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Sunday, August 9, 2015

PLAAF's BMD Network Takes Shape, As Do New Nuclear WMD Delivery Missiles

China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has taken the first concrete step towards the establishment of a national ballistic missile defence (BMD) system with the construction of an initial two long-range C-band active phased-array radar systems (LPAR). The first such LPAR is already operational north of Huian in Fujian Province, facing Taiwan, while the second LPAR is now being built in Sichuan province, meaning it will be India-specific. 
The LPAR north of Huian is made up of a single octagonal antenna-array of a CEIEC-developed C-band active phased-array radar that is located at Dongjing Shan, which is close to the PLAAF’s Huian-based electronic warfare (EW) facility in Fujian Province. This EW facility has been optimised to cause electronic degradation of Taiwan’s UHF-band Raytheon-supplied FPS-115 LPAR system at Leshan Mountain in Hsinchu County.
Construction of the PLAAF’s first new-generation LPAR commenced in 2008, and its hilltop-mounted octagonal fixed-array is boresighted along an azimuth of approximately 144 degrees. With an assumed coverage of +/-60 degrees in azimuth, this LPAR is theoretically capable of monitoring the entire Taiwan Strait region, as well as the southern approaches to the South China Sea. This LPAR can thus be used for providing long-range coverage extending north to Japan and to The Philippines.
So far, China has not yet revealed the design of the LR-SAM that will be used for BMD, but it is estimated that the final end-product, still undergoing development, will bear a close resemblance to Russia’s 9M82 and 9M83 family of hyper-velocity LR-SAMs.
Taiwan’s FPS-115 LPAR has been fully operational since February 2013. Its procurements origins date back to 2000 when its sale was approved by the Clinton Administration under the Surveillance Radar Programme (SRP). Competing against Lockheed martin, Raytheon won the $800 million contract in 2004 and began sub-systems deliveries in 2009. Construction delays due to landslides and technical issues forced Taiwan to agree to pay an additional $397 million in charges to finish the SRP, which has been described as being one of the most unique long-range airspace surveillance systems ever built. Japan is now attempting to catch up with the fielding of Raytheon-built AN/TPY-2 long-range, X-Band air-defence radars, which were originally designed as ground-based mobile target acquisition-cum-engagement radars for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system.
This LPAR is reported to have a range of 5,000km (3,100nm), and it is able to track a golf ball-sized target out to 3,000km. Taiwan can see almost all of China’s significant combat aircraft sorties and exercises from this radar. The requirement for such a powerful surveillance platform came about at China’s instigation. During the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis, China had launched ten DF-15 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) into the waters north and south of Taiwan. The intent was to discourage Taiwan from conducting its first democratic elections, but it failed. The US had then responded by sending two aircraft carrier battle groups to the area as a show of support. At that time, the PLA’s 2nd Artillery Corps had approximately 350 DF-11/DF-15 SRBMs, but today that number is about 1,100. Taiwan responded to the threat by procuring three Batteries of Raytheon MIM-104 Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) LR-SAMs for $1.3 billion. These were stationed around the capital city of Taipei, leaving much of the central and southern part of the island unprotected, except for a US-supplied air-defence missile system (supplied by GTE-Sylvania) in the late 1980s and using Taiwan-developed LR-SAMs, with the entire system being known as the Tien Kung 2 (Sky Bow-2). 
Though Taiwan’s military and the US Pentagon pushed Taiwan to proceed with the procurement of the MIM-104 Patriot PAC-3 systems, domestic politics in Taiwan slowed progress on the deal until 2007, when the US released a ‘Patriot Configuration 2 Ground Systems Upgrade’ for the older PAC-2s for $939 million. In 2008, the US released 330 PAC-3 missiles, and in 2010, the US released an additional 114 PAC-3 missiles.
The US Air Force’s Defense Security Program (DSP) reportedly has real-time access to the data collected by Taiwan’s FPS-115 LPAR. The DSP monitors ballistic missile launches and nuclear detonations worldwide. The US in turn has reportedly given Taiwan free real-time access to early warning alerts generated by the DSP’s SBIRS satellite constellation since the last 10 years as quid pro quo.

Genesis of China’s R & D on BMD
It was on December 15, 1963 that Chairman Mao Zedong said that China’s military strategy was defensive in nature, and therefore China should develop defensive (strategic) weapons as well as offensive weapons such as nuclear weapons and their delivery platforms. On February 6, 1964, during his meeting with Dr Qian Xuesen (the Father of Chinese Rocketry), Mao again expressed his views on the importance of ballistic missile defence (BMD) capabilities. This conversation, later known as ‘640 Directive’, cascaded to China’s military-industrial and R & D infrastructure as Mao’s order to develop a BMD system. On March 23, 1964, more than 30 top scientists of China attended a meeting organised by the Commission of Science, Technology & Industry for National Defence (COSTIND) in Beijing to discuss the feasibility of a BMD system. On May 10, 1965, the Central Special Committee issued a notice to the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Ministry of Machinery Industry, China Academy of Science, PLA’s 2nd Artillery Corps, and Base 20, asking them to list BMD in their annual and long-term plans. A plan BMD development submitted by COSTIND was approved by the Central Special Committee in August 1965. On February 23, 1966, COSTIND organised another conference to outline detailed R & D plans for the proposed BMD system, which was given a codename ‘Project 640’.The plan called for the total R & D endeavour to be divided into five key sub-areas. Key elements of the project included the ‘FanJi’ (Counterattack) family of interceptor missiles, the Xian Feng (Pioneer) anti-missile super gun, and a land-based ballistic missile early warning network. The meeting also decided to speed up the building of a dedicated BMD test-range and the development of the nuclear warhead for the ‘Fanji’ missile. Full-scale development work commenced in the early 1970s. Under the instruction of the then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, the 2nd Academy of the 7th Ministry of Machinery Industry (later the Ministry of Aerospace Industry) was officially renamed as the Academy of Anti-Ballistic Missile & Anti-Satellite in 1969, and became the nodal institution for developing a functional BMD system. Its subordinated 210 Institute was charged with developing of the anti-missile super gun. Shanghai Institute of Optics & Fine Mechanics was responsible for the development of a high-power anti-missile laser. The 2nd Academy also began to develop the anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon technology in the early 1970s. Project 640, however, faced enormous technical and financial difficulties from the very beginning. China, troubled by its financial hardships and internal political turmoil due to the ‘Cultural Revolution’, was simply unable to support an expensive R & D endeavour like this. Additionally, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the US and the USSR and later the scrapping of the US Safeguard ABM system made a Chinese BMD network seemingly unnecessary. After Mao’s death in 1976, all related R & D work began to slow down. In March 1980, China’s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping decided to terminate the entire project.

The FanJi-1 was a two-stage, semi-active radar-homing, hypersonic interceptor missile designed to intercept ballistic missile warheads at low- to medium-altitudes. The first-stage of the missile used liquid propellant and the second-stage used solid propellant. The missile was 14 metres in length. Flight tests of two dummy missiles were carried out successfully in August and September 1979. Between October 1971 and April 1972, the 2nd Academy conducted six flight-tests of a 1:5 scale-model of the FanJi-2 low-altitude interceptor missile, with five of them being successful. R & D work on this missile was terminated in 1973. The FanJi-3 high-altitude interceptor missile was proposed by the 2nd Academy in 1974, but all R & D activity ceased in 1977.

The ‘XianFeng’ super gun developed by the 210 Institute was given the codename ‘Project 640-2’. Initial research was carried out on a 140mm smoothbore cannon, which fired a 18kg projectiles to a maximum distance of 74km. First proposed in January 1967, the ‘Xianfeng’ was 26 metres in length and weighed 155 tonnes. Mounted on a fixed gun-rack, the 420mm-calibre super gun was designed to fire 160kg unguided rocket-propelled projectiles to intercept incoming nuclear warheads. Various test-firings were carried out in the early 1970s, but the design proved to be impractical. All R & D work was put on hold in 1977, and was followed by project termination in March 1980.


R & D work on a ground-based ballistic missile early warning radar network was much more productive. Phase-1 of this project included six early warning stations located in Khashi, Nanning, Kunming, Hainan, Jiaodong, and Xiangxi; and a command-and-control centre in Weinan (No.28 Station). Later, the network also included a data-processing station codenamed ‘Qin Ling’, a tracking station codenamed ‘Chang Jiang’, a land-mobile tracking station codenamed ‘Qian Shao’, a second land-mobile tracking station codenamed ‘Huang He’, and an additional early warning station codenamed ‘Chang Cheng’, located in Changchun. Key elements of the early warning network included a Type 7010 passive phased-array early radar and a Type 110 monopulse missile tracking radar. The Type 7010 radar was developed by the Nanjing-based 14th Electronic Institute between 1970 and 1976,. The 40-metre by 20-metre radar antenna was built on the Huangyang Mountain slope 1,600 metres above sea level in Xuanhua, Hebei Province, about 140km northwest of Beijing. A second site was built in Henan Province. These radar sites were abandoned in the early 1990s. The Type 110 radar was developed jointly by 14th Electronic Institute and the Electronic Institute of the China Academy of Science in the 1970s. The radar antenna was 25 metres in diameter, weighed 400 tonnes, and was housed in a large radome measuring 36.5 metres in height and 44 metres in diameter. The radar became fully operational in 1977, with only one station built at the Zhanyi Space/Missile Tracking Station in southern Yunnan Province. Following the cancellation of Project 640, this radar became part of China’s space tracking, telemetry and command (TT & C) network in the 1980s.


New Delivery Systems On The Anvil
The older conventionally-armed DF-21 and nuclear-armed DF-21A MRBMs are now being replaced by newer conventionally-armed DF-21Cs and nuclear-armed DF-21Ds. The PLA’s 2nd Artillery Corps is presently estimated to possess some 78 TELs of DF-21As, 39 TELs of DF-21Cs, and 16 TELs of 16 DF-21Ds, with two reload missiles for each TEL. 
The DF-21Cs are now deployed 230km west of Delingha in Qinghai Province. The DF-21Ds are deployed in Yunnan Province.
Now entering series-production is the 1,000km-range road-mobile DF-16 nuclear-armed tactical ballistic missile (TBM), which will eventually replace the solid-fuelled single-stage 600km-range road-mobile DF-15 and solid-fuelled single-stage 280km-range DF-11 TBMs. 
In addition, a new-generation road-mobile 4,000km-range MRBM is now under development and its maiden test-flight is due for later this year.
Lastly, an extended-range (1,800km-range) version of the CJ-10 GLCM is now being flight-tested. Mounted on a 12 x 12 TEL that also has a built-in SATCOM system, this new cruise missile (two missiles per TEL) will supercede the existing 1,000km-range CJ-10 GLCMs that are fired from 8 x 8 TELs each of which carry three cannister-encased CJ-10s.
 
All the above-mentioned strategic weapons have been/are being developed by a consortium of R & D institutions led by the China Aerospace Science & Technology Corp’s (CASC) 3rd Aerospace Academy (also known as China Haiying Electro-Mechanical Technology Academy or CHETA, or the 066 Base in Hubei), and including the 8359 Research Institute, the Beijing University for Aeronautics & Astronautics, Shanghai Jiaotong University, China State Electronics Systems Engineering Corp, Sichuan Aerospace Industry Corp, Tianjin Institute for Power Sources, 624 Engine Design Institute (or the China Gas Turbine Establishment, GTE), and the Sanjiang Aerospace Group in Yuanan, 210km west of Beijing in Hubei province.

Saturday, August 1, 2015

New-Generation IRST Systems From China

 The above is a laser designation pod that also mounts an integral IRST sensor. 
 Shown above and below are IRST sensors that have multiple mounting options, ranging from combat aircraft to helicopters and warships.
 Shown below are multi-function optronic turrets with various mounting options.

Sunday, July 5, 2015

Spooks: Ours And Theirs

Here is what we do or like to do:
And what follows below is how it is done by a superpower:
He was reportedly the most successful and valued agent/asset the United States had run inside the Soviet Union in two decades. His documents and drawings had unlocked the secrets of several of the USSR’s radars and guided-weapons R & D years into the future. He had even smuggled circuit-boards and blueprints out of the R & D laboratories where he was working. His espionage thus put the US in a position to dominate the skies over hostile airspace and confirmed the vulnerability of USSR-developed air-defence networks. The agent was Adolf Tolkachev, an engineer and specialist in airborne radars who worked deep inside the Soviet military-industrial complex. Over a six-year perriod, Tolkachev met with his CIA handlers 21 times on the streets of Moscow. Tolkachev’s story has now been detailed in 944 pages of previously secret CIA cables about the operation that was declassified without condition for the forthcoming book, ‘The Billion Dollar Spy’.  The CIA did not review the book before publication. The documents and interviews with the participants offer a remarkably detailed picture of how military-industrial espionage was conducted in the USSR during some of the most tense years of the Cold War. Tolkachev was driven by a desire to avenge history. His wife’s mother was executed and her father sent to forced-labour camps during Stalin’s Great Terror of the 1930s. He also described himself as disillusioned with communism and “a dissident at heart”. He wanted to strike back at the USSR, and did so by betraying its military secrets to the US.
His CIA case officers often observed that he seemed determined to cause the maximum damage possible to the Soviet Union, despite the risks. The punishment for treason was execution. Tolkachev did not want to die at the hands of the KGB. Therefore, he asked for and got a suicide pill from the CIA he could use if caught. The US Air Force estimated at one point in the operation that Tolkachev’s espionage had saved the United States $2 billion in weapons R & D. Tolkachev used to smuggle most of the secret documents out of his office during lunch-hour hidden in his overcoat, and photographed them using a Pentax 35mm camera clamped to a chair in his apartment. In return, Tolkachev asked the CIA for money, mostly as a sign of respect. There wasn’t much to buy in shortage-plagued Moscow in those days. He also wanted albums of Western music—the Beatles, Led Zeppelin, Uriah Heep and others—for his teenage son. Tolkachev thus became one of the CIA’s most productive agents of the Cold War.
Documentation supplied by Tolkachev by late 1983 had included: complete sets of engineering and technical data-packages of Phazatron NIIR’s 385kg N-019 Rubin RPLK-29/Sapfir-29 pulse-Doppler radar with twist-cassegrain antenna and its successor, the NO19MP Topaz—both meant for the MiG-29B-12 and MiG-29B-13; complete sets of engineering and technical data-packages of JSC V Tikhomirov Scientific Research Institute of Instrument Design’s N-001 Myech/RPLK-27 X-band pulse-Doppler radar with twist-cassegrain antenna for the Su-27SK; complete sets of engineering and technical data-packages of the Zaslon RP-31/N-007 PESA radar on-board the MiG-31; complete sets of engineering and technical data-packages of the Shmel 3-D radar for the Beriev A-50 AEW & CS from NPO Vega; and complete sets of engineering and technical data-packages of both 2K12 Kub MR-SAM family and the Buk-М1 MR-SAM.

Thursday, June 18, 2015

Myanmar Opts For CATIC's FC-1 Light MRCA

Myanmar last March became the second export customer (after Pakistan) for the FC-1 ‘Xiaolong’ light multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) when it inked a contract with the Chinas Aero Technology Import-Export Corp (CATIC) for an initial 12 aircraft along with a cockpit procedures trainer, while retaining the option to procure another 12 at a later date.
Deliveries are scheduled to begin in December 2017 and these FC-1s will eventually replace Myanmar’s existing Xi’an F-7M Airguard and Nanchang A-5IIIC combat aircraft, which had been procured in the early 1990s.
The FC-1’s formal R & D process began when Pakistan inked a procurement contract with CATIC in 1999. 
The MRCA’s design was frozen by China’s 611 Institute in February 2001. Subsequently, six flying prototypes were built by the Chengdu Aircraft Corp (CAC). The first prototype was rolled out on May 31, 2003 and its maiden flight took place on August 25, 2003. The third prototype, built to series-production standards, first flew on April 9, 2004. The fourth prototype flew in April 2006. 
The first tranche of six FC-1s, known as JF-17 Thunder Block-1, was delivered in flyaway condition to the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) between March and April 2008. 
Following this, a supplementary contract for 42 more JF-17s was inked on March 7, 2009. Of these, only the first two were delivered in flyaway condition, while the remaining were supplied in semi-knocked-down (SKD) condition to the Kamra-based Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC). The first PAC-assembled JF-17 was rolled out on November 23, 2009. 
To date, CAC has delivered 50 JF-17 Block-1s and four JF-17 Block-2s (featuring a fixed aerial refuelling probe), with another 46 JF-17 Block-2s due for delivery by 2020. CAC is building them at a rate of eight per year. 
The RD-93 turbofans for both the FC-1 and its JF-17 version are produced by the Moscow-based Chernyshev Machine-Building Plant, a subsidiary of Russia’s United Engines Corp (UEC) and supplied to CATIC.
The PAF plans to procure 50 Block-3 versions of the JF-17 in the following decade and each of these are likely to be equipped with a FWS-13 Taishan turbofan (now being flight-tested on board an IL-76MD testbed at the PLAAF’s China Flight Test Establishment at Xian-Yanliang air base in Xi’an, Sha'anxi province), passive electronically scanned array multi-mode radar (PESA-MMR) along with a CATIC-supplied  infra-red search-and-track (IRST) sensor and a Sicong Group-developed helmet-mounted display system (HMDS).
CATIC is presently developing the JFT-17, a tandem-seat operational conversion trainer that is expected to make its maiden flight by the year’s end.
Data On FC-1’s Avionics Suite
FC-1’s Weapons Package
The CPMIEC-developed CM-400AKG supersonic air-launched ASCM has a terminal cruise speed of Mach 3 and a maximum range of 120km.