Fitments Of Project 15A DDG INS Kolkata D-63

Official press-briefings of the type given by the Indian Navy (IN) on August 13 regarding the INS Kolkata D-63—the first of three Project 15A guided-missile destroyers (DDG) on order for the IN—are always important for two reasons: for what is disclosed, and for what is not. For instance, while the IN stated that INS Kolkata is 90% indigenous by cost, it never went beyond that (thereby repeating history, for, on April 29, 2010, the IN had claimed that the total indigenous effort accounted for 60% of the cost of producing each Project 17 guided-missile frigate (FFG). My personal estimation is that in terms of hardware, INS Kolkata can boast of less than 50% indigenous content. And each Project 15A DDG’s acquisition cost is almost US$950 million (Rs.38 billion), while that of each Project 17 FFG is US$650 million (Rs.26 billion). The cost escalation in these two shipbuilding projects has been about 225% for Project 15A, about 260% for Project 17, with the main reasons contributing towards cost escalations being: delay in supply of warship-building D-40S steel by Russia, escalation due to increases in expenditure of the services rendered by Russian specialists on account of inflation during the build-period, impact of wage revisions due from October 2003, and finalisation of cost of weapons and sensors. 

INS Kolkata, whose keel was laid down on September 23, 2003, was launched on March 30, 2006. Therefore, detailed design of this class of DDG (using TRIBON CAD software) by a joint team comprising the IN’s in-house Directorate of Naval Design (DND)—which celebrates its 50 years of existence this year—and the MoD-owned shipbuilder Mazagon Docks Ltd (MDL), should have been concluded by mid-2002. But this was not to be, since the weapon-and-sensor fitments were yet to be selected at that time. It was only on January 27, 2006 that India’s MoD-owned Defence R & D Organisation (DRDO) and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) inked the Barak-2 LR-SAM’s joint five-year joint R & D contract—valued at US$556 million—following 17 months of exhaustive negotiations. And the follow-on US$1.1 billion procurement contract for Barak-2 LR-SAMs and the three EL/M-2248 S-band multi-function search-and-target acquisition radars (MF-STAR)—the first naval active phased-array radars to become operational with a navy of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)—was inked in April 2009. As a result, it can be safely inferred that the DND had finalised only about 70% of the DDG’s design by 2003. 

What cannot be denied, however, is that the IN’s DND and its captive centre of excellence—the Weapons & Electronics Systems Engineering Establishment (WESEE)—along with MDL, have succeeded in fabricating and delivering an engineering marvel, despite several institutional handicaps. For instance, designing and building the main mast housing the EL/M-2248 was no small achievement. This APAR comprises four 3 x 3-metre fixed-array faces (each weighing 1,500kg) based on a modular tile-array architecture providing full 360-degree coverage. Liquid cooling is used to dissipate heat at the arrays. The EL/M-2248’s on-board processors and power-suppliers together weigh 900kg and are housed within six cabinets--two for the processors and four for the power-supply hardware. The entire MF-STAR suite thus weighs 6,900kg. In addition to 3-D long-range airspace volume search, the EL/M-2248 simultaneously provides ASCM approach warning; target classification; maritime surface surveillance; active and semi-active SAM support; fire-control for the OTOBreda 76/62 SRGM; and multiple targets engagement capabilities. It can detect a combat aircraft flying at high altitude at ranges of up to 250km, while an incoming ASCM can be detected at ranges of up to 25km.

The INS Kolkata’s CMS-15A combat management system (CMS), developed by the WESEE, includes the IAI-developed  Weapon Control System (WCS), which performs threat evaluation and resource allocation functions, thereby optimising the capabilities of the CMS. The WCS thus provides simultaneous long-range volume search, threat alert, target verification/acquisition, target classification, track-while-search, and dedicated track, multi-long-range intercept support, and kill assessment capabilities. It is also characterised by:

* Wide intercept envelopes against a wide variety of targets.

* Quick reaction, short response time and minimum intercept range, these being crucial in scenarios of late target detection, high-speed attacking weapons, and restrained response policy.

* Long-range area defence.

* Effective against targets from low-altitude to their maximum operational flight altitude.

* Simultaneous multi-target engagement capability and multi-missile co-existence capability for ensuring effectiveness against saturation attacks. 

* De-confliction and coordination capabilities in dense and complex scenarios.

* Advanced ECCM features.

* Built-in threat evaluation, resources allocation and engagement coordination with other on-board defence systems.

* 2-way data-link with LR-SAMs (housed within eight 8-cell modules each weighing 1,700kg) increases mission success and target selectivity by providing the missile with real-time in-flight targetting updates, and providing real-time kill assessment to support shoot-look-shoot operations.

* Multi-system interoperability (task force-level as well as carrier battle group-level operations), under which each system may operate either as a standalone unit, supported by own sensors for engagement and guidance; or integrated in a multi-warship task force. Joint task force-level operation enables coordinated engagement of threats, mission optimisation (engaging each target with the optimal interceptor, in the optimal time) and resource sharing.

* Advanced Net-of-Nets architecture to ensure interoperability with other air-defence assets, such as remote/airborne radars mounted on aerostats) and external command-and-control centres).

* The Barak-8 LR-SAM’s flexible dual-pulse motor propulsion system provides high manoeuvrability at target interception range throughout its wide envelope.

* High-performance missile warhead specially designed for catering to a wide variety of airborne targets, and which guarantees robust target destruction.

* Built-in fratricide avoidance for undertaking safe air-defence operations near friendly air-traffic.

* Gunnery support capability, including combined missiles/gun engagement.

Expected To Go On-Board In Future

 Or

Though it was way back in late 2007 that the IN was introduced to the concept of operating remote-controlled RHIBs equipped with dunking sonars, it was only in late 2011 that the IN decided to acquire such systems since, unlike active/passive towed-array variable-depth sonar, the dunking sonar-on-a-RHIB can be operated in both shallow and deep waters (up to an operational depth of 300 metres or 985 feet), are easily and quickly deployed, are much cheaper and impose no restrictions whatsoever on warship manoeuvrability, especially in situations when a warship is being engaged by wire-guided heavyweight torpedoes. It is for all these reasons that the IN in early 2012 refused to order either the NAGAN active/passive towed-array variable-depth sonar that was being developed by the DRDO’s Naval Physical & Oceanographic Labs (NPOL) or the ATLAS Elektronik-developed ATAS, which had earlier been selected after competitive bidding for the three Project 15 DDGs and three Project 1135.6 Batch-1 FFGs. The IN now plans to acquire a few ROVs from Textron Systems and equip them with the NPOL-developed LFDS, with all structural and systems integration work being done by a joint team of personnel hailing from NPOL and WESEE.

But what accounts for the long delays in commissioning INS Kolkata? Obviously, MDL cannot be blamed since it is the IN’s DND that was unable to freeze the Project 15A DDG’s design concept well before the commencement of hull construction. Another reason for the delay has been the WESEE’s inability to build either a dedicated shore-based facility for undertaking weapons-and-systems integration R & D, or to acquire a test vessel for on-board tests-and-trials of various sensors, weapon systems and propulsion sub-systems. Contrast this with what China’s PLA Navy (PLAN) has done for undertaking similar activities: at the PLAN’s Wuhan Naval Research Facility at Huangjia Lake southeast of Wuhan, a giant full-scale replica of the top-deck, island and citadel of the PLAN’s first aircraft carrier (Liaoning 16) was built, and a similar effort is now underway there to build a full-scale mock-up of the citadel and integrated mast of the PLAN’s futuristic Type 055 DDG.  

In addition, since March 1997, the PLAN has acquired at least three test vessels, with the first of these being the 6,000-tonne Dahua-class vessel (Shiyan 891) that was built by Shanghai-based Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard and became operational in January 1998. The second such vessel—Hua Luogeng 892—was commissioned in August 2005. The third vessel—893—was commissioned in November 2011. It features a raised-bow breakwater to reduce water over the bow and a never-before-seen 30-feet-tall, 3-feet-diameter SATCOMS antenna on the forecastle. The ship has an enclosed foremast instead of the latticework mast structures found on 891 and 892. The foremast’s three yardarms feature new paired round flat-faced ESM antennae, plus radomes housing weapons targetting Ku-band and UHF-band data-link antenna. 

Blindly Muddling Through With Eyes Wide Open

This, at best sums up the approach taken by those ‘desi’ journalists who, until recently, had vociferously alleged that the deal to acquire 12 AW-101 VVIP transportation helicopters from UK-based AgustaWestland was a tainted one. And the reason these ‘desi’ nitwits went totally off course was that instead of concluding that 2 + 2 = 4, they ASSUMED—based only on circumstantial evidence—that 2 + 2 = 22. No wonder they are all now in collective shock after an Italian court decided that all charges of international corruption would be dropped against Finmeccanica (the Italy-based holding company of AgustaWestland), and Finmeccanica would only pay a “negligible fine” for falsifying invoices, but this was “not in any way an admission of any wrongdoing or liability” by Finmeccanica. What this means I will explain later, but let us now examine how the ‘desi’ journalists missed the woods for the trees by, first, misinterpreting facts, and second, by jumping to untenable conclusions. 

The investigation into charges of international corruption involving Finmeccanica commenced in 2011 after an open succession war between Francesco Guarguanglini, who was then heading Finmeccanica, and his successor, Giuseppe Orsi, who in 2011 was Finmeccanica’s Chairman and CEO. In late 2012, when Silvio Berlusconi’s coalition government, which had as coalition partners parties such as the far-right Lega Nord (which was alleged to have received financial kickbacks), was replaced by one led by technocrat Mario Monti, this reportedly prompted Lorenzo Borgogni, a former top employee of Finmeccanica and an Orsi-baiter, to blow the whistle on the Rs 3,546 crore (Euro 556 million, or US$757 million) AW-101 contract, which had been inked on February 8, 2010. Borgogni told prosecutors in a detailed statement that kickbacks were allegedly paid by AgustaWestland for securing the AW-101 contract through the use of middlemen and that the total amount of financial kickbacks came up to Euro 51 million (Rs.362 crore). Borgogni detailed how the money was paid through a network of middlemen and consultants like Guido Ralph Haschke, Carlo Gerosa and Christian Michel, with the main allegation being that at least Euro 10 million was funnelled back to Italy and paid to the Lega Nord political party in return for its support to Orsi’s bid to become Chairman and CEO of Finmeccanica. In his statement, Borgogni said that Finmeccanica had decided to divert Euro 21 million for commissions meant for Europe-based consultants, knowing how risky it was to hire Indian citizens as agents for securing Indian military procurement contracts.

Borgogni had alleged that the Euro 21 million was generated through inflated bills and bogus engineering contracts, with regular monthly tranches of payments being made between 2007 and 2011. These payments averaged to a Euro 55,0000 per month towards the end. Guido Haschke, on the other hand, had claimed in his confession that he received a kickback of Euro 20 million of which Euro 400,000 was paid off to the brothers Juli ‘Jolly’ Tyagi, Docsa Tyagi and Sandeep (Julie) Tyagi, who in turn allegedly transferred a certain amount of money, not yet quantified, to ACM S P Tyagi, CAS of the Indian Air Force (IAF) from 2004 to 2007. In addition, another Euro 11.6 million came through inflated bills and invoices that were in the guise of engineering contracts placed with IDS Infotech, a Tunisia based engineering consultancy. While Guido Ralph Haschke is the CEO and partner of GADIT SA of Lugano and Tunis-based GORDIAN SERVICES SARL, Carlo Gerosa is Haschke's partner in the above companies (as well as in Chandigarh-based Aeromatrix, an engineering and IT outsourcing company), and British citizen Christian Michel is the owner of London-based Global Service Trade Commerce, and of Dubai-based Global Service FZE. Allegedly, Finmeccanica first paid the sum of Euro 400,000 to Haschke and Gerosa, through a consultancy contract between AgustaWestland and Gordian Services SARL. Later, these two signed engineering contracts with companies IDS Infotech India and IDS Infotech Tunisia, allegedly to cover up the payments of money to pay unidentified Govt of India officials. Christian Michel allegedly received Euro 30 million for supporting the corruptive activities meant to bag the AW-101 order. The first kickbacks, however, were allegedly made as early as on December 6, 2005, with Haschke receiving Euro 100,000 through an India Services Agreement vide letter AG/ME/05/188 by AgustaWestland to Haschke's Gordian Services SARL. This agreement was renewed for the next three years through more follow-on agreements, including one marked AG/ME/06/235 and sent by AgustaWestland.

AgustaWestland’s contract with IDS Infotech had promised a payment of 5% of the value of the AW-101 deal. The contract was signed on January 1, 2007 and said that AgustaWestland will utilise its engineering activity and consultancy if it secures the AW-101 order. It also said that AgustaWestland would avail the engineering, design and software services of IDS once the sale & purchase agreement is signed by AgustaWestland and the Govt of India. Payment records have shown that AgustaWestland made regular transfers to IDS Infotech between 2007 and 2011 through Tunisia, totalling over Euro 21 million, which is just under 5% of the total value of the AW-101 contract.

One contract (known as post-contract services agreement) worth Euro 6 million (paid in 22 installments of Euro 275,000 each), placed with Michel’s Global Services FZE by AgustaWestland, was meant for ensuring positive media coverage of the AW-101 deal. This agreement also stated that Michel was required to ‘advise and assist’ AgustaWestland in all aspects of performing the contract and provide it with details of changes in the laws pertaining to India’s MoD procurement procedures. Michel was also required to identify and inform AgustaWestland of any hostile press activity that may have impacted on the execution of the contract, in addition to assisting AgustaWestland in the development of risk mitigation strategies to minimise the impact of any hostile press activities, and also give routine feedback on Indian media activity. Such payments were indeed made after the AW-101 contract was signed. For instance, Euro 275,000 was paid to Michel’s company account 60601358922302 in Lloyds TSB Bank’s Dubai branch on May 5, 2010. In another transaction, the same amount was debited from AgustaWestland’s Barclays bank account number 52773044 to Michel’s Dubai account on August 3, 2011.

Plausible Inferences

Following the Italian court’s recent verdict, it can now be stated with certainty that A) there is no prima facie evidence of any kind of wrongdoing, such as engaging in bribery, international corruption or contract violation; and B) the case was always about ‘falsifying invoices’ in order to ensure compliance with contract implementation. Explained further, what this means is that as per the MoD’s Defence Procurement Procedures, if the contracted OEM cannot ensure full compliance with the agreed-upon quantum of direct industrial offsets, then the OEM is mandatorily required—as penalty—to surrender a quantum of funds amounting to 5% of contract value to the MoD. In fact, this is exactly what Fincantieri SPA of Italy did three years ago when it voluntarily paid back to the MoD 5% of the contract value of the Euro 159.32 million procurement contract for two fleet replenishment tankers that were ordered for the Indian Navy back in October 2008. Therefore, in all probability, what Finmeccanica and AgustaWestland did together was create the façade of trying to fulfill their mandatory direct industrial offset obligations in the hope of not being required to surrender the amount of 5% of contract value back to the MoD.

It is also now abundantly clear that AgustaWestland never had to solicit anyone’s help either within India or outside for securing the AW-101 contract. How come? Simply because the three-engined AW-101 was from Day-1 the only viable contender to satisfy an operational requirement whose prime prerequisite was the provision of the best degree of survivability. That’s precisely the reason why the AW-101 was selected in the previous decade by the US Marines and the US Secret Service for serving as the primary VVIP transportation helicopter for the US President. In fact, the IAF and the Special Protection Group had to do hardly any spadework in terms of evaluations and bidding processes, and whatever was eventually done by both was to merely ensure the façade of conducting a global, competitive bidding process. No wonder the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) has to date registered hardly any progress in its investigations, despite it taking just days to file a First Information Report (FIR) in March 2013 against ACM (Ret’d) S P Tyagi, and 12 others, alleging cheating and criminal conspiracy, and subsequently interviewing ACM (Ret’d) Tyagi, former National Security Adviser M K Narayanan, former Special SPG Director B V Wanchoo, and former Intelligence Bureau Director, E S L Narasimhan.

But that still does not explain why the services of the three Tyagi brothers were enlisted by Haschke and Gerosa. The only plausible reason for this that their services were enlisted for lobbying on behalf of AgustaWestland with various potential civilian helicopters operators—a crucial point totally overlooked by both the ‘desi’ journalists as well as the CBI. For, unknown to many is the fact that the projected civilian helicopter market in India will be at least thrice the size of the country’s combined military helicopter market between now and 2020. Potential customers include the various state governments, private hospitals, and corporate charter companies specialising in servicing the private tourist charter market as well as providing offshore helicopter services to the oil-n-gas industry in India.

Presently, the market leader in all these sectors is US-based Bell Helicopters, which has sold more than 100 helicopters, inclusive of the Bell 407, Bell 412EP and Bell 430. Coming next is AgustaWestland with its already-sold A-109E Power and AW-139. Next comes Eurocopter with its Dauphin-2s, AS.355 Twinstar and EC-135, and lastly followed by Sikorsky with its S-76C and S-76C++ variants. Over the years, the AW-139 has emerged as the choice favourite for both various state governments as well as private air-charter companies like Global Vectra Helicorp Ltd, Heligo Charters Pvt Ltd and India Flysafe Aviation Ltd. The AW-139 is also the frontrunner for meeting the Indian Coast Guard Service’s requirement for 14 shipborne medium-lift SAR helicopters, as well as for replacing Pawan Hans’ existing fleet of Dauphin 2s. And since neither state governments nor state-owned entities like Pawan Hans are subjected to stringent procurement norms of the type codified by the MoD, an intense ‘do-whatever-it-takes’ lobbying effort is always required in order to taste success. The CBI would therefore be well-advised to explore this particular angle, instead of groping in the dark with the AW-101 deal. 

But way beyond all this, the greatest damage to India, her MoD and the IAF has been done by none other than the former Raksha Mantri, Arakkaparambil Kurian Antony. And here’s why. By unilaterally terminating the contract on January 1, 2014 after only three AW-101s had been delivered, Antony for all intents and purposes created a horrendous precedent by WRONGLY admitting, without any prima facie evidence on hand, that the MoD’s procurement procedures were deeply flawed, and that they had loopholes despite the most stringent, redundant and multi-tiered checks-and-balances having been put in place. Translated into layman’s terms, what this means is that each and every procurement decision either already taken or to be taken by the MoD can now be easily challenged and even reversed by anyone who is not a wellwisher of India. Needdless to say, Antony has caused incalculable damage to the IAF’s hard-won institutional reputation.   

What Antony should have done was await the legal verdict from the Italian courts and based on the verdict’s pronouncements, he should have decided on the next step forward, i.e. if AgustaWestland and/or Finmeccanica were guilty of violating the MoD’s contractual norms and procedures, then by all means go full-speed ahead to seek financial compensation through liquidated damages from the OEM. What eventually happened was exactly the opposite, i.e. the MoD unilaterally encashed the bank guarantees worth about Rs.2,200 crore that had been provided by AgustaWestland to the State Bank of India, and followed it by terminating the AW-101 contract. Consequently, the nett loser in this sordid episode is once again the end-user, i.e. the IAF. Therefore, it is now more than obvious that when the UPA-2 coalition government decided to terminate the AW-101 contract, its decision was based purely on its own non-negotiable prospects for political survival, with the country’s supreme national interests becoming totally negotiable.     

The Future

To be honest, it’s quite bleak for the IAF’s VVIP transportation aircraft fleet at this point in time. And that’s because the IAF now has no other choice but to go for a VVIP transportation variant of the Mi-17V-5 helicopter. In this helicopter, the main gearbox drives the hydraulic pumps, which supply hydraulic power for the flying controls. Though the Mi-17V-5’s hydraulic system has a main and standby channel and both of them have independent tanks, pumps, accumulators and pipelines, both the pipelines feed only a single booster, which in turn moves the control surfaces. Though there are a total of four boosters in the system, one critical weakness is that if there is a leakage in any of the four boosters, there is a possibility of the entire oil from both the main and the standby systems leaking out. The mandated emergency procedure for a total hydraulic failure is to have both pilots flying the Mi-17V-5 in unison to a landing. As per the Flight Manual of this helicopter, the aircrew is required to abandon the Mi-17V-5 in case of total hydraulic failure. In case they cannot, then they have to resort to flying by both pilots to land immediately. Therefore, the procedure given in the Mi-17V-5’s Flight Manual for total hydraulic failure does not inspire confidence in those helicopter pilots who are certified for VVIP transportation. All of them feel that this helicopter cannot be flown with a total hydraulic failure, and that this aircraft cannot even be taxied on ground with total hydraulic failure.

Consequently, the only available common-sensical and logical option now left on the table is to bite the bullet, restore the bank guarantee that’s already been encashed, and commence negotiations with AgustaWestland for both a revised delivery schedule for the remaining AW-101s and for restoring the already-delivered AW-101s back to flightworthy condition. To even contemplate doing anything else to replace the AW-101s will only result in fatal disasters in future—this being the writing on the wall and not just a mere prophecy.

44th Successful Firing Of BrahMos-1 Supersonic LACM

The third successful test-firing of the BrahMos-1 Block-3 supersonic land-attack cruise missile took place at 10.38am on July 8, 2014 from the Integrated Test Range (ITR) at Chandipur in Balasore, Odisha. Following its launch, the missile flew through the designated 290km distance at Mach 2.8, culminating in a steep dive toward its designated target. Dr A Sivathanu Pillai, CEO and MD of BrahMos Aerospace, confirmed that it was a text book launch achieving 100% results, executed with high-precision from a wheeled Mobile Autonomous Launcher (MAL) prepared by the Indian Army’s 3^rd BrahMos-1 regiment (the two earlier regiments possess the BrahMos-1 Block-2 missiles), which is now being formed. In a historical first, the Block 3 missile’s advanced navigation-cum-guidance system used an indigenously developed software algorithm for integrating inputs from multiple GPS navigation satellites (like Glonass & IRNSS-1).