Monday, August 31, 2020

Increasing Sub-Conventional Threats Systematically Blunting India’s Conventional Deterrence

Ever since the Indian Army (IA) completed fencing of the 550km-stretch of the Line of Actual Control (LoC) fencing in the Kashmir Valley and Jammu region of Jammu & Kashmir Union Territory on September 30, 2004, terrorist infiltrations across the LoC had been reduced to single-digit levels per annum till 2012. Since then, the bulk of the infiltrations into both J & K UT and northern Punjab have taken place within the Ravi-Chenab corridor, especially along the India-Pakistan Working Boundary (WB) and the Chicken’s Neck area in particular, and along the riverine stretches of the India-Pakistan international boundary or IB (around the Shakargarh Bulge/Salient)—these being the districts of Amritsar, Tarn Taran, Gurdaspur, Pathankot, Fazilka and Ferozepur.
It is now important to understand the various territorial boundary/frontier references. The J & K UT has 734km of LoC running through Jammu, Kashmir and the UT of Ladakh from Kargil to Malu (Akhnoor) in Jammu district, while it has 190km of IB from Malu to Punjab running through Jammu, Samba and Kathua districts. The IB between India and Pakistan spans 2,175km. The WB spans 202km, the LoC spans 797km, and the Line of Actual Contact (LAC)—which India calls the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL)—from map-grid reference NJ-9842 till Indra Kol—spans 108km. The LoC runs from a place called Sangam close to Chhamb (which lies on the west bank of the Munnawar Tawi River) all the way up north to NJ-9842 in Ladakh, following which the AGPL takes over. The WB lies in Jammu Division between Boundary Pillar 19 and Sangam i.e. between Jammu and Sialkot), which was part of the erstwhile princely state of J & K. It is this stretch that is known in India as the IB, while Pakistan refers to it as the WB, since it maintains that the border agreement (the so-called standstill agreement of August 15, 1947) was inked between the princely state of J & K and Pakistan, and not between India and Pakistan. The Shakargarh Bulge/Salient (which is Pakistani territory) and runs along the IB, is 45km x 45km in size. The bulge joins Indian territory with a 40km distance in between both countries and touches India’s National Highway-1, which is the lifeline of the entire Kashmir Valley. If Pakistan Army (PA) troops manage to get operational in three to four days at the tip of this Bulge/Salient, the NH-1 could be cut of totally, rendering the entire north of India paralysed, as all supplies and winter stocking in the Valley is done by this route, for Indian troops.
Chicken’s Neck is the name given to the territory lying between the two branches of the River Chenab and it is a dagger-shaped salient in J & K that allows the PA an easy access to the bridge at Akhnoor in Jammu, as well as to the Chhamb-Jaurian sector. Measuring about 170 sq km, it is bound by the River Chenab in the west, and by the River Chandra Bhaga, or Ghag Nala in the east. Ferries in Saidpur, Gondal, Majwal and Gangwal areas connect it with the Sialkot sector. Being an open area in the plains, it is excellent for the conduct of swift, offensive manoeuvre warfare by the IA. However, for Pakistan, this area is indefensible by conventional means, as it is surrounded by India from three sides and back in December 1971, was captured by the IA’s 26 Infantry Division within a 48-hour period.
Thus far, since May 2008, three distinct patterns have been noticed with regard to the ways and means employed for covert infiltrations by groups of Pakistani ‘Fidayeen’ terrorists into northern Punjab, the Jammu plains and the Kashmir Valley: infiltration through riverine terrain and along the courses of the rivers and rivulets (nallahs) flowing through Punjab and Jammu; infiltration through underground tunnels dug beneath the WB; and the increasing use of China-made hexaCopters flying over the IB in both northern Punjab and southern Jammu for ferrying in weapons, explosives and narcotics stockpiles.

Infiltration Through Riverine Terrain
Though a large portion of the India-Pakistan border on the 553km Gurdaspur-Jammu sector is fenced, there are several gaps caused by the Ravi River and season rivulets that cut into the IB and WB. Gurdaspur shares a long, zig-zagging border with Pakistan. It is easy to infiltrate from this stretch as compared to the heavily-mined, fenced and guarded LoC. A dense fog in winters makes border surveillance an added challenge. As the border terrain is broken and forested, the rivulet beds provide an ideal cover for terrorists who can sneak in and reach the busy NH-44 highway that snakes along the border. This enables terrorists to hijack vehicles and mount rapid strikes. There are many gaps in the fencing on this stretch because of rivers flowing in and out of India. For example, the Ujjh River enters and exits many times on this stretch. Some of the gaps are as wide as 30 feet. It is not difficult to cross this stretch as the rivers are shallow (with water reaching just above the knee) and large parts of the riverbed are dry. In addition, large gaps due to monsoon floods disrupt the availability of the electrified fencing, which runs along the IB and WB in Punjab and Jammu. Hundreds of metres of fence come down every year and the Sarkanda grass, which springs up after the rains provides infiltrators plenty of cover. In Jammu, the entire Kathua district is profusely drained by numerous ephemeral and small perennial streams, which originate from northern mountainous region and are flowing in a southwestern direction. The perennial River Ravi that is a sub-basin to Indus River along with its tributaries viz Ujjh, Tarnah, Sewa and Bein drains the district. Apart from the major drainage systems, there are a number of seasonal streams (khads) traversing the whole district. They carry huge loads of boulders, pebbles, sand and silt during monsoon. They also generate flash floods immediately after rains, causing extensive damage downstream.

Instances of terror-attacks staged after riverine infiltrations included the terror-attack on the family quarters in the cantonment at Kali Mandi in Samba on May 11, 2008 in which left six people, including a photojournalist, two army jawans and two women dead; the September 26, 2013 terror-attack at 6.45am by a three-man JeM ‘Fidayeen’ squad of the Jaish-e-Mohammad’s (JeM) Shohada Brigade on the Hiranagar Police Station barely 7km from the WB, after the terrorists had commandeered a truck and took to the Pathankot-Jammu Highway and then they opened fire in Samba town against the IA’s 16 Cavalry Regiment in the Mesar area of the Samba-based 168 Infantry Brigade; the attack by a six-member ‘Fidayeen’ squad on December 5, 2014 on the IA’s 12 Brigade HQ at Mohura, Uri; an attack by a two-member ‘Fidayeen’ team on March 20, 2015 on Rajbagh Police Station police in Jammu’s Kathua district, with the recoveries including two AK-47 SLRs (one of them fitted with UBGL), two daggers; 13 hand-grenades; one China-made Star pistol, two UBGL rounds, 12 AK magazines, and one water-floating bag (used for infiltrating via riverine areas after crawling through an 80-metre-long tunnel under farmlands to cross the WB; a two-member ‘Fidayeen’ team striking for the second time in as many days on March 21, 2015 on an IA camp in the Meshwara area of Samba around 5:50am; the July 27, 2015 attack by three ‘Fidayeen’ terrorists on a bus and then attacking the Dina Nagar Police Station in Punjab’s Gurdaspur district; the attack by four ‘Fidayeen’ terrorists on January 2, 2016 at the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) Pathankot air base in Punjab’s Pathankot dfistrict; the attack on September 18, 2016 by four JeM ‘Fidayeen’ terrorists on the IA’s 12 Brigade in Uri sector on September 18, 2016 in which 19 IA soldiers (15 from 6 Bihar Battalion and three from 10 Dogra battalion) lost their lives; the attack on November 26, 2016 by four ‘Fidayeen’ terrorists (four local Kashmiri JeM members, namely Mohd. Ashiq Baba alias Mohd. Ashaq, Syed Munir-Ul-Hassan Qadri, Tariq Ahmad Dar and Ashraf Hamid Khandey, had facilitated a group of three heavily armed Pakistani terrorists—Khalid alias Abu Hissam, Numan and Aadil--and transported them from the WB in the Samba-Kathua sector to Hotel Jagdamba in Jammu and subsequently to Nagrota in their vehicles) on the IA’s 166 Medium Regiment at Nagrota; and the attack by four ‘Fidayeen’ Terrorists on February 10, 2018 on the sprawling camp of the 36 Brigade of the IA’s Jammu & Kashmir Light Infantry before dawn at Sunjwan in Jammu.

Of these, irrefutable forensic evidence of JeM-perpetrated terror-attacks has been garnered from only the July 27, 2015 and January 2, 2016 terror-attacks. Regarding the former, data shared by the US Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) with India’s Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) under the auspices of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) has revealed that the ‘Fidayeen’ unit had been stationed in the town of Gharota (in Shakargarh), facing Bamiyal. Forensic analysis by the FBI of the Garmin GPS navigation locator device used by the terrorists showed that the device was first fed with data on July 21, 2015 at Sargodha, a town 94km from Faisalabad. The data also showed that the terrorists had departed from a safe-house on the fringes of Gharota.  On the intervening night of July 26 and 27, they penetrated the IB near Alowal where the Ravi River makes a series of sweeping bends and then, travelling due east, they crossed a tributary of the Ravi River and reached Bamiyal town. From there, they caught an early morning bus that took them to the NH-1A highway, which links Punjab with J & K and on to Hiranagar, passing several Punjab State Police checkpoints along the way and eventually arrived at Dinanagar town, which is just 12km from the IB, 25km from Jammu and 235km from Chandigarh. Dinanagar is also on the 1,526km-long NH-15 that connects Pathankot in the north and Samakhiali in Gujarat. The retrieved pre-programmed GPS waypoint navigation data revealed that the terrorists had three targets. The first was the Dinanagar-Pathankot railway track on which five IEDs were subsequently found strapped. Dinanagar Police Station, where the encounters took place resulting in the terrorists being killed, was the second on the hit list. The terrorists were expected to eventually proceed to the high-profile targets of bungalows of the District Magistrate and the SP in the Civil Lines area of the town for what could have been a deadly climax. India had approached the FBI to help identify the Night Vision Device (NVD) used by the three terrorists.


The JeM terrorists who struck at the air base in Pathankot in the early hours of January 2, 2016 had entered the defence installation during the afternoon of January 1 and had spoken in Multani dialect, commonly used in the districts of Multan, Lodhran and Bahawalpur in southern Punjab region of Pakistan. Items recovered included a China-made wireless set similar to the one recovered from Rajbagh Police Station on March 21, 2015, and US Army-issued binoculars. The FBI supplied the cellphone call details of two numbers: 92-3017775253 and 92-3000597212. One of the first calls made by the terrorists to 92-3000597212 was at 9.12pm on December 31, 2015 from a location near the air base. In all, the FBI handed over evidence, comprising more than 1,000 pages of chats and conversations between the JeM’s handler Kashif Jaan and the four ‘Fidayeen’ who were eventually killed (identified as Nasir Hussain from Punjab, Abu Bakar from Gujranwala and Umar Farooq and Abdul Qayum from Sindh). The documents also included Kashif Jaan’s conversations with other Pakistan-based JeM office-bearers, apart from other exchanges over a period of time. Apart from chats on WhatsApp and other platforms, Jaan was using a Facebook account connected to the same mobile number that the attackers had called from Pathankot after abducting Punjab police SP Salwinder Singh. The terrorists had also called another number in Pakistan connected to a Facebook account of ‘Mulla Daadullah’. These accounts, operated by Jaan, were accessed before and around the time of the terror-attack using IP addresses of Pakistan-based telecommunications service-providers (Telenor and Pakistan TeleCommunications Company Ltd). These Facebook pages also contained jihadi material and videos and comments condemning the arrest of JeM cadres in Pakistan. The terrorists had also called numbers connected to Al-Rahmat Trust—the JeM’s financial arm.

Infiltrations Via Tunnels Dug Beneath WB
As far as infiltrations using tunnels dug beneath the WB go, the first such tunnel was uncovered on July 28, 2012 by the Border Security Force (BSF), which was constructed about 25 feet deep in the Samba sector. It was detected after an area caved-in near the border fencing. It had been dug out between two sides along the WB on India’s Chillayari BoP and Pakistan’s Lumberiyal BoP. It had air-supply through a 2-inch pipe. The tunnel was discovered accidentally by a farmer of Chachwal village on the evening of July 27 while working in his fields, when he saw the land sunk at three straight points due to monsoon rains. A joint team of the Geological Survey of India (GSI) and BSF later unearthed a total length of about 540 metres of the tunnel dug into the Indian side from the Zero Line (where the boundary pillars lie) and reportedly found its exit point about 500 metres short of Chechwal. On May 2014, the BSF found a caved-in portion of another tunnel in Chillyari border belt in Samba district, which was found 23 metres inside Indian territory. On August 2014, a tunnel, which was approximately 130 to 150 metres in length along the WB and had originated on the Pakistan side, was discovered in Jammu’s Pallanwala sector. On March 4, 2016, a 10 feet-deep tunnel was found concealed by elephant grass (Sarkanda) in the Ranbir Singh Pura sector near Allah Mai De Kothey BoP. On February 13, 2017, a tunnel dug underneath the WB was discovered in the Ramgarh sector. On September 30, 2017, the BSF unearthed a 14-feet-long tunnel in the Arnia sector of Jammu. The unfinished tunnel approximately had a length of 14 metres, height of three feet and two-and-a-half-feet width on the slope of bank at Dhamalla nulla (stream) ahead of the border fence. Items recovered from the location included a US-made compass, two magazines, 60 rounds of ammunition, a hand-grenade, and other items and most of these items were carrying the marking of Pakistan. On July 13, 2018, a 30-metre-long tunnel was uncovered BSF in the Ranbir Singh Pura sector of Jammu district. The tunnel was approximately 10 feet below the ground and had a length of 30 metres. Five JeM operatives, including the perpetrators of the February 14, 2019 Pulwama terror-attack, had crossed over to India in April 2018 using this tunnel. On August 27, 2020, the BSF detected the latest trans-border tunnel in the Samba sector’s Basantar area. The approximately 20 feet-long and three-four feet wide tunnel was 25 feet underground. Pakistan-made sandbags with Shakargarh/Karachi written were also found at the mouth of the tunnel to hide it. The place of opening of the tunnel was around 170 metres from the WB towards the Indian side in the field of a local farmer. A BSF patrol had detected the tunnel 50 metres from the border fence on the Indian side. The nearest Pakistani BoP is about 400 metres from the tunnel.
Terror-attacks staged by ‘Fidayeens’ who had entered India through such tunnels included the attack by two terrorists on October 3, 2016 on two adjoining camps of the IA’s 46 Rashtriya Rifles and the BSF’s 40 Battalion at Baramulla, following which a A GPS navigation locator and a compass were recovered from the slain terrorists; an attack on April 27, 2017 by a two-member ‘Fidayeen’ squad against an IA garrison at Panjgaon of Chowkibal in Kupwara district; an attack on August 26, 2017 by a three-member ‘Fidayeen’ squad against the District Police Lines in Pulwama district; an attack on the Lethpora CRPF camp in South Kashmir’s Pampore village in Pulwama district on December 30, 2017, in which four JeM terrorists—two of them Pakistanis—were killed during the 36-hour-long gunfight along with locals Manzoor Ahmad Baba, and Fardeen Ahmad Khanday; the attack on a BSF camp outside Srinagar Airport on July 13, 2018 (a similar attempt by three JeM ‘Fidayeen’ terrorists was thwarted by the security forces on October 3, 2017; the August 2018 attack by three JeM Fidayeen members on the J & K Police Station in Pulwama.
These terror-squads were all transported to the hinterland of J & K UT by local facilitators using their own vehicles. However, quite a few of them were successfully intercepted as well. For instance, on September 13, 2018 three JeM ‘Fidayeens’ who had crossed the WB via Tarnah Nallah and were picked up in Samba were killed in an encounter in Reasi district a day after they fired on a Police party and escaped. After several hours of gunfire, the three men were neutralised. The forces attempted to capture the third terrorist alive, but he was killed too. Truck driver Riaz Ahmed of Pulwama district and his helper Mohmmad Iqbal of Budgam, who were arrested when the three terrorists were intercepted at the Domail-Jhajjar Kotli highway belt, later admitted that they had helped the JeM five times in the past when it came to smuggling Fidayeen squads inside trucks. A cordon-and-search operation (CASO) to track down the JeM terrorists was launched in the Jhajjar-Kotli forest belt in Reasi district after the firefight with the Police. It was late on the night of September 12 when an informant informed the local Military Intelligence (MI) unit that the terrorists were possibly inside a house in Tirthi village. The two to three houses that are part of Ward No.6 in Tirthi belong to people from a minority community. What raised suspicion was the crying and unusual noises coming from the houses. The local MI unit assessed the input and advised contacting a nearby security forces (SF) column, which issued the CASO. The SF team nearest the house was contacted and shown a path to the exact two-three houses. Once the security team crossed a narrow nallah and started moving towards the houses, terrorists from one of the houses started firing at the SF party. It was later discovered that the terrorists who were on the move forcefully took refuge in a house owned by Ishwar Dass, a former serviceman in Ward No.5 of Jhajjar Kotli. The terrorists came at around 8pm demanding clothes to change from their combat dress. They also demanded food and water and left around 9.10pm. They soon moved to another residence in Ward No.6. According to MI, a group of four to five terrorists had infiltrated past the Lam-based Battalion of the IA’s 80 Infantry Brigade in Naushera on the night of September 2. The group travelled in a vehicle till the outskirts of Naushera. On September 4, 2018 they were sighted by some school students at Langar, after which a search operation was launched by J & K Police and the IA. Once the terrorists were detected, they ran out of options and cancelled their plan to head towards Naushera city. In order to avoid being detected, they moved along Jambhir Nallah and reached Bareri. Five days before the encounter they were spotted and another search operation was swiftly launched following inputs of suspicious movement in Bareri. It is most likely that the group had considered travelling to Lamberi in a vehicle. On September 9, 2018 the group was reported to be in Lamberi and was waiting for the guide to take them up to Mohar. The exact location of the group was reported by human intelligence (HUMINT) and another search operation was launched. During the search, the group got split into two sub-groups. One of these sub-groups comprising two terrorists with a cellphone was able to escape the cordon, leaving behind a sub-group of three that had no cellphone, but radio sets. The cordon was lifted by the evening of September 10. Security forces put up stops at roads leading towards Kalakot and Naushera. An urgent assessment was conducted as it was suspected that by this time the group had started moving towards Nihari Tawi River. However, it is believed that the group of three had left the place by then. Based on an intercept received, it was assessed that the sub-group would have boarded a vehicle for Jammu. Another intercept suggests that they were instructed to move towards the IA’s 10 Infantry Division HQ. After reaching Jammu on January 12 morning, the group boarded a civil truck with the number plate JK-03F-1476 and paid Rs.20,000 to the driver to ferry the armed men ahead. The group was next sighted at a Dhaba. The truck was subsequently intercepted at a ‘Nakka’ near Jhajjar Kotli, which finally led to the terrorists’ being slain. But the J & K Police gave another assessment. According to it, the infiltration took place on the night of September 11 between Kathua and Samba. The terrorists reached the National Highway near Chal Dayala and were picked up by a truck. On September 12 at about 8am in the morning a J & K Police party signalled a truck with the number plate JK-03F-1476, which was on its way from Jammu to Srinagar, to stop. The three terrorists who were boarding the truck opened fire. The truck driver was the brother to one of the dead terrorists and was an OGW himself. The truck took them ahead as a new bus driver and conductor took over the vehicle near the Bann Toll Plaza. Then they stopped at Jhajjar-Kotli to have breakfast when a J & K Police cop came to check the truck as part of a routine practice. The terrorists panicked, opened fire and fled the spot. Security forces then used drones and helicopters during the operation to track the three JeM terrorists who were between the ages of 18 and 22 years.
On September 12, 2019 four AK-56 and two AK-47 rifles along with six magazines and 180 live rounds were seized after the J & K Police intercepted a truck at 8am on the Jammu-Pathankot Highway near the Punjab-J & K border in Lakhanpur and arrested three residents (who belong to Pulwama and Budgam districts) of J & K. The truck was on its way to Kashmir from Bamiyal.
On January 31, 2020 three JeM ‘Fidayeens’ had entered from the WB in Hiragnagar in Kathua district 56km east of Jammu and were on their way to the Kashmir Valley by hiding inside an L-shaped cavity of a truck (JK-03F-1478) laden with goods. They were caught at the Bann Toll Plaza at Nagrota and were carrying one Colt M-4 carbine, AK-47 assault rifles, armour-piercing steel core ammunition, IEDs, grenades, pistols, satellite phone, wireless communication system, and a GPS navigation locator. The J & K Police nabbed Sameer Ahmed Dar alive from the encounter site. He is the cousin of the February 2019 Pulwama suicide-bomber Adil Dar. He had managed to establish links with the JeM on WhatsApp by using a virtual private network (VPN) that allows users to circumvent internet censorship to secure connections to the sites an individual wishes to access. It was through WhatsApp that Sameer was directed by the JeM in Pakistan. Sameer is a Master in Geology from Kashmir University. On receipt of the message from JeM, Sameer took his two aides in a truck to Basantar Nallah in Samba sector on the intervening night of January 30-31. He waited at a pre-decided pick-up point and moved towards the Valley after receiving the three JeM terrorists. In December 2019 Sameer had transported a group of three JeM terrorists. An OGW, Shoaib Wani from Karimabad in Pulwama had received those terrorists. One of the three was killed in Pari Tral area of Awantipora along with Qari Yasir. His truck was used to do a legal business transaction like transporting fruits. In December, the truck went to Delhi carrying an apple consignment and on return carried back pomegranates. As soon as Sameer entered Punjab, he used his WhatsApp freely. This is when the GPS coordinates were shared.  In December, with no access to the internet, the plotting was done in Punjab. On return, the terror module would use Google Maps. On dropping the consignment of pomegranates, Sameer picked up large packets of wall-putty. This was used to camouflage the presence of the JeM terrorists inside the cavity of the truck. Towards January-end, the same modus operandi was used. The truck went to Jaipur in Rajasthan and on return, came near the WB.

Infiltrations By HexaCopters
The usage of HexaCopters began last year following the Khalistan Zindabad Force’s (KZF) Pakistan-based chief Ranjeet Singh alias Neeta and his Germany-based associate Gurmeet Singh alias Bagga conducting nearly a dozen supply sorties. On March 11, 2019 the BSF shot down a HexaCopter in the Fazilka sector. One drone was recovered on August 13, 2019 and it was a crashed HexaCopter carrying 21kg payload in Mohawa village of Amritsar district—a mere 1.5km from the IB. The drone model U10 KV100-U, and it had been designed and manufactured by China-based T Motors. The airframe of the drone was called TAROT 680 PRO. Four brick-sized batteries (model Tattu-Made in China) were also found installed in the Hexacopter. Another HexaCopter (out of three) was seized in the burnt condition in September from Jhabal town in Tarn Taran. They were used for ferrying in five AK-47s (along with 16 magazines and 472 rounds of ammunition), four China-made .30 bore ‘Star’ Pistols (along with eight magazines and 72 rounds of ammunition), nine hand-grenades, five Thuraya satellite phones along with their ancillary equipment, two cellphones, two wireless sets and FICN with face-value of Rs.10 lakh—all of which were air-dropped in Rajoke. Between September 9 and 16, 2019 HexaCopters were used for ferrying almost 100kg of arms and ammunition into Punjab. The foreign handlers, Gurmeet Bagga of Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF), and his terrorist associates based in Pakistan, including KZF chief Ranjeet Singh Neeta, who were handling the Indian Punjab-based Akashdeep terror module, had informed Akashdeep and his associates about the crashing of this drone inside Indian territory. They had also shared the coordinates of the crash landing site and further directed Akashdeep to go to the crash site and destroy the drone by burning lest the Punjab Police came to know about it.

On September 22, 2019, the Punjab State Police successfully wound-up the India-based module of this operation, which was active in the Husseiniwallah, Tarn Taran, Ajnala, Fazilka and Khem Karan areas of Punjab. The HexaCopters with 10kg payloads had been flown for almost 7km from their launch-pads at a height of 2,000 feet to deliver their payloads. On both October 7 and 8, 2019 a HexaCopter originating from Pakistan was detected flying over two villages in the Hussainiwala area of Punjab. On October 10, 2019, HexaCopters were cited in two locations in Punjab. The first sighting was reported in Hazarasingh Wala village at 7:20am and later in Tendiwala village at 10:10pm. On January 27, 2020, a HexaCopter flown from Pakistan was shot down by the BSF in Arnia sector, while on June 20, 2020, BSF troops shot down a HexaCopter carrying one M-4 carbine, two loaded magazines (60 rounds), and seven China-irigin hand-grenades near the WB in Jammu’s Kathua district. The HexaCopter was spotted hovering in the vicinity of BoP Pansar around 5.10am by a BSF patrol party, which then shot it down 250 metres inside Indian territory.

One of the major India-based narco-terrorism modules, headed by former IA Naik Rahul Chauhan, was involved in carting 75kg of pure heroin and at least seven pistols between November and December 2019. The module, operating from the Jat Regiment Centre in Uttar Pradesh’s Bareilly, was busted on January 9, 2020. According to Chauhan’s interrogation report, a Pakistani national named Waqar got in touch with him when he was running surveillance drones for the IA in the Naushera sector in July-August 2019. Chauhan was later contacted by another source, identified as Choudhary, over a WhatsApp call from a Germany-based number, and a meeting was set up with Choudhary’s associate in Ambala. During interrogation, Chauhan admitted to operating drones from the border villages of Dhanoa Khurd and Mulaekot to pick up heroin and pistols from Pakistan. He used three drones purchased from Chandini Chowk (Delhi), Ghaziabad and Pune, and made cross-border sorties at the height of 1,200 feet on November 27 and 30, and then on December 8, 9 and 17, 2019. These sorties were made from border villages between 3am and 4am to avoid detection, and the distance covered from the launch area to the pick-up point in Pakistan was between 2.2km and 2.8km, with flying times generally between 14 and 18 minutes. Data gathered from the captured drones showed that the last flight on December 19 was 26 minutes, 54 seconds long. Further investigation revealed that the money used to buy the drones was provided by convicted drug smuggler Lakhwinder Singh (in Amristar Jail since September 2019), and his associates Ajaypal and Dharminder.

53 comments:

  1. TUNNELS
    August 27, 2020: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=toRhoJogL00
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6tBeCpeF_gg

    February 2017: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LnxffkEbaFI
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ur4d7-g_BW0

    March 2016: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O9lUARLVwrM
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YcAa3yJdQ6U

    July 2012 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l-I0EnluO3o
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pnHeIXPA58M
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9GmQx3uW57I

    HEXACOPTERS
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_VNNkkn85Gs
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EC8KJYjS_gM&t=35s
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SsfKm_nm5xs
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A4fWa7SFt5Y&t=106s
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FlNwZJebzwQ

    NARCOTICS & SMALL ARMS
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IZ-5ixWwBpE
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ngMisaVB4bo
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eCeYPr53El8
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJYrGF0mhKU
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xa0dKkYKSYI
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KCvQU78l6Sg
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NEv3mZD1BY4

    ReplyDelete
  2. Dear Prasun,

    Will you please comment on the recent military clash that happened yesterday? Don't you think that India must retaliate now. Modi must prove that he has 56 inch chest!!!!

    ReplyDelete
  3. What the PLAGF had attempted on the night of August 29/30 was to send a patrol by roads along the spur of the southern Bank (which is opposite of Finger-4 of the northern bank & offers a commanding view of PLAGF's deployment positions right up to Finger-7) of Panggong Tso to block the IA/ITBP patrolling routes & then establish a permanent presence there to outflank the IA & ITBP posts sited at the top of the spur. The PLAGF's objective was to deny the IA the direct visual observation perspective of the northern bank right up to Finger-7. However, the PLAGF's movements westward in the southern bank's spurs were pre-empted & interdicted by the ITBP & IA. The PLAGF has had a road there in existence & it is connected to the Garrison Administrative Centre located at the western end of the Spanggur Tso Lake, which lies to the east of the Chushul/Moldo BMH.

    ReplyDelete
  4. In-depth article..
    I was about to ask you about the latest chinese attempt then find your initial explanation ...
    It seems that they are eager to grab more land and strategic points..And talks are going to gain nothing ...
    Chinese needs to teach hard lesson both military and politically in global arena..But million dollar question can Indian armed force do that..As 30 years of anti terror operation and depleted old war equipment is nothing close to chinese armed force and massive rocket artillery force..

    https://theprint.in/opinion/indian-armys-orthodox-doctrine-distorts-military-strategy-in-ladakh-type-conflicts-study/492132/

    https://m.thewire.in/article/security/india-china-army-clash-lac-pangong-tso

    ReplyDelete
  5. Hi Prasun

    Whats ur reading of the latest flashpoint on the south bank of Pangong Tso which you have described above.

    1. Is it a Chinese reaction to the sudden realization and chatter in Indian media about a counter-occupation being a viable option for IA - something u've been suggesting for months now.

    2. Is it the Chinese attempt to simply strengthen positions further before winter sets in

    3. Part of a larger operational move - such as a feint for upcoming actions in other theatres like Sikkim or Uttarakhand (i'm asking because the PLA had to have known that the IA presence at Pangong would've been alert and ready)

    4. Or simply frustration on the part of the PLA arising out of just sitting out in the cold open high-altitude terrain for months now while large parts of their country (and quite possibly families) are being ravaged by once in a century floods.

    5. Threats/Warnings to India in light of the upcoming QUAD summit?

    Pls do shed some light on this. Thanks as always.

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  6. Prasun,

    shocking apathy @the least .. is it because of our history of not being a country which invaded others and hence have become passive to a point of being numb wrt geographical ownership.. all countries/cultures having a history of invading others seem to be very aggressive about how much land they hold
    1-will all these be presented to FATF to make a case for blacklisting? will it be enuff to compel/force those who decide ?
    2- P75I gaining momentum?
    3- new confrontation @pangong lake?
    4- wots wrong with the people of this country ????https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/chandigarh/akal-takht-to-honour-one-of-the-five-who-hijacked-indian-airlines-plane-to-lahore-6575484/#:~:text=The%20Akal%20Takht%2C%20the%20highest,Lahore%20on%20September%2029%2C%201981. ....

    ReplyDelete
  7. 5- Will this amke any diff ? guess china has been supplying images since a long time .. http://www.indiandefensenews.in/2020/08/eye-on-j-pakistan-buys-chinas-jilin-1.html
    6- Shouldnt the IA have captured the PLAGF patrol and used them as a bargaining chip & also embrass the chinese?

    ReplyDelete
  8. Dear Prasun

    The Link for Norad centre in Mountain Cheyenne was really good and informative. It is truly an civil engineering marvel and for it to be done in 1960s and just in five years. Truly Mind blowing. Now for the questions:

    1. For What KT or MT payload Nuclear Bomb can the NORAD Withstand if not directly hit?

    2. Where do you think it would be an ideal location or mountain where we can built something similar? Do we have any plan to do so? Just as in the cold war threats us faced we have twice the threat ( Pakistan & China ) who are nuclear powers and our neighbors which brings me to the second question.

    2. Even after building in a mountain and taking into the account for EMP, Heat and seismic parameter along with strengthening the weak points, it cannot sustain a direct hit. As in the video they consider the missile will not to have a low CEP ( I guess in the 60s the missile tech was less advanced and also the distance between USSR & USA based on the guidance tech). So is it worth to make such a base because current missile CEP for both are neighbors are decent,the distance also comparatively low and of course the guidance network is better than 60s USSR ICBMs?

    Anyhow Thanks for the link, it was really an interesting and informative video since i am also in the civil field.

    Regards

    Remo

    ReplyDelete
  9. Hi Prasun,

    According to our great scoop master Ajai Shukla, PLAGF already controlled Green Top Finger 4 and now "occupies Helmet Top, as well as a nearby feature called Black Top, both of which are on the Indian side of the LAC. From here, Chinese soldiers can observe and track Indian movements across the Pangong lake and as far away as India’s tactically vital Chushul garrison".

    Dunno how true, but his article seemed more political then objective.

    Then again, he is crying wolf since May, so who knows. It's getting tiring, IA should now do something and government must come out with details, else fake speculative news will rule the day.

    Regards,
    Srinivasa Nanduri

    ReplyDelete
  10. People claiming that IA/SFF have captured dominating heights upto 4km inside Chinese side of LAC. Some saying 20+ PLA POWs/casualties, reports of shots being fired at that sight also coming, request you to clear the picture with True News & tell us about current situation...

    ReplyDelete
  11. Killer instinct is missing from the Indian side whether be it Politicians or Armed forces. They simply lack common sense and vision. Politicians answerable during their ruling tenure and leadership of Armed forces too created an alibi called the shortage of war wastage reserve. All these are amply clear from your reply to "To SANJAY:" in the last thread.
    Done matter closed.
    Could you explain without possessing overwhelming capacity, how come PLA is dictating terms on everything regarding India?

    Don't you get frustrated by seeing this situation?

    ReplyDelete
  12. Sir shukla went on to claim we have "lost" helmet and black and black top? He is the only one.
    So now we hold these 5 points after pushing them off and retaliatory capturing?

    ReplyDelete
  13. To ASD, BUDDHA, KIDDO, JUST_CURIOUS, ASHISH GAUTAM & DASHU: Back in early May when the PLAGF advanced up to Finger-4 at the Lake’s northern Bank, the logic of pre-emption had then dictated that the IA & ITBP conduct a parallel movement eastwards on the Lake’s southern bank & another such move along the northern bank of the Spanggur Tso Lake that lies below Panggong Tso Lake. But this did not happen due to the successive Govts of India’s institutional reliance on the MEA & its infamous China Study Group (CSG) to totally rule out all such pre-emption tactics of India’s armed forces because both the MEA & CSG had become mental prisoners of their own words, i.e. the various agreements on CBMs inked between 1993 & 2013 would be enough to resolve all bilateral disputes. Consequently, it took a bloody mortal combat on June 15 at the Galwan River-Valley to wake the Govt of India out of decades of slumber & subsequently the IA’s ground commanders were given full authority to respond to fluid tactical situations. And this is exactly what happened on the night of August 29/30, when the PLAGF sent a reinforced recce/scout team at nighttime to occupy the dominating heights of Thakung (33 39 44.39 N, 78 43 45.79 E), Helmet Top (33 39 38.55 N, 78 44 27.09 E), Point 5167 (33 37 20.62 N, 78 43 1.25 E), Bump (33 37 26.85 N, 78 45 30.16 E) & Black Top (33 37 39.93 N, 78 46 51.60 E) located south of the Panggong Tso Lake’s southern bank, & also to lay anti-personnel mines in those areas. Recce/scout elements of the Special frontier Force Vikas Battalions (who are tasked specially for building high-altitude military structures & manning them) alerted the nearby IA & ITBP garrisons, which in turn quickly reached the sites & blocked any further advance by the PLAGF’s recce/scout team & the latter had to turn back & leave.

    I have uploaded above a map showing all the dispositions & features, which clearly indicate that the PLAGF is now also eyeing occupation of the two hilltops (Magar Hill & Gurung Hill) through which the Spanggur Gap flows westwards towards Chushul. These two hills were always in India’s possession & were vacated only during the 1962 war as part of an organised retreat. Therefore, after the war had ended & the PLAGF had withdrawn from those areas, nobody except the CSG’s illogical directives on the patrolling limits has so far prevented the IA from reoccupying those hilltops. Now, since China has already proven its intention of not abiding by any of the CBMs that were agreed upon in 1996, the IA is now free to reoccupy all those hilltops to the south of Panggong Tso & west of Spanggur Tso that it had possession of back in 1962. But make no mistake, for the PLAGF still harbours hopes of sitting atop both Magar Hill & Gurung Hill before the end of this November.

    And here’s a video-clip of the strategic importance of the Spanggur Gap & these two hilltops WRT the defence of Chushul:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9bS4MYHw8Ns&t=45s

    To ASD: Final irrefutable evidence of the number of PLAGF soldiers killed on the night of June 15 at the Galwan River-Valley:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oJUjhNDZHko
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1DllKIp9J9E
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NKuPtagHKjs

    And this is the burial site: Kangxiwa: 36 13 2.71 N, 78 45 23.16 E

    To BUDDHA: Data on the 3rd highway now under construction in Ladakh:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KYoI2EgsT_g

    Have also uploaded above slides of the latest dispositions of both the IA/ITBP & PLAGF in the Depsang Plains.

    To REMO: VMT. Such an installation can be built into any natural mountain formation made of granite rock. Foothills of the Shivalik mountain range would be ideal. Such man-made structure is able to withstand a pressure of 10,000 lbs per square inch (in comparison, a human bone breaks when subjected to a pressure of 5 lbs per square inch. The only such hardened underground infrastructure now being built in India is under the IN's Project Varsha down south.

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  14. Prasunda,
    That Ajai Shukla is saying "Sources say, the PLA now occupies Helmet Top, as well as a nearby feature called Black Top, both of which are on the Indian side of the LAC."

    There seem to be some casualties as well on both sides. Is this trues?

    How does this change the situation.

    Br,
    Glag

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  15. To VSJ & GLAGINYA: GoogleEarth imagery clearly shows that none of those 2 hilltops are accessible by roads, meaning no one had any intention of/reason for staying at those 2 hilltops for prolonged periods. Secondly, the PLAGF came with the intention of occupying those 2 hilltops, but were driven back by the SFF Vikas Battalion. So now it remains to be seen if this Battalion will permanently sit on those 2 hilltops, or will it also westwards withdraw to a distance from which it can maintain 24/7 surveillance over the approach paths to those hilltops that have been built by the PLAGF over the years.

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  16. Any casualties during the recent clashes?? Does india has adequate arty and MBT fire support in this stretch if china crosses threshhold?? One thing for sure china s intention is fluidic and high intensity skirmishes can't be ruled out

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  17. So was Reqin hill/pass PLA camp capture the retaliation ops. What other enemy held locations have been captured in counter ops? VMT

    ReplyDelete
  18. Prasunda,
    1. https://www.anandabazar.com/national/china-blames-india-for-pangong-confrontation-dgtl-1.1197271?ref=home-pq-stry-large-image-1
    Is it true? Does IA really entered and captured few area of chinese influence near chushul?
    2. https://www.defencestar.in/defence-industry/defence-psus/ordnance-factory-tiruchirappalli-unveils-stabilised-remote-controlled-gun/4105/
    How good is it ?
    3. Regarding corporatisation of OFB, MoD asked for consultancy and Delloite & few other firms has responded. How far has the matter been progressed?
    4. It was published in some articles that apart from Sig-716 , all necessary 7.62 x 51mm ammunitions are also being imported. Is it true? if yes, from which firm ?
    5. A price negotiation committee was formed to determine the cost of India made Ak-203. How much progress is achieved ?
    Thanks, Regards.

    ReplyDelete
  19. Dear Prasun

    Read this article after it was referenced in Pravin Sawhney's twitter handle, where he claims to have great respect for this author - Andrew Korybko.

    https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-09-01/More-to-India-s-latest-anti-China-provocation-than-just-territory-Tr16Liuzle/index.html

    Was shocked to see that it was essentially another Global Times type diatribe. Full of GLobal Times signature mix of propaganda, factual misrepresentation/distortion and threats.

    Including Blaming India for crossing the LAC in the last few days and claiming that INdia suffered humiliation after we provoked the Galwan incident, whereas we now know what had actually transpired along the LAC throughout this summer.

    Basically this article couldve just been taken straight from a Global Times "opinion piece". Not to mention CGTN is the media arm of the CCP.

    Do u know this writer? What kind of credibility can we attach to this guy and his opinions? Is he simply towing the official Party line?

    Would really appreciate ur insight on this. Thanks

    ReplyDelete
  20. Dear Prasun,

    Thank you very much for presenting the irrefutable evidence of PLA casualty. When I count them, it's more than 40.

    However, I have a query regarding aggressive posture shown by IA.

    So now where is the situation being driven? Earlier you told that China wanted India to be provoked and attack first so that it can play victim card. Now that IA is foiling the salami slicing of PLA, will China consider the activity of IA as agressive and initiate war.

    Please enlighten.

    ReplyDelete
  21. To AMIT BISWAS & SANGOS: There was never any face-to-face contact between the opposing forces since the IA had already taken up positions on the hilltops leading to the passes & hence the passes had been rendered un-passable. In warfare, no one captures any passes. Instead, only the dominating approaches to the passes are always held or captured. As for the area concerned, the Spanggur Gap leading to Chushul is only 2.5km in width & about 5km in length & only an IDIOT will decided to drive through it with mechanised assets, since the defender, armed with MBTs & field artillery, will find it extremely easy to bottle-up an invading force. It is all explained here by Lt Gen (R) Rakesh Sharma:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1arfl_3ctHI&t=18s

    Therefore, all talk of PLAGF Type 15 MBTs or any other MBT present in that area are all rumours & tantamount to FAKE NEWS.

    To UJJWAL: 1) Since both countries have their own perceptions of the LAC, one cannot pin down any piece of real estate as belonging to either country. This was stated again yesterday by no less a person than China’s Foreign Minister himself. Therefore, he has directly contradicted all that China’s Ministry of National Defense has been claiming. And since China from 2009 onwards has claimed that the entire Ladakh is disputed territory & not a part of India, having any talk about the LAC becomes a futile exercise & thye best option therefore is for either party to occupy all the dominating heights throughout Ladakh & the party that achieves this first will prevail. And that’s exactly why the IA is pro-actively occupying all the hilltops that are considered tactically important for thwarting any ingress by ther PLAGF. Also noteworthy is the total absence of any attack helicopters of the PLAGF in such areas, meaning the PLAGF clearly recognises that it is in a no-win situation & hence has been resorting to mere posturing. 2) LoLz! That news-report begins by claiming that it is being indigenously manufactured, but the last sentence says that “while the gun will be manufactured in Trichy, a contract is placed by Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence on Elbit Systems, Israel for transfer of technology (ToT) for SRCG.”—meaning it just a licenced-assembly endeavour. I had highlighted this procurement here:

    http://trishul-trident.blogspot.com/2018/09/pgms-being-developed-by-drdo.html

    3) It is still another 2 years away from happening. 4) From their US-based & Bulgaria-based OEMs. 5) Everything has been readied & contract signature has already taken place.

    To KIDDO: How can anyone accuse India of provocation when it is China that in 2009 claimed that from that time on Ladakh was no longer a part of India & hence it was disputed territory? So from 1949 till 2009 China considered Ladakh to be part of India & suddently one fine day it reversed its narrative? How can anyone take such a country seriously? Since that is now China’s stand, it is perfectly fine for India to occupy all dominating features throughout Ladakh & if the PLAGF opposdes it & decides to launch frontal assaults, then it is more than welcome to get slaughtered. Didn’t you know that CGTN, Global Times, Xinhua, CCTV & People’s Daily are all owned & controlled by the same state entity of China?

    ReplyDelete
  22. To ASD: The no of graves is more than 40 because it also contains graves of those who had perished earlier when operating under the PLA’s South Xinjiang Military Command. This graveyard is located exactly 6km northeast of the very field training range where the South Xinjiang Military Command had rehearsed for its now-underway faceoffs with India both in 2014 (for the Depsang & Chumar faceoffs) & in 2019. That is the reason that burial site is located in that area & all those who are now claiming this to be FAKE NEWS are, in fact, the very ones spreading disinformation. China will not initiate any military kinetic action on its own for fear of being labelled as the aggressor & that’s why it has not even permitted its attack helicopters to fly over the areas now under its occupation. Instead, only a lot of posturing & propaganda is being resorted to, like this:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DddLU8k144Q

    Meanwhile, a QUAD meeting will be held in delhi soon:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Yzb9QjliE8

    While an India-Russia Naval Exercise in Andaman Sea will be conducted:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fGtCFhupWkk

    The GOC of the IA's 17 MS Corps, Lt Gen. Savneet Singh, is now in Ladakh.

    The US defense Dept's annual report on China's military power is out:

    https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF

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  23. The Special Frontier Force (SFF) was raised on November 14, 1962 seven days before the ceasefire of the 1962 Sino-India war. It was a covert outfit which recruited Tibetans (now it has a mixture of Tibetans and Gorkhas) and initially went by the name of Establishment 22. It was named so because it was raised by Maj Gen Sujan Singh Uban, an Artillery officer who had commanded 22 Mountain Regiment. He, therefore, named the new covert group after his Regiment. Subsequently, the group was renamed as SFF and it now falls under the purview of the Cabinet Secretariat where it is headed by an Inspector General who is an Army officer of the rank of Major General. The units that comprise the SFF are known as Vikas Battalions. Former IA COAS, Gen Dalbir Singh Suhag, held that office at one point while in his service. SFF units are not part of the IA, but they function under operational control of the IA. The units have their own rank structures which have equivalent status with IA ranks. However, they are highly trained special operations forces personnel who can undertake a variety of tasks which would normally be performed by any special forces unit. The SFF units, therefore, function virtually as any other Army unit in operational areas despite having a separate charter and history. They have their own training establishment where the recruits to SFF are imparted special forces training. Incidentally, women soldiers too form a part of SFF units and perform specialised tasks. By late 1963, inter-service rivalry led to severe criticism by the Indian Army. To prove that the SFF's worth, the Inspector General sent 120 men from the SFF for a field exercise, codenamed Garuda, with the IA. The exercise proved to be a dramatic success for the SFF and the IA was now less inclined to criticise the force. In 1964, the SFF led by the Inspector General, began its airborne training at Agra. The SFF then began its own airborne training program at Sarsawa airbase near Saharanpur. By the late 1960s, the SFF was organised into six Battalions for administrative purposes. Each Battalion, consisting of six Companies, was commanded by Tibetan who had a rank equivalent to a Lt Col in the IA. A Tibetan Major or Captain commanded each Company, which was the primary unit used in operations. Females also participated in the force and they were in the Signals and Medical Companies. In 1971, the SFF operated in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) to neutralise Pakistan Army positions and help the IA advance ahead. The operation was code-named ‘OP Mountain Eagle’. They were airlifted into operational areas and infiltrated behind enemy lines to destroy lines of communication of Pakistan Army. They also played a vital role in preventing the escape of Pakistan Army personnel from Bangladesh into Burma (now Myanmar). By one estimate more than 3,000 SFF personnel were used in the covert operations in the eastern theatre of the 1971 war. During the conflict, the SFF lost 52 men, while 500 others were wounded. They also took part in OP MEGHDOOT in 1984 and OP VIJAY in 1999. None of the SFF combatants have ever been decorated with bravery awards, nor have their contributions ever been officially recognized.

    http://www.thetibetpost.com/en/outlook/interviews-and-recap/6563-from-army-barracks-to-hope-cafe-story-of-retired-special-frontier-force-officer

    https://www.dhakatribune.com/opinion/op-ed/2019/12/27/remembering-the-phantoms-of-chittagong

    http://magazines.odisha.gov.in/Orissareview/2016/December/engpdf/89-92.pdf

    ReplyDelete
  24. Prasunji,

    1) I know the range of an air to air missile varies, but what is the range of the meteor missile under ideal conditions (Eg : Amraam 120C7 is reported to have a range of 105km under ideal conditions)?

    2) What is the per plane cost to upgrade a su-30mki to supersukhoi?

    3) Will the rafale, following the India specific enhancements be better than even the upgraded super su-30 mki? If so can you share a few areas in which rafale will be better than super sukhoi?

    4) Will be super su-30 with newer engines be able to supercruise?

    5) Will the rafale be able to supercruise at mach 1.4 with 6 air to air missiles as claimed?

    6) You mentioned that the upgraded spectra on the Indian version of rafale will have high band, mid band and low band jammers, this means that it will be protected from ground based surveillance radars, SAM and aircraft fire control radars and missile radars, right?

    7) Does that mean the rafale will be adequately against almost any type of radar, that it is likely to face in war?

    8) Is the x guard towed decoy comparable to the older ale-50 or the newer ale-55 towed decoy of the US Air force?

    9) Between the f-18 superhornet and the India specific rafale, which is more capable?

    10) How many squadrons of spyder SAMs do the iaf and Indian army have?

    Thanks

    ReplyDelete
  25. Why this Special Frontier Force (SFF) was raised like it is raised? A parallel Army to complement the IA?

    ReplyDelete
  26. Prasunda,

    Is IA taking care to make sure that its deployments are not scattered in penny packets while PLAGF amasses for a decisive strike ?

    Satyaki

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  27. Prasunda,

    One day I was watching one Utube presentation of Mr Pravin Sawhney. After watching that ill informed presentation, I am sure that you will be a much better informed Utube presenter.
    Please start your own Utube channel. We are eagerly waiting.

    Best regards,

    ReplyDelete
  28. By the sound of things SFF is an attempt to copy US Marines or the British/Nz/Aus SAS. Shame that people who actually deliver are never recognised and instead statues of populist leaders get the priority!

    ReplyDelete
  29. To MILLARD KEYES: The SFF is more like the US Marine Force Recon.

    To PARTHASARATHI: LoLz! As I am not a journalist, I do not have a requirement for garnering ‘audio-visual’ exposure. I therefore prefer to stay unseen.

    To SATYAKI: Since the IA has resorted to mirror deployment in Ladakh, it means it has matched the PLAGF’s deployment pattern & content. Hence no asymmetry prevails on the ground. So, by such a definition, the PLAGF too is deployed in penny-packets & so cannot be amassed for any decisive strike anywhere. That in a nutshell is what mirror deployment is all about.

    To DASHU: When it was raised, the idea was to employ the SFF as the eyes & ears of the IA deep inside hostile territory. The SFF was only to be used for intelligence/surveillance/recce (ISR) & not as direct combatants. Similarly, the Special Service Bureau (now known as Shasastra Seema Bal) & the Indo-Tibetan Border Force (ITBF, totally different from ITBP) were raised for tailor-made reqmts. The SSB & ITBF were specialists in creating & maintain border village defence groups in Ladakh & today’s Himachal Pradesh & Uttarakhand. By 2003, when it became amply clear that China was in no mood to agree on a mutually-defined delineation of the LAC & was thus directly violating the clauses of the 1996 agreed-upon CBMs, that was the time that the SFF. SSB & ITBF should have been consolidated into a single formation in order to have more teeth. But Alas! A total lack of appreciation at that time by the country’s political & military decision-makers led to the squandering away of such vital assets, instead of employing them in a strategically focussed manner.

    But this is far more worrying:

    https://indianexpress.com/article/india/rafale-aircraft-indian-air-force-ambala-6579269/

    Back in 1979 when the Jaguar IS had arrived in Ambala, the same problem had then persisted. Looks like for some things, time never passes away, it just stays still. Still remember the Doordarshan programme aired back in 1979 in which Sqn Ldr Mike McMahon, who had just landed after a sortie, had then stated that he narrowly averted a bird-hit while on his final approach to the runway!

    To PRAMODW: 1) Meteor BVRAAM can go up to 150km. 2) About a quarter of its procurement cost. 3) I had mentioned all that in the thread dealing with Rafale Costings. 4) Looks like the AL-41 turbofans will not be procured. 5) Yes, but without the underwing fuel tanks. 6) Yes. 7) Yes. 8) Yes. 9) The Rafale. 10) That figure was mentioned in the thread dealing with EX Gagan Shakti.

    ReplyDelete
  30. Prasun ,

    1-Any reason why are engines being a sticking point in all the upgrade programs? jags earlier now super su30.. if AF 41 is skipped will the upgradebe as useful as touted?? same for upgraded jags how useful will they be if they are grossly underpowered. what is the thought process is there an alternate approach?
    2- any updates on the progress on bramhos ng? there are nes floating about brahmos 2 having zircon engine(i recollect you mentioning that the bramhos 2 will be a version of zircon). The report also quotes rostec head sayng it will have 2 variants one with a speed of mach 5 & the other with mach7 .. upgradable to mach 9 .. can you throw some more light on these
    3-US wants to formalize quad.. Shiv shankar had earlier discreetly mentioned of avoiding the same .. how will this pan out
    4- Czech lawmakers making officl visit to Taiwan.. EU warning China .. while we wait for emperor Xi's permission ... https://theprint.in/world/threats-dont-fit-in-here-german-foreign-minister-warns-china-says-eu-expects-respect/493663/

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  31. What is the status of drdo qrsam?

    ReplyDelete
  32. Sir since China doesn't wanna be look like an agressor do u see any high probability of land capturing by Chinese in any region of LAC?? for swapping purpose... Could be Ladakh, lipulekh, chickens neck, other places too....
    2) someone on twitter named Gaurav Pradhan tweeted this...
    https://twitter.com/OfficeOfDGP/status/1301264630451380225?s=19
    Action at LAC is expected but at Andaman? What u say?

    ReplyDelete
  33. Hi Prasun,

    What are the medium/long term implications of India's capturing of the dominating heights along south Pangantso? what reactions can be expected from China?

    Best Regards
    Raj

    ReplyDelete
  34. Prasunda,

    1) With the PLA knowing our intentions of occupying dominating heights all along the LAC, ca'nt they preempt us as well ?

    2) Would the winter force both sides to pull back? In particular would it force us to leave the dominating heights we now hold ?

    3) Pravin Swahney claims that PLA will repond with cyber warfare, kinetic/non-kinetic ASAT attacks which we cannot respond to, along with Pakistani military action combined with a rising of the Kashmiris. What do you make of this assessment?

    4) Abhijit-Iyer-Mitra claims that a conflict that this could precipitate would ultimately lead to our crushing defeat (in a month or so) after initial successes given our lack of military-industrial strength vis-a-vis China. What leads to such analysis ?

    Kritavarma

    ReplyDelete
  35. To JUST_CURIOUS: 1) Not a sticking point, but rather a waiting point, because India has been told by Russia to wait for the definitive turbofan for the Su-57, which is now being flight-tested & will be available for installation on the Su-30MKIs by the end of next year. 2) BrahMos-NG will be ready for rollout in 2022. Zircon/BrahMos-2 will be available to India in both versions. The anti-ship version will have a top speed of Mach 5 & the land-attack version will have a top speed of Mach 9. 3) The QUAD is already formalised as periodic ministerial-level meetings have already been held over the past 2 years. Now it is all about what aspects of the QUAD will be operatiionalised, i.e. the land, sea & air domains. For starters, it has been agreed that the naval element will be operationalised after India inks the BECA agreement & this then will enable the IOR’s major navies to be networked & functional in a NATO-type operating format.

    To ACID: It has already undergone the first round of user-assisted evaluations & now some user-specified improvements/product optimisation is now being carried out. It should be available for series production by next year-end.

    To ASHISH GAUTAM: 1) The PLAGF is neither trained nor motivated enough for undertaking direct contact fighting in a conventional battlefield setting. And that’s precisely why it lost out to India when it came to securing the dominating heights in the Panggong Tso Lake’s southern bank. Therefore, in the days & weeks to come, one will see the IA occupying more such dominating features all along the LAC. So, in a way, a new LAC will be established, since China has never even bothered to share with anyone what its perception of the LAC is & everytime it has been asked, it only makes claims further westwards, instead of producing maps based on historical, customary & traditional conceptions of its frontiers. So now the Govt of India has decided to call China’s bluff & pay it back in the same coin by pre-emptively occupying all the dominating heights reqd for turning Ladakh into an impregnable fortress. Elsewhere in Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim & Arunachal Pradesh, India already is in possession of all the dominating heights along the Himalayan watershed & hence the PLAGF will find it impossible to even dare to capture such positions by force. Thus, it is at last emerging that the PLA is not a professional national force, but one of ill-trained conscripts who are not at all well-versed in high-altitude plateaux warfare & neither are they motivated enough to lay their life for any particular cause (tyhanks to the one-child policy of China, which discourages everyone from accepting high-rick jobs).

    2) Arey bhai, everyone day it seems India produces a novel ‘bandalbaaz’! If China since 1949 has not yet been able to conquer the islands of Kinmen, Matsu & Pratas in the Taiwan Straits, how the hell can it be expected to conquer any island in the Andaman & Nicobar chain that is tens of hgundreds of miles away???

    Meanwhile, this is the PLAGF's CS/LR35 Sniper Rifle:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r5G1zKAG0F8

    The PLAAF's HQ-16/LY-80E MR-SAM that has been deployed near Lake Maansarovar since June this year:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SqSBep4lyKE

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Pransuda, I am just an enthusiast in defense matter. I have gone through your precious narratives, and it makes sense, for centuries Kailash is part of our tradition, and why it's in China? Second why China has deployed MRSAM https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SqSBep4lyKE ? Practically speaking, will Kailash will be part of India in any future? Since for China Kailash is all about Mansarovar as Kashmir is all about water resource for Pakistan. Neither Pakistan wants Kashmiris without water nor China wants Kailash without Mansarovar.
      Is any other plan regarding the water going on in China's book as we have been taught, many southasian rivers comes from Mansarovar?

      Delete
  36. Dear Sir,

    1) Will newly acquired 21 MiG 29UPGs have Zhuk- AESA Radar, ASTRA BVR-AAM & SDR based Datalinks?

    2)Will there be a fleet wide integration of all the sub-systems mentioned above in MiG 29UPGs?

    3)Is there a possibility of Izdeliye 30 engine on Super Sukhoi?

    4)Will Hal's proposal of Super Sukhkoi be accepted or we will keep on requesting Russia for Super Sukhoi prog?

    5)If HAL's proposal of Super Sukhoi is accepted then the jet will have Uttam AESA Radar, will that pave way for integration of Meteor as this missile was rejected for Tejas Mk1a only bcoz it had Israeli Radar?

    Thanks!
    AMAN

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  37. To RAJ: As I have explained above, a new LAC is now coming into being because previously China had refused to delineate & demarcate the LAC, despite its promise to do so as per the 1996 CBM Agreement inked by both countries. Examples of the new dispositions with eyeball-to-eyeball contact can be seen in the northern bank of Panggong Tso Lake & I've uploaded 4 slides above showing the dispositions.

    To KRITAVARMA: 1) No, the PLA can’t as of now because the IA has had plenty of time between mid-May & now to induct more than enough reinforcements into the theatre (including the HQ of XVII MSC & its GOC into Leh) & hence the PLA does tht have the element of surprise & initiative anymore. In fact, on the night of August 29/30, there was a 3-hour period that witnessed jostling & unarmed combat & that is what led to the 2 SFF casualties. Simply put, the PLAGF has ZERO expertise in both high-altitude mountain warfare & high-altitude plateau warfare & therefore in terms of human resources, cannot match the IA in any respect, which is exactly what had happened 34 years ago in Sumdorong Chu when the IA’s OP FALCON was put into effect. 2) No, the dominating heights will all be manned because now new-generation habitats are available for accommodating personnel at such forbidding heights. 3) Don’t you think such attacks would already have been mounted by now. Anyway, let us extend the benefit of doubt & see whether or not such attacks take place this month, next month or after that. That will once & for all prove who’s telling the truth & who’s spreading conspiracy theories. I for one have assessed that the PLASSF’s cyber warfare capabilities are terribly exaggerated & in reality, the PLASSF had only had some major successes in cyber espionage, not cyber warfare. These are 2 totally different domains & hence it does not mean that since one is good in one domain, it also has to be good in another. It is such find of assumptions that end up as being the mother of all fuck-ups. 4) Only suppositions like COULD, MAYBE, PERHAPS, LIKELY can emanate from such thoroughbred ARSEHOLES. Hence, it is far better to go by assessments made by domain experts who always tend to go by objective ground realities, rather than suck up to assumptive predictions made by ARESHOLES of the type you’ve named.

    BTW, the PM's Twitter account being hacked was not the handiwork of the PLASSF.

    ReplyDelete
  38. प्रसुन da,

    Thanks for your time and effort as always.

    This 'Dr.' Manoj Joshi is a classic example of subversive journalism in my opinion. He is probably on the payroll of CPC and part of the remainder 0.5 front faced by India.

    While I think he would be under the radar of our agencies, if you come to the same conclusion basis your reading /viewing of his work, would request you to please flag him to any relevant person in your contact. Couple examples of his anti india and pro China narrative:

    https://youtu.be/vymEDtrKf0w

    https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/india-china-border-clash-ladakh-pangong-lake-indian-army-special-frontier-force-chinese-army

    Thanks

    ReplyDelete
  39. Hello sir.

    1) Does Corps HQ contain certain formations on its own independent of it's divisions otherwise why move? Or did they rale over new inductions?
    2) June era articles stated of extra reinforcements as 1 div which was a theater reserve and 1 picked off LOC. So where is the lone raised MSC div headed? :)
    3) What will be the final sukhoi squadron tally? Numbers go from 13/14.5/15
    4) Would there be adequate strength available despite of LAC posture to take a tour of GB once November comes and LAC freezes earlier?

    Thanks.

    ReplyDelete
  40. Hi prasoon..as you are mentioning that a new LAC is coming up, does that imply in this new lac the areas beyond finger point 4 would go to china or do you envisage this being taken back eventually by india either theough force or attrition of chinese troops due to.weather etc.. regards kunal

    ReplyDelete
  41. How can Iyer-Mitra be a thoroughbred? It sounds like a cocktail to me...a bitsa perhaps.

    ReplyDelete
  42. Prasun,

    1- does that mean that the bramhos 2 & ng are the same??
    2- 2 SFF casualties on 20/30 aug .. did the Chinese also suffer losses?
    3- new turbofan for su 57.. wouldnt it be a risk to opt for an unproven engine than go for Af41/s

    ReplyDelete
  43. Hi Prasun da,

    Why are LCA’s deployed near Indo-pak border? How is the elta radar fitted into them compare to f-16 block 52 AN/APG-68 radar? do you think Navy will go with F-18’s instead of Mig 29k for INS viraat?

    ReplyDelete
  44. Prasunda,

    VMT. What about the special forces elements of the PLAGF in theatre? Could'nt they spring a surprise in one or two places, particularly if we get used to the pattern of prevailing without too much difficulty in occupying the heights we want to ?

    Kritavarma

    ReplyDelete
  45. Hello sir.Back after many days.Only one question.

    Isn't this Pentagon report very concerning? One part of this report says that China has achieved parity with or exceeded the US in several military modernization areas .And those areas are listed in this tweet. https://twitter.com/WarHorizon/status/1301251693703827459

    ReplyDelete
  46. Hi Prasun

    Today i will have to ask the same question asked many times in this blog about Tejas MK1 & MK1A, but i just needed some clarity because i just went through too much info and can't make head or tails about it.

    1. Tejas MK1 (Both IOC & FOC) lacks EW Suite,BVR with more range,AESA Radar(Has ELM 2032) and no air to air refueling pod and of course the autocannon. Is there any other thing i am missing? Even though Tejas has better maneuverability,Stealth,Radar, Weapon Load than Mig 21 bison they are almost in the same boat or generation because of the lack of the above items especially EW suite and of course the internal gun. I am right about this? Sorry if it is stupid question but just need to know. I know i am comparing a 60s era plane to Tejas but that it is how it is I guess.

    2. Can we fix the shortfalls of tejas MK1 to make it more effective like external EW Suite (can it be integrated with the existing system and some eg.), Astra induction (can it be integrated with the existing system or need structural up gradation or just software), the autocannon i don't know if it possible and finally external fuel tank to increase combat range if it is possible. I think with these changes we can get an early 4th gen platform which is good for CAP Missions and support roles and part of the strike package at the forward bases near pakistan border. I could be wrong please correct me if I am wrong.

    3. What is the Weapons Payload and range of Tejas MK1 with the drop tanks and i believe for combat you will have to drop it due to drag so i guess CAP mission would be without it. What would be the range without the drop tank?

    4. Tejas MK1A will have AESA radar, EW Suite , BVR & aerial refueling capability but without a gun. I am right ? What EW Suite did the go for,is it Mayawi or something else? Is it internal one or external addon?

    5.Will this Tejas MK1A be a true 4.5 gen aircraft which can face anything PAF and PLAAF throw at us. I know it wouldnt be a true multirole fighter since it lacks in range,payload and engine power but for CAP and support roles. Couldn't the Tejas MK1A actually replace the Mig 21 fleet? of course i forgot about the autcannon, i meant with the gun.

    Thank you for your patience and forgive my ignorance if showed any.

    Regards

    Remo

    ReplyDelete
  47. Prasunda,

    VMT for your last reply.

    1. A few days ago, in a previous thread, you mentioned that Indian govt is figuring the nature of the beast. So, with the current actions am I suppose to make that nature of the beast is figured out finally.

    2. Did MEA and its dysfunctional CSG (China Study Group) finally gave some space to Indian Army so that this operation was carried out successfully. Or did Modi have finally started lending his ears in the correct direction to CDS General Rawat. How did MEA took this decision of checkmating China and didn't they made all the wrong noises in the CCS when Modi gave go ahead to Indian Army plans.

    3. For once, I am seeing MEA, Government and Indian Army on the same page. App ban came pretty fast in 48-72 hours after we occupied heights. Who is behind all this coordination.

    4. Chinese Ambassador to India is unusually silent after this incident. He just released one incident through Chinese embassy and then is keeping quiet as far as I am able to make from his twitter timeline. Your thoughts please.

    5. With Wang Li finally mentioning LAC on European soil, is it that China wanted the new LAC emerge so that they now are clear about Indian positions and accordingly make plans to protect the Karakoram Highway and has made clear statement of intent to protect CPEC at all cost.

    6. Now that CPEC is mentioned, what will be the effect of bribery cases which Punjab govt of Pak, led by Sharif's brother, were filed against Chinese companies and Chinese are very angry. Will this now result again in a showdown in Military and Civil govt in Pakistan.

    7. Finally, is the reality drawing on Pakistan that they have been taken for a ride through CPEC and Pak army is also having second thoughts about putting all eggs in one basket.

    8. What will now happen at FATF meeting. Will it be black list for Pakistan or China will play a lead role in keeping Pakistan off black list. Will Americans and Europeans grant concessions to Pak in FATF.

    Hope you keep going well and enlighten us as always. Best wishes to you and your family.

    Regards,

    ReplyDelete
  48. Sir, I have been following your blog for more than 10 years now but sometimes you really confuse me. Till about 2 months back you were giving a very grim picture if the situation but now after reading your reply to Kiddo and Ashish Gautam you are sounding very confident that India now has the upper hand. Since now there is no real LCA, both parties are free to occupy heights to dominate the other. If Indian army can do it, so can PLA. Let us not underestimate the enemy. Lets hope India gains the upper hand in other sectors in Ladakh too.

    ReplyDelete
  49. Prasunji,

    1) Does the mig29upg have the d-29 EW suite or the vergilius suite?

    2) You mentioned that spectra will be upgraded to provide low band jamming, but rafale does not have wing tip jammers for that purpose. Will they be added later or is there any other way?

    3) The spectra has only 2 IR MAWS on the vertical tail, will that provide 360 degree protection? Isn't it's view blocked by aircraft body below?

    4) Since India now has to deal with china's formidable air defences, isn't it important for India to possess dedicated EW aircraft like prowlers or growlers to overcome China's powerful radars?

    5) Will equipping our aircraft will Rafael Skyshield provide them enough power to jam pak and Chinese radars?

    6) Is it true that India specific enhancements will be added only after last rafale has landed?

    7) If so how long after last rafale has arrived will it take for all rafales to get the India specific enhancements?

    8) Between the spectra and the Israeli el/l 8222 jamming pods which has better jamming capabilities and by how much?

    9) Aside for the meteor, mica and scalp, and alarm missiles have any other PGMs been contracted or are in the pipeline for rafale?

    Thanks

    ReplyDelete
  50. To ANMOL CHAUDHARY: One cannot fault anyone for his/her opinions. Nor should terms like sedition or subversion be applicable in any independent country. I have not come across anything objectionable in the links that you’ve highlighted.

    To VSJ: 1) The principal job of a Corps is battlefield coordination between its Divisional fighting-arms & hence the GOC of any Corps is mainly concerned with monitoring the unfolding battles & reinforcing success while avoiding defeats. 2) In Ladakh one cannot expect just one Corps Commander (the XIV GOC) to exercise control over the entire area of Ladakh. Hence a second Corps Commander is reqd to exercise control over the equivalent of 3 extra Divisions that have been inducted into Ladakh. 3) The final fleet strength will be 350. 4) No.

    To UNKNOWN/KUNAL: It will be possible to take back all the occupied areas once adequate superiority in land-based & air-delivered firepower is available in that theatre. Because, like I had stated before, Ladakh just cannot be captured by just 1 PLAGF Mechanised Division & 1 Motorised Division. The PLAGF too will require far more firepower & mass to stage a successful offensive & I don’t see from where the PLSAGF will be able to bring in the additional forces reqd.

    To JUST-CURIOUS: 1) of course not. The BrahMos-NG will be a scaled-down version of the existing BrahMos-1 so that it can be fired from much smaller FAC-Ms as well as MRCAs like the Tejas Mk.1A, MiG-29K & MiG-29UPG & the MWF. 2) Yes they did too. 3) The new turbofan has been undergoing flight-tests for the past 1 year & when it becomes available, it will be a proven & mature solution.

    To AUTHOR: The EL/M-2032 is a monopulse MMR whereas the APG-68 MMR isn’t. The Tejas Mk.1s will be superior to the PAF’s F-7s & Mirage-2/5s. No other MRCA except the MiG-29Ks will go on board both INS Vikramaditya & IAC-1.

    To ARUN: 1) yes, the PLAN is larger than the USN, but that does not mean that all PLA warships are technologically on par or are superior to those of the USN. 2) The PRC has a greater quantum of land-based BMs & CMs simply because the PLAAF does not have the kind of deep-strike interdictor that others have. 3) China’s so-called Integrated Air-Defence System is highly compartmentalised & hence elements of it under the PLAGF & PLAAF are not fully integrated.

    ReplyDelete
  51. To REMO: All those issues were discussed extensively in threads dealing with the Tejas-AF Mk.2 & the MWF.

    To ANIONE: 1) It was figured out long time ago, but it wasn;lt admitted to. 2) Sometimes it helps when there is only 1 option left on the table & in this case, this is what it was all about. 3) It is the combination of the PMO & the HQ IDS & the Chiefs of Staffg Committee. 4) He is still awaiting instructions from his superiors in Beijing, who themselves are now on the backfoot. 5) The Chinese FM is as confused as the others in Beijing & on one hand they say that the PLA has never violated the LAC & on the other hand they have been saying since 2009 that Ladakh is not part of India & hence it began issuing stapled visas to Ladakh’s residents. So, if Ladakh is not a part of India, then why has China been saying that India violated the LAC? Shouldn’t China say that the mere presence of India’s armed forces inside Ladakh is a wrong act? Hence, there are no clear answers emerging from China because of the inherent contradictions in their stated narratives from time to time. 6, 7 & 8) By the end of this month itself, something decisive will happen WRT Pakistan’s economy, which will further add to China’s woes.

    To AYUSH: This not a PUBG game that has constant updates. The situation is still grim & till this November, large-scale military movements will very much be possible & hence one mere pro-active action does not mean the end of the story. A few more such steps will be reqd to be undertaken as well & hence it is highly premature to start counting one’s chickens. Does the PLAGF have any training institution where high-altitude mountaineering skills or high-altitude plateau warfare training is imparted? If the answer is NO, then it will be stupid to ASSUME that the PLAGF is able to occupoy high-altitude mountain peaks.

    To PRAMODW: 1) It is the D-29 EW suite that uses certain imported elements of the Virgilius suite. 2) The low-band jammers are internally mounted. 3) There are MAWS sensors on the sides of the cockpit section too. 4) Why require jammers if DEW missiles are available for generating EMPs to temporarily shut down all kinds of RF transmitters? 5) There’s no need for such escort jamming pods for reasons I had explained before, i.e. low-flying aircraft are not at all exposed to any ground-based low-band long-range airspace surveillance radars. 6 & 7) Such enhancements are not like accessories mounted on automobiles. Each & every enhancement in any aircraft—civil or military—has to undergo certification-related flight-tests before being delivered to a customer. 8) Both are equally good & if there’s available internal space, the the EL/L-8222 can also be carried internally, as is the case with some of the IAF’s Jaguar IS platforms. 9) Spice-2000.

    ReplyDelete