If
anyone wants to go deep into why the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) fleet of
multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) was sub-optimally utilised on the morning of
February 27, 2019 over the skies of Jammu & Kashmir, then the following
details need to be taken into account.
MiG-21 Bison Upgrade Project Left Incomplete
To improve the beyond-visual-range (BVR)
capability of its MiG-21bis light-MRCAs, the IAF in 1995 selected the Phazotron
NIIR-developed Kopyo (Spear) multi-mode monopulse pulse-Doppler radar, which
was to be fitted on to each of the 125 MiG-21bis at a cost of US$840,000 (Rs.2.89
crore) per unit. The Kopyo was to be used in both the air-defence and ground-attack
role for guiding air-to-air missiles and air-to-ground precision-guided weapons.
A CAG audit noticed conducted in November 2009 revealed that since its induction,
the performance of the Kopyo had not been satisfactory due to various
inadequacies in the air-to-ground range (AGR) mode. One of the reasons for the
poor performance was the software, which was still under
development/modification as of July 2009. The IAF stated in November 2010 that
specialists from Phazotron NIIR were sent in November 2010 to India to load new
applications software to resolve the inaccuracies in AGR mode. However, there
was no improvement in the AGR mode further.
The audit also noticed from the
report submitted by the IAF’s South-Western Air Command in December 2010 that
missile integration checks were successfully completed only in December 2010. India’s
Ministry of Defence (MoD) stated in November 2012 that AGR mode did remain
inconsistent and inaccurate, but the BVR capability of an aircraft pertains to
its capability to fire air-to-air missiles. The error in accuracy of AGR mode
thus affected the delivery of air-to-ground weapons only and did not affect the
BVR capability of the upgraded MiG-21 Bison fleet. The MoD also stated that
further trials did not result in any significant inputs that could improve the
AGR mode further. The MoD’s contention was in conflict with its reply on sub
optimal performance of radar sub-assemblies and non-integration check of Vympel
R-77/RVV-AE BVRAAMs till July 2009, which affected the MiG-21 Bison’s BVR
capability during this period and expiry of life of several R-77s in December
2010.
The self-protection jammer (SPJ) is a
critical electronic warfare (EW) equipment of any combat aircraft that
contributes to the success of a mission. The MoD in February 1996 had procured
92 EL/L-8222 SPJ pods (82 for the IAF and 10 for the Indian Navy) from Israel
Aerospace Industries’ ELTA Systems. Out of the 82 pods, 50 costing Rs.152 crore
were for the MiG-21 Bisons, which were to be delivered between December 1997
and July 1999. However, these were actually delivered between August 2000 and
December 2004. It was observed in February 2011 that during series upgradation,
all the 125 MiG-21bis were modified for carriage of SPJ pods. However, only 50
SPJ pods were procured. A case was initiated by IAF HQ in July 2005 to procure an
additional 36 SPJ pods for the MiG-21 Bisons to cater to 70% of the MiG-21
Bison fleet and the approval of the MoD’s Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) was
obtained in January 2006. However, the proposal for procurement of additional
SPJ pods was not processed in view of the limited residual life of the aircraft.
Thus, only 43% of the MiG-21 Bison fleet was equipped with SPJ pods, leaving
the remaining aircraft vulnerable to detection by hostile airborne multi-mode radars,
thereby affecting the operational capability of IAF.
What also remains unexplained is why
were multi-purpose SPJ pods (that can also accommodate guided-missiles and
precision-guided weapons under them) available from OEMs like SaabTech of
Sweden and TERMA of Denmark were never considered for procurement. Such
fitments, interestingly, were available since the mid-1990s for light-MRCAs
like Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen.
As per the contract of March 1996, there
was a provision for Transfer-of-Technology (ToT) for manufacture and
repair/overhaul of the MiG-21 Bisons and their sub-systems by the MoD-owned
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL). However, ToT could not materialise in spite of
the IAF’s efforts, as well as those of MoD and HAL. Hence, IAF HQ directed HAL in
May 2003 not to pursue the ToT for manufacture of the aggregates and suggested
to establish diagnostic and repair/overhaul facilities for the Kopyo radars and
other sub-systems of the MiG-21 Bison on a fast-track basis by January 2008. A
CAG audit observed in April 2010 that though the repair facilities for Kopyo
had been established by August 2008, these facilities by March 2009 needed further
instrumentation for diagnosis and testing at an additional estimated cost of Rs.4.50
crore by HAL. Further, the full complement of training on repair of LRUs of the
Kopyo could not be imparted by the OEM specialists due to non-availability of
sufficient population of Cat ‘D’ repairable items, since most of the repairable
items had been sent to Phazotron NIIR for repairs. Hence, additional training
was required to be imparted to HAL personnel by deputation from Phazotron NIIR
at an estimated cost of Rs.1.80 crore.
The audit also observed by April 2010
that repair and overhaul facilities for the Kopyo set up by HAL strictly fell under the category
of second-line repair, which was also being established as intermediate-level
facilities in all the MiG-21 Bison operating squadrons, and full-fledged depot-level facilities had
not been set up by HAL. In April 2010, IAF HQ stated that setting up of
depot-level maintenance/repair/overhaul (MRO) facilities had not been
considered economically viable since the present facilities were being used
only for the MiG-21 Bisons, and the same would not be useful after withdrawal
of these aircraft from service. The calendar life of the MiG-21 Bisons had been
extended by March 2010 to up to 40 years. Due to non-availability of complete
MRO facilities, 297 LRUs of the MiG-21 Bisons and 564 LRUs of the MiG-21bis were
offloaded to the Russian OEMs for repair/overhaul during the period from April
2007 to November 2009, against a long=term repair agreement (LTRA) concluded in
April 2007 by HAL with the Russian OEMs involving a total repair cost of
US$976,593.52 (Rs.4.33 crore). The MoD stated in November 2012 that efforts
made to set up MRO facilities for components of the Kopyo MMR had not been
successful and instead of setting up full MRO facilities, only diagnostic and
repair facilities were proposed for HAL. The MoD further stated (November 2012
and March 2014) that in the absence of MRO facilities, all LRUs and components
had to be sent to various Russian OEMs for repairs.
MiG-29UPG Upgrade Project Left Incomplete
In March 2008, IAF HQ inked a contract
with Russia’s RAC-MiG for upgradation and life-extension of 63 MiG-29B-12 air
superiority combat aircraft. The contract was to be carried out in two stages i.e. (a) design and development (D &
D) work in two years (2008-2010) on six aircraft in Russia and (b) series-upgrade
of the remaining 57 aircraft in India (2010-2014). All of these were to be fitted
with the D-29 EW suite, each of which comprises a Unified Receiver Exciter
Processor (UREP) that encompasses a digital radar warning receiver (RWR),
electronic support measures (ESM) and electronic countermeasures (ECM)
elements, along with the ELT-568 self-protection jammer transceivers imported
from Italy-based Elettronica.
Based on ASORs prepared by IAF HQ in October 2006
for an integrated EW suite for fitment on the IAF’s fleet of MiG-29B-12s, the
DRDO’s Bengaluru-based Defence Avionics Research Establishment (DARE) proposed
in October 2007 the joint development of a state-of-art EW suite (D-29) with
Elisra of Israel. In March 2010 the MoD sanctioned this project to DARE under
Mission Mode (MM) for design and development of the D-29 at a cost of Rs.168.85
crore with a PDC of 33 months (December 2012). Accordingly, DARE in April 2010
signed a tripartite agreement with Israel’s Ministry of Defence and Elisra at a
cost of US$26 million (Rs.115.57 crore) with a PDC of 28 months (by August 2012).
Meanwhile, based on another MoD sanction
in March 2009, DARE signed a contract with RAC-MiG for the structural
modification of six MiG-29B-12s (which were already in RAC-MiG’s possession for
upgradation) for fitment of the proposed D-29 suite at a total cost of US$14.25
million (Rs.74.10 crore) with a PDC of 20 months (November 2010). During
structural modifications, RAC-MiG encountered issues related to positioning and
installation of the D-29’s LRUs, for which DARE in June 2011 suggested certain
additional structural modifications on the six MiG-29 airframes.
However, three
MiG-29UPGs after upgradation were delivered in December 2012 to the IAF by
RAC-MiG (without the DARE-specified additional modifications) for facilitating the
training of IAF pilots on the upgraded aircraft. The D-29 was fully developed
by DARE in March 2013 but it could not be evaluated on the first three MiG-29UPGs
received in India without the additional modifications, which was necessary to
carry out testing of the D-29 suite. The remaining three aircraft, after
upgradation and structural modifications (including additional modification)
for fitment of the D-29 suite were received in India only in December 2013 due
to delays by RAC-MiG.
Meanwhile, based on another MoD sanction
in March 2009, DARE signed a contract with RAC-MiG for the structural
modification of six MiG-29B-12s (which were already in RAC-MiG’s possession for
upgradation) for fitment of the proposed D-29 suite at a total cost of US$14.25
million (Rs.74.10 crore) with a PDC of 20 months (November 2010). During
structural modifications, RAC-MiG encountered issues related to positioning and
installation of the D-29’s LRUs, for which DARE in June 2011 suggested certain
additional structural modifications on the six MiG-29 airframes. However, three
MiG-29UPGs after upgradation were delivered in December 2012 to the IAF by
RAC-MiG (without the DARE-specified additional modifications) for facilitating the
training of IAF pilots on the upgraded aircraft.
The D-29 was fully developed
by DARE in March 2013 but it could not be evaluated on the first three MiG-29UPGs
received in India without the additional modifications, which was necessary to
carry out testing of the D-29 suite. The remaining three aircraft, after
upgradation and structural modifications (including additional modification)
for fitment of the D-29 suite were received in India only in December 2013 due
to delays by RAC-MiG. The evaluation of the D-29 was further held up till
October 2014 since the IAF used the upgraded MiG-29UPGs for testing various other
mission-specific systems that were fitted by RAC-MiG for upgrading the
aircraft. Thus, there was lack of synchronisation of upgradation with
structural modifications (including additional modification) of the IAF’s fleet
of MiG-29B-12s and development of the D-29 suite. And most importantly, no
attempt was made to install any Missile Approach Warning System (MAWS) suites on
the MiG-29UPGs, despite the IAF’s show of deep interest in such fitments by as
early as 2006. By March 2015,
DARE had spent Rs.199.82 crore on the development of the D-29 suite and
structural modifications of the MiG-29B-12s.
How DRDO’s DARE Totally Screwed Up ‘Desi’ MAWS R
& D Effort for Super Su-30MKI
MAWS suite installation is essential for
all combat and combat-support platforms to warn pilots of incoming guided-missile
attacks. The MoD’s DAC in September 2004 accorded clearance for installation of
MAWS in an 100 aircraft (both fixed-wing and rotary-wing). Hence, DARE in
January 2005 proposed to IAF HQ a project to design and develop dual-colour
(DC) infra-red/ultra-violet MAWS, jointly with the Israel’s Ministry of Defence
and Elisra. In July 2006 IAF HQ accepted the proposal and in March 2008 agreed
to install DC-MAWS on all its Su-30MKI Heavy-MRCAs and projected an initial
requirement of 50 DC-MAWS suites. In November 2008, the MoD accorded financial
sanction for the development and integration of DC-MAWS on Su-30MKIs by DARE at
a total cost of Rs.193 crore (including a foreign exchange component of Rs. 172
crore), with a PDC of 55 months (June 2013) under MM category. On July 17,
2006, Cassidian, the defence and security
division of European EADS and the Indian This MoD move came despite the DARE
signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Cassidian of Germany on the
joint development of an initial 36 MAWS suites for both fixed-wing and rotary-winged
aircraft of the IAF and Indian Army Aviation Corps that made use of IR/UV
sensors of the MILDS AN/AAR-60, with a planned initial operational capability
for 2007. The agreement also included the co-production of these suites by the
MoD-owned Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL).
In December 2008, DARE signed a
tripartite US$37 million (Rs.148 crore) contract with Israel’s MoD and Elisra
(now owned by Elbit Systems) for the joint development of DC-MAWS suite with a projected
PDC of 48 months (December 2012). The scope of contract inter-alia included
delivery of six infra-red sensors for one MAWS suite. HAL was selected by both
the IAF and DARE as the nodal agency for structural modification of Su-30MKI
airframes for integration of the MAWS suite. Subsequently, DARE found the
infra-red sensors (that make up the PAWS suite) submitted by Elisra to be heavier
and bigger in dimension (24cm in height and 4kg in weight) and hence, in May
2009 informed Elisra that the sensors might not be accepted for fitment on the
Su-30MKIs as it would cause serious restriction on their flight envelopes. IAF
HQ too expressed the same view in March 2010.
However, Elisra in June 2010 expressed
its inability to make any significant weight reduction. Installation of six
infra-red sensors on a Su-30MKI was not cleared in December 2012 by an Expert
Committee (EC) at locations specified by DARE, as it would involve cutting the
aircraft’s internal structure and the destruction of internal thermal masking coatings.
Subsequently, the EC in January 2013 cleared the installation of only four infra-red
sensors with a limitation of only 15-degree angle-of-attack (as against the
Su-30MKI’s capability of 90 degrees). In February 2013, DARE approached the Su-30MKI’s
OEM (OKB Sukhoi and IRKUT Corp) for expert review and clearance of the proposal for aircraft
modification to integrate DC-MAWS sensors. In May 2013 the OEM clarified that
the integration of DC MAWS sensors will significantly worsen the Su-30MKI’s flight
performance since the DARE-recommended installation locations were highly
sub-optimal.
The project cost was subsequently enhanced by December 2011 to Rs.228.80
crore due to exchange rate variation (ERV), and was further enhanced by July
2013 to Rs.273.80 crore. The MoD also extended in July 2013 the PDC of the
project by 24 months (up to June 2015). A CAG audit in October 2014 observed that
though increase in the weight of the DC-sensors was a cause of concern to IAF HQ
as well as DARE, the sensors (four for each aircraft, instead of the originally
envisaged six) were accepted with their present weights and with this, the possibility
of adverse effects on the Su-30MKI’s flight envelope remained.
In response to audit observations
regarding delays in the development of the DC-MAWS suite and its operational
impact, DARE in January 2015 agreed that the performance parameters of the
DC-MAWS on Su-30MKIs would be limited. It further added that DC-MAWS requirement
on Su-30MKIs was not originally envisaged by the IAF and hence DARE executed it
as only a technology demonstration (TD) project, instead of MM project and the
project was wrongly categorised as MM! Subsequently, DARE relocated the
installation of infra-red sensors on the Su-30MKI to the satisfaction of IAF HQ
and the EC, which concurred in February 2015 that the installation of all six
sensors was imperative.
Between March and April 2015, Elisra delivered all the
six sensors only after the completion of factory acceptance tests (FAT). The
flight evaluation of DC-MAWS was also carried out between March and April 2015
on an Elisra-owned Cheyenne airborne testbed. An amount of Rs.194.16 crore had
been incurred on the project by March 2015. IAF HQ stated in April 2015 that
flight-trials of DC-MAWS on a Su-30MKI were expected to commence in December
2015. The CAG audit also observed in June 2015 that in order to meet the latest
PDC (June 2015) of the project, DARE, after development and testing of the
DC-MAWS suite on an airborne testbed, closed the project claiming it
successful. In order to prove the developed DC-MAWS suite on a Su-30MKI, DARE
had proposed in June 2015 to take up a separate project. DARE further stated
that the delay in development was due to time taken (from February 2012 to
February 2015) by IAF HQ to assess the impact on aerodynamics of the Su-30MKI.
In response to the Draft Report of April
2015, the DRDO reiterated in June 2015 the views of DARE that DC-MAWS project
was taken up as a TD effort and suggested to exclude the project from its draft
report. The replies may be seen in light of the fact that IAF HQ had clearly
projected back in March 2008 the requirement of the DC-MAWS suite for Su-30MKIs
and accordingly, the project was sanctioned under MM category. Also, neither
the DRDO HQ nor DARE took any initiative during the development phase to obtain
an amendment to transition from MM to TD project. Further, flight evaluations
of the developed DC-MAWS suite was carried out on a Cheyenne airborne testbed
and as such, the success or otherwise of DC-MAWS with oversized sensors, would
be known only after flight evaluation on modified Su-30MKIs, for which a
separate sanction was awaited. Till then, the IAF’s Su-30MKI fleet would have
to operate without DC-MAWS capability.
In 2016, DARE once again succeeded in resuscitating
the DC-MAWS project by proposing to install four DC-sensors to the fore and aft
of each of the two Interface Beam Assemblies (one under each outboard wing
pylon), with the remaining two sensors being mounted on the topside and belly
of the Su-30MKI airframe. However, such a configuration too has not yet been
approved by OKB Sukhoi, which instead has cleared the MILDS-A installation
configuration that had been proposed by the industrial partnership of Hensoldt
(which bought over Cassidian), BEL and Alpha Technologies back in 2016 itself!
As a consequence of the above, DARE has
developed a MAWS suite installation package that does not have the support of
OKB Sukhoi and will therefore be regarded as an unauthorised and non-certified
fitment, which in turn will lead to both OKB Sukhoi and IRKUT Corp withdrawing
their airworthiness certifications for all such modified Su-30MKIs. Total product liability, therefore, will rest squarely on the shoulders of DARE and HAL, with
devastating consequences for the IAF and its entire Su-30MKI fleet.
Instead, what the IAF should have done
way back in the previous decade was to go for the very same certified MAWS fitment
configuration that was specified by OKB Sukhoi for the 18 Su-30MKMs of Malaysia
that were delivered between 2007 and 2009. This would then have become a
win-win solution for all the involved parties (Russian and Indian) and could
well have generated similar solutions for the IAF’s upgraded MiG-29UPGs.
Instead, the clearly evident criminal negligence displayed by the MoD, DRDO HQ and DARE since the previous decade have only
ensured that the IAF’s MiG-29UPG and Su-30MKI fleets remain devoid of DC-MAWS
fitments till this day!
How/Why DARE-Developed UEWS For
Tejas Mk.1/Mk1A LCA Was Rejected
It was IAF HQ through its
letter No.AHQ/S96056/6/7/ASR dated March 19, 1997 that had specified that the
DRDO-developed Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) should be capable of carrying an electronic
countermeasures (ECM) suite included internally-mounted SPJ, RWR and a
countermeasures dispensing system (CMDS). However, in December 24, 2009 in
another letter the IAF HQ stated that an internal SPJ was not part of the
specified FOC-standard for the Tejas Mk.1 LCA (because the SPJ consumed more
power and required lot of internal volume that were not available on the Tejas
Mk.1) and therefore it ought to be on-board the Tejas LCA-AF Mk.2. In addition,
provision was to be made for future upgrades.
It needs to be noted here that
when it comes to developing customised products like MMR and EW suite, one
first has to develop the MMR and only after that the EW suite because both the
MMR and EW suite (especially the SPJ) do not work together. SPJs can work only
when the MMR does not operate—as dictated by the absolute laws of physics. However,
with an SPJ fitment, the MMR works continuously just fine with an optimised radome.
In case of the Tejas Mk.1’s MMR (comprising an ELTA Systems-supplied
programmable signals processor and transmitter/receiver/exciter along with an
LRDE-developed mechanically scanning antenna built by ECIL) that initially used
a domestically-developed radome, airborne target detection range was 60km, but
this was increased to 70km when a Cobham-supplied radome was used.
In case of the Tejas Mk.1, due
to the delayed development of the MMR by LRDE, the SPJ’s development too had to
be delayed by DARE and hence the latter’s flight-tests on-board the LCA PV-1 (which first flew on November 2003) was
initially expected to start in early December 2013 (after it was installed in
October the same year). But the Unified
Electronic Warfare System-equipped PV-1 (inclusive of the SPJ) ended up
making its maiden-flight only on January 10, 2015. The SPJ subsequently demonstrated its
ability to simultaneously jam five hostile emitters. Despite this, the UEWS had
consumed far more internal volume than was available on the Tejas Mk.1 and
hence it was decided not to install it as standard-fit on the 40 Tejas Mk.1s on
order for the IAF.
The
UEWS comprises a Unified Receiver Exciter Processor (UREP) with advanced
digital receiver/digital radio frequency memory (DRFM) microwave power module-base
based transmitters. The RF signals received via the receiving antennae
are amplified by front-end amplifiers and fed to an advanced channelised receiver
in the central processor unit. The receiver
then measures all the RF signal parameters such as PRF, PRI, PW, direction etc,
for building pulse descriptors that are then fed to the central processor unit.
This then extracts the threats according to priority and level of lethality and
provides the situation awareness to the pilot via a multi-function AMLCD. Upon detection of a lethal threat, the central
processor unit then activates the jammer, selecting the appropriate EW
technique for each threat. The jammer is capable of responding simultaneously
to five different threats by implementing power management techniques.
In December 2018 Elisra was selected for
implementing a Rs.178 crore contract for developing the UEWS suite for the
projected Tejas Mk.1A after being selected by HAL as the winning contender. Its
developmental cost worked out to be Rs.177.43 crore, inclusive of three
prototypes and related support equipment. HAL selected Elisra’s UEWS offer
over the DRDO-developed UEWS for the Tejas Mk.1 and the D-29 suite (developed
by DARE for the MiG-29UPG) since installation of either of the latter two would
have involved significant redesign of the Tejas Mk.1A’s airframe. And neither
was BEL able to respond to HAL’s request for examining the prospects for miniaturising
either the Tejas Mk.1’s UEWS or the D-29.
However, Israel’s Ministry of Defence prevented Elisra from developing the UEWS suite for the Tejas Mk.1A, and instead suggested to both HAL and the IAF that the EL/L-8222 SPJ pod be selected and ordered. And this is exactly what happened subsequently.
The
reason given was that since the Tejas Mk.1A will be using the ELTA
Systems-supplied EL/M-2052 AESA-MMR, its integration with the the EL/L-8222 SPJ
pod will be cheaper and risk-free since this very same package had earlier been
installed and integrated for the IAF’s Jaguar IS/DARIN-3 project (both the
AESA-MMR and elements of the SPJ pod were integrated with DARE-developed UEPS sub-systems for internal mounting) for this project were delivered to HAL in May 2018 and on
August 10 the same year the first of 10 flight certification-related flights of
the first Jaguar IS/DARIN-3 prototype had taken place).
