large-scale construction of NG-HAS infrastructure on several air bases so that they all can accommodate the Su-30MKIs, MiG-29UPGs & Rafales.
To DASHU: VMT. I too hope so.
To ARPIT KANODIA: All that I can say is that his assessments & conclusions & flawed & there’s no evidence to indicate that the PAF is making an additional investments in new-generation EW suites. So, his sources of information can only be those ‘desi patrakaars’ who have been churning out outlandish FAKE NEWS related to critical deficiencies in tactical data-links (due to which the enemy was allegedly able to jam existing radio-based comms), thereby conveniently forgetting the absolute laws of physics which dictate that both broadband & wideband jamming can always jam every band from band A to band Z, provided the jammers are able to be accommodated within dedicated airborne jamming platforms. As for the aerial engagements of 2-27-2019, the results would have been devastating for the PAF if only the IAF’s 1999-era Rules of Engagements had been refined & updated to conform to present-day realities. In other words, the deficiency was not at the hardware-/equipment-level, but at the intellectual-level.
To VIKRAM GUHA: It was all explained here:
http://trishul-trident.blogspot.com/2019/04/how-modernisation-of-iafs-fleet-of.html
I think this was your best thread yet!
ReplyDeleteThanks for sharing it with us.
What do you make of the assertions by Christine Fair that 1) No F-16 was lost and 2) The Balakot strike failed because the buildings, not being hardened, are still standing suggesting that the Spice munitions missed?
I know that she has not spoken to any of the Indian journalists who saw the satellite image as allowed by the IAF (Vishnu Som, Manu Pubby, Shiv Aroor and Snehesh Alex Philip to name four).
To SBM: VMT, but in my reckoning, the following thread was the best byfar in terms to data content & assessments:
ReplyDeletehttps://trishul-trident.blogspot.com/2018/05/decoding-ex-gagan-shakti-2018.html
As I had stated before, folks like Christine Fair are reaching erroneous conclusions because they can’t access the ‘unknown-unknowns’, i.e. factoids that are still beyond their understanding or reach. And the most compelling one is that of the radar fingerprinting technique when operating in the NCTR mode. The reason I highlighted this aspect in the narrative above was to illustrate 2 points: First, despite ACM Dhanoa revealing this for the very first time if one goes by the IAF’s official statements (in fact, the ACM went a few steps further by briefly stating the IAF’s ability to decrypt the PAF’s encrypted comms), no one in India for the past 48 hours has commented on the radar fingerprinting technique when operating in the NCTR mode. 2) If Christine Fair would have even a modicum of respect for the laws of physics, then would have immediately grasped the importance of the radar fingerprinting technique when operating in the NCTR mode & would not have made that stupid comment on erroneous RF reflections due to the Doppler Effect. In other words, the IAF not only possessed the radar-tracks of airborne physically solid objects up in the sky on February 27, 2019, but also had a back-up data in the form of electromagnetic emmissions tracks. Thus, there are not one but two ways of authenticating the number of airborne aircraft at that time & of real-time decrease in that number.
Hence, such subjects, when discussed/dissected, require domain specialisation, which Dr Fair in this particular case, lacks.
Cont'd below...
That’s not unusual at all & it reminds me of an incident back in 2003 in Malaysia during a F/A-18E/F product presentation by a US industrial consortium (then pitted against the Su-30MKM). During the luncheon, I asked a RMAF pilot seated next to me if he had the NCTR operating mode in the RMAF’s eight F/A-18D Night Attack Hornets that were procured in 1993. The RMAF pilot confessed that he had never even heard of that term, following which a lady technocrat from Northrop Grumman sitting on the same table as the rest of us giggled & bowed her head down. I was both amused & intrigued & after a short while when the RMAF pilot excused himself to get his second filling-up of the buffet lunch, the lady technocrat told me in a soft tone that the NCTR mode is standard-fit on all US-built combat aircraft, but its activation & usage is highly regulated by the strict US export-control laws, i.e. the RMAF F/A-18Ds had all the reqd hardware/software for the NCTR mode inside them, but they cannot be activated & used unless the reqd crypto-keys are obtained from the US-based OEM for activating the operating software reqd for the NCTR mode to become operable. And since the RMAF was not authorised by the US to have access to this mode, no one within the RMAF was even aware that such a mode of operation exists within the F/A-18D.
ReplyDeleteI’m the least bothered about any ‘desi patrakaar’ being shown SAR imagery of post-strike damage assessment, since I know the SOPs of IAF HQ. In other words, such data is just not shared with any patrakaar, desi or videshi, period. But they make such claims because they know only too well that even if their claims are contested, there’s no way they can provide any material evidence to substantiate their claim & hence will claim that they have the right to protect the identity of their ‘sources’, nor will the IAF make any comment on such claims. So, the lesser said about such claims, the better. Talking of whicvh, despite years of dabbling in such subjects, their ‘desi bandalbaaz’ still can’t differentiate between a Mirage-2000 & a Tejas Mk.1 LCA:
http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/2019/12/rs-26000-crore-order-for-tejas-mark-1a.html
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-jBo5tE-pkMs/Xfb7aRyzq7I/AAAAAAAAJT0/kYUfYIiw2VUy4Z0HhZv5dVVrwbPjb72LwCLcBGAsYHQ/s1600/AA%2BTejas%2BMk1.jpg
Thanks for information sir.
ReplyDeleteJust now on my comment on twitter.
https://twitter.com/ayush_gtm/status/1206673438343094272?s=19
U can check the whole thread, since i didn't had detailed information of interference issues so i didn't speak up much their.
Yes... the Gaganshakti thread was great.
ReplyDeleteMuch obliged for the explanation.
Would it be fair (no pun intended) to suggest that the Balakot target was hit?
https://twitter.com/Firezstarter1/status/1206690836278206464?s=19
ReplyDeleteTo ASHISH GAUTAM: Responding to the first ‘Chootiyaa’, these 2 images clearly show the EL/L-8222 underwing installation on Su-30MKI:
ReplyDeletehttps://qph.fs.quoracdn.net/main-qimg-47d95d188570accde5945002fbe4028d
http://www.f-16.net/forum/download/file.php?id=1975&t=1
As for the second ‘Chootiyaa’, there are dozens of DRDO-developed products that have never seen the light of day but have always been shown at Aero India & DEFEXPO expos. Product liability is always the core issue & any party not authorised by the OEM to tinker with the OEM’s end-product (like Su-30MKI) can’t ever make unilateral modifications/retrofits. If they are done, then the OEM will never again take part in in any air-crash investigations involving that end-product. And no self-respecting air force will like to be left in such a lurch. The OEM will even go to the extent of either discontinuing product-support, or hike the price of product-support to prohibitive levels. But don’t expect such ‘Chootiya’ internet fan-boys to go into such details that are both beyond their reach & beyond comprehension. Isiliye, don't bother about such farts & enjoy your sleep.
To SBM: If the targets were not hit, then why did the ISPR allow only 4 local Pak journalists to visit the site, but prohibited them from scaling the hilltop during the first 48 hours after the air-strike? And why were journalists taken to the hilltop only 43 days after the air-strike?
For those interested in knowing what ACM (Ret'd) B S Dhanoa was referring to when he mentioned "SAR imagery in the classified domain" of less than 30cm resolution, he was talking about the RISAT-2B & RISAT-2BR1 that are now in orbit. While ISRO did not release any photo of the RISAT-2B, it did release those of the RISAT-2BR1, which shows it to be an advanced version of the RISAT-2/Polaris/TechSAR supplied by Israel Aerospace Industries. The RISAT-2BR1 can be seen here:
ReplyDeletehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BojbuSfopzM
https://www.isro.gov.in/update/12-dec-2019/radial-rib-antenna-of-risat-2br1-deployed-successfully
Prasunda,
ReplyDeleteSince RISAT 2B/2 Br1 were launched in May this year and this month respectively, are'nt these new capabilities ? We would not have had access to such imagery for post-Balakot/Feb 27 battle damage assesment, unless we obtained such imagery from a friendly power. Am I correct ?
Satyaki
Prasunda
ReplyDeleteThe news about HAL owned Hawk-i being used to test home grown avionics & other technologies is now joined by the information that of a HAL manufactured & owned Su-30MKI for use as a testbed. Indigenous Avionics, ofcourse, even AESA Radars other sensors.
But can such testbeds be used to test Turbofan engines such as HTFE-25, Kaveri etc.?
Thanks again for a lovely thread.
Prasun,
ReplyDelete-sobering assesment by the IAF chief --http://www.indiandefensenews.in/2019/12/lot-of-lip-service-is-being-done.html
- your assessment of the new wannabes sultans ganging to form an alternate OIC .. Indonesia also invited
- anything intersting expected in the upcomming def expo
Dear Prasun,
ReplyDelete1.Can non combat aircraft giving midcourse update to a missile can be jammed?
2. If I am correct NCTR method was first proposed during gulf war by USAF. Where did we learn this method? From Russia or USA. I think we might have learned and practiced this during joint exercises with either one of them. Correct me if I am wrong.
3. Finally, NCTR is target specific method. We need to collect lot of information about the target aircraft and store them in digital memory like EMP emission, Unintentional radar emission from hostile aircraft, etc. Are we capable of doing the same to all PAF aircrafts. Or else only for F-16s. Because I think these datas are shared with us by USA, again correct me if I am wrong.
Dear Prasun,
ReplyDeleteWhen Indian or Pakistani forces use ATGMs to target each other's bunkers along LOC, does it become a case of Calibre escalation? Because lots of people are tweeting that BAT teams are now using ATGMs against Indian forces? Also our neighbor is so rich that he can use such high caliber weapons?
Isn't the air to air version of Brahmos supposed to be used against enemy AWACS in future?
ReplyDeleteprasun,
ReplyDelete- this news is great if true-http://idrw.org/tejas-mk-1a-unit-price-tumbles-from-64-5-million-to-58-1-million-to-now-to-43-6-million/.. what happened here & how
- china @it again -https://www.defencenews.in/article/China-pushes-for-another-discussion-on-JnK-at-UNSC-808434 ... SOP before Indo-china meets.. why doesn't india bring in such resolutions
-Wannabe sultans agenda -http://www.indiandefensenews.in/2019/12/kashmir-likely-to-be-key-issue-of.html.. ditto to china. Just why isn't India responding to these prvocations
Like many others, I also feel that this is the best of the best of your threads. Herein you left no stone unturned. All the stones must be weeping.
ReplyDelete1. Now that Indian army has got about 10000 Sig Seur rifles ? What are next steps to equip the whole army with new assault rifles ?
ReplyDelete2. What happened to Caracal deal for carbines ?
3. Is the made in India FICV program cancelled ?
4. What is the time line for Army to receive the 100+ Arjun Mk1A ?
5. When Indian army start getting the South Korean anti aircraft gun systems ? Which sector will utilise these ?
6. There should be additional orders for K9 , when will these be placed ?
Regards
Venky
Even as discuss the events of a Feb 27, are we again not planning the last war ?
ReplyDeleteHow do we plan to handle say swarms of drones ? We cannot even handle drones from Pak dropping guns . This is a reality today.
It is a threat even for navy not just Air Force.
Regards
Venky
Could u kindly specify during which phase of operation on 27th did IAF used this NCTR mode...as IAF didnt fired any BVRAAM or did IAF M2K nd Su 30MKI locked on to any JF17/F16/Mirages for BVRAAM firing
ReplyDeleteThanks PrasunDa.
ReplyDeleteMaybe because I don't have your experience, therefore asking this noob question.
I was going through Data Pattern's website and it seems they design in house all the sensors that the IA, IAF and the IN needs. This includes Electronic Warfare capabilities.
https://www.datapatternsindia.com/product/product.php
Given the urgent requirement of such systems in the IAF, it is rather surprising that GoI does not procure these systems from companies like Data Pattern
Thanks again
To SATYAKI: Yes, under the auspices of a bilateral cooperation agreement that India has had with the very same country that supplied the RISAT-2 family of LEO satellites.
ReplyDeleteTo KAUSTAV: Have uploaded above the remaining part of the narrative that attempts to present a comprehensive picture of the present state of affairs in terms of hardware reqmts. Airborne testbeds like Hawk Mk.132 & Su-30MKI are reqd by both HAL & the IAF’s ASTE for various types of airworthiness certification activities. In case of the HTFE-25 turbofan, use will have to made of a Jaguar IS platform. If & when a definitive Kaveri turbofan emerges, then a twin-engined platform will be reqd as an airborne testbed, for which the lighter MiG-29 & not the heavier Su-30MKI will be the ideal testbed.
To JUST_CURIOUS: Upon learning that Iran’s President Rouhani was also headed for Kuala Lumpur, the Saudis summoned IAKN on very short notice & warned him against going ahead with the visit to Malaysia & instead the Pak FM will now be going. Malaysia is sourting Pakistan because the former wants to establish a final-assembly line in Pakistan for its PROTON family of automobiles & SuVs. Details can be found here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xc9E3C-BjSI
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Ruh9CDq0mI
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TPlXXn5WKEA
In terms of hardware procurements, I have already uploaded above most of the issues that will be the focus on DEFEXPO 2020.
To MANIVANNAN SERMAIYA: 1) Anything & everything can be jammed. Its all about the envelop of coverage & max transmitted power output. 2) NCTR in its most rudimentary form emerged in the early 1970s during the Vietnam War when electronic intercepts acquired by various means were fused together to give advance warning about airborne North Vietnamese combat aircraft & consequently USAF & US Navy combat aircraft had adequate time to stage air ambushes. 3) NCTR mode is meant for use against all opposing platforms & hence the EW threat library is regularly updated, not njst by the IAF, but also by the IA & IN.
To PAVAN: It isn’t calibre escalation, because in reality it is escalation in terms of the explosive power of an artillery round & therefore it is actually barrel diameter escalation, like starting with 81mm mortars, going to 105mm field gun, then to 120mm mortars, then to 130mm tube artillery, 155mm tube artillery & then to 214mm & 300mm MBRL rockets. The ATGMs are used mostly far lower altitudes over relatively flat terrain, i.e. in southern Poonch & Prankote & then along the WB with Jammu.
To RAJESH MISHRA: VMT indeed.
To ANUP: It was inducted into service way back in late 2015. The Philippines has not yet singled out the BrahMos-1 for procurement. All that it has confirmed is that it requires an initial 2 Batteries of coastal defence cruise missiles. Nor does the INS Sahyadri FFG carry BrahMos-1s. Instead, Novator 3M-54E Klub supersonic ASCMs are on-board that FFG.
To VENKY: 1) That will have to be the Ghaatak 7.62 x 51 SLR. 2) The production orders should have been placed by now. 3) Yes, it is. The FICV has been overtaken by the FRCV, whose developmental process too is in limbo. 4) The 118 Arjun Mk.1As will all be delivered by 2022. 5) The contract has yet to be inked. 6) Not necessary. But the motorised Dhanush-52 needs to be procured ASAP.
To AMIT BISWAS: The NCTR mode was functional throughout the engagements as for as long as the Su-30MKIs & Mirage-2000Ns were airborne, since it is an all-passive system. NCTR mode for radar fingerprinting is only an information/data-gathering tool & is not used for any fire-control guidance.
To VIKRAM GUHA: On the contrary, several systems developed by DATA Patterns have already be inducted into service. They were all highlighted here:
https://trishul-trident.blogspot.com/2019/08/indian-navy-places-bulk-order-for-sdrs.html
https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-tE1S2HgBNRg/XU9NANd49TI/AAAAAAAARiA/MuBglky2H3oUP99eT_AGvrARsrRvoClsQCLcBGAs/s1600/SDR-5.jpg
That's where the confusion..I quote ur post " However, the laws of physics dictate that when the MMR is activated, the ASPJs have to be switched off for preventing electromagnetic interference (EMI). This is when the NCTR mode enables an aircraft like the Su-30MKI to passively lock-on to its opponent and fire BVRAAMs like the R-77 or even IIR-guided SRAAMs like the R-73E while at the same time keeping its EL/L-8222 ASPJ activated for completely neutralising hostile BVRAAMs like the AIM-120 AMRAAM. The hostile MRCA, on the other hand, remains unaware of the approaching BVRAAM or SRAAM (until it is too late to take evasive action) because it is illuminating the AMRAAM while at the same time being forced to de-activate its own integral ASPJ pod."
DeleteBut now u clarified that NCTR doesn't give fire guidance cues.
This clarification contradicts your post sir...so again confusion prevails
Prasunda
ReplyDeleteThanks again for the update & clarification about HTFE & Kaveri on Jaguar & Mig-29 being ideal testbeds. The updates too, informative as usual
What does India need to do, for Pakistan to desist from LOC attacks? Is Pakistan merely skirmishing or is India provoking retaliation? Is it because Indian Army lacks superiority to silence or subdue Pakitan Army? Please do post. I believe, India seems to be incurring higher cost of aggressive deployment by IA & IAF without consumerate gains
To AMIT BISWAS: The confusion has arisen because you are ASSUMING that guidance & cues are one & the same. I had stated: NCTR mode for radar fingerprinting is only an information/data-gathering tool & is not used for any fire-control guidance (which requires the target to be tracked & illuminated by a MMR). What this means is that the NCTR mode makes it possible for a hostile aircraft's location & bearing to be passively obtained with accuracy & hence the fire-control radar is not reqd to either track or illuminate the target. Instead, a BVRAAM can be fired in the direction of the hostile aircraft formation out to up to 30km, but not to the BVRAAM's max range.
ReplyDeleteTo KAUSTAV: Maybe the PA is sorely missing the Excalibur rounds! Its thirst will be quenched very soon, rest assured. Meanwhile, here's the statement on yesterday's BrahMos-1 ALCM firing:
Today on the 17th of December 2019 two launches of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles were carried out from Land and Air platforms. The first launch took place from a Land-based mobile launcher where maximum components were of Indian origin, primarily the missile airframe, fuel management system and DRDO designed seeker. This launch has enthused a fresh impetus in the ambitious “Make in India” programme of Govt. of India. The second launch was carried out by the Indian Air force from its prime fighter aircraft SU-30MKI against a sea target. The test, conducted in user configuration, revalidated the ship attack capability of the advanced air-launched cruise missile. During the launch, the missile was gravity dropped from the air combat platform's fuselage and the two-stage weapon’s engine fired up and straightaway propelled towards the intended target positioned at the sea piercing the same with pin point accuracy. With this test the IAF now has a World record of direct hits on targets in all its launches from air against sea and land targets establishing itself as the prime user of the world’s most powerful conventional airborne weapon to attack targets on sea and land. The Indian Air Force, on 22 May 2019, had successfully tested the missile against a land-based target in the Car Nicobar Islands region. The first launch from SU-30 MKI was carried out on the 22 Nov 2017 against a sea target which made the Indian Airforce the first in the World to have fired a supersonic cruise missile. The formidable BRAHMOS ALCM promises to immensely bolster the IAF’s air combat capability from long distance stand-off ranges and become the ultimate “game changer” for the IAF in the 21st century. Dr Satheesh Reddy, Secretary DRDO congratulated Team BrahMos & DRDO for the successful launch which was spearheaded on ground by Dr Sudhir Mishra, Director General BrahMos, Dr Dashrath Ram, Director DRDL & Dr Binoy Kumar Das, Director ITR.
How an insidious plot hatched by the triad of Erdogan-Mahathir Mohd & IAKN to create a forum parallel to the OIC has been checkmated by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and is now being labelled as a misadventure:
ReplyDeletehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eNoNHCu8obk
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dv8kRdmoo-s
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hxmy4sZdbUU
ACM R K S Bhaduria's Interview: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-xcw4S-jUYY
Excellent documentary on the 1971 Genocide in East Pakistan:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=voT8MPAQyh0
PLAN's 2nd aircraft carrier, Shandong CV-17, was commissioned into service at Sanya, Hainan, on December 17.
ReplyDelete2013.11 – Metal-Cutting
2015.03 - Hull construction begins
2017.04 - Hull launched & entry into wet basin
2018.05 - 1st sea-trial
2019.12.17 - Entry into service
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zokS_RUvO_o
Dear Sir
ReplyDeletePlease Answer my Question
Now that IAF is engaged in a Rapid And Serious Augmentation of its Capabilities and is aiming to remove its deficiencies is it Possible that
Pakistan will go for a MISADVENTURES
BEFORE our Modernisation is Complete
For eg in 1965 they Attacked because they believed that India is Not fully ready after 1962
Suppose another 2 day Face off happens Next Month , Can we give a STRONGER RESPONSE as compared to last time or IAF Will come out with same
" We are not prepared " reply
Sir,
ReplyDeleteyou said.....148 su 30 on 12 airbases. 148 only?
can you please clarify how many sukhoi exactly and how many squadrons?
HAL recently said only 12-16 sukhoi are yet to be suplied from order of 272.
Prasun da,
ReplyDeleteComparing Shandong CV-17 with our INS Vikrant (Wiki and your reply)
INS Vikrant:
Laid down: 2009
Launched: 2013
TBC: 2021
Commissioning:2022
Where is the delay, why we take everything for granted or we are building supercarrier compare to Shandong CV-17. Agar nahin to CHULLU bhar paani mein mar kyoun nahin jaatien.
Your view on this statement sir
ReplyDeletehttps://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/national/not-my-job-to-protect-railways-mamata-banerjee/article30332112.ece
Prasun Da,
ReplyDeletehttps://youtu.be/mOeSouTCxU0
Your views Sir.
Dear Prasun,
ReplyDelete1. Will Tejas Mk1A be a potent aircraft with Elta-8222 SPJ fitted with it?
2. Is it true that the last batch of 51 Tejas Mk1A will be fitted with desi AESA radar?
Your view please.
To RISHI: Even as of now the IAF is far superior to the PAF both qualitatively & quantitatively. Back in 1965 or even in 1971 Pakistan was backed by a superpower & yet it lost both wars. The next time there will be no superpower to guarantee Pakistan’s safety from military dismemberment.
ReplyDeleteTo PARVESH: No air force in the world ever constructs HAS for all of its combat aircraft. Only those air forces that are in the line of fire have such HAS. Back in 1971 Amritsar, Pathankot, Srinagar, Avantipora, Uttarlai, Jodhpur, Ambala & Agra were hit by PAF air-strikes, while Adampur, Halwara, Gorakhpur, Bareilly, Pune, Gwalior, Tezpur, Kalaikunda, Agartala, Nagpur, Sulur, Tambaram etc etc were not even touched despite the PAF then possessing B-57 bombers. Today the PAF does not possess any deep-penetration interdictor. So at best only those air bases close to the IB & LoC will be targetted by the PAF, while those IAF air bases in the hinterland won’t be vulnerable to such air-strikes.
To SIDHARTH: One cannot compare apples with oranges. Both the PLAN aircraft carriers have been built to a readymade design, with the first one coming in fully built but sparsely equipped. The IN’s IAC-1 on the other hand is a brand-new design with a new-design propulsion system of the type not yet possessed by any of the PLAN’s aircraft carriers. On top of that, the IAC-1 is a hybrid design incorporating design aspects of both Western & Russian origin. To marry up all this together takes a far longer time in terms of both hull fabrication & systems integration.
To AMIT BISWAS: That’s true, but the ‘desi patrakaar’ should then have asked whose job it is then to prevent the citizens of her state from taking the law into their own hands. If stupid questions are asked, the answers will also be equally stupid in nature. BTW, India has to date provided citizenship to 4.61 lakh Tamils of Indian origin after signing PM-level agreements signed in 1964 & 1974. Presently, 95,000 Sri Lankan Tamils are living in Tamil Nadu on Central & State Govt subsidies & grants. In last 6 years, approximately 2,830 Pakistani citizens, 912 Afghani citizens & 172 Bangladeshi citizens have been given Indian citizenship. There are more than 2 lakh Sri Lankan Tamils and Tibetans in India and more than 15,000 Afghans, 25,000 Rohingayas and a few thousand other refugees of different nationalities presently live in India.
How Bangladeshis illegally residing in India are heading back to Bangladesh:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GKr3_YIc4-k
To SUVO: That is a typical oversimplification of the nature of the problem. Many other countries around the world too have state-own DPSUs that are highly profitable & can compete with the best in the world. So, the problem therefore is far more deep-rooted & one cannot just blame the DPSUs & bureaucrats of India.
ReplyDeleteTo ANUP: The Shangdong CV-17 will have on-board H-MRCAs like the J-15, but only 12 of them, since there are only 24 J-15s that have been built. The Liaoning CV-16 will have the remaining 12 J-15s.
To ASD: 1) Not just with ASPJ pod. MAWS sensors too will need to be installed. 2) Not true as of now. It will take another 7 years for the Uttam AESA-MMR to emerge as a mature product.
To RAD: Interesting statistics of the 10971 air war from veteran air warriors of the IAF:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ud8WaUxdf-s
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j0Kx7NSIKmE
Interestingly, it now emerges that the straffing of the East Pakistan Governor-General’s mansion in Dhaka on December 14 was made possible NOT due to a tourist map of Dhaka, but by a Burmah Shell-produced street map showing the location of that company’s petrol stations inside Dhaka.
Myanmar Air Force’s FC-1 L-MRCA: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UlYYgOwkMZU
PA COAS Visits SSG HQ in Cherat after the mutilation on December 16 of IA Rifleman Sukhwinder Singh in the Sundarbani sector:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yalaiIngfnU
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E542YzgkUoM
Dilapidated state of a Gurdawara in Rawalakot, PoK:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FSIqPaweWfY
Russian Navy CNS Visits PN HQ: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cPY7c-e23Qs
Dear Prasun,
ReplyDeleteW.r.t. to your response to my query, I want to state that I visited your previous post about Tejas Mk1A, and in that poster there is no mention of MAWS. Only a pylon based ASPJ. Then what's the survivability of the Mk1A?
Further does the MWF has both MAWS and ASPJ?
It seems "Desi Patrakar Syndrome" is not limited to our country. This is hilarious:
ReplyDeletehttps://sofrep.com/news/british-press-freak-inept-reporter-believes-naval-5-inch-guns-literally-5-inch-guns/
"A British tabloid made an embarrassing error Friday, writing a hysterical piece that incorrectly reported the Defence Ministry had paid hundreds of millions of pounds to buy a five-inch-long gun.
“We just blew £183m on a five-inch gun, but it’s ‘a good value for taxpayers,’” read the outraged headline from The Daily Star. The subheadline also reinforced that the author believed the gun was literally five inches, calling it “the length of a toothbrush.”"
Dear Prasun,
ReplyDeleteThanks for your Kumari Kandam comments.
Actually world Civilization starts from Kumari Kandam which is below Srilanka.
It is 49 Countries ruled by Pandyan Kingdom. Shiva, Murugan gods were those times.
Ancient Tamil Sangam started during this time. After KK submerged that is 12000 Years ago humans start migrating toward other continent where the story of NOVA started. From there Babylon, Indus Valley Civilization, Jews, Christians, Muslim Civilization started.
Many in India are thinking All languages originated from Sanskrit. Poor fellow No Civilization spoke Sanskrit. They are talking about Vedas.
Vedas are not written in Sanskrit. It is written Pakrit, Then What is Sanskrit.
SANSKRIT = Spoken persian + written tamil
https://tamilfirstlanguageofhuman.wordpress.com/2015/08/03/sanskrit-spoken-persian-written-tamil-part-i/
https://tamilfirstlanguageofhuman.wordpress.com/2015/09/25/sanskrit-spoken-persian-written-tamil-part-ii/
Mahabaratha Never Happened in North India. Madurai Pandyas are called Pandavas in Sanskrit. Kerala Kuravas are called Gouravas in Sanskrit. Mahabharata War happened in Tirunelveli district of Tamil Nadu between Kerala and Tamil Nadu. Pandyas who are in the plains destroyed the forest Lands for Cultivation which is opposed by Mountain Kuravas. In between them Yadavas who are cow and goat herders which is krishna team sided with Pandyas which is called Mahabharata War.
During 5th Century AD Guptas translated tamil epics into Sanskrit. Delhi is never a ancient historical Site. Only during Mughal period Delhi got Importance.
If we spoke truth, people will label me Tamil Fanatics. Anyhow thanks for your Comments.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EZDCm5mrTn8&t=427s
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cDZpZS_fSbs
Regards
Senthil Kumar
Prasunda
ReplyDeleteRegarding the escalation ladder by Army Chief Shri.Bipin Rawat & the whines of Pak FM
Doing Rounds on Pakistani Twitter Handles
- India Removed Fencing at 5 places along LOC
- Tanks deployed by India
- Pak Fm ran to UN
- Brahmos Deployed, Other Missiles locked on Pak military assets
Not confirmed from Indian side - JUST what you predicted - the heavy Artillery shelling with 155mm & precise targeted strikes
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/situation-along-loc-can-escalate-any-time-army-chief-bipin-rawat/articleshow/72872824.cms
https://www.dawn.com/news/amp/1523177#click=https://t.co/JDtbvyMlNt
Prasun sir, if reports are true then operation P.O.L has started?
ReplyDeletePrasunda,
ReplyDeleteDo'nt nuclear WMDs guarantee that Pak is safe from military dismemberment from our side? After all, theyr existence would ensure that any conflict is limited in scale and time, which is what allows Pak to attempt its misadventures. Would'nt we be able to didmember them only if and when they are denuclearized ?
Satyaki
To ASD: It was all explained here:
ReplyDeletehttp://trishul-trident.blogspot.com/2019/04/how-modernisation-of-iafs-fleet-of.html
Underwing pylon-mounted modules from TERMA are available for housing MAWS sensors. This was all discussed & analysed in several threads in the recent past.
To RAD: DRFM means digital radio-frequency memory (see the slides I have just uploaded above), i.e. the EW threat library that can be updated through reprogramming, so that the RWRs can immediately recognise & identify the EM emissions. And as for airborne SDRs like the HAL-developed SOFTNET SDR-2010, , the first IAF combat aircraft-type to use them are the upgraded DARIN-3 Jaguar IS:
https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-xNkaRd40x8c/UmjY0TEGX5I/AAAAAAAAF_s/1TiGIEnx6SM/s1600/Jaguar+DARIN-3+Upgrade+Package's+LRUs-1.jpg
https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-12qbJQq43UA/UmjZSuI9czI/AAAAAAAAF_8/WzrdQ0xuq2E/s1600/Jaguar+DARIN-3+Upgrade+Package's+LRUs-3.jpg
To KAUSTAV & SUJIT: It is not India that has removed the fencing, but Mother Nature, i.e. the on-going snowfall. The MBT formations deployed belong to the IA’s PIVOT Corps formations along the Chhammb-Sialkot salient. They are NOT from the Strike Corps of the IA. Have explained the escalation dynamics in the following thread.
To SATYAKI: Dismemberment does not mean total annhilation & hence even in mid-1999 the PA faced dismemberment at the icy heights at Drass, Kargil, Batalik, Kaksar & Turtuk despite possessing nuclear WMDs.
ReplyDeleteprasun,
ReplyDelete- wot is playing out in pakistan, first the bajwa extn issue now deah verdict on musharraf.. why & how has the judiciary found spine to take on the army. guess it give even more reason for the army to finish the judiciary
- on Jag upgrades, what is the point of doing it sans uprated engines? as it is, the IAf has been complaining about lack of power, what is the rationale behind this
-why on the earth is the IA calling for bids for wheeled armored vehicles instead of nominating kestrel & backing it like tejas mk1a . what was the need for this when all past exp has always resulted in controversy & /or cancellation of Rfx. This would also result in inordinate delays leading to cost escalations. Since its a DRDO/tata joint venture . it is a classic project for strategic partnership
ReplyDeleteHI prasun
i wonder how the denel 2 raptor pgm went onboard the f-16 .? The US never allows any foriegn armament on their aircraft s, how so? Again the data link for terminal guidance have to be attached for man inthe loop guidance , how was that done?
i understand the onlythe mirgaes 3 were capable of doing that?
is the denel bomb produced under picense or a bought of the shelf? how do you rate it
some reports say f-16 offloaded LGB?
one of the reasons abhinandan was shot down is that he did not have a jammer pod and MAWS. Now how did the f-16 get hit when it had all the above?
IAF has specified the bnet radio for all its ac , now the sofnet devloped by drdo is also going on board the jags and su-30s . Both are vhf -uhf data link capable so is there a duplicity. though the bnet is far superior having a MANET capability?
i blieve tha bnet will also be used as a direct link for hand held sensor to shooter type comms as we have seen in iraq and afghanistan?
Dear Mr.Rad
ReplyDeleteThe F-16 was hit by a CCM, A Jammer won't work on a heat-seeker IR Close Combat AAM, also probably cued by Wg.Cdr.Abhi's HMDS. A Heat Seeker once fired within close combat range will probably hit right up the jet exhaust or popularly know tailpipe/stovepipe. With an HMDS to cue, probably flares wouldn't work either, even if a MAWS gave timely enough warning which is unlikely with a heat seeker at close range.
kaustav
ReplyDeleteI am quite aware that. i am talking of the f-16 which had MAWS. FYI the r-73 can be decoyed as it is not a IIR Missile and can be easily decoyed with correct sequence of flares and manouvers. There is no missile which is jam or fool proof.HMDS is to cue the misile and not guide the missile and is on it own once it leaves the launcher unless it has a data link like the aim-9x-2