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The climate in Tibet is dry and healthy and troops require no protection against rainfall. Road-making and building of air strips are simple processes and miles and miles of road can be laid out simply by demarcating the alignment with stones. The ground is hard and generally smooth and so motor vehicles can be driven sometimes over hundreds of miles without undertaking any heavy engineering work. Similarly, air strips can be laid out at many places. And, once the roads and air strips are laid, there is hardly any wear and tear caused by climatic conditions as there is little rainfall and very little snow due to the absence of humidity. Whereas it was an extremely difficult engineering job to build even 10 miles of roads in NEFA and Sikkim and even in UP, and the roads often had to pass over high snow-clad mountain ranges in Ladakh and Himachal Pradesh, China was sitting pretty on a high plateau (roof of the world) where the only effort it required in even laying down hundreds of miles of roads was to mark out the direction by flags or pieces of stones on both sides. Only an occasional digging or filling or blasting had to be done. The surface was generally so hard that it could take heavy military traffic without any deterioration and required no metalling or tarring. Compared to this, in the soft hillsides of NEFA even the best road just melted away and disappeared during the rains. No means had till then been found of circumventing the deep layer of snow on all the passes, which stopped communications between Kashmir and Ladakh for the better part of the year. That India’s frontier roads were not ready by the time the conflict with China started is no reflection on Indian road-builders. India’s was an incomparably more difficult task than what the Chinese faced. Simultaneously with developing road communications toIndia’s frontier areas, China also extended its administrative control in such areas like Pemako, Chimdru, Migytun and Tsona, which it had previously left uncontrolled except by sending occasional parties. Thus, by the end of 1958, China's control over Tibet was complete.
The Govt of India accepted the legacy of the British and drew a boundary starting from the trijunction of' India, China and Afghanistan through Kilik Pass, Mintaka Pass, Kharchanai Pass, Parpik Pass and Khunjerab Pass. These were all taken as the boundary of Hunza State. From Khunjerab the boundary crossed the Muztagh River and came to the Aghil Mountains and then on to the Aghil watershed and to Marbo Pass and Shaksgarn Pass to tile Karakoram Pass. A little to the east of this pass the main Karakoram Range takes a southerly direction and no longer forms the boundary. But from the point the Karakorain Range turns south, another range of mountains, known as the Akhtagh Range, takes off and this forms the watershed between Shyok coming to the Indus system and the watershed of Yarkand. This was taken as the boundary east of Karakoram Pass, going through Qara Tagh Pass, crossing the Karakash River and then joining with the Kuen Lun Mountains. Thereafter the boundary went through Yangi Pass along the crest of the mountains separating the Yurungkash Basin fom those of the lakes in Aksai Chin. Leaving the crest of the Kuen Lull Mountains, the boundary running south-westwards passed along the watershed separating the basins of Amtogar and Sallg Jilganang Lakes in lndia f5rom those of Leighten and Tsoggar Lakes in Tibet and finally came down to Lanak La. This boundary, which was accepted by the Government of lndia and was put on the map, followed the natural high watcrshed principle throughout and was also the natural boundary of'the area up to which the Ladakhis had from times immemorial exercised the right of pasture and collection of salt. It is true that north of this line, which was a no-man's-land, the Ladakis did not normally go. Through it lay the trade routes between Yarkhalid and Leh and also between Yarkhand and Gartok.
But between the northern boundary of Ladakh as claimed by lndia and the southern boundary of Sinkiang as claimed by China there were 16,000 sq. miles of territory which was uninhabited. Through this lay three trade routes; (1) through Karakoram Pass via Panamik or Shyok to Leh, (2) via Haji Langar and passing through Shinglung, Shamul Lumpka, Tsogatsalu, Phobrang to Leh and (3) from Haji Langar through the eastern end of Aksai Chin, past Amtogar Lake to Rudok and then to Gartok. There were some good pastures between Pangong Lake and Lanak La, which the people of Phobrang and other neighbouring villages in Ladakh utilised during summer. Similarly the Amtogar Lake was used for collection of salt. Some enthusiastic shikaris travelled in this area in quest of mountain goats or bears and, besides the traders who used to come from Khotan (Hotien) to Leh, the only other parties who visited this area were the patrol and survey parties sent by the Kashmir Government. There was no need for any effective administrative occupation of this territory as it was uninhabited.
In late 1949, the first joint IB-IA checkpost was set up at Panamik/Shyok to cover the route from Karakoram and an Intelligence post was opened at Leh. The scheme, which was sanctioned by the GoI in 1950, consisted of 21 checkposts, excluding the one already established in Ladakh, and these were all set up by the beginning of 1951. Some further increases were made after the receipt of the Himmatsinghji Committee Report, and by the end of 1952, 30 checkposts were in operation in the frontier, of which 7 were in Ladakh, 4 in Punjab-Himachal Pradesh, 6 in UP, 5 in Sikkim and 8 in NEFA. In 1958, 14 posts were added in NEFA bringing the total to 22. By 1960 the total number of posts had risen to 69 in Ladakh, 9 in Himachal Pradesh-Punjab, 17 in UP, 10 in Sikkim and 22 in NEFA, the total staff employed being 1,334. Re-adjustments and further strengthening were taking place all through this troublesome period and by 1962 the number of posts had risen to 77 employing 1,590 personnel. Every year since 1958 IA patrol parties set out from Leh and trekked along the northern route towards Karakoram, the north-eastern route to Aksai Chin, Lingzithang, etc. and the eastern route to Lanak La, etc. The patrol parties were often out of communications with Leh for over three months as they had no wireless sets.
Immediately after the Chinese Communist forces "liberated" Sinkiang, it was reported by us that with the help of Russian engineers the Chinese were developing road communication in Xinjiang. Chou En-lai had claimed in 1960 that Chinese troops had entered Western Tibet as early as October, 1950, by the Aksai Chin Road. But in this he was pulling a fast one. Unfortunately, without verifying Chou En-lai's claim, some writers have accepted this assertion true. There was irrefutable evidence that the PLA did not enter Gargunsa in western Tibet till June, 1951. These troops came not through Aksai Chin but from Khotan (Hotien) via Keriya, Nurmat Langar, Polur, Aqsu, Khizil Pass, Baba Hatim, Kokyar Pass, Altoon Pasha, Yashil Tso, Ibrahim Kol, Jawaza, Dung Ming, Zama Mangbo, Mense to Gargunsa. This route at no point passed within 100 miles of the north-eastern frontier of Ladakh. China had first tried to open this route to motor traffic but encountered many engineering difficulties. Soon after their arrival at Gargunsa, the PLA’s surveyors started prospecting for a direct route to Gartok via Rudok from Sinkiang along an old silk route which existed part of the way. The surveyors were noticed near Rudok surveying the possibility of opening this route for motor traffic in October, 1951. The first mule caravan using this route arrived at Rudok from Xinjiang in April, 1952. Then the PLA decided to discard the Hotien-Keriya-Polur-Dun Ming-Gargunsa road and decided to go all out for this shorter route via Aksai Chin. After this the regular change-over of troops from Yarkhand to Western Tibet started through this route though the movements were yet on foot or animals as the motor road had not yet been constructed. In November, 1952, the IB reported that the PLA had engaged 2,000 labourers to develop this route into a jeep track and they planned to complete the construction by 1953.
In December 1952, the IB reported that the jeep-track from Xinjiang to Lake Amtogar had been completed and the PLA was working to bring the road to Rudok. In 1953, the IB reported that the jeep track to Rudok had been completed and regular jeep traffic had cornmenced. It was because of these troop movements and the road-building activity that China had refused to allow a trade mart to be opened at Rudok. All through 1953-1954 the PLA was improving and constructing the road from Xinjiang to the Ladakh border (Haji Langar). There were two routes, both starting from Yarkhand. The route was the same up to Karghalik where it bifurcated. One branch went direct east to Hotien and then came down south, crossed the Kuen Lun mountains at Yangi Pass and came into Ladakh border at Haji Langar. The other branch first took a southernly direction from Karghali k, then turned east, passed through Kengshewar, entered north Ladakh near Qarakash river and joined the first route at Haji Langar. It was the second route, which was used mostly for traffic between Xinjiang and western Tibet. The Indian Trade Agent at Gartok reported in July and again in September 1955 that he had been told by China’s Vice-Chief of the Foreign Bureau of Ngari (Western Tibet) that China was going to construct the Xinjiang-Gartok road via Rudok as it was shorter than the Lhasa-Rudok road. He again reported in September, basing himself on the same source, that China had started work on this road. It was also in that year that a Chinese Transport Officer had told the Tibetans that Gartok would be linked with Xinjiang within two years and that the work on this road had been started from the summer of 1955. In January, 1956, IB sources reported the working of survey parties between Rudok and Gartok and it was learnt that this was for connecting Yarkhand with Gartok. By June 1956, it was learnt that the road from Hotien up to Karnang, north of Yangi Pass, had been completed. In July it was reported that the road from Xinjiang to Gartok was near completion. In March, 1957, China first announced the completion of the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway (G-219) without mentioning the alignment. In August the Indian Trade Agent at Gartok reported that the Gartok-Rudok road was almost complete and China hoped to run a through motor service from October onwards and that it laid great importance on this road as being vital. On October 6, 1957, the Xinjiang-Gartok road was formally opened with a ceremony at Gartok and 12 trucks on a trial run from Yarkhand reached Gartok. The road was reported to be 1,170km long. In January 1958, the New China News Agency (NCNA) reported that the Xinjiang-Tibet highway had been opened two months earlier and the road was being fully utilised. In February 1958, the IB reported that troops were being utilised to widen and improve this road.
One must, however, admit that though the IB’s informants, and even its staff, had personally visited the road from Gartok to Rudok and up to a point parallel to Lanak La, i.e. more or less the point at which the road entered Aksai Chin from the south, no Police party had actually traversed the portion of the road within the Aksai Chin itself. There were three ways how this could be done. The easiest would be to cross Lanak La into western Tibet, which was indisputably Chinese territory, strike the road some miles east of that pass and then travel north along the road. The party ran the almost certain risk of encountering the PLA. The second alternative was to go up to Haji Langar in the northern end where this road entered Aksai Chin from the Hotien side and travel southwards. The party would have to come back by the same route but again would run the certain risk of encountering the PLA and being captured. The third would be to strike direct east from Shamul Lungpa, cross two mountain ranges and come to the fresh water lake, Sarigh Jilganang Kol. Going further east, the party would strike this road. Travelling south and then north, the whole of this route could be traversed without at any point going beyond Indian territory. But on this occasion also the party would run the risk of encountering the PLA, though in India’s own territory. The easiest was the first course and this was the route the Ladakhis had taken for decades to go to Lake Amtogar to collect salt. But as explained above a part of this route would lie through indisputably Chinese territory. Regarding the other two routes, in those days the available resources did not permit us to do the trek up to Haji Langar and then along this road to Lake Amtogar, back to Haji Langar and then back to Leh, or to go from Shamul Lungpa to Salig Jilganang Kol and then traverse the road north and south and come out again by the way of Shamul Lungpa. Though the iB had a good idea on the map about the alignment of this road as the two ends were known and the IB had traced it in its maps, no member of the IB staff had actually traversed this part of the road. Only sources had travelled a few miles from the Lanak La side to fix the southern entry point. However, enough information was available about the construction of the G-219 right from 1951 to 1957, when the road was formally declared open. But though it was also known that the Chinese laid great stress on the construction of this road, which they considered to be vital, its implications to India's security in the Ladakh region were not properly comprehended at any level. All through these years no questions were raised by either IA HQ or the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) about this road.
Year after year the IB used to send its patrol parties during the summer to check infiltrations. Excepting the north-eastern Aksai Chin area, which the patrol parties had not visited, no sign of Chinese infiltration was noticed anywhere up to 1956. In fact, a patrol party going to Lanak La in June 1956, found that the Indian flag put up there by a party in 1954 was still flying though very much battered due to weather. But on August 29 that year, for the first time, the patrol party saw signs of a Chinese survey party having come up to Mebdo La, about two marches from Lanak La, in Indian territory. Actually the Chinese had not come from Lanak La but from the Niazi and Dambuguru side and had claimed Khurnak Fort to be in their territory though it was undisputedly Indian. In September 1956 unmistakable signs of a Chinese survey party having camped earlier at a nala called Zulung Khongma were found. Further on similar marks were found at Chhuzungpo Kongma. It was not yet clear whether the Chinese were trying to fix their boundary with Ladakh or were surveying for opening a road through Lanak La or Niazi towards the west, probably up to Hot Springs or Shamul Lungpa. Alarmed by this sign of China’s penetration in Indian territory, next year the IB made more elaborate arrangements for patrols to go to the frontier in all directions. The IB built up an advance post at Hot Springs, two marches from Phobrang, and the party went to Shamul Lungpa, Dehra Compass, Shinglung, Sumdo, then along the Qara Kash River to Malik Shah almost 40 miles inside Xinjiang. Tell-tale signs of fresh Chinese intrusion were found at Dehra Compass, Khizil Zilga and north and south of Khizil Zilga, Shinglung and between Shinglung and Sumdo. Signs were also found near the Qarakash River of an area having been marked on the dry bed of the river apparently for small aircraft to land. This was serious because the southern-most intrusion had taken China over 70 miles inside Indian territory. When judged against the intrusion noticed the previous year, it also became apparent that Chinese surveyors were trying to find a route from Haji Langar through Sumdo, Shinglung, Dehra Compass and Shamul Lungpa to link up with a road from Lanak La via Khongka La to Shaniul Lungpa. This road would go parallel to the claimed Chinese boundary deep within lndian territory. The report of the 1957 patrol party was available in early 1958, and the IB reported this to the GoI in March 1958, and recommended that a protest should be lodged with China against this serious trespass. The IB also recommended that in future at least two expeditions should be sent every year over this area—one by the IA and the other by the ITBP with IB officers attached to each. The IB also recommended that a proper map of the area should be made from the reports of the various expeditions which had been sent by the IB, that shacks should be constructed at camping places for accommodating officers and men who would be out on patrol and who had no place for halting; that the Phobrang frontier post should be strengthened and a summer post should be opened at Hot Springs as the IB felt that this would be more or less the link-up point between the possible routes coming from Lantrk La in the east and from Haji Langar in the north. On its own the IB left secret caches of food, kerosene, fuel and other indestructible material at Hot Springs to serve as the spring-board for its operations next summer. This report was discussed in the MEA with the IA’s CGS present. The line taken by the MEA was that the exact boundary of this area had not yet been demarcated and so in any protest we lodged we could not be on firm grounds. Probably the infiltrations had been made by over-zealous survey officers and did not indicate anything more serious. Moreover, as we were not physically controlling this area it would be useless to make any formal protest. The Chinese were sure to reject it and claim the territory as their own. The IA’s attitude was that it could send an occasional patrol but it was in no position to open and hold any posts in this area. Moreover, the G-219 road was not of any strategic importance and it would be difficult to oust the PLA from this region. In any case, the IA was in no position to make that effort because of the limited resources available at Leh and of the non-existence of any road communications from Leh to these parts. The conclusion was that India should intensify her patrols and also try to open one post north of Phobrang at Tsogatsalu to check Chinese infiltration. It was suggested that from this advance post we should do more effective patrolling of the Lingzi Tang area in summer.
One serious difficulty faced by the IB was that starting from Leh our patrols would have to cross three successive mountain ranges both towards Lingzi Tang and towards Karakoram and these passes did not open till July, so the patrol could be sent only in the second half of the year. The Chinese coming from Xinjiang into Lingzi Tang had no snow-clad passes to cross and could come to Indian territory, do the survey and go back before the IB patrol party could get into that area. In the meantime, a report had been received from India’s Embassy in Beijing about the completion of the G-219 road. The IB had also earlier reported it. So in June, 1958, another meeting was held in the MEA. This was attended by the IA’s CGS also. The Foreign Secretary maintained that neither the Embassy report nor the IB report conclusively proved that the Xinjiang-Western Tibet highway actually passed through Indian territory and no Indian party had actually traversed this route and so before any protest was lodged we should be sure of our ground. Hence it was decided that two patrol parties would be sent to traverse the G-219 road and see it on the ground if it passed through Indian territory. One would be of the IA and the other of the ITBP. The IA chose the known route from Hot Springs via Shamul Lungpa, Dehra Compass, Shinglung to Haji Langar to see the road from the northern end. The ITBP was left with either the route going through Lanak La into admittedly Chinese territory in Tibet or traverse an uncharted route direct east from Shamul Lungpa crossing two mountain ranges up to 18,000 feet high and land at Sarigh Jilganang Kol Lake. The IB chose the second route, as going via Lanak La it would be impossible to avoid the Chinese. The IB had foreseen a commitment of this type and had laid its stores the previous year at Hot Springs, which it now moved to Shamul Lungpa. The IA team was led by Lt. Iyengar. At Haji Langar this party encountered a PLAGF patrol and was taken prisoner and removed to a fort in Xinjiang where the members were detained for two months till a protest was lodged. Though this team had a wireless set, it went out of order and so the team remained out of touch with its HQ from the very beginning. The ITBP team was led by Karam Singh. He stuck to the route charted out on the map prepared by the IB and reached Sarigh Jilganang Kol. Numerous heavy tyre marks were seen on the bank of the lake. From these and other marks, it was clear that the Chinese had halted at this place and that Chinese trucks were taking water from the lake. The party went further east crossing the G-219 road up to Ladakh's boundary and planted the Indian tricolour. It came back to the road and traversed it both north and south up to Lake Amtogar. The party members saw a Chinese convoy but managed to hide themselves effectively and to take photographs of the convoy. Karam Singh took out one of the wooden pegs demarcating road miles in Chinese. This hazardous trip undertaken by Karam Singh confirmed without any doubt that the so-called G-219 road really cut across Indian territory from Haji Langar in the north to Amtogar in the south. The Govt of India then made a protest to Beijing about this road and also enquired if Lt Iyengar was being held by them. Lt Iyengar's party was then released, but not at Haji Langar where it had been captured, but at the Karakoram Pass, which was the only point where there was no dispute about the lie of the frontier. The Chinese summarily rejected the protest about the road.
Earlier, another patrol party of the IB going to the Karakoram Pass from Panamik had found signs of Chinese infiltration near Daulat Beg Oldi from the Qara Kash side. With regard to the Chinese infiltration in Lingzi Tang, Aksai Chin and Soda Plains, the IB recommended that the checkpost at Phobrang should be raised to a Company HQ and Police posts should be opened at Tsogatsalu, Shamul Lungpa and Shinglung. The IB also recommended that the IA should establish posts at Sarigh Jilganang Kol in the east and Palong Karpo in the north to be near the two ends of the G-219 road. Our argument was that if we could not prevent the Chinese from using and further developing the G-219, we could at least stop them from extending their road system further within our territory and the signs were that they were trying to connect Haji Langar with Shamul Lungpa and join it up with thc projected Lanak La-Sharnul Lungpa road. The IB’s recommendation was discussed in January, 1959, at a meeting in the MEA with Gen Thimayya, Chief of the Army Staff, present. Thimayya quite categorically stated that he did not consider that the G-219 road was of any strategic importance nor was he willing to open any posts at Palong Karpo and Sarigh Jilganang Kol because he felt that small IA posts would be of little use and in any case he had no means of maintaining them from his base at Leh. When the IB argued that the Chinese were using this road to bring reinforcements to western Tibet whence they could threaten eastern Ladakh and so this road was of much security importance to India, Gen Thimayya agreed but expressed his inability to do anything about it. The Foreign Secretary also agreed with the IA’s COAS and felt that posts at Shamul Lungpa, Shinglung, etc. would be of no use to stop Chinese infiltration. They might even provoke the Chinese into making further intrusions. The IB was informed by the Foreign Secretary after some days that the Prime Minister had approved of his views and no posts need be opened in this area. Against this decision the IB protested in February 1959, and maintained that even if the IA could not open posts at Palong Karpo and Sarigh Jilgnang Kol the IB should be allowed to open posts there. The IB also argued that it should be allowed to open the posts at Tsogatsalu, Hot Springs, Shamul Lungpa and Shinglung. It would keep Police at these places not for the purpose of fighting the Chinese but to prove India’s possession so that the Chinese might not claim that area and quietly occupy it. The IB also recommended that the posts at Palong Karpo and Sarigh Jilganang Kol could be fed by air and the other posts would be maintained by animal transport. Shortly after receiving the IB’s note of February 16, the Prime Minister passed orders that whilst we should not open posts at Palong Karpo and Sarigh Jilganang Kol, because they would be too near the G-219 road and might create tensions, the other posts recommended by the IB should be opened at Tsogatsalu, Hot Springs, Shamul Lungpa and Shinglung. Out of them only the Tsogatsalu and Hot Springs posts could be opened in October 1959 but before the others could be opened the Chinese came in and occupied the area.
IA HQ knew that the Army was in no position to prevent the Chinese from constructing this road across Aksai Chin. According to the IA, it was physically impossible for it even to maintain posts at these places in the prevailing state of communications from Leh. Even the road from Srinagar to Leh was subject to interruptions for seven months in the year. Gen Thimayya knew the strength and the capability of the PLA. He had seen it at close quarters in Korea where the PLA had very nearly defeated the Americans. He knew that the IA in those days was in no position to engage the PLA in a big war. He was expressing this view even as late as 1962. And at such a remote place, where there was no means of sustaining the force, his troops would have suffered severe reverses at the very outset and he would be in no position to retrieve the situation. He was not to be lured into an area where he was in no position to defend himself. So he tried to play down the importance of the G-219 road and throw doubts on IB reports about its existence. If he admitted its importance from the security point of view, he might have been forced by Indian public opinion to engage in an unequal fight, the adverse result of which he clearly foresaw. The attitude of the MEA was that this part of the territory was useless to India. Even if the Chinese did not encroach into it, India could not make any use of it. The boundary had not been demarcated and had been shifted more than once by the British. There was an old silk route which was a sort of an international route. The Chinese had only improved it. It would be pointless to pick up quarrels over issues in which India had no means of enforcing her claims. These were all valid arguments and their validity seems to be more acceptable to the people at large and even the Opposition than it was in those days. The PM was no doubt inhibited by the same considerations and his knowledge about the weakness of his Army vis-a-vis the PLAGF and its inability those days to effectively prevent Chinese encroachment in Indian territory. Aksai Chin was the only part of Indian territory in which so far the Chinese had been able to make an entry. Ousting them from this area, he knew, was well-nigh impossible. So he was even willing to allow the Chinese the use of this road for civilian purposes.
All through these years the Chinese continued their road construction programme in all parts of Tibet relentlessly—engaging large numbers of Tibetans as labourers and treating them worse than slaves. By the end of 1958 the Chinese had completed the following arterial highways linking China with Tibet from north-east, east and west. The most important was the Sining (rail-head)-Gormo-Nagchuka-Zamsar-Lhasa roadand this carried most of the heavy traffic and practically all the patrol. Another road starting from Sining led to Nagchuka and Lhasa via Jyekundo and Chamdo. From the Chengtu side on the east a road led to Kanting and then connected with Chamdo via Kantse. From Kanting another road took off in a westerly direction and going via Markhang, Drokhang, Shugden, Chomo Dzong and Gianda terminated at Lhasa. Thus Lhasa was connected with China from the north-east and the east. From Lhasa a highway to the west passed through Shighatse, Lhatse, Saka, Tradom and Parkha and terminated at Gartok where it met the G-219 highway passing through Aksai Chin. A direct route was also built from Nagchuka along the northern steppes to Thokjalung and ending at Tashigong where it met the Gartok-Xinjiang highway. A road parallel to the Nepal border was constructed starting at Gyantse and passing through Khamba, Sekhar Dzong, Tingri, Dzongka Dzong and meeting the Lhasa-Gartok highway at Tradom. Besides these arterial roads, numerous roads were constructed towards India, Sikkim and Nepal borders, the more important of which were Drowa to Rima, Gyantse to Phari, Parkha to Taklakot and Gartok to Tholingmath. A road ran parallel to the south bank of the Tsangpo and from this radiated roads to Tsona and Lhuntze on the NEFA border and Lakhang Dzong on the Bhutan border. China had therefore carefully laid out both arterial and radial roads in Tibet and was no longer dependent on getting supplies from India to maintain the PLAGF in Tibet. China had also carried out, as the reports of Karam Singh's patrol parties showed, extensive surveys in the years 1956 and 1957 to the depth of nearly 70 to 80 miles within Indian territory south of Haji Langar and west of Lanak La. This also could not have been due to the ignorance about the exact position of the Chinese frontier. After having blatantly grabbed a part of Aksai Chin by the end of 1957, the Chinese by 1958 felt bold enough to occupy or claim other parts of Indian territory as they could then talk of maintaining the status quo as a handle to force the Govt of India to come to the negotiating table and dictate terms to the latter. So the time according to them was now ripe for a discussion of the frontier. This they did not indicate by adopting normal diplomatic procedures but applying pressure tactics of first deliberately creating incidents on the border and then questioning the validity of the entire frontier.
India's boundaries had been clearly marked in all Indian maps since 1954, which showed the whole of Aksai Chin, Soda Plains and Lingzi Tang, the Chang Chenmo Valley, etc. to be a part of Ladakh. Similarly, the whole of NEFA south of the McMahon Line as well as all territory up to the watershed of the Himalayas in Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh was within Indian boundaries. Similarly the northern boundaries of Sikkim and Bhutan were also clearly shown in these maps. So there was no shade of doubt about what India claimed to be her boundary. On the other hand, the Chinese maps were in small scale, the boundary was indefinite and varied in different maps and, except the fact that they included considerable parts of Indian territory in China, they did not help to determine the actual Chinese frontier. Nor did the frontier follow any internationally recognised principles such as watershed, high ranges, etc. In the China Pictorial of July 1958 (a Chinese official publication), a map of China showed practically the whole of NEFA, large areas in Ladakh, considerable areas in Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh and even large areas of Eastern Bhutan as part of China. The publication of this map in an official journal meant clearly that the Chinese Communist Govt now openly claimed this frontier though it had previously not claimed the correctness of the old maps. Naturally the Government of India protested and, in a note on August 21, 1958, it pointed out the absurdity of the claim over Indian territory made in the Chinese map as published in the China Pictorial. The Chinese reply came on November 3, 1958. The old platitudes were repeated and it was again mentioned that this was a reproduction of old maps. But then followed the alarming statement that the Chinese Government had not till then undertaken a survey of the Chinese boundaries, and had not held consultations about them with the countries concerned. In other words, it was for the first time that China was openly questioning the entire boundary of Tibet not only with India but also with Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and Burma. This was completely contrary to what Chou En-hi had stated earlier when he had practically accepted the & facto position and the validity of the McMahon Line, though not convinced of its legality; and when he had said that there were disputes only about small bits of territory in other sectors. China, therefore, was now about to lay claim to nearly 52,000 sq. miles of Indian territory.
During the months of May to September 1959, there were several cases of intrusions by PLA troops in NEFA, in Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh. The Chinese were obviously trying to pick up quarrels and also find holes in the Indian security arrangements. Though in some cases Chinese troops remained in our territory for several weeks, these were temporary intrusions and on our protest the Chinese finally withdrew. But in eastern Ladakh they were following different tactics. Here they came for good and would not withdraw. They first occupied Khurnak Fort and a hill overlooking Chushul and posted a picket at Rezang La. They prevented Ladakhi graziers from going into their large traditional pastures of Nyagzu and Dambuguru. These were not mere cases of frontier violations but in some places of fairly deep penetration within Indian territory. In Nyagzu the penetration was as deep as 30 miles. When an Indian Police patrol went towards Khurnak Fort, it was captured and kept under detention for over a month and ultimately released. A serious violation occurred between Mygitun and Longju in NEFA. The border passed between Mygitun and Longju, but the Chinese claimed Longju to be a part of Mygitun and killed three Assam Rifles soldiers on the border and then came and surrounded Longju, which the Indians had to vacate as they were greatly outnumbered and there was no other alternative. The Chinese later withdrew from Longju but remained in force at Mygitun. The Indians could not re-occupy Longju and had to be content with a post at Maja, a few miles south of it. It was over this Longju incident that China did not get the complete support of Soviet Russia much to her chagrin. Protest notes from one side making allegations of violation and replies refuting the allegations from the other flowed endlessly-the despatches progressively becoming more acrimonious. From July 1959, China commenced further roadbuilding and penetration in Lingzi Tang further west of the G-219 road in right earnest. By September 1959, China had sent PLAGF troops into Chang Chenmo Valley and Lingzi Tang. In a statement made by Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister of China, before the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on September 13, 1959, he accused India of drawing her maps in such a way as to cut 38,000 sq km deep into Chinese territory along the Xinjiang-Tibet-Ladakh section, of invading Parigas, Chuva, Chusa, Shipki Pass, Puling Sumdo, Sangoha and Lapthal along the Tibet-Punjab-Uttar Pradesh frontier and annexing 90,000 sq km of Chinese territory along the Assam-Tibet frontier.
Why, in the face of Chinese construction of the Aksai Chin road and the fact that they had conducted surveys to connect Haji Langar with Lanak La via Shamul Lungpa, did the Govt of India not take immediate steps to secure their position over the rest of Aksai Chin and Lingzi Tang which the Chinese had till then not occupied? In January 1959, the IA's COAS considered that the road was of no strategic importance to India, though he admitted that it was through this road that the Chinese were bringing to western Tibet reinforcements which might threaten eastern Ladakh. In view of this assertion by the COAS, the MEA’s Foreign Secretary was inclined to soft-pedal the issue particularly as, according to him, the road was an improvement of the old silk route and the territory through which it passed was disputed. The IB’s suggestion to open posts at Tsogatsalu, Hot Springs, Kongka La, Shamul Lungpa, Shinglung, Palong Karpo and Saligh Zilganang Kol was considered to be impracticable and unnecessary and in effect provocative. The IB had moved the Union Home Ministry (MHA) to spare a company of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) to be moved into this area to open the posts. But surprisingly for the first time the MHA too turned unsympathetic to our request. The MHA first questioned the need for opening the posts in an area where "not a blade of grass grew" and then raised various administrative difficulties and said that, as the CRPF was fully committed, a new company would have to be raised and this could not be got ready for at least two to three years. Wazir Mehra. the Inspector General of Police, Jammu & Kashmir, was next approached for assistance. He had a battallon of the CRPF in the valley, which was not deployed for any immediate work as the valley was then quiet and peaceful. With the concurrence of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, the Prime Minister of Jammu & Kashmir, he agreed to release one company out of this battalion for use in Ladakh. The IB then started negotiating with the IAF to lift the company with all its equipment to Leh. This took over a month, because the carrying capacity of the IAF was very limited those days and this was a new commitment which it had not provided for. But as was usual with the IAF it rose to the occasion and ultimately by the end of September 1959, the company landed at Leh. The Tsogatsalu post was opened on October 17, and the post at Hot Springs on October 19. Earlier, in June, Karam Singh's patrol had gone right up to Lanak La and had met no Chinese at either Kongka La or at Lanak La. On October 20, one patrol consisting of a local man and a constable was sent towards Kongka La, because the idea was to open the next post at that place. This patrol did not return. So on October 21, Karam Singh with 20 men and a small rear guard moved towards Kongka La in search of the missing patrol. He found hoof marks on the way, which indicated that some Chinese horsemen had come into that area and probably they had arrested the two Indians. Two miles west of Kongka La, near the bank of the Chang Chenmo river, Karam Singh's party of 20 was ambushed by two Chinese pickets, one perched on a hill top on the flank of the route by which the Indian party was advancing and another located in front on the other side of the river. This was cold-blooded murder and eight of the policemen lay dead in a few minutes. But the rest succeeded in taking some cover and fought till their ammunition ran out. They had killed at least one Chinese officer and injured some others. The party could not return as their retreat was cut off by the Chinese picket on the hill top. They could not escape along the river-bed as this was guarded by the Chinese picket on the other bank. At about dusk the Chinese brought some reinforcements from Kongka La and 12 policemen, including Karam Singh, some of them badly wounded, were taken prisoners. They were taken to Kongka La at the point of bayonets carrying their injured comrades. One constable, who was badly injured, had to be left behind and was killed by the Chinese. At Kongka La they were held in a largish Chinese camp, which the enemy had earlier established. Here Karam Singh and other prisoners were made to undergo severe indignities and tortures and they were constantly threatened to confess that they had trespassed into Chinese territory. The Govt of India very strongly protested and ultimately the Chinese released the prisoners and returned the dead bodies on November 14 on the bank of the Silung Barma river, which they claimed was the western frontier of Tibet. The Silung Barma river was only three miles east of Hot Springs, whereas the traditional frontier for centuries had been at Lanak La, which was 40 miles further east. Karam Singh had gone with a patrol up to Lanak La via Hot Springs and Kongka La only four months earlier. He had not met any Chinese on the way, so there was no doubt that the Chinese trespass in this area occurred after June 1959. If the IB had opened the posts in June, it could have forestalled the Chinese. They could, of course, come in force and throw the Indians out as they had done at Longju; but they could not have claimed the absence of any Indian posts as evidence of their own possession over this territory as they did later.
On September 23, 1959 when the facts of this outrage came to be known, the PM Pandit Nehru held a meeting which was attended by the Defence Minister, the COAS and officers from the Ministries of MEA, Home and Defence. The IA demanded that no further movements of armed CRPF should take place on the frontier without its clearance. In complete command of his facts, the IB fought tenaciously and effectively countered all accusations. But placed as he was, the PM had to give in to the IA’s demand. The result was that the protection of the border was thereafter handed over to the IA and all operations of the CRPF were made subject to prior approval of the Army Command. The COAS had even demanded that all the IB posts and their communications should be placed under his control. One would not blame the Army for this attitude in this matter. It was in no position at that time to guard the frontier effectively or keep units at the checkposts which the lightly equipped CRPF were holding. The logistics in Ladakh were against the concentration of any sizeable force in the Aksai Chin area. It was for these reasons that Gen Thimayya had earlier opposed the opening of any Indian posts in this area. If the Police got into any trouble with the Chinese, the IA would necessarily be drawn into it though it would be quite unprepared for it. As the IA could not yet fight at these places, it would prefer the disputes to be settled at diplomatic levels rather than at rifle point. Moreover, in this difficult region the Army would rather let the Chinese occupy the territory up to their claimed frontier than put up opposition which they were afraid they could not sustain. But the result was that thenceforward the IB could not take any initiative in opening posts in areas which were yet unoccupied and which were indisputably within Indian frontiers as the IB had been doing during the previous eight years. The Army was also not in a position to do so for quite sometime yet. Security of the frontier by the Army only remained on paper, because no additional army units were moved to the frontier till a year later. The units which continued to remain on the frontier were only the CRPF and the Assam Rifles. Over-zealous local junior Army officers even tried to interfere with the work of the Intelligence posts. All further consolidation of the frontier, which the IB had started in 1952 under the express orders of the Prime Minister, stopped and the northern frontier of India was frozen at the points which had been secured by the IB with the help of the CRPF, the State Police units and the Assam Rifles up to October 21, 1959. Not one square mile of territory could be added to India’s effective possession after that date. This immobilisation of India’s forward patrols was taken advantage of by the Chinese immediately. Unhindered, the Chinese rapidly completed the circular Haji Langar-Shamul Lungpa-Lanak La Road of which the G-219 was roughly the same diameter. This enabled the Chinese to occupy quietly another 8,000 sq. miles of Indian territory, whilst carrying on a verbal fusillade against the Govt of India. Though the IB went on reporting this further road-building activity, it could only helplessly look on with no means of redress at its disposal. Kongka La incident had taken place on October 21, 1959.
Pandit Nehru maintained that the entire border between India and Tibet had been there for centuries and had been determined by history, geography, custom and tradition. He logically upheld the validity of every treaty which had been entered into by the earlier governments of Tibet and/or China and the British Govt of lndia or other Indian authorities and pointed out that some of' these treaties were more than a century old and the boundary agreed to had remained peaceful and had been recognised as the international boundary (IB) for a very long time. He admitted that the boundary, though defined, was not demarcated and, therefore, there might be minor disputes about the actual location of the IB at some places. Nehru mentioned that though India had given full details of the IB, the Govt of India did not know with any precision where the frontier claimed by the Chinese lay. It was all a matter of surmise based on small-scale Chinese maps in which the frontier varied from year to year. Therefore, there could be no possible observance of status quo as the facts concerning the status quo were themselves disputed. Instead of the status quo he suggested the following measures: lndia would withdraw all her personnel to the west of the line which the Chinese government had shown as the IB in its 1956 maps. And similarly, the Chinese government would withdraw its personnel to the east of the IB which had been described by the Govt of India in its earlier notes and correspondence and shown in its official maps. Since these two lines would be separated by long distances, there would not be the slightest possibility of clashes between the forces of either side. As the area was entirely uninhabited, it would not be necessary to maintain administrative personnel in that area.
Chou En-lai's reply was received on November 7, 1959. Whilst postponing the consideration of the Indian PM’s detailed letter to a future date, he proposed, as an interim measure, that in the eastern sector both Chinese and Indian troops should withdraw to a depth of 20km from the so-called McMahon Line. In the western sector, similarly they should withdraw up to a depth of 20km from the line up to which each side exercised actual control. He suggested that the civil administrative machinery, however, might be left behind. The most charitable interpretation which could be put on this letter was that China was trying to equate the actual control of India in NEFA up to the McMahon Line, which had existed for decades, with the actual control which China had secured in some parts of north-east Ladakh during the previous two years and which she was trying to extend forcibly, as a result of which the massacre of October 21 at Kongka La had taken place. But this proposal was not so simple as it looked on the surface. Acceptance of this suggestion would mean the acceptance by lndia of the claims of China to the territory of north-east Ladakh which she had illegally seized and was still in the process of seizing and also throwing open the entire Indo-Tibetan boundary to question even in areas of Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh. Moreover, once the checkposts were withdrawn it would be impossible to prevent further Chinese intrusion and seizure of those areas which they would later claim as having always been under Chinese control. Actually, there were no Indian troops within 20 miles of the frontier at this time anywhere along the entire Sino-Indian border. There were only units of CRPF or the Assam Rifles, which was a normal complement of every civil administration in any part of India. It was necessary to maintain these armed police units in these inaccessible areas with very poor means of communications, particularly when large bands of armed Tibetans were crossing into India every month and they had to be disarmed, taken charge of and escorted to the plains. Moreover, Pandit Nehru had trusted Chou En-lai's words in all good faith too long and he had been badly bitten. He was not going to be duped once again. He had declared even as early as 1950 that the McMahon Line was India's frontier, maps or no maps. He was not going to give in on the frontier issue over which the Chinese had kept quiet from 1950 to 1959. Once the Chinese claim that the frontier was not defined was conceded, it would start a process of interminable discussions with no prospect of agreement on any issue as the previous negotiations on Barahoti had shown. In all their correspondence the Chinese never defined what they meant by the line of actual control (LAC). The Chinese had surreptitiously grabbed certain parts of the Indian territory in Ladakh. But there was no continuous line of occupation. The first time that the Chinese clearly laid down on paper what they meant by the LAC was when they provided in December 1962, to the Colombo Powers the map showing the delineation of the territory claimed by them which they said they controlled-a control which the Chinese had gained at least in some areas by their aggression.
About the demilitarisation of a 20km belt on each side, the IB strongly objected to this procedure. As explained earlier, all through the frontier except at a few places in NEFA and in the north-eastern Ladakh we were occupying checkposts almost right on the frontier and commanded all the important passes and many of the important tracks from Tibet into India. Our withdrawal to a depth of 20km from the frontier would have meant in most cases in NEFA the IA coming down from heights of 10,000 feet to 3,000 feet, losing all its tactical locations and coming to areas where tracks and passes lost their significance, and in the dense forests it would be no longer possible to check infiltrations even in large numbers. The Chinese withdrawal of 20km from the border would mean nothing to them. First of all they were not yet in occupation of so many posts on the frontier as India was and there were still large gaps which were not under their administrative control. Their withdrawal would not involve climbing down from the heights, because they would still remain at practically the same height as on the frontier. In the barren plateau of Ladakh, infiltrators could be as easily checked at the frontier as at distances of 20km from it. Thus, by this withdrawal only the Indian side would lose a great deal whereas the Chinese would give away very little. There was the additional danger that the people on the Indian side of this so-called demilitarised zone would be subjected to large-scale Chinese subversion. Even according to the proposal made by Pandit Nehru regarding Ladakh, India would have lost all her frontier posts at Chumar, Demchok, Koyul, Dungti, Chushul, Tsogatsalu, Hot Spring, Murgo and Daulat Beg Oldi, because these were either on the frontier claimed by India or within 20km of the Chinese-claimed frontier. It would leave the whole of the Shyok and the Chang Chenmo valleys open to Chinese penetration and as India’s routes were longitudinal, she would even lose the route to the Karakoram Pass. Of course, the compensation here was that the Chinese would withdraw east of Aksai Chin and would have to leave the G-219 and also give up the areas like Kongka La, Shinglung, etc. where they had made further intrusions. So, though in south-east Ladakh India would stand to lose unilaterally, in north-east Ladakh the losses would be more or less counterbalanced by the loss suffered by the Chinese, who. in addition, would have to give up the Aksai Chin territory.
That Pandit Nehru was right in suspecting a trap in the Chinese Premier’s proposals dated September 7, from which he had adroitly disentangled himself, was proved by the cute proposals which Chou En-lai made on December 17 in reply to Pandit Nehru’s letter. Whilst expressing his readiness to accept the proposal that the armed personnel of both the countries should withdraw from Longju, he demanded that the same convention should be followed in case of Khinzemane. Sangcha and Lapthal (Nilang-Jedang), Chuba, Chuze. Puling Sumdo (Barahoti), Sung Sang, Shipki Pass, Parigas (Demchok), all of which he alleged the Indian troops had occupied after the 1954 Agreement. Regarding Pandit Nehru’s proposal that patrols should not be sent forward, Chou En-lai agreed but made a condition that this should be observed in the Ladakh sector also. In other words, as the Indian patrols would no longer be able to go to Lingzi Tang, Aksai Chin and Soda Plains, etc., it would enable the Chinese to quietly occupy them as they were doing after the stoppage of the forward patrols by the CRPF in October 1959. Whilst characterising the Priine Minister’s proposal regarding Ladakh as unfair, he claimed that Aksai Chin had always been a part of Xinjiang Province and also made the false claim that as far back as the latter half of 1950 it was along the traditional route in the area that units of the PLA had entered western Tibet. (This was a false claim, because the PLA came from Hotien-Keriya and it did not pass within 100 miles of the north-eastern extremity of Aksai Chin. The first Chinese group to travel across Aksai Chin was a mule caravan which came in September 1952, along an old silk route, which partly existed in this area.)
The Chinese raised several questions and purported to give the answers. The first question was: “Has the Sino-Indian boundary been formally delimited?” The reply questioned the authenticity of all the treaties, the right of the contracting parties, and stressed the indefinite nature of the borders indicated in the treaties, and finally claimed that the fact that the entire Sino-Indian boundary, whether in its western, middle or eastern sector, had not been delimited was incontestable. In all their correspondence and arguments contesting the basic principles of boundary alignment on which the Indian case was built, the Chinese deliberately confused the use of the words “definition”, “delimitation”, “delineation” and “demarcation”. They invariably sought to exploit the absence of actual physical demarcation on the ground to create the impression that the border did not even have juridically recognizable definition (verbally) or delineation (in maps).
China’s hand also fell heavily on the working of the Indian Trade Agencies at Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok. The Chinese interfered in the construction work of the Gyantse Agency building, which had been destroyed by floods. They arrested the Tibetan servants of these Agencies on false pretexts. A primary school run by the Agency at Yatung was prevented from taking Tibetan pupils. A doctor and a dentist attached to the Agency were prohibited from attending to Tibetan patients even though there was no other medical facility available there. All contacts between these Trade Agencies and Tibetans were stopped. The Trade Agent at Gartok was refused permission even to go to recognised trade marts. Pilgrim traffic to Kailash and Mansarovar was interfered with on the plea of disorder by the Khampas and was ultimately stopped altogether. The Indian Consul at Lhasa was not allowed to move more than 2 miles outside his Consulate. The doctor there was not allowed to treat Tibetan patients. No Tibetan visitor to the Consulate was allowed. The Chinese tried to brain-wash a large number of Kashmiri Muslims at Lhasa by forcing them to attend indoctrination classes and would not admit any right of the Indian Consul to intercede on their behalf. Several restrictions were also imposed on trade by Indian merchants in Tibet. They were not allowed to send remittances to India, were forced to open accounts in the China Bank and had to account for every item and commodity sold or purchased in Tibet to the Chinese authorities. Thus the working of the Trade Agreement was also brought to a standstill. It was clear that China’s aim was to make it impossible for the Indian Consulate at Lhasa and the Trade Agencies at Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok to function normally, to stop all cultural and personal intercourse between the Indians and the Tibetans, to stop trade unless carried through Chinese official agencies and even prevent pilgrimage by Indians to Tibet. Thus all cultural and trade rights of India in Tibet were more or less denied not in words but in deeds. All this time, China went on abusing the privileges which her Consulate and Trade Agencies enjoyed in a free country. The China Bank cornered all trade with Tibet and also trade by the considerable Chinese population in Calcutta, Bombay and Assam; the Consulate officials made frequent journeys to Assam, Darjeeling and all over the country; the Chinese population in Calcutta and Bombay were coerced into denouncing the KMT and supporting the Communist regime; the Consulate officials maintained regular contacts with members of the CPI and other opponents of the Government of India; and the NCNA carried full-length criticisms of the Govt of India by reproducing statements of Chinese leaders or newspaper editorials. The China Review, published in Calcutta, started open vilification of the Govt of India. Ultimately the Govt of India was forced to take reciprocal measures-though even these were taken rather haltingly. Restrictions were placed on the visitors to the Chinese Trade Agency at Kalimpong. Both the NCNA and the China Review were severely warned; some recalcitrant and trouble-making Chinese were deported; and the Reserve Bank of India started a check on the activities of the China Bank, which was rightly suspected of spending money for espionage purposes.
On January 29, 1960 at the conclusion of Burmese Gen Ne Win’s visit to Peking, a border agreement and a treaty of friendship and non-aggression between China and Burma were signed. The border agreement laid down that a joint committee would be set up to survey and demarcate the boundary. Burma agreed to part with certain parts of Burmese territory, Hpimaw, Gawalum, etc in favour of China and in return got the Namwan tract. Burma also agreed to hand over the areas inhabited by Panhung and Panlao tribes. In any case, the Burmese had no effective control over these areas. But Burma’s traditional boundary in the north with Tibet as defined by the McMahon Line, was recognised and the watershed principle was accepted though not mentioned in so many words. The only point left undecided was the trijunction of India, Burma and Tibet. The Chinese claimed this to be at Diphu Pass, which was 5 miles south of Talu Pass, which was till then recognised as the trijunction. It should be mentioned here that talks with Burma had been going on for several years and had bogged down due to the intransigence of the Chinese who had made claims over large tracts of Burmese territory. So the fact that during the height of its dispute with India, China suddenly changed its attitude, showed a spirit of accommodation and reason and conceded to Burma practically all that the latter had demanded showed that this was done to spite India and to prove to the world how reasonable China was and that it was India and not China that was motivated by big power chauvinism.. But this border agreement in no way stopped the PLAGF from frequently making deep incursions inside Burmese territory and this continued year after year. So the agreement was entered into as a matter of convenience to suit China’s interests at that time.
Another agreement was signed with Nepal during the
Nepalese PM B. P. Koirala’s visit to Beijing on March 21, 1960. The agreement
provided for economic aid to Nepal and the establishment of embassies on a
reciprocal basis. It also mentioned that a treaty of friendship would be signed
during Chou En-lai’s return-visit to Kathmandu between April 26 and 29. B. P.
Koirala was asked to sign a non-aggression pact to which, however, he did not
agree. Koirala was informed that China was building roads to Nepal’s frontier.
A mass paradropping exercise was held to impress upon Koirala and S. P.
Upadhyaya, who had accompanied him, that China could at any moment capture
Kathmandu and India could not do anything to prevent it. Every attempt was made
to convince Nepal that she need no longer depend on India for her development
and defence. The agreement on the border said that the conflicting parties had
decided to determine concretely the boundary between the two countries in the
following ways: in sections where the delineation of the boundary line between
the maps of the two countries was identical, the boundary would be fixed
according to the identical delineation. In sections where the delineation
varied, but the actual jurisdiction was undisputed, the actual jurisdictional
boundary would be accepted; and where the delineation of the boundary and the
actual jurisdictions both varied, adjustments would be made working on the
principles of equality, etc. A joint survey team would be sent out by the joint
committee to carry out this survey. In this case, also, China was making a deep
dent in an area of undoubted Indian influence, which had lasted for over a
century. India and Nepal differed from each other only politically. Otherwise
by culture, religion and language (both Hindi and Nepali springing from
Sanskrit), trade, marriage and social intercourse there had been eternal affinity
between these two countries and there was no need to have this set out in a
formal treaty. There was no passport system between these two countries and
thousands of Nepalese enjoyed the same freedoms of employment and movement in
India as any other Indians. Indeed, the Gurkhas formed a strong section in the
IA and the Indian Armed Police or armed guards. Just as there was a large
population of Indian origin in Nepali Terai, similarly there was a large
population of Gurkhas in Darjeeling district, South Sikkim, South Bhutan and in
Assam and even in the tea gardens of North Bengal. In the past whenever the colonial
British government was in trouble, Nepal had always sent a symbolic force to
India to assist the British government to prove her solidarity with British
India; and, of course, the famous Gurkha battalions fought in both the world
wars not only in Burma and South-East Asia but in West Asia, Ethiopia, North
Africa and even in Italy. So this was the first breach which China was making
in India’s traditional and centuries-old friendship and unity with Nepal by
offering a treaty of friendship and economic aid and by a show of generosity in
settling the border without making too big a claim on Nepal. Indeed, China even
went so far as to concede that Mount Everest was in Nepal, though previously it
had stoutly contested this point.