Interesting Visit

The just-concluded three-day visit to India by US Army Gen Richard D Clarke, Commander United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and his officially acknowledged meeting with the Indian Army’s Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), Gen Manoj Mukund Naravane, gives us several pointers about this little-noticed visit.

Firstly, the US SOCOM Commander does not have direct Indian counterpart as yet. Consequently, as the commander of all special operations forces of the US Army, US Navy, US Air Force and the US Marine Corps, he surely would have liked to have interacted with the Indian Air Force’s Chief of the Air Staff and the Indian Navy’s Chief of the Naval Staff in order to familiarise/update himself with the activities of the GARUD and MARCOS special operations forces. But since such meetings did not take place and his official interaction was only with the IA’s COAS, this can only mean that Gen Clarke’s visit was confined to interactions only with the land forces special operations formations, i.e. the IA’s Para (Special Forces) and the IA-commanded but R & AW-owned Special Frontier Forces (SFF).

Obviously the US SOCOM would like to keep abreast of the recent experiences of the Para (SF) and SFF as a result of high-altitude deployments all along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) since mid-2020, even though the US SOCOM has no intention of ever deploying for combat at such forbidding heights. But it is also highly likely that Gen Clarke was briefed about the urgent hardware requirements of both the IA and the SFF, especially for equipment like light all-terrain tracked vehicles, exoskeletons and fuel cell-powered manportable SATCOM gear. It is also highly probable that the IA has asked for similar hardware on behalf of the Royal Bhutan Army.

Hasimara AFS Being Upgraded For Hosting The IAF's Rafale M-MRCAs

 

Missing The Woods For The Trees

The two back-to-back televised interviews given yesterday by India’s first-ever Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) Gen Bipin Rawat and the Indian Air Force’s 26^th Chief of Air Staff (CAS) Air Chief Marshal Rakesh Kumar Singh Bhadauria, have not only caused much consternation, but have also exposed the intellectual faultlines between the three armed services. Here are the two interviews:

CDS: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wwhbsvN9o_I

CAS of IAF: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7timgL3mEa4

Such intellectual faultlines, which have developed since the early 1960s, are primarily due to the perceptional ‘battle horizons’ of each of the three armed services. For instance, the Indian Army (IA) generally has a battle horizon of “a day’s march”, within which it sees its battlespace. The Indian Navy (IN), on the other hand, operates in “a few Knots per hour” domain, while the Indian Air Force (IAF) operates new “a few hundred Knots per hour” domain. Consequently, the IAF’s airpower has the capability to strike across the targetting cycle, directly at the enemy’s military and political leadership, if so desired, while prosecuting war at all three levels—tactical, operational and strategic—in any air campaign seamlessly. It is such perceptional differences that caused the CDS to define the IAF as being a “supporting warfighting arm” yesterday, which in turn throws into danger the armed forces’ projected objectives of achieving theaterisation of the armed forces and the adoption of joint and synergised warfighting doctrines. Such deep-rooted perceptional divergences have not arisen overnight, but are rooted in illogical decision-making processes that began way back in the early 1960s. Here is the first recorded divergence highlighted in the slide below:

As a result, the IA frittered away a golden opportunity to co-locate the geographical commands of the IA and IAF under one roof, and delayed the raising of an Army Air Corps by another 24 years (it was finally raised on November 1, 1986 for operating only LUHs, while approval for the IA to operate attack helicopters came only in August 2017). The IA then could easily have driven a hard bargain and in return for agreeing to the IAF retaining ownership, command-and-control over SAGW assets, it could have had its own integral fleets of aeroscout, CASEVAC and attack helicopters (to meet its immediate air-support requirements), thereby freeing the IAF to focus on air-defence, deep-strike and tactical interdiction missions.

It was in 1975 that the then Govt of India appointed an expert committee (on re-organisation & Modernisation of the IA) in 1975 to undertake, probably for the first time, a long-term perspective plan for the IA. The committee was headed by Lt Gen (later General) Kotikalapudi Venkata Krishna Rao, with Major Generals M L Chibber and K Sunderji as members and Brig A J M Homji as secretary. It was mandated to present a perspective plan till the year 2000. Interestingly, the mandate was given under challenging circumstances, which despite the prospect of a two-front war, required the Army to cap its strength at 8.38 lakh (in order to cater for increased budgetary pressures in the aftermath of the 1973 Middle East oil crisis). The committee’s report of nine volumes, encompassing 1,740 pages, contained far-reaching recommendations, which were to be implemented over 25 years. Although the report was accepted by the Govt of India, most of the recommendations were not acted upon. The principal recommendations were:

1) Creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff.

2) Transformation of the offensive infantry formations from motorised to mechanised.

3) Creation of a Unified Air-Defence Command led by the IAF.

4) Creation of a Joint Logistics Command.

5) Creation of a Joint Training Command. Therefore, it is fallacy to claim that the creation of the post of CDS was first proposed by the Kargil Review Committee or the Naresh Chandra Committee, or that the proposal for raising a Unified Air-Defence Command was born in 2016.

In the existing system each service plans its own logistics following its own planning, provisioning, transportation and delivery model. This has resulted in tremendous amount of duplication, long inventories, and a colossal waste of precious resources that goes against the very ethos of an efficient economy. It is imperative that the logistics organisations of the three armed services are integrated into one, thereby enabling optimisation of resources. The UK Chief of Defence Material, US Defence Logistics Agency, and the PLA’s Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF) have all functioned very efficiently and India too needs to create a Joint Logistics Command.

 

There are few organisational structures in place that could meaningfully formulate or impart the desired level of joint training. The essential ingredients of a joint training system (philosophy, infrastructure, and processes) need to be implemented. Therefore, to give impetus to jointness and promote synergy amongst the three armed services, there is a need to start training officers together from junior command and equivalent courses onwards. Integration of the three higher command courses into one curriculum would be the next logical step akin to higher defence management courses and at the National Defence College. The role of HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) should be extended from merely promulgating joint doctrine and joint military strategy, from which flow the individual service doctrines, to being fully integrated in the planning and conduct of joint exercises and the validation of the joint doctrine and military strategy. This necessitates the creation of an integrated joint training command under which all training establishments function.

Since future military operations will be conducted in the backdrop of cyber warfare and information dominance, this necessitates synchronisation of all resources for better synergy and utilization. The necessity of a tri-services Cyber Command has already been accepted by the armed services. In 2008, an Integrated Space Cell under HQ IDS was established for integration between the armed forces, the Department of Space, and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). The logic behind the creation of a Joint Aerospace Command is abundantly clear: firstly, as India’s requirements for space applications increase, the necessity of a single agency coordinating different activities becomes paramount. Secondly, the presence of a single entity will allow India to better promote its national interests in Outer Space as it becomes increasingly crowded and contested. Though its necessity has been accepted by the armed services, one needs to look at US model where it has merged its Space Command into the Strategic Command, which now looks after both the nuclear and space realms, while a separate Space Force Command was raised in December 2019. In 2013, the Indian Armed Forces have submitted a proposal for the creation of three new tri-service commands: Cyber command, Aerospace command, and Special Operations Command. As per the plans, the Special Operations Command will be headed by an IA officer and the Aerospace Command by an IAF officer, while the Cyber Command will get its head on a rotational basis from the three services.

Dismal Joint Forces Warfighting Record

Conceptually, jointness implies the synergised use of resources of the three armed services in a seamless manner to achieve the best results in the least possible time. The idea is to avoid needless redundancy and optimally utilise available resources. Jointness implies cross-services combination wherein the capability of the joint force is understood to be synergistic, with the sum greater than its parts (the capability of individual components). Joint forces also require high levels of inter-operability and systems that are conceptualised and designed with joint architectures and acquisition strategies. This level of inter-operability reduces technical, doctrinal and cultural barriers that limit the ability of joint force commanders to achieve their assigned objectives. The goal is to employ joint forces effectively across the range of military operations. Firstly, based on unity of effort, jointness seeks to focus all the energy of armed forces across the range of military operations, throughout all levels of war, in every environment toward enhancing the effectiveness of military operations. Secondly, joint forces provide commanders with multi-dimensional capabilities (land, sea, air, syber, space and special operations) that are more effective than uni-service forces by providing a wider range of operational and tactical options. Finally, multiple service capabilities allow an innovative forces commander to combine joint capabilities in asymmetrical as well as symmetrical ways to produce a total military impact that is greater than the sum of its parts. To be truly integrated, the coordinating mechanisms must be so designed that an assorted force can be immediately assembled and dispatched to meet various contingencies/scenarios. Integrated forces are premised on the presence of a theatre commander with over-riding authority. He/she is vested with authority and the resources to undertake operational missions, and is alone responsible for the employment of all three armed services components functioning under him/her. His/her orders will cut down the response time in developing situations during operations, and exploit fleeting windows of opportunity.

The need for jointness in the Indian context was well appreciated even at the time of India’s independence. India inherited a command structure for the services that had unity of command, under a Commander-in-Chief. Soon, a Joint Services Wing was set up for training officer cadets, which later became the Khadakvasla-based National Defence Academy, followed by the establishment of the Wellington-based Defence Services Staff College. To these were added, in due course, the College of Defence Management at Secundrabad at a more senior level, and finally, the National Defence College at New Delhi for training officers of the rank of Brigadier and equivalent. This framework for joint training of officers at different levels and to bring them together again at different stages of their careers was, therefore, well laid out and continues till date. It has yielded some good results in bringing about inter-service bonhomie. However, optimisation in jointness for conventional warfighting continues to elude India’s armed forces.

The India-Pakistan conflict in 1947-1948 was essentially an IA action, with the IAF’s airpower being used only to transport troops and equipment and to provide limited close air-support (aerial straffing) to ground troops. Later, in 1961, the military was again involved in a brief two-day conflict to liberate Goa, but this was without any opposition. In the conflict with China in 1962, the IAF and the IN did not come into play at all in any offensive manner (with the IAF only conducting limited tactical recce and extensive air-maintenance and CASEVAC sorties with fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters) and watched from the sidelines. Finally, the three armed services did come to fight together against Pakistan in 1965, but without any pre-conceived synergised battle-plan. In short, in all these conflicts, whatever their extent and severity, it was essentially only land-based force projection that came into play. The IAF did participate more meaningfully in the 1965 war, but without much synergy with the plans of the IA. No post-conflict enquiries or studies were ordered or conducted by India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD). The war with Pakistan in 1971 was the first real military operation since Independence in which all three armed services were full participants. By April 1971, it had been assessed that military conflict was likely, even inevitable. The then Chief of the Army Staff, Gen (later Field Marshal) S H F J Manekshaw wanted time to complete preparations, for the monsoon season to get over and also for winter to set in so that mountain passes on the India-China border would be rendered impassable. These factors taken together, allowed the armed forces about seven months to get their act in order. In this period, it was expected that the military would formulate a common and synergised OP-PLAN into which operations of all three armed services would be dovetailed. This did not happen. There was no integrated planning of the campaign, which resulted in quite a few unplanned and uncoordinated decisions being made. As the war progressed, for example, the sudden decision to launch an ground assault on Chittagong, was soon changed to Cox Bazaar. The troops chosen, Gurkhas, with their short stature and relative unfamiliarity with water, were singularly unsuited for that purpose. There was no training, and beach survey, a crucial prerequisite, was inadequate. Not surprisingly, the operation was a total fiasco with no aims achieved and some lives lost. In another episode, IAF Gnats attacked Mukti Bahini vessels operating in the waters off Khulna without being aware that these were friendly forces. One of the two boats sank, some of the crew killed, and others wounded and captured. The attacks carried out on vital installations at Karachi from the air and by sea, were also not part of any combined plan. There are other instances of mismatch between the different wings. Lt Gen J F R Jacob, who, as Chief of Staff of the IA’s Eastern Command was responsible for conduct of operations in the eastern sector, subsequently went on record to say that the three wings of the military went about doing their own things without any synergy. The war was fought in a tripartite fashion with no unified or accountable military authority in command even though, as might be expected, Gen Manekshaw as the then Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) was primus inter pares for the political leadership. Not unexpectedly, this reluctance to boldly institutionalise the ground reality resulted in more discord than harmony.

India’s armed forces were called to action in 1987 once again, albeit in a somewhat modified role, when they were asked to proceed as the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka. The COSC appointed the GOC-in-C Southern Command, Lt Gen Depinder Singh as the Overall Force Commander (OFC). Component Commanders from the three armed services were subordinated to him with command of operational forces delegated from the Eastern Naval Command and the Southern Air Command, respectively. A formal Directive was issued to the OFC to undertake the ordered missions in Sri Lanka. While on surface it appeared that the Indian military hierarchy had finally come of age; alas, this proved too good to be true. In less than a month from the time that IPKF moved into Sri Lanka, the situation was turned on its head. The IN and IAF Cs-in-C, responsible for providing forces, declined to delegate command and forced their superiors in New Delhi, i.e., the Service Chiefs, to get the component commanders designated as Liaison Officers with no role other than to act as go-betweens between the OFC’s HQ and of the Cs-in-C. Relatively junior officers were appointed to do this work, further diluting the authority and accountability of the OFC. The COSC, with no permanent head, was, itself, shown up as a weak structure, with its own internal rifts and dissension and incapable of enforcing its will. The IPKF grew from one Division in 1987 to four by 1989, but it was never one force under one command, as originally contemplated. The OFC lost credibility and was, in effect, just the commander of the land forces, with the IAF and IN cooperating, but independently. Apart from the political infirmities of the intervention, poor command-and-control must rate as the most important military failure of OP PAWAN.

OP VIJAY in 1999 was essentially a land battle in which some offensive airpower was used under OP VIJAY to soften enemy positions and conduct tactical recce sorties. The IN, somewhat exaggeratedly, decided to concentrate its entire strength on the western seaboard (such deployments do not come without great cost) under OP TALWAAR, signalling a degree of belligerence not visible in the political posture. It took two months for the IA forces to regain the heights after Pakistan was forced to withdraw. This time too, there were glaring mismatches between the highest military leadership. The IAF was not prepared to provide the Mi-25/Mi-35P attack helicopters that the IA requested since such platforms could not fly over the Pir Panjal mountain range while taking off fully loaded from air bases in southern Jammu & Kashmir. In fact, the IAF at that time did not even deploy a single airspace surveillance radar north of the Zoji La Pass! The IA, for its part, was reluctant to share full details of what had actually happened. When the IA sought air-strikes for immediate air-support, the then CAS of the IAF, ACM A Y Tipnis, disingenuously, demurred on the logic that this required political approval (despite such air-strikes being conducted within India-controlled airspace along the LoC). In short, once again the armed forces stumbling into action without a synergised plan.

This is because the three Service Chiefs, despite having been converted from Commanders-in-Chief of their respective wings into Chiefs of Staff in 1955, continue to act in their former roles and are, therefore, responsible for the conduct of operations. They do this by issuing directives to their respective commanders. For example, in the IN, these are the Western and Eastern Naval Commands which, in turn, give out orders to their subordinate operational commanders and task forces. Where any assistance is required from another wing, say air-support from the IAF, this has to be arranged through the Mumbai-based Maritime Air Operations (MAO) Directorate, an IAF institution, acting as the link. The MAO interacts with the appropriate IAF geographic Command HQ which, in turn, issues instructions to the IAF air base holding the relevant air assets. Often, IAF HQ itself may have to be approached. The arrangement is about the same as far as the IA is concerned. All operational geographic IA Commands have IAF elements attached to them, not as subordinates but as advisers. They, in turn, interact with their own superiors to arrange the desired support through IAF air bases. In brief, the inter-services interaction is through several tiers, both laterally and vertically. The desired air-support might not be provided, possibly for good reason and even if it is, may not be in the form and strength requisitioned. Thus, the person responsible for execution of a task does not have control over all the forces that are deployed. On the other hand, the authority providing supporting forces is not responsible for the successful achievement of any operation. The shortcomings of this system were and are readily apparent: the IAF has no role to play in the Cold Start doctrine of the IA, nor is the IAF being consulted by the IA for inputs on the composition of terrain-specific Integrated Battle Groups!

The Sequential Way Ahead

If one were to access the combat theaterisation processes adopted by countries like the US and China, it will emerge that both these countries have had to embrace on a colossal scale simulation technologies that firstly aimed at optimising joint, synergised warfighting doctrines, tactics and technologies, and secondly through these, achieve consolidation of the capabilities, capacities and resources that are required for combat theaterisation. Wargames are analytic games that simulate aspects of warfare at the tactical, operational, or strategic level. They are used to examine warfighting concepts, train and educate commanders and analysts, explore scenarios, and assess how force-planning and posture choices affect campaign outcomes. The US has developed various types of wargames, including short-term (one to two years), medium-term (five to seven years), and long-term (seven to 20 years) scenario exercises, table-top map exercises, “Day After…” wargames, and computer-supported exercises. In 1984, the War Gaming and Simulation Center (WGSC) was founded at the US National Defense University.  WGSC was responsible for the design and delivery of all experiential events associated with the colleges across the NDU.  At this time, the WGSC exercises focussed primarily on politico-military exercises via the use of tabletop exercises and traditional “blue vs. red” scenarios. Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, Vice Admiral Gaffney, the then NDU President, was determined to ensure that the WGSC become a true national asset for strategic-level exercises.  So, in 2002, given this directive, the WGSC was transformed into the National Strategic Gaming Center (NSGC) where it became responsible for not only providing national strategic-level exercises in support of the JPME mission of NDU, but also providing exercise design and delivery assistance to the warfighter via exercises for the various Combatant Commands, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the White House, and Congress, i.e., the all-of-country approach. 

In 1979, China first established an operational planning analysis research structure and began to simulate military operational problems. Operational planning analysis incorporated aspects of computers, information technology, and other new elements of science and technology to warfare, in ways that had not been possible in the ideologically charged Mao-era. As the PLA sought to inculcate officers with greater familiarity with advanced technologies, the increasingly complex and sophisticated problems of modern warfare could no longer be addressed solely through classroom discussions. This lent impetus to the creation of a number of forms of computerised wargaming and operational modelling software, such as “Joint 99” and the “Red Star System.” In addition, major PME institutions such as the Ground Forces Staff College at Shijiazhuang, as well as the various Military Region (MR) HQs, all had their own computerised wargaming centres. It is in the midst of this period, in 1997, that Maj Gen Hu Xiaofeng came to the fore. Hu was transferred from the National University of Defence Technology (NUDT) to the National Defence University (NDU) in 1997 by order of the Central Military Commission (CMC) itself to take charge of the PLA’s computer wargaming efforts. He had been one of the first students to be enrolled in Dr Qian Xuesen’s Systems Engineering & Mathematics Department. Thus, Hu’s academic pedigree was impeccable, being associated with the man identified as the father of China’s nuclear and space programmes. Hu attracted the attention of senior PLA leaders because of his familiarity with systems engineering, and the belief that PLA wargaming would have to incorporate aspects of this field. At the same time, however, Hu also had a military background. He was among the first students to enter the PME system after the revival of the national testing system, and had enrolled at the newly re-established NUDT. He also worked extensively on military information & communications systems after graduating. Hu’s efforts received highest level support from within the PLA. This was important, since Hu initially had trouble attracting sufficient human resource talent to help write the various software programmes. His efforts were facilitated, even accelerated, by the decision in 1999 to consolidate various warfighting laboratories and wargaming efforts within a single organisational structure and a unified training system. Hu was made chief designer and subject matter leader for the PLA’s entire operations analysis laboratory development effort, and the NDU was made the central nodal institution housing it. Hu and his team engaged in extensive research, visiting MRs to interview hundreds of officers, and writing over ten million lines of code in the course of their development effort. Their initial product, introduced in the early 2000s, was the “Whetstone” (or “Sword Sharpening”) series of operational-level command training models. These were China’s first efforts at a computer-based, war-zone level, intranet-based campaign exercise. Hu subsequently designed the first strategic-level computerised wargames, the “Absolute Victory” series, incorporating economic and political elements into the military systems. He also designed an “immersion style” multi-player networked gaming system to facilitate strategic-level decision-making. These efforts garnered for Hu high-level recognition, including awards for advancing both the national level of science and technology and military science and technology. In 2007, Hu began designing a computerised wargaming system that would link strategic- and campaign-level operations. PLA writings suggest that, since the renewed focus on developing tri-services PLA wargames in 2007, their wargaming efforts, and specifically their computerised wargaming systems, are intended to support two key areas: CMC-level command-and-control decision-making; and decision-making under wartime conditions, including informational uncertainty amidst dynamic, constantly changing conditions.

Part of the objective was to accelerate the decision-making cycle, since the multi-domain network-centric battlespace will not allow for delays. Command-and-control decision-making, especially in “local wars under high-tech conditions,” or now under multi-domain network-centric conditions, must focus on the development of plans and responses, often in immediate response to developing circumstances, rather than the previous emphasis on implementing process and procedures developed long in advance of the conflict or situation. Computerised wargames are thus seen as promoting closer situational analysis, more flexible tactics, and training commanders and staffs to “think more completely, more precisely, more deeply, which will produce more effective levels of command stratagem.” This more flexible, more responsive training, in turn, requires the ability to make clear whether any particular decision is right or wrong, beneficial or harmful. It is also essential to identify key points in the course of a campaign, i.e., which decisions were most important, and at what points are decision-making necessary. Identifying such moments and decisions requires a degree of rigour to be credible, and cannot be the function of biases or relationships. PLA literature 20 years ago suggests that previous attempts at developing wargaming (not necessarily just computerised wargaming) yielded results that were either scripted, or influenced by subjective assessments.

The new computerised systems, by contrast, allow more “free play” and autonomy on the part of players, but with the results derived more objectively. When one computerized wargame reported high casualties in the course of an action, the underlying algorithms could be displayed to allow players to better understand the results. This need for rigour is especially important, as the PLA apparently is also seeking to incorporate more realism into its wargames. In particular, wargames can help emulate both the time-urgency associated with modern warfare, as well as uncertainty due to the lack of complete battlespace situational awareness. This latter aspect has been a source of PLA concern and commentary for at least a decade. Thus, the ability to incorporate the fog of war and uncertainty has thoroughly altered the thinking and command styles of PLA commanders and their staffs. It is Hu Xiaofeng’s efforts, as well as the perceived utility of computerised wargaming, that has led to a growing employment of such systems within the PLA. Intriguingly, it would appear that such games started with simulations of inter-service strategic problems, and have since expanded towards more tactical simulations, at the individual service-level. By 2013 tactical-level wargames were employed by all MRs and Military Districts, while the individual armed services engaged in combined-arms (i.e., inter-branch) wargames, in addition to joint inter-services wargames.

In India’s case too, similar sequential, scientific steps are required to be taken, firstly, for achieving jointness, and only then embracing combat theaterisation. For this to happen, the Indian NDU (INDU) at Gurugram, under construction since May 2013, needs to be operationalized ASAP, followed by the establishment of a multi-domain national wargaming centre within the INDU’s campus.

Ways To Achieve Jointness

Back in the previous decade, the world got its first-ever demonstration of joint forces network-centric multi-domain warfare operations when for the very first time new-generation common data-links were put to use during OP Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to ensure inter-operability, create common operational battlespace pictures, and increase situational awareness to hitherto unprecedented levels. Closing the sensor-to-shooter loops with precision and with rapidity differentiated OIF from the German ‘Blitzkrieg’ aerospace-air-land coordination. The various OIF campaigns were precise because all objects were digitised and de-conflicted before an engagement. This was a result of real-time blue and red force tracking through a myriad of sensors integrated using near real-time ODLs. The sensor-to-shooter loops were shorter because the sensors and shooters were tightly integrated through a series of stacked data-links in many cases. A combination of video imagery feeds, situational awareness updates and command-and-control data-links created a real-time collaboration environment for prosecuting all the warfighting operations in which the environment was highly localised and supported a few nodes (for a sensor-to-shooter system), reflecting a near-optimal pairing of sensors and weapons to target. In effect, airpower was reinforced; the integration of a myriad of sensors, intelligence analysts, planners and decision-makers using data links reinforced the effective use of joint forces (army, navy and air force) airpower.

The various types of data-links using Time-Division Multiple Access (TDMA) techniques that were employed during OIF included:

1. Common data-links (CDL), used for down linking sensor information to the ground control stations of command-and-control nodes. They were used to support the exchange and fusion of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) information and employed mainly by manned ISR platforms.

2. Tactical common data-links (TCDL), a part of the CDL family, used to equip unmanned aerial platforms (UAS) that were used for ISR applications.

3. Link-16, which is the US Department of Defense’s primary tactical data information Link (TADIL) based on J-series messages for airborne battle management. It was used for exchanging command-and-control messages between various manned and unmanned aerial platforms, i.e., surveillance tracks, electronic warfare, weapons coordination, etc. It supported a wide area of operations within a 300nm diameter.

4. The enhanced position location reporting system (EPLRS)/situational awareness data-link (SADL), which complemented Link 16 by providing the ground situational awareness picture. Aircraft equipped with SADL also share air surveillance tracks and command-and-control information updates.

5. Video data-links, which provided information/video downlinks from UAS and target-designation pods carried by combat aircraft to specific joint tactical air-control (JTAC) centres and/or special operations forces (SOF) with specially encrypted transceivers.

Of these five data-links, the EPLRS played an important role when unleashing fire-assaults (via both ground-based artillery and manned/unmanned aerial platforms) because it was able to display the five closest friendly units within proximity, regardless of the target position. This was critical as the Blue Force Tracker (BFT) provided a non-real-time update of Blue Forces’ position, with refreshes occurring approximately every five to ten minutes. The information from BFT could not be used to gauge the accurate position of a unit to avoid fratricides. The video downlinks from UAS and target designation pods gave JTACs and SOF units a positive identification of a target. It also enabled the JTACs and SOF units to guide shooters like combat aircraft to the targets. Battle damage assessment (BDA) through the video downlinks was also instantaneous, enabling a faster decision to re-strike if necessary. While EPLRS and video data-links provided the capability for precise and rapid decentralised execution, the suite of CDLs, TCDLs and Link-16 provided the means for integrating intelligence with command-and-control nodes, enabling centralised control and the efficient allocation of resources, such as weapons and sensors to target pairing. Such an increase in the sophistication of data-links enabled integration and operational effectiveness. However, it came with a price. The Germans during World war-2 had relied mainly on HF radios for communications. This entailed the same frequency and waveform operations. The advantage was greater manageability and unquestioned inter-operability across air-land elements. OIF used different types of data-links. Consequently, for inter-operability, ‘gateways’ were required. For example, integrating Link-16 and EPLRS/SADL required the Transparent Multi-Platform Gateway (TMPG). The TMPG translated Link-16 TADIL-J messages to SADL-type messages. The different types of data-links have thus created a situation where gateways have now become a necessity. The gateways can be deployed on various types of ground-based, naval and airborne platforms. The manageability, mobility, persistence and survivability of these platforms have to be factored into the mission equations for success. Recognising the problem, the US has since embarked on fielding the joint tactical radio system (JTRS), a software-defined radio (SDR) which uses the wideband networking waveform (WNW) technique for harmonising joint services usage of this technology. Any radio system wirelessly transmits/receives signals in the radio frequency (RF) spectrum to facilitate the transfer of information. The SDR is a very special kind of system in which the physical layer functions are defined as software functionality, i.e., a software code executes the role of a circuit board of the conventional radio and software-based filtering algorithms are used for frequency selection. The software generates the communications signal waveform, which is equivalent to a modulated signal, making SDR capable of communicating over a large portion of the spectrum whilst supporting multiple protocols. These software algorithms are downloadable and adaptable over the lifespan of the hardware. Thus, the SDR is a multi-mode, multi-band and multi-functional radio requiring only a software upgrade for improvements, whereas traditional hardware-based radios have cross-functionality limitations and can only be modified through physical changes.

Another real force-multiplier that enhances battlespace situational awareness by generating and disseminating a common operational picture and improving the management of all linked command-and-control/ISR networks is the versatile, modular and scalable, multi-data-link processor (DLP) that can be configured/customised as required by the end-user. When integrated with the CDL, the DLP, the result is a network-centric suite that enables a seamless, configurable and expandable integration of data-links on naval, ground-based and airborne platforms. The DLP-CDL combination can thus be connected through an agnostic interface to multiple hosts like land-based, shipborne and airborne command-and-control centres in a way that facilitates network integration, as well as future upgrades and maintenance requirements over time, thus reducing costs and risk. The definition and design of any data-link architecture has to capture a wider spectrum of operational contexts, functions and processes. It has also to be synchronised across different services or units to achieve a degree of integration and operational effectiveness. For example, an air-strike should not result in fratricide and should not slow the advance of ground mechanised units. Instead, the air-strike should reinforce and enhance the mobility of friendly mechanised forces. In order to achieve this, both land and air elements are required to share a common data-link capability. This common capability provides ease of integration of all necessary force elements and enables a shorter warfighting cycle to be achieved. Thus, the DLP-CDL combination has to be engineered to support a very rich picture of the battlespace and at the same time reduce the synchronisation time of all warfighting elements.

In India’s case, adoption of the DLP-CDL combination in future will be mandatory if the desired end-state is to achieve joint service warfighting through the synchronisation of existing standalone networks like the Indian Army’s Army Strategic Operational Information Dissemination System (ASTROIDS) and its subordinate Command Information and Decision Support System (CIDSS), the IA-owned ADC & RS, the Indian Navy’s NAVNET and multi-band LINK-II Mod-3 network, and the Indian Air Force’s Integrated Air Command, Control and Communication System (IACCCS). This is what should be the immediate point-of-focus when creating an IAF-led Unified Air-Defence Command.