Monday, June 28, 2021

Early Pointers On First Drone-Attack Inside India; The Kashmiri Panj Pyarees (Five Musketeers) Who Frittered Away India's Gains At Shimla In 1972; Plus Construction Updates At Ormara

Probable Directions of HexaCopters' Flight-Paths

Here is what one can infer about the drone-strike conducted in the early pre-dawn hours of June 27, 2021 against the Indian Air Force’s Jammu AFS:

1) The drones used were in all likelihood China-made DJI Matrice 600 Pro Hexacopters that can be remote-controlled out till a maximum distance of 5km (Specifications: https://www.dji.com/matrice600-pro/info).

2) All previous instances of the usage of such HexaCopters for ferrying in weapons across the Working Boundary (WB) had made use of the DJI Matrice 600 Pro. Those that were recovered up to 12km inside India in all probability suffered from loss of remote-control data-linking and consequently drifted further inland.

3) Since the two DJI Matrice 600 Pro drones were not shot down on June 27, it can only mean that they were safely recovered by their controllers.

4) Consequently, we can thus infer that these two HexaCopters were launched within a distance of 5km from Jammu AFS and from an easterly direction that afforded the controllers an unrestricted view of the targetted area.

5) This in turn leads us to the terraces of those buildings that were sufficiently tall to offer such a view, since the areas to the west of the airport/air base is flat agrarian terrain.

6) The attack thus came from an easterly direction and not from across the WB, i.e. Pakistan-controlled territory cannot be the launch-pad for the two HexaCopters.

7) However, it is highly likely that the drone-attacks were staged by cadres of the PoK-based and Pakistan-funded Resistance Front (successor of the United Jihad Council), since Pakistan wants to give the impression that the unrests inside J & K UT are a totally indigenous affair. 8) If that is the case, then that leaves us with only three possibilities regarding the source of the HexaCopters:

A) either they were smuggled overland into Jammu from across the riverine terrain prevailing along the WB.

B) They were smuggled by an infiltration team that sneaked into Jammu via underground tunnels dug beneath the fenced-up WB.

C) The HexaCopters were ordered from and received in India under the guise of ‘agricultural spray drones’.

The riddle will be resolved only if the two HexaCopters are either recovered intact or are shot down in future during another round of attacks. For only these will reveal the identity of their operators and their financial sponsors. As for the shaped-charge IEDs used, only a well-trained person can fabricate them and this then rules out the involvement of any J & K-based operative. Instead, the IED-maker is most probably from Pakistan who has infiltrated into Jammu.

If it is true that in addition to the two back-to-back explosions, which occurred at 1.37am and 1.42am, there were two additional drones—one launched from Ratnuchak (north of Jammu AFS) and another from Kaluchak (to the southeast)—that were shot at from the ground and therefore they had to withdraw without dropping their IEDs, then this could only mean that the controllers of those drones could hear the sounds of groundfire (not possible if the controllers were Pakistan-based) and consequently the controllers were within the urban areas of Jammu and they wanted to prevent any physical damage to the drones, probably for the sake of using them again in future.

Which then brings us to the future targets, i.e. where will the next air-strike probably take place. Targets like the IAF’s air bases in Pathankot, Udhampur and Avantipora can easily be ruled out since there are no high-rise structures around such air bases and hence the controllers will not be able to visually acquire their targets at nighttime when operating from atop such structures. That leaves us with only one mouth-watering target: the heliport at Nagrota, which can be attacked in the same manner as that conducted against Jammu AFS.

So what are the soft-kill and hard-kill options available for defending such vulnerable air bases and heliports? China, for instance, has developed a truck-mounted ESM sensor that in essence uses radar warning receivers (RWR) originally developed for application on-board combat aircraft.

India can come up with a similar solution by making use of the DARE-developed Dhruti R-118 RWRs.

There are also indigenously-developed counter-drone systems, like Tonbo Imaging's VAULT C-UAS. If imported solutions are sought, then the Drone-Dome from RAFAEL of Israel is available. According to RAFAEL’s specifications, the Drone-Dome can detect micro-drones as small as 0.002 m² (3.1 square inches) at a distance of 3.5km and can sense and then jam signals between the drone and its remote control station.

https://www.rafael.co.il/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Drone-Dome.pdf

Backgrounder: Infiltrations By HexaCopters

The usage of HexaCopters began in 2019 following the Khalistan Zindabad Force’s (KZF) Pakistan-based chief Ranjeet Singh alias Neeta and his Germany-based associate Gurmeet Singh alias Bagga conducting nearly a dozen supply sorties. On March 11, 2019 the BSF shot down a HexaCopter in the Fazilka sector. Similarly, on September 19, two AK-47 SLRs, two pistols and four grenades were recovered from three arrested militants in J & K UT who claimed that arms and ammunition were received via drones. One drone was recovered on August 13, 2019 and it was a crashed HexaCopter carrying 21kg payload in Mohawa village of Amritsar district—a mere 1.5km from the IB. The drone model U10 KV100-U, and it had been designed and manufactured by China-based T Motors. The airframe of the drone was called TAROT 680 PRO. Four brick-sized batteries (model Tattu-Made in China) were also found installed in the Hexacopter. Another HexaCopter (out of three) was seized in the burnt condition in September from Jhabal town in Tarn Taran. They were used for ferrying in five AK-47s (along with 16 magazines and 472 rounds of ammunition), four China-made .30 bore ‘Star’ Pistols (along with eight magazines and 72 rounds of ammunition), nine hand-grenades, five Thuraya satellite phones along with their ancillary equipment, two cellphones, two wireless sets and FICN with face-value of Rs.10 lakh—all of which were air-dropped in Rajoke. Between September 9 and 16, 2019 HexaCopters were used for ferrying almost 100kg of arms and ammunition into Punjab. The foreign handlers, Gurmeet Bagga of Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF), and his terrorist associates based in Pakistan, including KZF chief Ranjeet Singh Neeta, who were handling the Indian Punjab-based Akashdeep terror module, had informed Akashdeep and his associates about the crashing of this drone inside Indian territory. They had also shared the coordinates of the crash landing site and further directed Akashdeep to go to the crash site and destroy the drone by burning lest the Punjab Police came to know about it.

On September 22, 2019, the Punjab State Police successfully wound-up the India-based module of this operation, which was active in the Husseiniwallah, Tarn Taran, Ajnala, Fazilka and Khem Karan areas of Punjab. The HexaCopters with 10kg payloads had been flown for almost 7km from their launch-pads at a height of 2,000 feet to deliver their payloads. On both October 7 and 8, 2019 a HexaCopter originating from Pakistan was detected flying over two villages in the Hussainiwala area of Punjab. On October 10, 2019, HexaCopters were cited in two locations in Punjab. The first sighting was reported in Hazarasingh Wala village at 7:20am and later in Tendiwala village at 10:10pm. On January 27, 2020, a HexaCopter flown from Pakistan was shot down by the BSF in Arnia sector, while on June 20, 2020, BSF troops shot down a HexaCopter carrying one M-4 carbine, two loaded magazines (60 rounds), and seven China-irigin hand-grenades near the WB in Jammu’s Kathua district. The HexaCopter was spotted hovering in the vicinity of BoP Pansar around 5.10am by a BSF patrol party, which then shot it down 250 metres inside Indian territory.

One of the major India-based narco-terrorism modules, headed by former IA Naik Rahul Chauhan, was involved in carting 75kg of pure heroin and at least seven pistols between November and December 2019. The module, operating from the Jat Regiment Centre in Uttar Pradesh’s Bareilly, was busted on January 9, 2020. According to Chauhan’s interrogation report, a Pakistani national named Waqar got in touch with him when he was running surveillance drones for the IA in the Naushera sector in July-August 2019. Chauhan was later contacted by another source, identified as Choudhary, over a WhatsApp call from a Germany-based number, and a meeting was set up with Choudhary’s associate in Ambala. During interrogation, Chauhan admitted to operating drones from the border villages of Dhanoa Khurd and Mulaekot to pick up heroin and pistols from Pakistan. He used three drones purchased from Chandini Chowk (Delhi), Ghaziabad and Pune, and made cross-border sorties at the height of 1,200 feet on November 27 and 30, and then on December 8, 9 and 17, 2019. These sorties were made from border villages between 3am and 4am to avoid detection, and the distance covered from the launch area to the pick-up point in Pakistan was between 2.2km and 2.8km, with flying times generally between 14 and 18 minutes. Data gathered from the captured drones showed that the last flight on December 19 was 26 minutes, 54 seconds long. Further investigation revealed that the money used to buy the drones was provided by convicted drug smuggler Lakhwinder Singh (in Amristar Jail since September 2019), and his associates Ajaypal and Dharminder.

On May 14, 2021 the BSF had detected weapons dropped by a suspected Pakistan drone at Samba in Jammu. On specific information regarding dropping of arms and ammunition, BSF troops carried out a search operation in Samba sector and recovered an item wrapped in yellow polythene from a field. One AK-47 assault rifle, one pistol, one magazine, 15 rounds for a 9mm weapon, one wooden frame (used to attach the payload to the drone) and wrapping material were recovered approximately 250 metres inside Indian territory. On June 20, 2020 the BSF even shot down one such HexaCopter that was carrying arms and ammunition at Rathua village in Kathua district’s Hiranagar sector. A BSF patrol party from Pansar border outpost (BOP) had noticed this HexaCopter flying at a height of 200 feet from Pakistan towards the Indian side at around 5.10am. The drone fell nearly 250 metres on the Indian side of the border after the BSF party fired several rounds at it. Fitted with four batteries, a radio signal receiver and two GPS devices, it was 8 feet x 6.2 feet in size and weighed 18kg. The drone was carrying a payload of nearly 5kg, including a US-made M4 semi-automatic carbine, two magazines, 60 rounds and seven China-made hand-grenades. The payload marked with the name of one Ali Bhai, who BSF suspected, must have been present within 1.5km from the spot to receive the consignment.

Saga Of The Panj Pyarees (Five Musketeers)

I am uploading again details about this incident due to incessant public demand.

Construction Updates At Ormara, Pakistan
Submarine Rebuild Facility For S-26 & S-30 SSKs
New UAV Air Base
1st Type 054AP FFG of Pakistan Navy

Saturday, June 26, 2021

PLAGF Deployments In Depsang Plains

The deployment footprint is indicative of the existence there of an entire High-Mobility Light Mechanised Infantry Brigade of the PLAGF.

Tuesday, June 15, 2021

China's Military Infrastructure Updates In South Xinjiang & Tibet Military Districts

Over the past 12 months, several new permanent structures have been constructed and commissioned by the PLAAF, PLAGF and PLARF throughout the South Xinjiang and Tibet Military Districts, the most notable of which are highlighted below.

New Underground Facilities for TBM Storage in South Xinjiang

New Permanent PLA-BDR Garrison Quarters in Depsang Plain
PLAGF Tactical Observation & EW Post in Depsang Plains
New EW Site at Rutog
TMD's New Underground Facilities South of Demchok
Ngari Airport & LR-SAM Site
UAV Testing Site North of Lake Mansarovar
TMD's New Underground Facilities for TBM Storage at Zanda, Opposite Himachal Pradesh & Uttarakhand
Civilian Heliport & Logistics Warehouses in Lhasa
PLAGF 85 Air-Defence Brigade MR-SAM & SHORADS Training Centre at Lhasa
PLAGF 85 Field Artillery Brigade Training Areas in Lhasa
PLAGF Changda Combat Engineering Training Area in Lhasa
PLAGF MBT Training Area & Heliport in Lhasa
TMD's 15 Engineer Brigade at Lhasa
PLAGF Motor-Pool in Lhasa
PLAGF Motor-Pool Training Grounds
TMD's New UAS Air Base at Tsolung, Lhasa
Lhasa Gonggar Airport
Shigatse Airport
Guizhou EA-03 Xianglong WZ-7 Soar Dragon HALE-UAV

The logistics infrastructure accretions at Gyantse, Shannan, Tsetang, Bangda and Linzhi are dedicated for the Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh sectors and are detailed below.
PLAAF LR-SAM Site at Gyantse
PLAGF Logistics Depot at Gyantse
PLAGF Underground Facility for TBM Storage at Gyantse
TMD's New Underground Facility & PLAGF Motor-Pool Facility at Shannan
TMD's New Underground Facility & Technical Support Facility in Tsetang
TMD's New Underground Facility for TBM Storage at Tsetang
Underground Facilities for TBM Storage & LR-SAM Site at Bangda
Linzhi Armaments Depots & LR-SAM Site
PLAGF 85 Army Aviation Brigade Heliport at Nagku

The PLAGF has also constructed a number of new facilities to the northeast and east of Sikkim, as detailed below.
PLAGF Armaments Storage Base East of Jelep La
PLAGF Gunpits East of Lachung
PLAGF Gunpits in Chakung
PLAGF Helipads in Chakung
PLAGF Gunpits near Nathu La
PLAGF Logistics Warehouse at Dromo

Composition of PLAGF High-Mobility Light Mechanised Infantry Brigade
PLAGF Mini-UAVs
PLAGF Sky Saker FH-500 tactical UAV For Artillery Fire-Direction
PLAGF ASN-301 Anti-Radar Drone
Motorised Track-Layer
Motorised AVLB
PLAGF Mine-Clearing Vehicle
Tracked High-Mobility APC
ZBD-04 Tracked Scout Vehicle
Decoy Dispenser For Protecting SAM Sites

Analysis of the varied kinds of electronic force-multipliers fielded by the PLAGF since 2017 (shown below) indicates that the PLAGF remains deeply worried about the tactical air interdiction capabilities of its adversaries, especially with the usage of standoff air-launched precision-guided munitions (PGM) that are likely to be used against static and mobile SAM sites/networks of both the PLAGF and PLAAF. 
PLAGF Mi-171 with Battlefield Surveillance Radar
PLAGF Battlefield GPS Jammer for SAM Battery
PLAGF Battlefield Surveillance Radar
PLAGF Battlefield Surveillance Sensors on Wheeled & Tracked Armoured Vehicles
PLAGF Mast-Mounted Battlefield Surveillance Sensors
Mengshi CSK-131 LAMV with SATCOM Antennae

The field artillery and fire-support systems fielded by the PLAGF (shown below) are all meant for providing immediate fire-support for advancing Battalion-sized PLAGF ground formations and are all armoured for protection from aerial straffing. The PLAGF believes in being self-sufficient in direct fire-support requirements, given the PLAAF’s inability to provide immediate air-support. This has been the case since 1962 and was also visible during the 1979 Sino-Vietnam war, when China refrained from using the PLAAF and thereby kept such conflicts limited in nature, just so that it would not provoke the then-USSR into taking any military action against China.

PLAGF 130mm MBRL on Dongfeng EQ-2050 For Minefield-Clearing
ZTL-11 Assault AFV
PHZ-11 122mm Tracked MBRL
PCL-161 122mm MGS
PCL-181 155mm 52-cal MGS
PLZ-07A Tracked 122mm SPH
PLL-09 122mm Wheeled SPH
PTL-02 120mm Mortar
PGZ-07 35mm SPAAG
QSL-92 4 x 4 with HJ-9 ATGM

The construction of new underground storage facilities at Bangda, Gyantse, Shannan, South Xinjiang, Tsetang and Zanda for tactical ballistic missiles (TBM) indicates that the PLAAF, which has been unable to procure fourth-generation deep-strike interdictor aircraft, will continue to rely on the PLARF’s arsenal of DF-15B and DF-16 TBMs for targetting those forward and principal air bases and ALGs of the Indian Air Force that are likely to be used in the event of any future limited high-intensity conventional war between China and India.

Also, the PLAAF has not yet qualified on its J-10B/C M-MRCAs and J-111/J-14 H-MRCAs all those home-grown air-launched standoff PGMs that it had procured in the previous decade for its second-generation JH-7A deep-interdictor combat aircraft.

Thus, the PLAGF’s vulnerabilities are three-fold: 1) the military hardware developed by China’s domestic military-industrial complex remains unproven in battlefields and consequently is of questionable quality. 2) The bulk of the PLAGF’s human resources come from compulsory military conscription and consequently professionalism/combat proficiency of its combat arms remains highly questionable. 3) The PLAGF’s combat integration with the PLAAF remains minimal and consequently the former remains highly vulnerable to hostile tactical air interdiction and deep air-strikes.