Thursday, September 8, 2022

IAF's Project Eagle Eye, Plus IA's Battlespace Digitisation Efforts For IBGs & China's Perception of Friction Points In Eastern Ladakh

 Dhruti Radar Warning Receivers on IAF 
Su-30MKI H-MRCAs
IA's Battlespace Digitisation Efforts For IBGs

AVision is a JV between Israel-based UVision Air Ltd & Hyderabad-based Aditya Precitech Pvt Ltd that is offering the PALM family of loitering PGMs.

https://www.avisionsystems.com/tactical-systems/

China's Perception of Friction Points In 
Eastern Ladakh
Recalling History

The climate in Tibet is dry and healthy and troops require no protection against rainfall. Road-making and building of air strips are simple processes and miles and miles of road can be laid out simply by demarcating the alignment with stones. The ground is hard and generally smooth and so motor vehicles can be driven sometimes over hundreds of miles without undertaking any heavy engineering work. Similarly, air strips can be laid out at many places. And, once the roads and air strips are laid, there is hardly any wear and tear caused by climatic conditions as there is little rainfall and very little snow due to the absence of humidity. Whereas it was an extremely difficult engineering job to build even 10 miles of roads in NEFA and Sikkim and even in UP, and the roads often had to pass over high snow-clad mountain ranges in Ladakh and Himachal Pradesh, China was sitting pretty on a high plateau (roof of the world) where the only effort it required in even laying down hundreds of miles of roads was to mark out the direction by flags or pieces of stones on both sides. Only an occasional digging or filling or blasting had to be done. The surface was generally so hard that it could take heavy military traffic without any deterioration and required no metalling or tarring. Compared to this, in the soft hillsides of NEFA even the best road just melted away and disappeared during the rains. No means had till then been found of circumventing the deep layer of snow on all the passes, which stopped communications between Kashmir and Ladakh for the better part of the year. That India’s frontier roads were not ready by the time the conflict with China started is no reflection on Indian road-builders. India’s was an incomparably more difficult task than what the Chinese faced. Simultaneously with developing road communications toIndia’s frontier areas, China also extended its administrative control in such areas like Pemako, Chimdru, Migytun and Tsona, which it had previously left uncontrolled except by sending occasional parties. Thus, by the end of 1958, China's control over Tibet was complete.

The Govt of India accepted the legacy of the British and drew a boundary starting from the trijunction of' India, China and Afghanistan through Kilik Pass, Mintaka Pass, Kharchanai Pass, Parpik Pass and Khunjerab Pass. These were all taken as the boundary of Hunza State. From Khunjerab the boundary crossed the Muztagh River and came to the Aghil Mountains and then on to the Aghil watershed and to Marbo Pass and Shaksgarn Pass to tile Karakoram Pass. A little to the east of this pass the main Karakoram Range takes a southerly direction and no longer forms the boundary. But from the point the Karakorain Range turns south, another range of mountains, known as the Akhtagh Range, takes off and this forms the watershed between Shyok coming to the Indus system and the watershed of Yarkand. This was taken as the boundary east of Karakoram Pass, going through Qara Tagh Pass, crossing the Karakash River and then joining with the Kuen Lun Mountains. Thereafter the boundary went through Yangi Pass along the crest of the mountains separating the Yurungkash Basin fom those of the lakes in Aksai Chin. Leaving the crest of the Kuen Lull Mountains, the boundary running south-westwards passed along the watershed separating the basins of Amtogar and Sallg Jilganang Lakes in lndia f5rom those of Leighten and Tsoggar Lakes in Tibet and finally came down to Lanak La. This boundary, which was accepted by the Government of lndia and was put on the map, followed the natural high watcrshed principle throughout and was also the natural boundary of'the area up to which the Ladakhis had from times immemorial exercised the right of pasture and collection of salt. It is true that north of this line, which was a no-man's-land, the Ladakis did not normally go. Through it lay the trade routes between Yarkhalid and Leh and also between Yarkhand and Gartok.

But between the northern boundary of Ladakh as claimed by lndia and the southern boundary of Sinkiang as claimed by China there were 16,000 sq. miles of territory which was uninhabited. Through this lay three trade routes; (1) through Karakoram Pass via Panamik or Shyok to Leh, (2) via Haji Langar and passing through Shinglung, Shamul Lumpka, Tsogatsalu, Phobrang to Leh and (3) from Haji Langar through the eastern end of Aksai Chin, past Amtogar Lake to Rudok and then to Gartok. There were some good pastures between Pangong Lake and Lanak La, which the people of Phobrang and other neighbouring villages in Ladakh utilised during summer. Similarly the Amtogar Lake was used for collection of salt. Some enthusiastic shikaris travelled in this area in quest of mountain goats or bears and, besides the traders who used to come from Khotan (Hotien) to Leh, the only other parties who visited this area were the patrol and survey parties sent by the Kashmir Government. There was no need for any effective administrative occupation of this territory as it was uninhabited.

In late 1949, the first joint IB-IA checkpost was set up at Panamik/Shyok to cover the route from Karakoram and an Intelligence post was opened at Leh. The scheme, which was sanctioned by the GoI in 1950, consisted of 21 checkposts, excluding the one already established in Ladakh, and these were all set up by the beginning of 1951. Some further increases were made after the receipt of the Himmatsinghji Committee Report, and by the end of 1952, 30 checkposts were in operation in the frontier, of which 7 were in Ladakh, 4 in Punjab-Himachal Pradesh, 6 in UP, 5 in Sikkim and 8 in NEFA. In 1958, 14 posts were added in NEFA bringing the total to 22. By 1960 the total number of posts had risen to 69 in Ladakh, 9 in Himachal Pradesh-Punjab, 17 in UP, 10 in Sikkim and 22 in NEFA, the total staff employed being 1,334. Re-adjustments and further strengthening were taking place all through this troublesome period and by 1962 the number of posts had risen to 77 employing 1,590 personnel. Every year since 1958 IA patrol parties set out from Leh and trekked along the northern route towards Karakoram, the north-eastern route to Aksai Chin, Lingzithang, etc. and the eastern route to Lanak La, etc. The patrol parties were often out of communications with Leh for over three months as they had no wireless sets.

Immediately after the Chinese Communist forces "liberated" Sinkiang, it was reported by us that with the help of Russian engineers the Chinese were developing road communication in Xinjiang. Chou En-lai had claimed in 1960 that Chinese troops had entered Western Tibet as early as October, 1950, by the Aksai Chin Road. But in this he was pulling a fast one. Unfortunately, without verifying Chou En-lai's claim, some writers have accepted this assertion true. There was irrefutable evidence that the PLA did not enter Gargunsa in western Tibet till June, 1951. These troops came not through Aksai Chin but from Khotan (Hotien) via Keriya, Nurmat Langar, Polur, Aqsu, Khizil Pass, Baba Hatim, Kokyar Pass, Altoon Pasha, Yashil Tso, Ibrahim Kol, Jawaza, Dung Ming, Zama Mangbo, Mense to Gargunsa. This route at no point passed within 100 miles of the north-eastern frontier of Ladakh. China had first tried to open this route to motor traffic but encountered many engineering difficulties. Soon after their arrival at Gargunsa, the PLA’s surveyors started prospecting for a direct route to Gartok via Rudok from Sinkiang along an old silk route which existed part of the way. The surveyors were noticed near Rudok surveying the possibility of opening this route for motor traffic in October, 1951. The first mule caravan using this route arrived at Rudok from Xinjiang in April, 1952. Then the PLA decided to discard the Hotien-Keriya-Polur-Dun Ming-Gargunsa road and decided to go all out for this shorter route via Aksai Chin. After this the regular change-over of troops from Yarkhand to Western Tibet started through this route though the movements were yet on foot or animals as the motor road had not yet been constructed. In November, 1952, the IB reported that the PLA had engaged 2,000 labourers to develop this route into a jeep track and they planned to complete the construction by 1953.

In December 1952, the IB reported that the jeep-track from Xinjiang to Lake Amtogar had been completed and the PLA was working to bring the road to Rudok. In 1953, the IB reported that the jeep track to Rudok had been completed and regular jeep traffic had cornmenced. It was because of these troop movements and the road-building activity that China had refused to allow a trade mart to be opened at Rudok. All through 1953-1954 the PLA was improving and constructing the road from Xinjiang to the Ladakh border (Haji Langar). There were two routes, both starting from Yarkhand. The route was the same up to Karghalik where it bifurcated. One branch went direct east to Hotien and then came down south, crossed the Kuen Lun mountains at Yangi Pass and came into Ladakh border at Haji Langar. The other branch first took a southernly direction from Karghali k, then turned east, passed through Kengshewar, entered north Ladakh near Qarakash river and joined the first route at Haji Langar. It was the second route, which was used mostly for traffic between Xinjiang and western Tibet. The Indian Trade Agent at Gartok reported in July and again in September 1955 that he had been told by China’s Vice-Chief of the Foreign Bureau of Ngari (Western Tibet) that China was going to construct the Xinjiang-Gartok road via Rudok as it was shorter than the Lhasa-Rudok road. He again reported in September, basing himself on the same source, that China had started work on this road. It was also in that year that a Chinese Transport Officer had told the Tibetans that Gartok would be linked with Xinjiang within two years and that the work on this road had been started from the summer of 1955. In January, 1956, IB sources reported the working of survey parties between Rudok and Gartok and it was learnt that this was for connecting Yarkhand with Gartok. By June 1956, it was learnt that the road from Hotien up to Karnang, north of Yangi Pass, had been completed. In July it was reported that the road from Xinjiang to Gartok was near completion. In March, 1957, China first announced the completion of the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway (G-219) without mentioning the alignment. In August the Indian Trade Agent at Gartok reported that the Gartok-Rudok road was almost complete and China hoped to run a through motor service from October onwards and that it laid great importance on this road as being vital. On October 6, 1957, the Xinjiang-Gartok road was formally opened with a ceremony at Gartok and 12 trucks on a trial run from Yarkhand reached Gartok. The road was reported to be 1,170km long. In January 1958, the New China News Agency (NCNA) reported that the Xinjiang-Tibet highway had been opened two months earlier and the road was being fully utilised. In February 1958, the IB reported that troops were being utilised to widen and improve this road.

One must, however, admit that though the IB’s informants, and even its staff, had personally visited the road from Gartok to Rudok and up to a point parallel to Lanak La, i.e. more or less the point at which the road entered Aksai Chin from the south, no Police party had actually traversed the portion of the road within the Aksai Chin itself. There were three ways how this could be done. The easiest would be to cross Lanak La into western Tibet, which was indisputably Chinese territory, strike the road some miles east of that pass and then travel north along the road. The party ran the almost certain risk of encountering the PLA. The second alternative was to go up to Haji Langar in the northern end where this road entered Aksai Chin from the Hotien side and travel southwards. The party would have to come back by the same route but again would run the certain risk of encountering the PLA and being captured. The third would be to strike direct east from Shamul Lungpa, cross two mountain ranges and come to the fresh water lake, Sarigh Jilganang Kol. Going further east, the party would strike this road. Travelling south and then north, the whole of this route could be traversed without at any point going beyond Indian territory. But on this occasion also the party would run the risk of encountering the PLA, though in India’s own territory. The easiest was the first course and this was the route the Ladakhis had taken for decades to go to Lake Amtogar to collect salt. But as explained above a part of this route would lie through indisputably Chinese territory. Regarding the other two routes, in those days the available resources did not permit us to do the trek up to Haji Langar and then along this road to Lake Amtogar, back to Haji Langar and then back to Leh, or to go from Shamul Lungpa to Salig Jilganang Kol and then traverse the road north and south and come out again by the way of Shamul Lungpa. Though the iB had a good idea on the map about the alignment of this road as the two ends were known and the IB had traced it in its maps, no member of the IB staff had actually traversed this part of the road. Only sources had travelled a few miles from the Lanak La side to fix the southern entry point. However, enough information was available about the construction of the G-219 right from 1951 to 1957, when the road was formally declared open. But though it was also known that the Chinese laid great stress on the construction of this road, which they considered to be vital, its implications to India's security in the Ladakh region were not properly comprehended at any level. All through these years no questions were raised by either IA HQ or the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) about this road.

Year after year the IB used to send its patrol parties during the summer to check infiltrations. Excepting the north-eastern Aksai Chin area, which the patrol parties had not visited, no sign of Chinese infiltration was noticed anywhere up to 1956. In fact, a patrol party going to Lanak La in June 1956, found that the Indian flag put up there by a party in 1954 was still flying though very much battered due to weather. But on August 29 that year, for the first time, the patrol party saw signs of a Chinese survey party having come up to Mebdo La, about two marches from Lanak La, in Indian territory. Actually the Chinese had not come from Lanak La but from the Niazi and Dambuguru side and had claimed Khurnak Fort to be in their territory though it was undisputedly Indian. In September 1956 unmistakable signs of a Chinese survey party having camped earlier at a nala called Zulung Khongma were found. Further on similar marks were found at Chhuzungpo Kongma. It was not yet clear whether the Chinese were trying to fix their boundary with Ladakh or were surveying for opening a road through Lanak La or Niazi towards the west, probably up to Hot Springs or Shamul Lungpa. Alarmed by this sign of China’s penetration in Indian territory, next year the IB made more elaborate arrangements for patrols to go to the frontier in all directions. The IB built up an advance post at Hot Springs, two marches from Phobrang, and the party went to Shamul Lungpa, Dehra Compass, Shinglung, Sumdo, then along the Qara Kash River to Malik Shah almost 40 miles inside Xinjiang. Tell-tale signs of fresh Chinese intrusion were found at Dehra Compass, Khizil Zilga and north and south of Khizil Zilga, Shinglung and between Shinglung and Sumdo. Signs were also found near the Qarakash River of an area having been marked on the dry bed of the river apparently for small aircraft to land. This was serious because the southern-most intrusion had taken China over 70 miles inside Indian territory. When judged against the intrusion noticed the previous year, it also became apparent that Chinese surveyors were trying to find a route from Haji Langar through Sumdo, Shinglung, Dehra Compass and Shamul Lungpa to link up with a road from Lanak La via Khongka La to Shaniul Lungpa. This road would go parallel to the claimed Chinese boundary deep within lndian territory. The report of the 1957 patrol party was available in early 1958, and the IB reported this to the GoI in March 1958, and recommended that a protest should be lodged with China against this serious trespass. The IB also recommended that in future at least two expeditions should be sent every year over this area—one by the IA and the other by the ITBP with IB officers attached to each. The IB also recommended that a proper map of the area should be made from the reports of the various expeditions which had been sent by the IB, that shacks should be constructed at camping places for accommodating officers and men who would be out on patrol and who had no place for halting; that the Phobrang frontier post should be strengthened and a summer post should be opened at Hot Springs as the IB felt that this would be more or less the link-up point between the possible routes coming from Lantrk La in the east and from Haji Langar in the north. On its own the IB left secret caches of food, kerosene, fuel and other indestructible material at Hot Springs to serve as the spring-board for its operations next summer. This report was discussed in the MEA with the IA’s CGS present. The line taken by the MEA was that the exact boundary of this area had not yet been demarcated and so in any protest we lodged we could not be on firm grounds. Probably the infiltrations had been made by over-zealous survey officers and did not indicate anything more serious. Moreover, as we were not physically controlling this area it would be useless to make any formal protest. The Chinese were sure to reject it and claim the territory as their own. The IA’s attitude was that it could send an occasional patrol but it was in no position to open and hold any posts in this area. Moreover, the G-219 road was not of any strategic importance and it would be difficult to oust the PLA from this region. In any case, the IA was in no position to make that effort because of the limited resources available at Leh and of the non-existence of any road communications from Leh to these parts. The conclusion was that India should intensify her patrols and also try to open one post north of Phobrang at Tsogatsalu to check Chinese infiltration. It was suggested that from this advance post we should do more effective patrolling of the Lingzi Tang area in summer.

One serious difficulty faced by the IB was that starting from Leh our patrols would have to cross three successive mountain ranges both towards Lingzi Tang and towards Karakoram and these passes did not open till July, so the patrol could be sent only in the second half of the year. The Chinese coming from Xinjiang into Lingzi Tang had no snow-clad passes to cross and could come to Indian territory, do the survey and go back before the IB patrol party could get into that area. In the meantime, a report had been received from India’s Embassy in Beijing about the completion of the G-219 road. The IB had also earlier reported it. So in June, 1958, another meeting was held in the MEA. This was attended by the IA’s CGS also. The Foreign Secretary maintained that neither the Embassy report nor the IB report conclusively proved that the Xinjiang-Western Tibet highway actually passed through Indian territory and no Indian party had actually traversed this route and so before any protest was lodged we should be sure of our ground. Hence it was decided that two patrol parties would be sent to traverse the G-219 road and see it on the ground if it passed through Indian territory. One would be of the IA and the other of the ITBP. The IA chose the known route from Hot Springs via Shamul Lungpa, Dehra Compass, Shinglung to Haji Langar to see the road from the northern end. The ITBP was left with either the route going through Lanak La into admittedly Chinese territory in Tibet or traverse an uncharted route direct east from Shamul Lungpa crossing two mountain ranges up to 18,000 feet high and land at Sarigh Jilganang Kol Lake. The IB chose the second route, as going via Lanak La it would be impossible to avoid the Chinese. The IB had foreseen a commitment of this type and had laid its stores the previous year at Hot Springs, which it now moved to Shamul Lungpa. The IA team was led by Lt. Iyengar. At Haji Langar this party encountered a PLAGF patrol and was taken prisoner and removed to a fort in Xinjiang where the members were detained for two months till a protest was lodged. Though this team had a wireless set, it went out of order and so the team remained out of touch with its HQ from the very beginning. The ITBP team was led by Karam Singh. He stuck to the route charted out on the map prepared by the IB and reached Sarigh Jilganang Kol. Numerous heavy tyre marks were seen on the bank of the lake. From these and other marks, it was clear that the Chinese had halted at this place and that Chinese trucks were taking water from the lake. The party went further east crossing the G-219 road up to Ladakh's boundary and planted the Indian tricolour. It came back to the road and traversed it both north and south up to Lake Amtogar. The party members saw a Chinese convoy but managed to hide themselves effectively and to take photographs of the convoy. Karam Singh took out one of the wooden pegs demarcating road miles in Chinese. This hazardous trip undertaken by Karam Singh confirmed without any doubt that the so-called G-219 road really cut across Indian territory from Haji Langar in the north to Amtogar in the south. The Govt of India then made a protest to Beijing about this road and also enquired if Lt Iyengar was being held by them. Lt Iyengar's party was then released, but not at Haji Langar where it had been captured, but at the Karakoram Pass, which was the only point where there was no dispute about the lie of the frontier. The Chinese summarily rejected the protest about the road.

Earlier, another patrol party of the IB going to the Karakoram Pass from Panamik had found signs of Chinese infiltration near Daulat Beg Oldi from the Qara Kash side. With regard to the Chinese infiltration in Lingzi Tang, Aksai Chin and Soda Plains, the IB recommended that the checkpost at Phobrang should be raised to a Company HQ and Police posts should be opened at Tsogatsalu, Shamul Lungpa and Shinglung. The IB also recommended that the IA should establish posts at Sarigh Jilganang Kol in the east and Palong Karpo in the north to be near the two ends of the G-219 road. Our argument was that if we could not prevent the Chinese from using and further developing the G-219, we could at least stop them from extending their road system further within our territory and the signs were that they were trying to connect Haji Langar with Shamul Lungpa and join it up with thc projected Lanak La-Sharnul Lungpa road. The IB’s recommendation was discussed in January, 1959, at a meeting in the MEA with Gen Thimayya, Chief of the Army Staff, present. Thimayya quite categorically stated that he did not consider that the G-219  road was of any strategic importance nor was he willing to open any posts at Palong Karpo and Sarigh Jilganang Kol because he felt that small IA posts would be of little use and in any case he had no means of maintaining them from his base at Leh. When the IB argued that the Chinese were using this road to bring reinforcements to western Tibet whence they could threaten eastern Ladakh and so this road was of much security importance to India, Gen Thimayya agreed but expressed his inability to do anything about it. The Foreign Secretary also agreed with the IA’s COAS and felt that posts at Shamul Lungpa, Shinglung, etc. would be of no use to stop Chinese infiltration. They might even provoke the Chinese into making further intrusions. The IB was informed by the Foreign Secretary after some days that the Prime Minister had approved of his views and no posts need be opened in this area. Against this decision the IB protested in February 1959, and maintained that even if the IA could not open posts at Palong Karpo and Sarigh Jilgnang Kol the IB should be allowed to open posts there. The IB also argued that it should be allowed to open the posts at Tsogatsalu, Hot Springs, Shamul Lungpa and Shinglung. It would keep Police at these places not for the purpose of fighting the Chinese but to prove India’s possession so that the Chinese might not claim that area and quietly occupy it. The IB also recommended that the posts at Palong Karpo and Sarigh Jilganang Kol could be fed by air and the other posts would be maintained by animal transport. Shortly after receiving the IB’s note of February 16, the Prime Minister passed orders that whilst we should not open posts at Palong Karpo and Sarigh Jilganang Kol, because they would be too near the G-219 road and might create tensions, the other posts recommended by the IB should be opened at Tsogatsalu, Hot Springs, Shamul Lungpa and Shinglung. Out of them only the Tsogatsalu and Hot Springs posts could be opened in October 1959 but before the others could be opened the Chinese came in and occupied the area.

IA HQ knew that the Army was in no position to prevent the Chinese from constructing this road across Aksai Chin. According to the IA, it was physically impossible for it even to maintain posts at these places in the prevailing state of communications from Leh. Even the road from Srinagar to Leh was subject to interruptions for seven months in the year. Gen Thimayya knew the strength and the capability of the PLA. He had seen it at close quarters in Korea where the PLA had very nearly defeated the Americans. He knew that the IA in those days was in no position to engage the PLA in a big war. He was expressing this view even as late as 1962. And at such a remote place, where there was no means of sustaining the force, his troops would have suffered severe reverses at the very outset and he would be in no position to retrieve the situation. He was not to be lured into an area where he was in no position to defend himself. So he tried to play down the importance of the G-219 road and throw doubts on IB reports about its existence. If he admitted its importance from the security point of view, he might have been forced by Indian public opinion to engage in an unequal fight, the adverse result of which he clearly foresaw. The attitude of the MEA was that this part of the territory was useless to India. Even if the Chinese did not encroach into it, India could not make any use of it. The boundary had not been demarcated and had been shifted more than once by the British. There was an old silk route which was a sort of an international route. The Chinese had only improved it. It would be pointless to pick up quarrels over issues in which India had no means of enforcing her claims. These were all valid arguments and their validity seems to be more acceptable to the people at large and even the Opposition than it was in those days. The PM was no doubt inhibited by the same considerations and his knowledge about the weakness of his Army vis-a-vis the PLAGF and its inability those days to effectively prevent Chinese encroachment in Indian territory. Aksai Chin was the only part of Indian territory in which so far the Chinese had been able to make an entry. Ousting them from this area, he knew, was well-nigh impossible. So he was even willing to allow the Chinese the use of this road for civilian purposes.

All through these years the Chinese continued their road construction programme in all parts of Tibet relentlessly—engaging large numbers of Tibetans as labourers and treating them worse than slaves. By the end of 1958 the Chinese had completed the following arterial highways linking China with Tibet from north-east, east and west. The most important was the Sining (rail-head)-Gormo-Nagchuka-Zamsar-Lhasa roadand this carried most of the heavy traffic and practically all the patrol. Another road starting from Sining led to Nagchuka and Lhasa via Jyekundo and Chamdo. From the Chengtu side on the east a road led to Kanting and then connected with Chamdo via Kantse. From Kanting another road took off in a westerly direction and going via Markhang, Drokhang, Shugden, Chomo Dzong and Gianda terminated at Lhasa. Thus Lhasa was connected with China from the north-east and the east. From Lhasa a highway to the west passed through Shighatse, Lhatse, Saka, Tradom and Parkha and terminated at Gartok where it met the G-219 highway passing through Aksai Chin. A direct route was also built from Nagchuka along the northern steppes to Thokjalung and ending at Tashigong where it met the Gartok-Xinjiang highway. A road parallel to the Nepal border was constructed starting at Gyantse and passing through Khamba, Sekhar Dzong, Tingri, Dzongka Dzong and meeting the Lhasa-Gartok highway at Tradom. Besides these arterial roads, numerous roads were constructed towards India, Sikkim and Nepal borders, the more important of which were Drowa to Rima, Gyantse to Phari, Parkha to Taklakot and Gartok to Tholingmath. A road ran parallel to the south bank of the Tsangpo and from this radiated roads to Tsona and Lhuntze on the NEFA border and Lakhang Dzong on the Bhutan border. China had therefore carefully laid out both arterial and radial roads in Tibet and was no longer dependent on getting supplies from India to maintain the PLAGF in Tibet. China had also carried out, as the reports of Karam Singh's patrol parties showed, extensive surveys in the years 1956 and 1957 to the depth of nearly 70 to 80 miles within Indian territory south of Haji Langar and west of Lanak La. This also could not have been due to the ignorance about the exact position of the Chinese frontier. After having blatantly grabbed a part of Aksai Chin by the end of 1957, the Chinese by 1958 felt bold enough to occupy or claim other parts of Indian territory as they could then talk of maintaining the status quo as a handle to force the Govt of India to come to the negotiating table and dictate terms to the latter. So the time according to them was now ripe for a discussion of the frontier. This they did not indicate by adopting normal diplomatic procedures but applying pressure tactics of first deliberately creating incidents on the border and then questioning the validity of the entire frontier.

India's boundaries had been clearly marked in all Indian maps since 1954, which showed the whole of Aksai Chin, Soda Plains and Lingzi Tang, the Chang Chenmo Valley, etc. to be a part of Ladakh. Similarly, the whole of NEFA south of the McMahon Line as well as all territory up to the watershed of the Himalayas in Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh was within Indian boundaries. Similarly the northern boundaries of Sikkim and Bhutan were also clearly shown in these maps. So there was no shade of doubt about what India claimed to be her boundary. On the other hand, the Chinese maps were in small scale, the boundary was indefinite and varied in different maps and, except the fact that they included considerable parts of Indian territory in China, they did not help to determine the actual Chinese frontier. Nor did the frontier follow any internationally recognised principles such as watershed, high ranges, etc. In the China Pictorial of July 1958 (a Chinese official publication), a map of China showed practically the whole of NEFA, large areas in Ladakh, considerable areas in Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh and even large areas of Eastern Bhutan as part of China. The publication of this map in an official journal meant clearly that the Chinese Communist Govt now openly claimed this frontier though it had previously not claimed the correctness of the old maps. Naturally the Government of India protested and, in a note on August 21, 1958, it pointed out the absurdity of the claim over Indian territory made in the Chinese map as published in the China Pictorial. The Chinese reply came on November 3, 1958. The old platitudes were repeated and it was again mentioned that this was a reproduction of old maps. But then followed the alarming statement that the Chinese Government had not till then undertaken a survey of the Chinese boundaries, and had not held consultations about them with the countries concerned. In other words, it was for the first time that China was openly questioning the entire boundary of Tibet not only with India but also with Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and Burma. This was completely contrary to what Chou En-hi had stated earlier when he had practically accepted the & facto position and the validity of the McMahon Line, though not convinced of its legality; and when he had said that there were disputes only about small bits of territory in other sectors. China, therefore, was now about to lay claim to nearly 52,000 sq. miles of Indian territory.

During the months of May to September 1959, there were several cases of intrusions by PLA troops in NEFA, in Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh. The Chinese were obviously trying to pick up quarrels and also find holes in the Indian security arrangements. Though in some cases Chinese troops remained in our territory for several weeks, these were temporary intrusions and on our protest the Chinese finally withdrew. But in eastern Ladakh they were following different tactics. Here they came for good and would not withdraw. They first occupied Khurnak Fort and a hill overlooking Chushul and posted a picket at Rezang La. They prevented Ladakhi graziers from going into their large traditional pastures of Nyagzu and Dambuguru. These were not mere cases of frontier violations but in some places of fairly deep penetration within Indian territory. In Nyagzu the penetration was as deep as 30 miles. When an Indian Police patrol went towards Khurnak Fort, it was captured and kept under detention for over a month and ultimately released. A serious violation occurred between Mygitun and Longju in NEFA. The border passed between Mygitun and Longju, but the Chinese claimed Longju to be a part of Mygitun and killed three Assam Rifles soldiers on the border and then came and surrounded Longju, which the Indians had to vacate as they were greatly outnumbered and there was no other alternative. The Chinese later withdrew from Longju but remained in force at Mygitun. The Indians could not re-occupy Longju and had to be content with a post at Maja, a few miles south of it. It was over this Longju incident that China did not get the complete support of Soviet Russia much to her chagrin. Protest notes from one side making allegations of violation and replies refuting the allegations from the other flowed endlessly-the despatches progressively becoming more acrimonious. From July 1959, China commenced further roadbuilding and penetration in Lingzi Tang further west of the G-219 road in right earnest. By September 1959, China had sent PLAGF troops into Chang Chenmo Valley and Lingzi Tang. In a statement made by Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister of China, before the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on September 13, 1959, he accused India of drawing her maps in such a way as to cut 38,000 sq km deep into Chinese territory along the Xinjiang-Tibet-Ladakh section, of invading Parigas, Chuva, Chusa, Shipki Pass, Puling Sumdo, Sangoha and Lapthal along the Tibet-Punjab-Uttar Pradesh frontier and annexing 90,000 sq km of Chinese territory along the Assam-Tibet frontier.

Why, in the face of Chinese construction of the Aksai Chin road and the fact that they had conducted surveys to connect Haji Langar with Lanak La via Shamul Lungpa, did the Govt of India not take immediate steps to secure their position over the rest of Aksai Chin and Lingzi Tang which the Chinese had till then not occupied? In January 1959, the IA's COAS considered that the road was of no strategic importance to India, though he admitted that it was through this road that the Chinese were bringing to western Tibet reinforcements which might threaten eastern Ladakh. In view of this assertion by the COAS, the MEA’s Foreign Secretary was inclined to soft-pedal the issue particularly as, according to him, the road was an improvement of the old silk route and the territory through which it passed was disputed. The IB’s suggestion to open posts at Tsogatsalu, Hot Springs, Kongka La, Shamul Lungpa, Shinglung, Palong Karpo and Saligh Zilganang Kol was considered to be impracticable and unnecessary and in effect provocative. The IB had moved the Union Home Ministry (MHA) to spare a company of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) to be moved into this area to open the posts. But surprisingly for the first time the MHA too turned unsympathetic to our request. The MHA first questioned the need for opening the posts in an area where "not a blade of grass grew" and then raised various administrative difficulties and said that, as the CRPF was fully committed, a new company would have to be raised and this could not be got ready for at least two to three years. Wazir Mehra. the Inspector General of Police, Jammu & Kashmir, was next approached for assistance. He had a battallon of the CRPF in the valley, which was not deployed for any immediate work as the valley was then quiet and peaceful. With the concurrence of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, the Prime Minister of Jammu & Kashmir, he agreed to release one company out of this battalion for use in Ladakh. The IB then started negotiating with the IAF to lift the company with all its equipment to Leh. This took over a month, because the carrying capacity of the IAF was very limited those days and this was a new commitment which it had not provided for. But as was usual with the IAF it rose to the occasion and ultimately by the end of September 1959, the company landed at Leh. The Tsogatsalu post was opened on October 17, and the post at Hot Springs on October 19. Earlier, in June, Karam Singh's patrol had gone right up to Lanak La and had met no Chinese at either Kongka La or at Lanak La. On October 20, one patrol consisting of a local man and a constable was sent towards Kongka La, because the idea was to open the next post at that place. This patrol did not return. So on October 21, Karam Singh with 20 men and a small rear guard moved towards Kongka La in search of the missing patrol. He found hoof marks on the way, which indicated that some Chinese horsemen had come into that area and probably they had arrested the two Indians. Two miles west of Kongka La, near the bank of the Chang Chenmo river, Karam Singh's party of 20 was ambushed by two Chinese pickets, one perched on a hill top on the flank of the route by which the Indian party was advancing and another located in front on the other side of the river. This was cold-blooded murder and eight of the policemen lay dead in a few minutes. But the rest succeeded in taking some cover and fought till their ammunition ran out. They had killed at least one Chinese officer and injured some others. The party could not return as their retreat was cut off by the Chinese picket on the hill top. They could not escape along the river-bed as this was guarded by the Chinese picket on the other bank. At about dusk the Chinese brought some reinforcements from Kongka La and 12 policemen, including Karam Singh, some of them badly wounded, were taken prisoners. They were taken to Kongka La at the point of bayonets carrying their injured comrades. One constable, who was badly injured, had to be left behind and was killed by the Chinese. At Kongka La they were held in a largish Chinese camp, which the enemy had earlier established. Here Karam Singh and other prisoners were made to undergo severe indignities and tortures and they were constantly threatened to confess that they had trespassed into Chinese territory. The Govt of India very strongly protested and ultimately the Chinese released the prisoners and returned the dead bodies on November 14 on the bank of the Silung Barma river, which they claimed was the western frontier of Tibet. The Silung Barma river was only three miles east of Hot Springs, whereas the traditional frontier for centuries had been at Lanak La, which was 40 miles further east. Karam Singh had gone with a patrol up to Lanak La via Hot Springs and Kongka La only four months earlier. He had not met any Chinese on the way, so there was no doubt that the Chinese trespass in this area occurred after June 1959. If the IB had opened the posts in June, it could have forestalled the Chinese. They could, of course, come in force and throw the Indians out as they had done at Longju; but they could not have claimed the absence of any Indian posts as evidence of their own possession over this territory as they did later.

On September 23, 1959 when the facts of this outrage came to be known, the PM Pandit Nehru held a meeting which was attended by the Defence Minister, the COAS and officers from the Ministries of MEA, Home and Defence. The IA demanded that no further movements of armed CRPF should take place on the frontier without its clearance. In complete command of his facts, the IB fought tenaciously and effectively countered all accusations. But placed as he was, the PM had to give in to the IA’s demand. The result was that the protection of the border was thereafter handed over to the IA and all operations of the CRPF were made subject to prior approval of the Army Command. The COAS had even demanded that all the IB posts and their communications should be placed under his control. One would not blame the Army for this attitude in this matter. It was in no position at that time to guard the frontier effectively or keep units at the checkposts which the lightly equipped CRPF were holding. The logistics in Ladakh were against the concentration of any sizeable force in the Aksai Chin area. It was for these reasons that Gen Thimayya had earlier opposed the opening of any Indian posts in this area. If the Police got into any trouble with the Chinese, the IA would necessarily be drawn into it though it would be quite unprepared for it. As the IA could not yet fight at these places, it would prefer the disputes to be settled at diplomatic levels rather than at rifle point. Moreover, in this difficult region the Army would rather let the Chinese occupy the territory up to their claimed frontier than put up opposition which they were afraid they could not sustain. But the result was that thenceforward the IB could not take any initiative in opening posts in areas which were yet unoccupied and which were indisputably within Indian frontiers as the IB had been doing during the previous eight years. The Army was also not in a position to do so for quite sometime yet. Security of the frontier by the Army only remained on paper, because no additional army units were moved to the frontier till a year later. The units which continued to remain on the frontier were only the CRPF and the Assam Rifles. Over-zealous local junior Army officers even tried to interfere with the work of the Intelligence posts. All further consolidation of the frontier, which the IB had started in 1952 under the express orders of the Prime Minister, stopped and the northern frontier of India was frozen at the points which had been secured by the IB with the help of the CRPF, the State Police units and the Assam Rifles up to October 21, 1959. Not one square mile of territory could be added to India’s effective possession after that date. This immobilisation of India’s forward patrols was taken advantage of by the Chinese immediately. Unhindered, the Chinese rapidly completed the circular Haji Langar-Shamul Lungpa-Lanak La Road of which the G-219 was roughly the same diameter. This enabled the Chinese to occupy quietly another 8,000 sq. miles of Indian territory, whilst carrying on a verbal fusillade against the Govt of India. Though the IB went on reporting this further road-building activity, it could only helplessly look on with no means of redress at its disposal. Kongka La incident had taken place on October 21, 1959.

Pandit Nehru maintained that the entire border between India and Tibet had been there for centuries and had been determined by history, geography, custom and tradition. He logically upheld the validity of every treaty which had been entered into by the earlier governments of Tibet and/or China and the British Govt of lndia or other Indian authorities and pointed out that some of' these treaties were more than a century old and the boundary agreed to had remained peaceful and had been recognised as the international boundary (IB) for a very long time. He admitted that the boundary, though defined, was not demarcated and, therefore, there might be minor disputes about the actual location of the IB at some places. Nehru mentioned that though India had given full details of the IB, the Govt of India did not know with any precision where the frontier claimed by the Chinese lay. It was all a matter of surmise based on small-scale Chinese maps in which the frontier varied from year to year. Therefore, there could be no possible observance of status quo as the facts concerning the status quo were themselves disputed. Instead of the status quo he suggested the following measures: lndia would withdraw all her personnel to the west of the line which the Chinese government had shown as the IB in its 1956 maps. And similarly, the Chinese government would withdraw its personnel to the east of the IB which had been described by the Govt of India in its earlier notes and correspondence and shown in its official maps. Since these two lines would be separated by long distances, there would not be the slightest possibility of clashes between the forces of either side. As the area was entirely uninhabited, it would not be necessary to maintain administrative personnel in that area.

Chou En-lai's reply was received on November 7, 1959. Whilst postponing the consideration of the Indian PM’s detailed letter to a future date, he proposed, as an interim measure, that in the eastern sector both Chinese and Indian troops should withdraw to a depth of 20km from the so-called McMahon Line. In the western sector, similarly they should withdraw up to a depth of 20km from the line up to which each side exercised actual control. He suggested that the civil administrative machinery, however, might be left behind. The most charitable interpretation which could be put on this letter was that China was trying to equate the actual control of India in NEFA up to the McMahon Line, which had existed for decades, with the actual control which China had secured in some parts of north-east Ladakh during the previous two years and which she was trying to extend forcibly, as a result of which the massacre of October 21 at Kongka La had taken place. But this proposal was not so simple as it looked on the surface. Acceptance of this suggestion would mean the acceptance by lndia of the claims of China to the territory of north-east Ladakh which she had illegally seized and was still in the process of seizing and also throwing open the entire Indo-Tibetan boundary to question even in areas of Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh. Moreover, once the checkposts were withdrawn it would be impossible to prevent further Chinese intrusion and seizure of those areas which they would later claim as having always been under Chinese control. Actually, there were no Indian troops within 20 miles of the frontier at this time anywhere along the entire Sino-Indian border. There were only units of CRPF or the Assam Rifles, which was a normal complement of every civil administration in any part of India. It was necessary to maintain these armed police units in these inaccessible areas with very poor means of communications, particularly when large bands of armed Tibetans were crossing into India every month and they had to be disarmed, taken charge of and escorted to the plains. Moreover, Pandit Nehru had trusted Chou En-lai's words in all good faith too long and he had been badly bitten. He was not going to be duped once again. He had declared even as early as 1950 that the McMahon Line was India's frontier, maps or no maps. He was not going to give in on the frontier issue over which the Chinese had kept quiet from 1950 to 1959. Once the Chinese claim that the frontier was not defined was conceded, it would start a process of interminable discussions with no prospect of agreement on any issue as the previous negotiations on Barahoti had shown. In all their correspondence the Chinese never defined what they meant by the line of actual control (LAC). The Chinese had surreptitiously grabbed certain parts of the Indian territory in Ladakh. But there was no continuous line of occupation. The first time that the Chinese clearly laid down on paper what they meant by the LAC was when they provided in December 1962, to the Colombo Powers the map showing the delineation of the territory claimed by them which they said they controlled-a control which the Chinese had gained at least in some areas by their aggression.

About the demilitarisation of a 20km belt on each side, the IB strongly objected to this procedure. As explained earlier, all through the frontier except at a few places in NEFA and in the north-eastern Ladakh we were occupying checkposts almost right on the frontier and commanded all the important passes and many of the important tracks from Tibet into India. Our withdrawal to a depth of 20km from the frontier would have meant in most cases in NEFA the IA coming down from heights of 10,000 feet to 3,000 feet, losing all its tactical locations and coming to areas where tracks and passes lost their significance, and in the dense forests it would be no longer possible to check infiltrations even in large numbers. The Chinese withdrawal of 20km from the border would mean nothing to them. First of all they were not yet in occupation of so many posts on the frontier as India was and there were still large gaps which were not under their administrative control. Their withdrawal would not involve climbing down from the heights, because they would still remain at practically the same height as on the frontier. In the barren plateau of Ladakh, infiltrators could be as easily checked at the frontier as at distances of 20km from it. Thus, by this withdrawal only the Indian side would lose a great deal whereas the Chinese would give away very little. There was the additional danger that the people on the Indian side of this so-called demilitarised zone would be subjected to large-scale Chinese subversion. Even according to the proposal made by Pandit Nehru regarding Ladakh, India would have lost all her frontier posts at Chumar, Demchok, Koyul, Dungti, Chushul, Tsogatsalu, Hot Spring, Murgo and Daulat Beg Oldi, because these were either on the frontier claimed by India or within 20km of the Chinese-claimed frontier. It would leave the whole of the Shyok and the Chang Chenmo valleys open to Chinese penetration and as India’s routes were longitudinal, she would even lose the route to the Karakoram Pass. Of course, the compensation here was that the Chinese would withdraw east of Aksai Chin and would have to leave the G-219 and also give up the areas like Kongka La, Shinglung, etc. where they had made further intrusions. So, though in south-east Ladakh India would stand to lose unilaterally, in north-east Ladakh the losses would be more or less counterbalanced by the loss suffered by the Chinese, who. in addition, would have to give up the Aksai Chin territory.

That Pandit Nehru was right in suspecting a trap in the Chinese Premier’s proposals dated September 7, from which he had adroitly disentangled himself, was proved by the cute proposals which Chou En-lai made on December 17 in reply to Pandit Nehru’s letter. Whilst expressing his readiness to accept the proposal that the armed personnel of both the countries should withdraw from Longju, he demanded that the same convention should be followed in case of Khinzemane. Sangcha and Lapthal (Nilang-Jedang), Chuba, Chuze. Puling Sumdo (Barahoti), Sung Sang, Shipki Pass, Parigas (Demchok), all of which he alleged the Indian troops had occupied after the 1954 Agreement. Regarding Pandit Nehru’s proposal that patrols should not be sent forward, Chou En-lai agreed but made a condition that this should be observed in the Ladakh sector also. In other words, as the Indian patrols would no longer be able to go to Lingzi Tang, Aksai Chin and Soda Plains, etc., it would enable the Chinese to quietly occupy them as they were doing after the stoppage of the forward patrols by the CRPF in October 1959. Whilst characterising the Priine Minister’s proposal regarding Ladakh as unfair, he claimed that Aksai Chin had always been a part of Xinjiang Province and also made the false claim that as far back as the latter half of 1950 it was along the traditional route in the area that units of the PLA had entered western Tibet. (This was a false claim, because the PLA came from Hotien-Keriya and it did not pass within 100 miles of the north-eastern extremity of Aksai Chin. The first Chinese group to travel across Aksai Chin was a mule caravan which came in September 1952, along an old silk route, which partly existed in this area.)

The Chinese raised several questions and purported to give the answers. The first question was: “Has the Sino-Indian boundary been formally delimited?” The reply questioned the authenticity of all the treaties, the right of the contracting parties, and stressed the indefinite nature of the borders indicated in the treaties, and finally claimed that the fact that the entire Sino-Indian boundary, whether in its western, middle or eastern sector, had not been delimited was incontestable. In all their correspondence and arguments contesting the basic principles of boundary alignment on which the Indian case was built, the Chinese deliberately confused the use of the words “definition”, “delimitation”, “delineation” and “demarcation”. They invariably sought to exploit the absence of actual physical demarcation on the ground to create the impression that the border did not even have juridically recognizable definition (verbally) or delineation (in maps).

China’s hand also fell heavily on the working of the Indian Trade Agencies at Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok. The Chinese interfered in the construction work of the Gyantse Agency building, which had been destroyed by floods. They arrested the Tibetan servants of these Agencies on false pretexts. A primary school run by the Agency at Yatung was prevented from taking Tibetan pupils. A doctor and a dentist attached to the Agency were prohibited from attending to Tibetan patients even though there was no other medical facility available there. All contacts between these Trade Agencies and Tibetans were stopped. The Trade Agent at Gartok was refused permission even to go to recognised trade marts. Pilgrim traffic to Kailash and Mansarovar was interfered with on the plea of disorder by the Khampas and was ultimately stopped altogether. The Indian Consul at Lhasa was not allowed to move more than 2 miles outside his Consulate. The doctor there was not allowed to treat Tibetan patients. No Tibetan visitor to the Consulate was allowed. The Chinese tried to brain-wash a large number of Kashmiri Muslims at Lhasa by forcing them to attend indoctrination classes and would not admit any right of the Indian Consul to intercede on their behalf. Several restrictions were also imposed on trade by Indian merchants in Tibet. They were not allowed to send remittances to India, were forced to open accounts in the China Bank and had to account for every item and commodity sold or purchased in Tibet to the Chinese authorities. Thus the working of the Trade Agreement was also brought to a standstill. It was clear that China’s aim was to make it impossible for the Indian Consulate at Lhasa and the Trade Agencies at Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok to function normally, to stop all cultural and personal intercourse between the Indians and the Tibetans, to stop trade unless carried through Chinese official agencies and even prevent pilgrimage by Indians to Tibet. Thus all cultural and trade rights of India in Tibet were more or less denied not in words but in deeds. All this time, China went on abusing the privileges which her Consulate and Trade Agencies enjoyed in a free country. The China Bank cornered all trade with Tibet and also trade by the considerable Chinese population in Calcutta, Bombay and Assam; the Consulate officials made frequent journeys to Assam, Darjeeling and all over the country; the Chinese population in Calcutta and Bombay were coerced into denouncing the KMT and supporting the Communist regime; the Consulate officials maintained regular contacts with members of the CPI and other opponents of the Government of India; and the NCNA carried full-length criticisms of the Govt of India by reproducing statements of Chinese leaders or newspaper editorials. The China Review, published in Calcutta, started open vilification of the Govt of India. Ultimately the Govt of India was forced to take reciprocal measures-though even these were taken rather haltingly. Restrictions were placed on the visitors to the Chinese Trade Agency at Kalimpong. Both the NCNA and the China Review were severely warned; some recalcitrant and trouble-making Chinese were deported; and the Reserve Bank of India started a check on the activities of the China Bank, which was rightly suspected of spending money for espionage purposes.

On January 29, 1960 at the conclusion of Burmese Gen Ne Win’s visit to Peking, a border agreement and a treaty of friendship and non-aggression between China and Burma were signed. The border agreement laid down that a joint committee would be set up to survey and demarcate the boundary. Burma agreed to part with certain parts of Burmese territory, Hpimaw, Gawalum, etc in favour of China and in return got the Namwan tract. Burma also agreed to hand over the areas inhabited by Panhung and Panlao tribes. In any case, the Burmese had no effective control over these areas. But Burma’s traditional boundary in the north with Tibet as defined by the McMahon Line, was recognised and the watershed principle was accepted though not mentioned in so many words. The only point left undecided was the trijunction of India, Burma and Tibet. The Chinese claimed this to be at Diphu Pass, which was 5 miles south of Talu Pass, which was till then recognised as the trijunction. It should be mentioned here that talks with Burma had been going on for several years and had bogged down due to the intransigence of the Chinese who had made claims over large tracts of Burmese territory. So the fact that during the height of its dispute with India, China suddenly changed its attitude, showed a spirit of accommodation and reason and conceded to Burma practically all that the latter had demanded showed that this was done to spite India and to prove to the world how reasonable China was and that it was India and not China that was motivated by big power chauvinism.. But this border agreement in no way stopped the PLAGF from frequently making deep incursions inside Burmese territory and this continued year after year. So the agreement was entered into as a matter of convenience to suit China’s interests at that time.

Another agreement was signed with Nepal during the Nepalese PM B. P. Koirala’s visit to Beijing on March 21, 1960. The agreement provided for economic aid to Nepal and the establishment of embassies on a reciprocal basis. It also mentioned that a treaty of friendship would be signed during Chou En-lai’s return-visit to Kathmandu between April 26 and 29. B. P. Koirala was asked to sign a non-aggression pact to which, however, he did not agree. Koirala was informed that China was building roads to Nepal’s frontier. A mass paradropping exercise was held to impress upon Koirala and S. P. Upadhyaya, who had accompanied him, that China could at any moment capture Kathmandu and India could not do anything to prevent it. Every attempt was made to convince Nepal that she need no longer depend on India for her development and defence. The agreement on the border said that the conflicting parties had decided to determine concretely the boundary between the two countries in the following ways: in sections where the delineation of the boundary line between the maps of the two countries was identical, the boundary would be fixed according to the identical delineation. In sections where the delineation varied, but the actual jurisdiction was undisputed, the actual jurisdictional boundary would be accepted; and where the delineation of the boundary and the actual jurisdictions both varied, adjustments would be made working on the principles of equality, etc. A joint survey team would be sent out by the joint committee to carry out this survey. In this case, also, China was making a deep dent in an area of undoubted Indian influence, which had lasted for over a century. India and Nepal differed from each other only politically. Otherwise by culture, religion and language (both Hindi and Nepali springing from Sanskrit), trade, marriage and social intercourse there had been eternal affinity between these two countries and there was no need to have this set out in a formal treaty. There was no passport system between these two countries and thousands of Nepalese enjoyed the same freedoms of employment and movement in India as any other Indians. Indeed, the Gurkhas formed a strong section in the IA and the Indian Armed Police or armed guards. Just as there was a large population of Indian origin in Nepali Terai, similarly there was a large population of Gurkhas in Darjeeling district, South Sikkim, South Bhutan and in Assam and even in the tea gardens of North Bengal. In the past whenever the colonial British government was in trouble, Nepal had always sent a symbolic force to India to assist the British government to prove her solidarity with British India; and, of course, the famous Gurkha battalions fought in both the world wars not only in Burma and South-East Asia but in West Asia, Ethiopia, North Africa and even in Italy. So this was the first breach which China was making in India’s traditional and centuries-old friendship and unity with Nepal by offering a treaty of friendship and economic aid and by a show of generosity in settling the border without making too big a claim on Nepal. Indeed, China even went so far as to concede that Mount Everest was in Nepal, though previously it had stoutly contested this point.

(To Be Concluded)

124 comments:

  1. Wow, shocking the major aircraft of the IAF even lacked RWR. Prasunji, same way can we not integrate MAWS (IR).

    ReplyDelete
  2. Prasun,

    1 Guess Super 30 upgrade has commenced. you had once shared.. http://trishul-trident.blogspot.com/2018/08/super-su-30mki-has-taken-shape.html... there was this HAL proposal for indigenous upgrade. given that IL76/&* upgrade plans have got stuck due to sanctions & other reasons because of the Rus-ukr war, the Indo-Rus joint sukhoi upgrade plan is probably going in the same direction.. is HAL now working on all other components that it showcased in its indigenous upgrade plan minus the FCR?
    https://idrw.org/super-sukhoi-more-indian-less-russian/
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dZsSpTp25T8
    2 Biden admin /US deep state approval of $450 m F16 sustainment program ... impact on indo_US relations?.. looks like a retaliatory act for not toeing line on russia.. shows why US cant be trusted.
    3 http://idrw.org/aero-engine-consortium-recommends-india-get-a-flying-testbed-for-engine-testing/--will anything tangible happen? anytime soon?
    4 UK-Japan tango on aero engines & other critical defence products.. are both trying to squeeze out of US dependency? anything that India can gain from joining the pair?

    ReplyDelete
  3. hi prasun

    druti rwr is good enough like the israeli and swedish stuff? any help form out side??

    did we get approval from the russians to certify that

    how good is the Uified EW system,..is it going onboard the sukhoi and LCA mk1a as well?

    Is pak going to get better jamming pods from the US for the F-16

    what are they really getting ad how is going to affect us.

    ReplyDelete
  4. Hi Prasun

    Would you care to comment on the following

    https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=zGUYONkJPWk

    Regards

    Raghu

    ReplyDelete
  5. Dear Prasun,

    Greetings!!

    Refer to your earlier thread on chinese force weakness i.e for PLA and PLAAF
    https://trishul-trident.blogspot.com/2017/08/debunking-plas-over-hyped-manoeuvre.html?m=0

    Sitting today i.e in 2022, does the ancient assessment still hold true for chinese armed forces , or they have improved their Capabilities.

    If yes, whether we have also improved our capabilities in line with threat level against china. Pls elaborate.

    Also do throw some light on recently concluded 16th commander meet for ongoing Ladakh standoff and what's your take on it.

    Regards,
    Pinkal Shah

    ReplyDelete
  6. To SUMEET: How did you reach such a conclusion? The Su-30MKIs had Tarang Mk.3 RWR prior to the Dhruti RWRs.

    To JUST_CURIOUS: 1) Not quite. The Super Su-30MKI deep upgrade will have to carried out by HAL at Nashik (including the installation of Russia-supplled avionics hardware), whereas Project Eagle Eye was implemented at the IAF’s air bases. AESA-MMR antenna will come from Russia while DARE-developed RC-1 & RC-2 processors will come from HAL. 2) The package is just for spares provisioning & updating the ASPJ’s EW threat library. No armaments are being supplied nor are new AESA-MMRs being installed. 3) Nothing new there, and the webinar whose weblink I had shared 3 threads ago on future turbofan developments contains much more data & details. 4) Yes.

    To RAD: 1) Dhruti RWR is an upgrade of the earlier Tarang-3 RWR. 2) No Russian approval was sought because the upgrade involved a ‘drop-in’ installation. 3) Unified EW suite will go on Super Su-30MKIs & Tejas-AF MK.2 only.

    To RAGHU: The timelines of the events mentioned there are correct, but the contextualsation is wrong, meaning the process of restructuring & re-balancing of the armed forces had begun right after OP Parakram’s conclusion in late 2002. The IA’s force accretion assumed urgency AFTER China began upping the ante in areas opposite Sikkim & began denying that Sikkim & TAR did not have a mutually acceptable IB. That was also the time when China’s Special Representative for Resolving he Border Dispute began saying that although none of the two countries would uproot settled population in disputed areas, Tawang was the exception to this understanding that was reached back in 2005 between the PMs of both countries.

    To PINKAL SHAH: Yes, that still holds good today & I have uploaded above some new slides to illustrate that. As for the situation along the LAC, China has only dis-engaged from Gogra/Hot Springs & Pangong Lake, but has decided to permanently stay put in the Depsang & Linzhithang plains, thereby permanently denying India patrolling rights over a 800 sq km piece of territory. Now China is asking India to meet Beijing half-way, i.e. accept China’s sovereignty over the Depsang & Linzhithang plains. In other words, there will not be any de-escalation of the build-up & no de-induction of opposing forces in the foreseeable future. Instead, China has formally announced the construction of G-695 highway that is more closer to the LAC than the existing G-219 Highway. The next logical step for China to take will be the publishing of official political maps showing all the occupied territory in Ladakh as being Chikna’s sovereign territories, just as China now shows the whole of Arunachal Pradesh as being an integral part of Southern Tibet.

    To KIDDO: What has changed is explained here:

    https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/m777-centrepiece-of-army-s-deployment-in-arunachal-101662654115781-amp.html

    In addition, the IAF heliport at Dinjan (27 32 16.86 N, 95 16 10.01 E) is now being upgraded & expanded.

    To SIDHARTH: Those are all early prototypes of the Ghaatak SLR & that rifle has yet to be series-produced. The ‘unknown’ maker of that video therefore presenting mis-leading information. For instance, his comparison of the Ghaatak with AK-47 is dead-wrong. If at all a comparison is to be made, it should be between the AK-47 & the Trichy Assault Rifle (TAR).

    ReplyDelete
  7. Prasunda,
    Have got an idea what's actually happened at British Aircraft carrier.
    In any Gasturbine ship power from Gasturbine transfer to propeller via a gear box and propeller shaft. As the shat is quite long so there are few couplings. Couplings are ( connected) attached with each other by coupling bolts. Some coupling bolts are sheared off causing detachment of propeller from Gasturbine or gear box.
    It's a massive problem. It's due to misalignment of Gasturbine and propeller.
    Or bolts need to be redesigned.
    Best regards

    ReplyDelete
  8. That explains Mr EAM's frequent babbling. At least PM modi should avoid meeting Xi in coming days if any shame left.

    ReplyDelete
  9. Prasunda

    Your reading of the situation - How much lost by Russia? Is it a general retreat, lines too thinly stretched or are they preparing to encircle?

    ReplyDelete
  10. If India is installing a Russian AESA MMR then wat about scaled up UTTAM radar?
    Will india always be dependent on Russia for Upgrade unlike China?

    ReplyDelete
  11. To KAUSTAV: https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/08/we-have-already-lost-far-right-russian-bloggers-slam-kremlin-over-army-response

    China’s Flawed Semiconductor Industry Assumptions:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NGa2QwRjVjc

    To SANTOSH: All talk about any scaled-up Uttam AESA-MMR is emanating from internet fanboys, i.e. total lies & utter hogwash. Neither has CEMILAC issued an certificate of approval for installing the Uttam AESA-MMR on Tejas Mk.1A as of to date.

    ReplyDelete
  12. https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/35684/Joint+Statement+Second+IndiaJapan+22+Foreign+and+Defence+Ministerial+Meeting

    5. While expressing its resolve to examine all options necessary for national defence, including so called "counterstrike capabilities,” the Japanese side expressed its determination to fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defence capabilities within the next five years and secure substantial increase of Japan’s defence budget needed to effect it. Acknowledging Japan’s determination to reinforce its defence capabilities, Indian side expressed its support to work towards enhanced security and defence cooperation.

    7. The Ministers noted the progress in the defence cooperation and exchanges between the two sides. The Ministers welcomed the participation of Japan for the first time in the multilateral exercise MILAN and the operationalization of the Agreement Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Indian Armed Forces in the exercise. The Ministers expressed their commitment to continuing bilateral and multilateral exercises including "Dharma Guardian”, JIMEX and "Malabar.” The Ministers noted with pleasure that the air services of the two countries are working closely for the early conduct of inaugural India-Japan fighter exercise. The Ministers also expressed their shared intention to make continuous efforts towards more complex and sophisticated bilateral exercise.

    8. The Ministers concurred to launch the Joint Service Staff Talks between the Japan Joint Staff and the Indian Integrated Defence Staff. The Ministers also committed to seek deeper cooperation on HA/DR and response to infectious diseases and pandemics. Acknowledging the potential of the Information Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region, the Ministers looked forward to actively deepening multilateral coordination with liaison officers of other countries in the forum for enhanced maritime cooperation. The Ministers acknowledged the vast potential for the two countries to expand bilateral cooperation in the areas of defense equipment and technology cooperation. The Ministers further expressed satisfaction with the ongoing cooperation in the areas of Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV)/Robotics and the Sixth India-Japan Joint Working Group on Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation and concurred to further identify concrete areas for future cooperation in defence equipment and technology.

    ReplyDelete
  13. Hello Prasun Da, what of this indigenous ICV turret from TATA? Are they JVing with some foreign(Israel) OEM or is it truly indigenous with Indian vendors? I see a gun, APS, smoke grenade launchers, electro optics and 2 ATGMs. I mean, that seems rather ambitious.

    ReplyDelete
  14. Hi Prasun

    How does the following report tally with the picture presented by the guardian

    https://www.zerohedge.com/military/wounded-ukrainian-soldiers-paint-grim-picture-kherson-counteroffensive

    Is everything published by media part of organised narrative these days?

    Regards

    Raghu

    ReplyDelete

  15. HI prasun
    the IAF seems not interested in the qrsam.. perplexing ... as they need one for airbase and cruise missile defence . I wonder if they are going to use against cruise missiles? costly barak 8?? what is the definate anti cruise missile missile?

    cant it be tied to the el 2084 and other radars that the iaf use?
    from western radars

    again how is the targetting data for the bramhos missile transfered to the missile when enemy ships are 300 km away

    ReplyDelete
  16. @Prasunda


    1. How to dislodge the Chinese from the Depsang plains?
    Did we blunder by giving up our leverage atop the Kailash range?
    In 2017 we got the better of the Chinese, what has changed now?

    2. Why did we delay our nuclearization despite the 1974 nuclear tests?

    Reagrads,
    Abs


    ReplyDelete
  17. Prasun,
    1- reports mention rmaf has chosen fa50 over Tejas. Some murmers about bribery floating around... anything u can share on this... recently Poland bought 48 fa50s .. given that Lockheed Martin is a stakeholder is there some US involvement in these decisions?
    2- indo-jap 2+2 .. apart from nicities..there is nothing more to it
    . Is this mechani working anywhere..be it US or S Korea or the Aussies?

    ReplyDelete
  18. Prasunda,
    Kindly write as article on India's direct energy weapons. DEW is will rule world in near future.
    Best regards

    ReplyDelete
  19. Dear Prasun,

    I hope you must have a good idea about the Narmada dam case. Medha Patkar used to oppose the project vehemently. However, Modi government then CM told that it's due to the project water reached at the homes of lakhs of people. But the liberals like Medha claim that even before the completion of the Sardar Sarovar dam, the water had reached the households.

    What's your view upon it? Please enlighten.

    ReplyDelete
  20. Hi Prasunji

    Are their any videos of chinese jets doing catapult launchs because I can't find them. If no catapult launchs are done then how long will it take Type 003 carrier to be Fully operational?

    Thanks & Regards

    Hardik Thanki

    ReplyDelete
  21. Don't you think this flood is becoming blessing for pak elite? Somehow I feel UN setup is always biased in favor of Pak. Or as usual I hastily came to this conclusion? https://twitter.com/najamsethi/status/1568932603738353664

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Nothing extraordinary about these floods. It's the usual Paxtani oppurtunism to milk a natural crisis for whatever it's worth with the usual pliant sympathetic western media. Nothing new about the actions of the rentier state & it's patrons. Of course as a geopolitical nuclear Islamic power, they are too important to be left adrift. India can only watch & prepare for expected outcome & eventualities.

      Delete
    2. Prasunda

      Ideally India should have built atleast one to two more aircraft carriers of the 45000T displacement STOBAR INS Vikrant design even without well decks since India doesn't seem to have felt the need for the really needed 4-6 LHDs with well decks both designs having immediate dual use for HADR & Island operations in the Andamans. Of course budgets being what they are, India will very possibly lose all the economy of scale advantages of building another STOBAR (or LHDs ,)with design capabilities & infrastructure while again throwing money a decade later at building a EMALS CATOBAR Aircraft Carrier a decade or more later by when it would be again starting from scratch, if circumstances so permit then.

      Sorry, for the rant. But is it possible for India to allocate resources now immediately for carriers (or LHDs)?!

      Delete
  22. To ANSH: The turret was first shown at the Aero India 2019 expo & has been jointly developed by the DRDO & TATA. ATGMs will be vehicle-launched variant of HELINAZ.

    EX PARVAT PRAHAR: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8qulYnuM4VA

    To RAGHU: What Ukraikne is trying to do is force a war of attrition on Russia. Here is another assessment:

    https://www.grid.news/story/global/2022/09/09/who-will-win-the-ammunition-war-in-ukraine-russia-is-buying-shells-from-north-korea-the-us-is-burning-through-its-stockpile-of-weapons/

    To RAD: The Akash-NG will the IAF’s E-SHORADS. Had explained it all in the thread dealing with Akash-NG.

    To ABS: It is now impossible to militarily dislodge the PLAGF from Depsang & Linzhithang plains. After August 31, 2000 he IA & SFF were strategically perched atop Mugger Hill, Gurung Hill, Mukhpari, Rezang La & Rechin La, overlooking the entire PLAGF deployment footprint within the Spanggur Gap. This deployment should have been held on to, rather than give them up in February 2021. 2) Why? Because of the financial cost of going ahead with a full-scale weaponisation project.

    To JUST_CURIOUS: 1) The RMAFV/TUDM wants a LIFT, not a tandem-seat OCU version of Tejas Mk.1, which is much more expensive. Furthermore, the Tejas SPORT LIFT variant does not exist In physical/material form as yet. 2) Japanese OEMs will in future team up with some Indian OEMs for co-developing integrated masts & new-generation Combat Information Centres for future warships of the IN.

    To PARTHASARATHI: Here it is:

    https://forceindia.net/feature-report/dews-on-hypersonics/

    To ASD: Medha Patkar was never against the Narmada Dam or Sardar Sarovar project. Instead, her crusade was always about seeking & obtaining proper compensation for the displaced populated hamlets that had to be re-located for the waterways to be built.

    To HARDIK THANKI: There are no such open-source videos available anywhere. The PLAN has targetted 2024 for commissioning the Type-003/Fujian CAROBAR aircraft carrier.

    To DASHU: Rather than being a blessing, it is all about KARMA, i.e. what goes around, comes around. After decades of robbing PoJK’s natural resources & still unwilling to offer financial compensation for such robberies, it is now payback time as per the diktats of the Gods of yore. Here’s Pakistan’s Ambassador to the US with a begging bowl:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oi0x14c_-i0

    What should be asked now is how come this Masood Khan fella, who claims to be a citizen of PoJK & is a former President of PoJK, suddenly represent Pakistan? After all, he can’t be a citizen of two countries!!!

    To KAUSTAV: Ideally, the IAC-1’s design can easily be scaled down as a 28,000-tonne flat-top LPH/LHD. Consequently, orders for 2 such vessels can immediately be placed with Cochin Shipyard Ltd. Procuring STOBAR aircraft carriers is a no-brainer since the on-board M-MRCAs will then be able to operate with only 60% weapons-load carrying capability. The IAC-2 should be of CATOBAR design, even if it means operating with steam catapults.

    ReplyDelete
  23. @prasun dada

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0uspF5Y2Ids on Medha Patkar

    ReplyDelete
  24. Prasunda

    Many thanks. Should IN then immediately not place orders for such LPD/LHDs? They are very much needed & will complement the two existing Aircraft Carriers suitably. I believe CSL has already stated it's ability to build a modified Vikrant CATOBAR carrier (or 2) of similar or slighly higher displacement at 55000T. It could certainly be Nuclear powered but then again I run ahead of myself. It would be a waste to let such capacity idle & need unfulfilled - I believe India certainly needs at least 4 LHDs, can fit budgets & don't even think we even need Well Decks taking up space as such amphibious assault capabilities is beyond IN's projected capabilities or even anything more than CIWS for rudimentary AD since they would probably be acting with Aircraft Carriers during war & not needed for HADR.

    The dispute with PRC is very much alive & with India being a weaker power,militarily & evonomically, won't be settled anytime soon

    The topical article on the Russian hawks berating their Army is great but blame aside, Russia needs to put more boots on the ground? The situation on ground seems very fluid or is the US/NATO reading of the situation correct since both Ukraine & Russia seem to be settling in for a year long conflict - war or SMO. Your views much appreciated.

    ReplyDelete
  25. Are we going to see the INDRA LTR-25 LANZA radar installed on Project 17A frigates or not?

    ReplyDelete
  26. @Prasunda

    Why was the blunder of giving up on our leverages without ensuring Chinese withdrawal from the Depsang plains done? Did the IA authorities miscalculate Chinese intentions big time? Was giving up on our leverages an act to build goodwill with the Chinese and possibly pre-empt any adventure on their part?

    Reagards,
    Abs

    ReplyDelete
  27. Sir the so called russian military supremacy is losing in dust and despair in Ukrainian sector..
    Does the scope of reconciliation between the two party there ...
    Or Does Russia have the might left to finish the the aimless war of attrition .
    ...
    Sir What is the status of NIMICA Project
    Has it been in production...
    Has Indian naval design department has finished detail design of scaled down as 28,000-tonne flat-top LPH/LHD of IAC 1.

    Why mine sweeper is far cry for naval acquisition..Is this has some technology that India lacks.
    Is there any positive news regarding Indian subsonic missile program.
    Submarines and fighter aircraft acquisition seem to going nowhere..At least previous UPA govt acquired some heavy lift capacity
    This govt going very slow in acquisition..

    ReplyDelete
  28. @Prasunda
    To add to the previous. Based on your talks held, if any, with the murican power and biz authorities, do you see them willing to shift manufacturing away from China to India in a massive way? Or is it just paying lip service?

    China is successfully gaming Western sanctions by using Vietnam to repackage their manufactured goods and exporting them to the USA/West.

    Regards,
    Abs

    ReplyDelete
  29. To KAUSTAV: Yes, in order to retain the necessary human resource skills at CSL, the orders for an initial 2 LPH/LHD vessels should be placed ASAP, with options for another 2. 80% of their usage will be accounted for by HADR missions throughout the IOR. For the IAC-2, in order to save time & money, the propulsion system should use proven & in-service solutions, i.e. Rolls-Royce MT-30 gas-turbines & Alsthom’s integrated electric propulsion system. In addition, steam catapults should be used.

    As for the Russia-Ukraine war, Russia has limited itself by waging the so-called ‘Special Military Operation’, thereby discarding the full general mobilisation option. Ukraine on the other hand has gone for full countrywide mobilisation & is thus not short of manpower, but is instead short of firepower & other war-waging materials. For effectively taking on Russia, these are what Ukraine now requires:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sd4xRBuVs48&t=1s

    To HARSH: Yes, as indicated by the Project 17A FFG’s scale-model that was exhibited at DEFEXPO-2020:

    https://1.bp.blogspot.com/--aba0AkwvC4/XkILSJIpy0I/AAAAAAAASmI/DZVs1huXv-Iw2CRsfkfOF6lOFEXDos2HwCLcBGAsYHQ/s1600/Project%2B17A%2BFFG.jpg

    To ABS: Yes, probably so. As for industrial de-coupling with China, the foreign MNCs will go wherever skilled human resources are available. In India, re-skilling of human resources remain a sub-optimal effort.

    To BUDDHA: Russia has limited itself by waging the so-called ‘Special Military Operation’, thereby discarding the full general mobilisation option. Ukraine on the other hand has gone for full countrywide mobilisation & is thus not short of manpower, but is instead short of firepower & other war-waging materials. For effectively taking on Russia, these are what Ukraine now requires:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sd4xRBuVs48&t=1s

    Orders for NAMICA/NAMIS have already been placed. No such design work on LPH/LHD vessel has been initiated as yet. The IN is examining the option of modifying its Sea King Mk.42Bs & Mk.42Cs into airborne minesweepers.

    To TECHNOLOGY, PHOTOGRAPHY & TRAVEL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0hU3kqsLSPM

    It has now been established that by using methods devised thousands of years ago, creation of waterbodies offers the best options for supplying water to parched areas. Canals get silted too soon & during floods they break their banks & this leads to further man-made disasters.

    Amrit Sarovar: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yctpPBkgpXk&t=12s

    ReplyDelete

  30. HI prasun
    yester day i posted some querries to you on this blog ,and they dont seem to appear in the blog . Is there any reason for that?

    ReplyDelete
  31. To RAD: Because you posted them in the previous thread. Check it out.

    ReplyDelete
  32. Why GOI is moving ahead with 3billioon deal mq9 deal.Hermes 900, which can be made in india by Adani, They are now offering upgraded weaponized varients to india? Any consideration to that?
    2) is there any project of new long range mbrl? Pinaka3?Any new update on tactical short range ballistic missile for conventional warfare (rocket force)
    3)Any plans for india considering further rafale order or it will move with MMRCA 2.0
    Ur view on this news https://idrw.org/economic-explosives-ltd-offers-to-develop-a-250km-tactical-ballistic-missile/
    Is it true?

    ReplyDelete

  33. Dear Sir,,
    Thanks for your informative blog. Could you please help with the following queries?
    1. How is the energy situation going to be this winter in Europe with restrictions on gas and oil from Russia
    2. How is Putin going to respond to the setbacks?
    3. Will Putin remain in power?
    4. What will be the outcome of the Ukrainian conflict ?
    5. How is the Armenian Azerbaijan conflict going to end?
    6. Is there another conflict with Iran around the corner?
    7. Will the world end up in a recession from the trade wars and conflicts around Ukraine, Taiwan etc?
    Thanks and regards
    D

    ReplyDelete
  34. To DASHU: Have uploaded slides above showing China's perception of friction points along eastern Ladakh. Unfortunately, India has withdrawn from PP-16, also known as Discharge Ground, which had a decades-old permanent post located there. Now the Kugrang Valley has got disputed. Miles of land have now become a buffer zone from the Indian side.

    Gogra Disengagement Analysed:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cA4BhigZfpI
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZWhf-n3d7Ms

    To SANTOSH: 1) can hermes-900 UAS be controlled through SATCOM data-links? If you can find the answer to this, then you will get your answer to the main question. 2) Yes, but only in the design stage. SRBMs are legacy designs. SS-BSMs are the new-generation solutions. Developing a 250km-range STBM is a no-brainer. Instead, development of a 150km-range variant of Pinaka MBRL is a good idea.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Dear Prasun ... When Switzerland ordered 6 Hermes that version was both armed and supports satcom ... Now Hermes supports satcom
      https://elbitsystems.com/product/hermes-900/

      Delete
  35. What Went Wrong for Russia in Ukraine:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8OMT6mqItxE

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zrkDm9d33JY

    ReplyDelete
  36. 1) In the above slides, are those WhAP based NAMICA launchers the ones that are being ordered (105 units) to replace BRDM under WhAV category for recce formations as part of mechanization upgrades? Is this in addition to 13 units BMP based NAMICA?

    2) How many attack helicopters are there in a Heli unit/squadron etc of army and IAF? Army has 13 rudras per unit but aiming for 10 helis in LCH squadrons. IAF has 11 in apaches and 16 in Mi35 and Rudra squadrons.

    3) Is the 1 RR sector (15k troops) transferred from Kashmir to Ladakh being converted into a full division?

    4) What are your opinions on agniveer scheme in terms of troop proficiency and training quality/experience impact on army for battles? 4 years adequate?
    Thanks

    ReplyDelete
  37. Sir
    What is the practical future of MRFA tender. IAF gave requirement way back in 2001. Now we are in 2022. Still tender is not out

    What's the main issue ailing this tender ? Stubbornness of IAF on Rafale in numbers which Indian Government can not afford ?
    Inability of Government to find a middle path ?
    Kanjus Indian Government?

    As s common Indian it's a frustrating saga. I can not even imagine the plight of IAF pilots.

    Regards
    Nikhil

    ReplyDelete
  38. Don't u think if required Hermers 900 can be equipped with SATCOM and customized as per IAF requirements?
    2)Don't u think 3 billion dollar for ultra costly 30 mq9 which cannot operate in contested airspace is an bad idea?
    3)There are pictures of SAP518 jamming pod on the hands of Ukraine
    How this will effect Indian su30mki fleet?

    ReplyDelete
  39. Prasun da,

    Your recent reply to DASHU regarding recent military disengagement agreement between India and China. To my understanding the former is ruined (or fucked) up and the latter emerges as the winner, what are the factors that makes (or rather constrained) the former to toe down the line. 56" now punctured...

    ReplyDelete
  40. Dear Prasun,

    Greetings!!

    Refer to your earlier thread on Regional Strategic coherence wrt Afghan problem.
    http://trishul-trident.blogspot.com/2021/09/from-regional-strategic-convergence-to.html

    Sitting today i.e in 2022, does the assessment still hold true, given Russian pre-occupation wrt Donbass-Lughansk at Ukraine.

    Also last year during March, after our forces had vacated from kailash range i.e (Mugger Hill, Gurung Hill, Mukhpari, Rezang La & Rechin La) wrt Pangong-Sa de-escalation process, you said Helmet top, black top near Spanggur gap was under 24x7 survelliance by both sided and no need to station any man-power on there features, and it can be occupied again in event of war, however in your above reply to ABS, you are recommending that IA should have not vacated those heights.
    Kindly elaborate on the above contradictory statements.


    Regards,
    Pinkal Shah

    ReplyDelete
  41. I remember Mr Prasun saying Russia has already won by destroying important military installations in Ukraine and the military of Ukraine will be overthrown in 7 days. Now I see a different tune in line with what the Western world is saying all along. How so?

    ReplyDelete
  42. Prasunda,
    Many thanks for answering my previous queries.
    Dada how dependable is Ak630 as point defence system ? Why we are not considering a CDome type system? A billion dollar destroyer but fir self defence only 32 Barak 8 and 2 AK 630.
    Is it sufficient? How come indian war ships are so underarmed ?
    Best regards

    ReplyDelete
  43. To NIKHIL: LoLz! Both M-MRCA & MRFA procurements are now one & the same & the delayed decision-making only reveals that India’s ‘netas’ are still with the 1980s mindset, i.e. they reckon that non-Russia military hardware ought to be as cheap as Russia-origin hardware. Hence, everyone baulks at the price-levels quoted by Western OEMs. But one reality is certain & cannot be contested, i.e. no Gen-4 MRCA can ever be licence-built due to the cost-prohibitive nature of acquisition through licenced-production route.

    To SANTOSH: 1 & 2) Don’t you think such an option would already have converted itself into reality if Israel had wanted it to be so? Both the SATCOM data-links & the satellites offering such capabilities are US-owned & hence all those countries seeking over-the-horizon command-n-control of MALE-UAS & HALE-UAS have opted for US solutions. Israel has never felt the need for such capabilities & hence its military-industrial complex has never developed such solutions. 3) The IAF never had SAP-518 jamming pods. Such pods for Su-30MKIs haved been developed by DRDO’s DARE lab.

    To PINKAL SHAH: Yes, that outlook still holds good, especially if the subjects of PoJK finally decide to ditch Pakistan for good & opt for reunification with India. There is no contradiction in my statements, since, after having set foot on the Kailash Range in August 2020, the IA should have been there permanently since India has always been claiming that those areas all belong to India. After all, why should the IA & SFF withdraw from India-controlled territory?

    To KUMODI SHEKHARAN: How so? Because ground realities change & so does the situational environment. The West is determined to drown Russia into a quagmire through massive financial & military support to Ukraine. No one had foreseen this when hostilities began last March.

    To PARTHASARATHI: AK-630M is an excellent point-defence system for terminal air-defence. It can be further improved through adoption of new-generation fire-control system, like adopting an integral active phased-array target acquisition/engagement radar like a variant of the ‘Uttam’ AESA-MMR, along with IRST sensors developed the likes of TONBO Imaging. IAC-1 Vikrant will also have VL-SR-SAMs on board.

    ReplyDelete
  44. Dear Prasun,
    As Indian Army and SFF have withdrawn from Kailash range, can we assume that it is going to be lost in the near future as China captures inch by inch? Then we will shade crocodile tears accusing China of playing devil role!!!

    ReplyDelete
  45. https://mobile.twitter.com/IAF_MCC/status/1236129172763734017
    The above pic of SU 30 mki shows SAP518 jamming pod published by IAF, i do understand there is DARE developed jamming pod too, But we still use SAP518 jamming pod, don't u think because of the war, our aircraft performance will get affected?
    Please answer in brief,Thank u sir

    ReplyDelete
  46. To CHANAKYA CHATTERJEE: The Swiss Hermes-900 has BOTH satellite communications (Ku-band) & LOS data-links (C-band) ONLY for receiving imagery & data at the ground-control station (GCS) & not for remote-controlled flight-control purposes from a GCS located hundreds or thousands of km away. That’s the difference & the technological secret is the US-developed encryption/decryption modem (that is prohibited for export when meant for use with other non-US origin UAS) that is used for beyond LOS flight-control of the Reaper/Guardian family of MALE-UAS platforms.

    To SANTOSH: LoLz! That photo WAS NOT published by the IAF. All photos of aircraft published by the IAF’s Twitter account have the IAF’s insignia on top & they never say ‘Picture of the Day’ inside the image. The photo you have quoted was uploaded into the IAF’s Twitter account by this internet fanboy:

    https://twitter.com/hvtiaf/status/1236484974775132160?lang=bg
    https://twitter.com/hvtiaf/status/1380766637196865537

    And that’s how it got cross-posted here: https://mobile.twitter.com/IAF_MCC/status/1236129172763734017

    And further confusion was caused when this mischievous report added to the confusion through disinformation:

    https://www.livefistdefence.com/how-a-secretive-drdo-lab-is-saving-the-iaf-su-30mki/

    Clearly therefore, that image was photoshopped & it can very easily be an Algerian or Malaysian or Angolan Su-30MK variant or even a Su-30SM. In reality, this is the image originally posted by the IAF on its Twitter account & it clearly shows EL/L-8222 ASPJ under the starboard wing of the Su-30MKI:

    https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-5ei6BJYgpys/XfkmWhqyHQI/AAAAAAAASFE/yhQoG0KLx28TJcG-HTEA6kZPf1A2t8I1gCLcBGAsYHQ/s1600/IAF%2BSu-30MKI%2Bwith%2BELL-8222%2BASPJ%2BPod.jpg

    Clearly if SAP-518 pods were procured by the IAF, then where was the need for EL/L-8222 ASPJs on the Su-30MKI? Therefore, kindly apply sound common-sense before making claims that are an insult to the laws of physics.

    The only wingtip-mounted EW pods certified for the IAF Su-30MKI are these:

    https://2.bp.blogspot.com/-PLiwxZRKDKA/W29tn2IJjkI/AAAAAAAAPXo/60-XmUKeWoILsRFMYFCJku3uuMF4_qOUgCLcBGAs/s1600/DARE-developed%2BEW%2BPod.jpg

    To ASD: Not if the IA & SFF were ordered in future to retake & re-occupy them.

    ReplyDelete
  47. HI prasun'
    I am reposting here.
    1) IIT madras is developing the 5 g network , this is cutting edge . can the same lab be used for developing data links like the bnet? i am sure that we have enough brains but there is no one to realize that and consolidate our efforts that is happenning like the 5g project

    2) do u think the present labs and brain poer is better than what drdo can make ?

    3) we can make use of taiwan hardware capacity and slowly ban chinese 5g cellphones as well .
    4) what are the main factors that pak f-16 get and what advantages does it confer VIZ A VIZ IAF

    5) MOst rf Seekers are in the KU bamd S , L < X band etx. Why cant we make the KA band seeker for pout missiles and surprise the enemy.

    6)what is freq of low band jammers and have we made them

    7)dare seems to have made wing tip mounted jammers for the SU-30 can u eloborate ie hi . low, mid etc are theyAESA type antennas.?

    8) d-29 is a jammer re phrased from the elt 568 , did we get software as well so as to build our own ew ?.

    9) why cant we get 3 scorpius land based jammers and deploy them to degrade the pak awacs in times of skirmish, shpould be cost effective?.







    '

    ReplyDelete
  48. Hi Prasun,
    Has Rustom-2 failed to meet MALE UAV requirements (like 30000 feet altitude)? few reports have surfaced connecting Rustom2 failure and new found interest in Adani/Hermes

    ReplyDelete
  49. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/transportation/shipping-/-transport/airport-container-depot-township-in-16610-hectares-of-pristine-nicobar-cleared/articleshow/94208294.cms

    Is this the one you were referring to in previous thread while replying to Rakesh ?

    To RAKESH: India’s first Chief of Defence Staff Gen Bipin Rawat believed that India would become a true Indo-Pacific power by developing maritime security infrastructure in Andamans and Nicobar Islands. His national security plans included development of a container cum replenishment facility at Campbell Bay in Great Nicobar so that mercantile shipping and warships of friendly nations would get sustenance at India’s island territories while proceeding towards Malacca Straits rather than wait for their turn at Sri Lankan ports. Dovetailed into the plan was creating a deep harbour in the same Campbell Bay so that Indian aircraft carrier could berth and have a faster response time to any global emergency including natural disasters. After the commissioning of INS Vikrant, the Modi government must activate its long-drawn-out plans by overcoming the usual military bureaucratic red tape.

    ReplyDelete
  50. Thank u for that explaination
    1)Could u please explain how good is DRDO devoloped wing tip mounted high band jammer compared to SAP518
    2)Is it any issue with its interface with bars radar?is it AESA based jammer
    How good it is when compared with MIG29upg D29 radar or Kibiny EW suite of su30sm?
    3)Wat kind of jamming pod will be in Tejasmk1a?
    Is it ELM 8222 or ELM 8222SB or 8222WB?
    4)Any update on IRST in Tejasmk1a?
    5)will India go for additional rafale or the same old saga of MRCA 2.0 which was recently updated by IAF chief

    ReplyDelete
  51. To 3rd-EYE: IA has leased 4 Heron-2s from Israel:

    https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/army-to-deploy-two-heron-mk2-uavs-in-eastern-sector-by-month-end/article65891093.ece

    To ANUP: Yes, it is possible but over a 15-year period, not within 4 years as is being claimed by ADA.

    To DASHU: Yes, indeed I was.

    ReplyDelete
  52. Dear Prasunda,

    Pranaams and thank you for your answers to all our questions. grateful for it.

    Is it correct India has leased Heron TP (Eitan) as well if so then are they armed versions?
    Albeight they appear to be in the MQ9 Reaper class do they ahve the same level of surveilance tech and can they be remotely flow through satcom like the Reapers?

    What types of NRUAV's are we developing and where are we in the development process?
    What NRUAV(s) are we currently planning to buy in the interim.

    I did hear GREC had a MoU sugned with an Israeli comnpany for the protector USV - any comments?

    Thanks


    ReplyDelete
  53. To KANE1966: Not the Heron-TP, but Heron Mk.2:

    https://www.iai.co.il/sites/default/files/2021-10/Heron%20MK%20II%20Brochure.pdf

    No, they are not armed. NRUAVs being procured now are Sagar Defence Engineering's Quadcopters, similar to those supplied to ONGC:

    https://www.sagardefence.com/uav/

    HAL too is offering its VTOL NRUAV that was first showcased at Aero India 2019 expo. The GREC MoU with ELBIT was inked way back in 2018.

    Here are some interesting presentations on Space Warfare Domain & Options for India's armed forces:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PfSNT67mt90
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=psxRLZOPbOU
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HpsX_T3GC-U
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9w7CN9AMtI

    Damning details on LAC Disengagement:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-D7l5BVeQaw
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oNbB277GITw

    Excellent explanations on what is transpiring in Ukraine on the military front:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q9-NER8aFJ4
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IoASQUhaRok&t=28s
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FCWn3pWu388

    ReplyDelete
  54. Prasun,

    1-was it wise of Modi to give gyaan to Putin on war during their 1 on 1? seems like the french asked modi to bring it up?
    2- why a catch up with erdogan?

    ReplyDelete
  55. I think the situation in Ukraine is clear: It was a gross miscalculation on part of the Russians. These are the presumptions leading to the offensive 1) a large percent of Ukrainians were sympathetic to Russia - especially the Eastern Ukraine hence they will chip in to overthrow the current regime or support Russia 2) Western threat was mere words like in other parts of the world and the EU and US won't agree to take on Russia - in fact due to energy concerns, EU will differ with the US and there will be no unified approach to step into Ukraine's aid 3) Soviet mindset and war fighting doctrine - numbers and waves of assault instead of strategy will overpower Ukraine 4) Power of the media.
    Now the Russians have realised that- 1) Even those in favour of Russia have now stopped supporting it save a small minority 2) EU has been pressured by the US into agreement - so differences in opinion exist but no dissension resulting in Russia vs the West instead of mere Ukraine 3) It is absolutely clear that Western war fighting strategy is far superior to Russia and Western equipment are far more accurate. Plus they have more access to satellite intelligence resulting in more pinpoint strikes by Ukraine and large losses for Russians. 4) Western media is using Russian and Chinese method of completely suppressing Russian media and overwhelming with Nazi like propaganda sweeping public opinion and sapping Russian morale.
    In fact if Russians did not go into Ukraine they still would have caused some ambivalence regarding their prowess and capability. Today they stand totally exposed- and their weaknesses are glaring. The Russian weaponry stands bereft of any precision and it is also clear Russia does not have a real stock of the "cutting edge" stuff they display for export markets.

    ReplyDelete

  56. HI prasun

    i was eagerly awating ur reply . were my queries irrelevant?

    ReplyDelete
  57. Hi Dada,

    What you do think timeline for Indian fighter planes? Will it be in same sequences Tejes mk1a, Tejas Mk2, TEDBF, AMCA mk 1(non stealth version), AMCA MK2 (stealth version).

    Till then India will be ok with Rafale , SU 30 mki, and Tejas mk1a combo or will we buy some other fighter aircraft?

    regards,
    Rakesh

    ReplyDelete
  58. Hello Prasun Sir, are we continuously loosing ground to China's expansionist tactics in ladak and Arunachal Pradesh.
    Why is indian government and Indian Army falling prey to China and giving up claims to Indian land. We all know how China is...
    What can be long term remedy to Chinese issue ?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Dont know about indian govt but its army chief and Northern commanders duty to apprise the country whats happening on ground.. Alas Tyrant PM has made everyone spineless

      Delete
  59. Prasun,

    1- what is your analysis of the SCO meet
    2- what is Rajnath talking abt whne he says US is sharing some key tech?

    ReplyDelete
  60. Prasunda,
    Russia-Ukraine war clearly established one fact that western technology particularly Drone technology is far superior to Russian one. Ukraine is wining the war because they definitely have cutting age technology to counter Russia.
    I was watching few utube videos on Turkish Drones and it's impressive. The newest Turkish Drone is totally autonomous. Instead of GPS to determine It's position It's use Honeywell Ring Laser Gyroscope and to find target they are using Canadian Camera and both are integrated by Turkish AI based control computer. Armaments are miniaturized.
    Impressive indeed.
    My questions are why India is so incompetent in Drone technology? What our military planners are doing to miniaturized weapons which are suitable for drones ? Why our PM has to beg for a meeting with Turkish President at Samarkhand? If our scientists are so incompetent then it's better to give them golden handshake and employ new recruits from IITs. At least these young graduates will be more patriotic than these ineffectual oldies.
    Best regards

    ReplyDelete
  61. Hello Prasun

    Can you share some insight and details of IAF Project Cheetah vis-á-vis weaponization, communication upgrades and changes in operational roles?

    https://www.aninews.in/news/national/general-news/iafs-project-cheetah-for-weaponising-israeli-drones-to-be-awarded-to-indian-firms-under-make-in-india-route20220918190502/

    Thanks and Regards :)

    ReplyDelete
  62. To RAD: Encrypted data-link operator software has been developed in-house in India, but the dependency on foreign hardware remains. 5-G cellular networks can be used for border surveillance systems & military communications. Banning China-made cellphones is a tall call since almost everyone in India is too used to using them. No PAF F-16s are being upgraded. The US package is entirely for spares support. The Su-30MKI’s wingtip-mounted pods are HBJs, not LBJs. The MBJ pod is the EL/L-8222. LBJs are used against D/E-band long-range airspace surveillance radars & are carried in the underbelly. D-29 is the name of the suite that makes use of ELT-568 jammers. PAF Saab-2000 AEW & CS use Erieye radars operating in S-band if Indian ground-based S-band jammers are employed, then they will also jam the S-band radars of the IAF’s EMB-145Is.

    To JUST_CURIOUS: 1) Both gave their respective ‘Gyaans’ during the one-to-one. 2) Why not? After all, Erdogan has stopped making statements on the Kashmir issue & he also wants Indian tourists to go in larger numbers of Turkiye. 3) The SCO Summit enabled India to expedite the international north-south trading corridor involving Russia, Iran & the Central Asian Republics. 4) The term ‘shared’ does not mean know-how or know-why. Instead, it means making available for usage technologies like the SATCOM modems leased by the IN for operating the Sea Guardian MALE-UAVs on a 2-year lease.

    To RAKESH: The detailed timetable was explained here:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lZ8QXCxtW7g

    To AMIT BISWAS: LoLz! What else can be expected from a regime that takes an eternity to even appoint a new CDS??? Anyway, here are some appraisals of what’s happening on the ground in Ladakh:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6RvvtntXdts
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DMZM4ChEc4U
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g0d45h_lfeg

    To PARTHASARATHI: Make no mistake: this isn’t a war between Russia & Ukraine, but between Russia & the US & NATO. That Russia does not possess sophisticated or new-generation force-multipliers like STARLINK space-based telecommunications systems & new-generation ISR systems is obvious. Consequently, Ukraine is benefitting from superior situational awareness-generating assets provided by NATO member-states.

    To SOUMYA RAY: It is a no-brainer since armed MALE-UAVs or armed HALE-UAVs cannot survive within contested airspaces of the type likely to prevail along India’s western & northern borders during hostilities. Mini-UAVs armed with grenades can be used against isolated targets, like what Ukraine is doing, but against a layered, in-depth air-defence network no UAV will survive while operating near hostile airspace, as has been proven in Ukraine.

    To KUNAL J: For getting into the root of the matter, one has to delve into history in chronological order. For this, I have uploaded above a new narrative that explains in details what caused India to face such a situation today. Suffice to say that history is repeating itself today.

    ReplyDelete
  63. Prasun Da,

    Regarding to the ongoing Russian Ukrainian Conflict, do you agree with the point made by this Article:

    https://www.weeklyblitz.net/opinion/ukrainian-counter-offensive-was-media-invention-to-boost-kievs-morale/

    ReplyDelete
  64. Hi sir

    Can the IN's P-8I be modified for air surveillance?

    ReplyDelete
  65. Prasun,

    http://www.indiandefensenews.in/2022/09/sco-plans-single-list-of-banned.html-- with china & porkis in SCO does it make any sense at all? why is India risking this.. 'coz if teh DCO countries do not endorse india wanted terrorists then they may not support on other forums as well .. it would be silly to contradict them selves

    ReplyDelete
  66. https://m.thewire.in/article/books/book-excerpt-how-will-a-india-china-war-pan-out. It describes a doomsday scenario, if we do the case study of Russia Ukraine war, Russian preemptive strikes failed to do any significant damage to small Ukrainian air force. What is your take on it Sir ?

    ReplyDelete
  67. Prasunda,

    https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/18/world/europe/ukraine-war-drones-inmates.html

    See the link above. It seems to indicate that Iran's shahed-136 loitering munitions acquired by Russia are highly effective and seeing increasing use. Wo'nt similar munitions be effective for India if it acquires them (indigeneously or otherwise) ?

    Satyaki

    ReplyDelete
  68. To SUMANTA NAG: How can it be a ‘media invention’ when the Russians themselves have acknowledged the reverses? On top of that, Western & other media are now being taken by the Ukrainians to all those areas that were recaptured.

    To HARSH: No, they can’t, if you mean their usage as AEW & CS platforms. But they have been, are being & will be used for ground surveillance.

    To JUST_CURIOUS: It is absolutely possible since both China & Pakistan will claim that entities like the LeT & JeM are not inside Pakistan, but somewhere in eastern Afghanistan.

    To ROHIT GILL: LoLz! Anyone can draft such a doomsday scenario. Any scenario becomes balanced & credible ONLY IF both sides of the scenario are presented, i.e. what will be India’s counter-response & counter-options. Without that, everything is reduced to blind assumptions, surmises & suppositions.

    To SATYAKI: FYI, the IAF has had such loitering PGMs since the 1990s, i.e. the Harpy & Harop killer-drones. Usage of loitering PGMs is therefore not at all anything new to India.

    India Defence Conclave 2022:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ZY4p0BwM_A

    ReplyDelete
  69. Prasunda,

    VMT. Is'nt the shahed-136 longer range than Harpy/Harop ? Also, with Russia using it to target even M777's of Ukraine, are they available with Iran and Russia in substantial numbers, not small numbers of 100-150 like what IAF has ?

    Satyaki

    ReplyDelete
  70. Well., If it is how it could go then it's better not to propagate such Solly ideas at all.. btw edrogan at it again with his Kashmir rant in UNGA.. so much for wasting time on him @recent SCO

    ReplyDelete
  71. @Prasunda

    You mingle with a lot of 'insiders' with know-how. We are well aware that the eventual goal for the BJP is to either drastically change the existing constitution or usher in an entirely new one. While the contours of what changes such an exercise would entail remain to be seen, this would be a welcome change as there is a dire need to reorient our constitution and laws to 21st century aims and goals, something that you have also spoken in favour of several times in the past. I for one, don't see how we can industrialize and emerge as a modern nation without crucial changes in the constitution. Given our demographic dividend will only last another 25-30 years, such exercises need to be undertaken sooner than later.

    My question is, if efforts are on to enact such changes at all or is it just wishful thinking on our part? And if it is not the latter then within what time frame could we expect to see these changes happening based on your understanding and knowhow from 'insiders' if at all?

    Regards,
    Abs

    ReplyDelete
  72. To SATYAKI: No, it is not & neither it is developed by/in Iran. The Shahed-136 is nothing else but a minimally re-engineered ASN-301 loitering drone from China, which was reverse-engineered from the Harpy.

    ASN-301: https://qph.cf2.quoracdn.net/main-qimg-f018d162e530c98281858aee8f077fd2

    To JUST_CURIOUS: Erdogan has always played it safe when commenting about Kashmir. For instance, previously he had said that the issue should be resolved as per UNSC resolutions while now he has spoken about evolving a bilateral solution. Here is his statement:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oGUIydTzYIw&t=114s

    To ABS: The answer is ELEMENTARY. For true de-colonisation to happen, all legislation by Parliament should focus on ushering in governance & not ruling over, since India is still being ruled, not governed. If any 'neta' has good intentions concerning India, then this should be the starting point. It is explained in some detail here:

    https://theprint.in/opinion/security-code/pm-modi-wants-india-to-shed-its-colonial-past-he-should-begin-by-reforming-the-police/1136332/

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Dada, on most matters i have very high regard for your judgement but on this article by the print i have issues ... In a country where mob mentality still rules, where fringe political groups like mns can still make life hell for Amitabh bachhan or where love jihaad and the al Qaeda make roots (Kerala and Bengal) ... .. we as a population aren't mature enough to be governed ... Citizens define the govt they get ...

      Delete
    2. The print and wire wouldn't exist if we had a govt capable of establishing their funding sources and intent ... Also the quint

      Delete
  73. As far as India is concerned reformation is only in this: Netas might change to panties under the dhotis instead of those sloppy pantaloon like things! Nothing else. When the rest of the world, even Arabs, have moved on from religious bigotry and the like, in India they are still worried about "conversion" etc! As if a non Hindu Indian is not committed to India! With this kind of mindset where people are still rooted in being Brown Sahibs, every second sentence these days is in dodgy English such as "are saab ab to ...I mean you are absolutely dashing...saab lok taliyan bajao...please clap at the genius" and worried about religion ignoring social injustices - raising slogans Bharat Mata ki Jay and yet evading taxes, stealing public property, vandalising public transport, leading the nation in bribery and corruption, political pork barreling...sure they need a new constitution- constitution of the mindset more like it LOLLZZZ

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Voluntary conversions aren't an issue ... Haven't mentioned corruption scandals because in the last 9 years there haven't been any ... Have mentioned targetted radicalisation campaigns like love jihaad and by the way even many developed western countries are facing this and are treating this as a threat ... Also do read the report by the WB Police themselves on how Al Qaeda seems to have taken roots in Bengal ... There is a process of Nationalism arising in India and it is scary to many of the older Psuedo liberalists ... But it is necessary ... The primary threat to india is china and the country is extremely nationalistic ... Battles of today aren't just about hard power ... Infact they are more about how the citizens react

      Delete
    2. A case in point is Ukraine ... While Russians are fleeing Russia to avoid military call ups, ukrainians across the world are voluntarily coming back ...

      Again if the afgan army and country had showed a little more spine would a rag atg army of Taliban been able to take it over so easily

      In an extreme and radical world, nationalism is a good thing

      Delete
  74. Prasun ,
    why is India taking anti russia stance suddenly??

    ReplyDelete
  75. Hey Prasun,

    Is this : https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/quick-reaction-missile-induction-to-be-delayed-deficiencies-found-during-trials/articleshow/94383051.cms
    a hit job? How can such a vague story be published.
    1) the system failed to even detect and engage hovering helicopters at low altitude and minimum range.
    --> If the altitude is low enough and the helicopter is static in a cluttered environment the laws of physics bar you from being able to tell apart a helicopter from a tree right? Or are we missing something?
    2) with only half the missiles hitting the designated targets.
    --> Could this be that if two missiles are fired and the first one hits, they are counting the second as a miss?

    And overall is there any unexpected delay?

    Best regards,
    Rajdeep

    ReplyDelete
  76. Dear Prasun

    Can you share information on regarding onboard equipments, crew complement, deployment,...etc. on the recently launched Diving Support Vessels of HSL?

    Thanks and Regards :):)

    ReplyDelete
  77. Dear Prasun

    Why does most major shipbuilding PSEs such GSL, HSL, GRSE, etc. are under the administrative control of MoD (particularly Dept of Defence Production) only, except CSL under Ministry of Shipping? Unlike HAL, BEL, these shipyards also cater to non-defence commercial orders. Why the burden hasn't been shared/devolved with other ministries such as Ministries?

    Thanks and Regards:)

    ReplyDelete
  78. Prasun Da,

    Ukrainian Starlink guided Unmanned Boat with explosive.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I8CeJ3QUeHs

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Isnt this starlink a kind of state tool to poke others?? Expcting pakistan also to use it ..

      Delete
  79. Sir
    News is brewing on coup in PRC. Would like to know about your thoughts on Indo China relationship, after clarity emerges (in both the cases: Succesful coup and failed coup)
    Regards
    Nikhil

    ReplyDelete
  80. Sir what is going on in China...
    Unconfirmed media report suggesting possible house arrest of Chinese president XI.
    If true what would the global impact of it.
    ..

    ReplyDelete
  81. Dear Prasun,

    Please throw some light upon the crack on PFI. Under the political leadership of Amit Shah ji and NSA Dr. Ajit Doval, the plan was executed well. This should have happened long back. However radicals are asking a comparison between RSS and PFI. Whenever, a riot happens Muslims first go ga ga about RSS. Question is that RSS has already mended its way long back. Congress is too skeptical about RSS. When it was in power, it never took any action against RSS. This shows that RSS has a clear path ahead. What's your opinion about it and crackdown upon PFI?

    ReplyDelete
  82. Prasun,

    interesting perspective --https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KzQut4Ls7ck.Also agree with Amit B that starlink is another dark project of the US deep state like twitter to disrupt others...

    ReplyDelete
  83. Pasun Da, I personally think Xi is purging his potential opponents before CCP Congress meet on 16th October, as such presence of Army is being increased in the streets of Bejing, and outbound flights getting restricted, on contrary what is being rumored and speculated in the social media about potential coup.

    Kindly share your view?

    Thanks in Advance.

    ReplyDelete
  84. Prasun ,

    1-what do you make of the Mk1a, LCH product brochures shown @AAD 2022
    2- while your assessment is MRFA to be cost prohibitive, why is the IAf insisting on it instead of opting for additional rafales & land version of TEDBF
    3-Russia calling its reserves.. last ditch attempt to impose itself?

    ReplyDelete
  85. Prasunda,
    Which fighter IN is choosing for Vikrant. F18 or Rafale.
    Best regards

    ReplyDelete
  86. Sir,

    Fake News?

    https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/with-depleting-fighter-strength-indian-air-force-looks-to-speed-up-su-30-fleet-modernisation/article65934607.ece?homepage=true

    ReplyDelete
  87. prasun,

    "you are not fooling anyone"- jaishankar on US's $450mln aid to pakis. bakshish to terrorists for sellin one of their own - al zawhari

    ReplyDelete
  88. Prasun ,

    -US response to Jaishankar's comments seem to suggest they are back with the porkies--https://idrw.org/after-s-jaishankars-remarks-on-f-16-deal-with-pakistan-us-reply/#more-294567.

    ReplyDelete
  89. Prasunda?
    Our Foreign Minister said few things against America and the result is again USA is treating both Pakistan and India in same league. They said ' both are our partners '. Or our EAM done his best to elevate Pakistan from Friend to Partner in America's eye.
    False bravado is harmful.
    Best regards

    ReplyDelete
  90. Sir,

    https://t.co/vYR1wcrKpD

    Isn’t it funny that Indian products have to go through full spectrum trails for every environment in India but foreign toys get to have limited sector-specific trails, if this isn’t moral (or outright) corruption I don’t know what is.
    Countless waivers for imports.

    Post-induction add ons purchased at extra cost by Indian users,but we are told that Indian equipment must coke ready to fight in every terrain from day one but they must not cost more than their foreign competitors even though being more capable

    These are the games they play.

    ReplyDelete
  91. To AMIT BISWAS: So it is official at last! No foreign OEMs participating at DEFEXPO-2022:

    This edition will see the participation of only Indian companies. The Expo was earlier scheduled to be held in March was postponed due to “logistical challenges” the Ministry had said then as the war in Ukraine began on February 24. For DefExpo 2022, Indian companies, Indian subsidiaries of foreign Original Equipment Manufacturers, Division of company registered in India, exhibitor having joint venture with an Indian company will be considered as Indian participants, the Ministry said.

    https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-africa-defence-dialogue-and-ior-plus-at-defexpo-2022/article65931237.ece

    Perhaps this is the reason why:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0wPQMNsHFe4

    To ANWAY: Saab to Produce AT-4 Carl Gustafs in India:

    https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/defence-manufacturer-saab-produce-carl-gustaf-m4-weapons-system-india-2022-09-27/#:~:text=Sept%2027%20(Reuters)%20%2D%20Swedish,looks%20to%20ramp%20up%20production.

    https://www.saab.com/markets/india/stories/2021/ins-kavaratti-the-saab-edge-to-indias-potent-asw-corvette

    https://www.saab.com/markets/india/stories/2021/carl-gustaf-indian-armys-versatile-weapon-of-choice

    https://www.saab.com/markets/india/stories/2021/idas-indian-alh-rudra-self-protection-system-of-choice-for-years

    DRDO-developed VSHORADS Test-Fired:

    https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1862617

    ReplyDelete

  92. HI Prasun
    give is more dope on the vshorads. On what i can see it has a aeropsike like the russian counterpart. Its got mid body wing for better lift and better turn ability hence more agile ...dumping the front canards as is the norm. The reaction control ports seem to be on the rear. those black stripes. The designers have taken a new approach to vshorads design .
    The missile is rather big and it could be in the range of the mistral missileor rbs 70

    How are they going to put antennas for datalink as published? in that case it has to have a radar input to up date targte info .. how..?

    does i tmean that tha contract wiht russia is dead?

    where did the Dual band IIR seeker come from> is it cooled for better sensitivity.?

    was tonbo involved in the design especially the video processing dsp part as they are masters in it.?


    ReplyDelete
  93. Prasun,
    does VSHROAD have 2 variants?... https://idrw.org/after-vshorad-drdo-also-working-on-mpdms/. How does it compare to its new gen peers like Verba

    ReplyDelete
  94. 1) Why is no one talking about US sabotage of Nord stream? Europeans too dumb to state the obvious??

    https://www.bitchute.com/video/H2dhF3mkczz5/

    If Poland sends peace-keeping forces to Ukraine following Russian mobilization, will Russia be forced to use TNWs???

    https://wavellroom.com/2022/04/22/russias-tactical-nuclear-weapons/

    2) Why we are not prioritizing TNWs?

    3) So-called analysts in India assumed Pakistan will collapse on their own, but the USA is the new sugar daddy of Pakistan under Abu Biden. India will be in a dangerous Russia-like situation if either Pakistan or China possess superior ISR and A2/AD.

    4) India finally shedding neutrality by supplying arms to Armenia or is this just payback to the Turks?

    5) How is Iran producing so many drones under sanctions?

    6) After Ukraine, US-Iran conflict seems inevitable, maybe this decade or the next. What will India's role be? How will Russia and China respond?

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Sir,
      Prasunda will answer your questions but I am just trying to mention the intalectual capabilities Iran is possessing.
      Quite a few years back one of my relatives participated in Maths Olympiad. India is traditionally doing well in Maths Olympiad.
      But that year Iran was better placed than India and my relative said its not very uncommon. Iran is a very strong force in international Maths Olympiad.
      In science and technology Iran is quite advanced. Their system is just carbon copy of American one.
      So please don't underestimate Iran.
      Best regards

      Delete

  95. HI prasan

    I belive the latest vshorads missile will be in the leaugue of the sa-9 Ir missile that will a company the armoured column into battle field. Having 6 or more missiles on the carrier .
    should have a range of 10km to take care of helis with hell fire type missiles with 10km range backed up wiht data link from a radar wihthte like of the elta on the schilka upgraded version
    your inputs pse

    ReplyDelete
  96. Sir, is it really coincidence that both BJP and Congi using India map without PoK and Aksichin in their respective invents ?

    Is there any kind of sign/hint?

    ReplyDelete
  97. Suvo Sarodia Durga Puja to Prasun Da and Everybody here, stay happy and be blessed.

    ReplyDelete
  98. Sir, what is opinion on the new CDS? Did govt do the right thing by opting for a retired general over serving ones?

    ReplyDelete
  99. Sir , on a serious note your blogposts should be made mandatory for young Indian diplomats and army officers.

    ReplyDelete
  100. To SATYA: Assessments of new CDS Appointment:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pfoXJ3E4K3w
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UEc9iRt9U6g
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WFJLvat_7fc

    To DASHU: Bugging of Pak PMO: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2chlntiv3yM&t=34s
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L7vLaIzUsQo

    To ANWAY: IA Artillery Modernisation Details: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JW6YQsWjVCI

    ReplyDelete
  101. Prasun,

    What has stopped the govt from procuring its own engine test bed - they could have easily bought a mothballed one IL76 any other suitable aircraft for that matter. Can HS748 be used for engine testing? or how about the boeing 747 which the govt bought along with the 6 A320's which are now planned for netra 2.0
    http://www.indiandefensenews.in/2022/10/testing-of-kaveri-dry-engine-meant-to.html

    ReplyDelete
  102. IAF LCH https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-EUGkQx6fPo

    These LCHs have no radar warning receiver, no laser warning receiver,
    no countermeasures dispenser & no missile approach warning system &
    not ATGMs! Thus, the IAF's excuse for procuring the LCH is for
    shooting down enemy UAVs & that too inside friendly airspace!!!

    Khud bhi mareega aur doosro ko bhi marwaaega!

    ReplyDelete
  103. Hi Prasun, does IA LCH have rwr,lwr , counter measures , missile approach warning system ?

    ReplyDelete
  104. Prasun da,

    With regard to HAL Prachand, so in the coming years this helicopter will not be equipped with a radar warning receiver, a laser warning receiver, a countermeasures distributor, a missile approach warning system and ATGM.

    Now we all Bhartiya hope, every UAVs coming from the western border will now be shoot down "Kamikaze action by HAL Prachand"

    ReplyDelete
  105. The following are all the official press-releases & images released thus far of the LSP-series LCHs of the IAF & IA:

    https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1864787

    https://twitter.com/rajnathsingh/status/1576902053640622080?cxt=HHwWgMCqjYSEpOIrAAAA

    https://twitter.com/rajnathsingh/status/1576572261574017025?cxt=HHwWgoDU3c2HjuErAAAA

    https://static.pib.gov.in/WriteReadData/Gallery/PhotoGallery/2022/Oct/H20221003118732.JPG

    https://static.pib.gov.in/WriteReadData/Gallery/PhotoGallery/2022/Oct/H20221003118731.JPG

    https://static.pib.gov.in/WriteReadData/Gallery/PhotoGallery/2022/Oct/H20221003118730.JPG

    https://static.pib.gov.in/WriteReadData/Gallery/PhotoGallery/2022/Oct/H20221003118729.JPG

    https://static.pib.gov.in/WriteReadData/Gallery/PhotoGallery/2022/Oct/H20221003118728.JPG

    https://twitter.com/adgpi/status/1575464477050413056?cxt=HHwWgICx7Yemlt0rAAAA

    Can anyone spot the BDL-built chaff/flare countermeasures dispenser, DARE-developed or Saab-supplied MAWS, & Saab-supplied RWRs & LWRs--all of which are very prominent fitments on the IA's & IAF Dhruv WSIs/Rudras???

    Perhaps, the excuse to be given later will be that such fitments will go on board the SP-series LCHs! Then what the hell was HAL & its clients--IA & IAF--up to since October 2006 when the LCH's R & D effort was sanctioned? Are we to believe that even after 16 years of R & D effort & production of 4 LCH technology demonstrators, the fitment of RWRs, LWRs, MAWS & countermeasures dispensers has yet to be achieved??? In short, today's 'nautanki' at Jodhpur AFS was an international embarrassment.

    And of course, India's RMs (Defence Ministers) over the years are totally clueless about such matters & will accept the IAF's argument about the 'Prachand' shooting down UAVs (costing a few thousands of US$) over Sri Ganganagar or Anupgarh or Poonch or Samba with Mistral AAMs costing a few millions of US$!!!

    ReplyDelete
  106. None of the 'desi patrakaars' present at Jodhpur AFS today noticed the absence of the LCH's self-protection suite:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2HFiFQb9cZ8
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CqbQU2P2PfY
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lUPluIt_Quc
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VZnzBJhz0cw
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8CUvQbcNsFE

    India’s Tri-Services Rocket Artillery Command:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yT7QIMQcJW0

    This is the recipe for another disaster, since such a Command, if approved, will claim ownmership of the IA's existing rocket artillery regiments charged with the control & ownership of IRBMs/ICBMs/SS-BSMs armed with TNWs, the IAF's nuclear warhead-equipped air-delivered munition stockpiles, & in future the IN's SSBNs & SLBMs.

    What the GoI’s move to make NaVIC mandatory on cellphones means:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g5Scbz24YOA

    To NIKHIL M & BUDDHA: The rumours about a coup in Beijing were initiated by pro-Falung Gong US citizens of China-origin, but inside India the rumours were spread by a coterie of Hindi-language TV channels (absolute imbeciles), as revealed here:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rzVagLVb-vs&t=52s

    ReplyDelete
  107. humm One more https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qVNzDPWvdSg and https://twitter.com/usembislamabad/status/1576558637123706886

    And GoIndia is not screaming either.

    ReplyDelete
  108. "but inside India the rumours were spread by a coterie of Hindi-language TV channels (absolute imbeciles), as revealed here:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rzVagLVb-vs&t=52s"

    Prasun Da, please check my comments on 26th September 2022 at 5:49 AM, As I quote:

    "Pasun Da, I personally think Xi is purging his potential opponents before CCP Congress meet on 16th October, as such presence of Army is being increased in the streets of Bejing, and outbound flights getting restricted, on contrary what is being rumored and speculated in the social media about potential coup"

    The mainstream YouTube English language news channel cleared air of rumor itself on 26th September:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3gKwBdGd1N4 under headline "Xi under 'house arrest', 'military coup' in China rumours trigger online frenzy | Know The Truth"

    This standup Dramabaaz of News Laundry (Once Notorious Channel for spreading unverified news and taken down after reporting of copyright violation by India Today group) being slow to act late.

    On contrary, in my humble opinion, the YouTube channels manned by the Desi Internet Fanboys spearheaded the spreading rumors in India, like this one:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IrK9tL1jg1s




    ReplyDelete
  109. To DASHU: Well, that's nothing new as foreign diplomates have been going there since the 2005 earthquake. What the Indian MEA should say is that it hopes the US Ambassador had a good look at the abject living conditions in PoJK & bench-mark them with what the situation is inside J & K UT.

    PA COAS in US: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JQKpwP3DN3M

    Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J_eEuOhtcxE

    SKYDOCK Drone: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MW_vRCXNYbI

    To SUMANTA NAF: LoLz1 NewsLaundry being sued by India Today Group is at best laughable because both media entities are owned by biological sisters & brothers! In addition, it was just not the rumour-mongering by Hindi & English TV channels, but the absolute racial vilification of the Chinese & not realising that Chinese just don't exclusively reside inside the PRC & Hongkong, but also in countries of Southeast Asia & Taiwan! Here is 1 example by a mainstream Indian English language channel:

    https://www.youtube.com/shorts/bBU7FobcOyw

    I don't know how this chap became an Ambassador, since I used to see him on Doordarshan in the 1980s as a newscaster & by 1992 he was seen by me as being a member of a National Defence College team visiting Singapore & by 1996 I saw him at the Indian High Commission in KL, Malaysia as a Deputy High Commissioner. He then was a heavy consumer of alcoholic beverages & this had led to a couple of embarrassing moments on board IN warships whenever they visited Port Klang, Malaysia on goodwill visits. I was a witness to 1 such incident. After that I have no idea where he wandered off to & what he did. Then out of nowhere he surfaced at NewX TV channel during the COVID-19 lockdown period & has been there since then as a self-appointed spinmaster, often to the detriment of what the GoI states & declares from time to time.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Lolz seriously, Prasun Da , is IQ Level of the Head of the Market Research Wings of the TV Channels are seriously degraded , pan South Asia, that this type of gibberish comes out in a TV Show ?

      BTW, It was Newslaundry who accused You Tube 'taking down' their channel following allegations labelled by the India Today group,

      https://www.google.com/amp/s/m.thewire.in/article/media/newslaundrys-youtube-channel-taken-down-after-india-today-reports-copyright-violation/amp

      Now , may that be the rivalry of siblings or business interest, what ever may be speculated.

      However, Newslaundry Along with HANS India , Opindia were clubbed as unreliable source for any shorts of current affairs and defence related news, during the days of Foruming ( Which I have left parmanent ly for good 7 years ago )Defence Forums, using link of the those sites were discouraged and posters were cautioned and forbed , that too after receiving complains in the inbox from members questioning the authenticity of the news program , and verification of their allegations.

      Delete
  110. Prasun Da, most of the contents of the News X , which are aired mostly lack substance, in nature.

    However, I do admire of your way of calling a Spade as a Spade, very character, and pointing out the mistakes being made,which seems lacking in the media today which remains speculative at most.

    ReplyDelete
  111. Happy Navratri and Navami to Prasun Da and every body here.

    ReplyDelete
  112. Since everyone seems to like calling a Spade a Spade .. may i pls do the same


    Everyone is in an expert 2 or 7 days too late .. very rarely did anyone commit then (except some notable exceptions) ...


    To everyone else ... There's an old adage

    Hindsight is 20)29

    ReplyDelete