While it is indeed true that in some
sectors along the LAC, the deployed Indian armed/paramilitary forces actually far
outnumber their PLA counterparts, the principal problem is that of the
acute lack of road/rail transportation infrastructure along most of the LAC
(i.e. leading right up to the LAC) due to the indecisions of India’s Ministry
of Environment & Forests, meaning that in times of crisis, rapid
deployment of forces required for border domination will not be that
rapid, since forward deployments will be heavily reliant on the IAF’s
availability of its limited fleet of medium-lift utility helicopters that's
available from its Central & Eastern Air Commands. No less than 60
Mi-17V-5s and CH-47F-type helicopters are required for full-time deployments
with these two IAF Commands.
When it comes to the dynamics of
India-PRC politico-military relations, they are best evident in Sikkim, where
India has the highest concentration of troops anywhere in the world against a
virtually non-existent adversary. India’s entire XXXIII Corps and elements of
Assam Rifles are pitted against meagre BDR detachments. In terms of numbers,
India has allocated nearly 40,000 troops for Sikkim, of which 8,000 are now
physically holding forward positions against about 400 BDR personnel located
20km away from the LAC. The Indian Army has thus adopted a defensive posture,
with the unsaid political directive that every inch of Indian territory must be
guarded. The consequent Indian military posture against China is to maintain
full strategic defence with minor tactical offensive capabilities. Given the
politico-operational compulsions, difficult terrain, and the PLA’s track
record, it is clear that the Indian Army is doing an onerous task. Sikkim has
an area of approximately 8,000sqkm, measuring 113km north to south, and 64km
from east to west with heights rising up to 28,000 feet. Militarily, the state
is divided into north and east Sikkim. Due to a central massif, north Sikkim is
further divided into the Muguthang Valley in the west, the Kerang Plateau in
the east, and north-east Sikkim. The Lachung, Lachen and Muguthang Valleys in
north Sikkim prevent any lateral movement. Of the 14 passes along the
206km-long Sikkim-TAR border, six are all-weather, implying that these are open
throughout the year. Three each of these passes are in north and east Sikkim,
these being Kongra La, Bomcho La, Sese La, Nathu La (at 14,438 feet in east
Sikkim), Batang La and Doka La. Unlike the passes in north-eastern and eastern
Sikkim, the passes on the watershed border in north Sikkim are fairly wide and
motorable. Being windswept, they remain relatively free from snow and are open
throughout the year. The watershed and the adjoining Tibetan Plateau are devoid
of any cover. The terrain in north and north-east Sikkim is more difficult,
rugged and formidable, with the altitude rising suddenly and steeply (one can
travel from 5,000 feet to 14,000 feet in just about 60km) than east Sikkim,
where surface communications are better developed due to its proximity to the
north Bengal plains. India’s 435km-long border with Nepal includes a 125km
border between Nepal and Sikkim, of which about 50km is most inhospitable.
Sikkim’s strategic importance is thus
underlined by the following facts:
1) It
adjoins Tibet in the north and east, Bhutan in south east and Nepal in the
west.
2) It
provides depth to the Siliguri corridor, which is 180km by 75km, with the neck
of the corridor being 20km. The corridor comprises four districts in West
Bengal—Dinajpur, Cooch Behar, Jalpaiguri and Darjeeling. If China were to sever
this corridor, probably with support from Bangladesh, India would lose contact
with Assam and other north-eastern states.
3) It
outflanks the Chumbi Valley of Tibet in the east. The width of the Valley in
the north is 25km and tapers down to 4km in the south. The Chumbi Valley has
well-defined roads and tracks, which terminate in passes. As the Valley has a
restricted deployment area, it favours offensive operations. Towards the
southern tip of the Valley, China snce 1993 has claimed the area of Doklam Plateau
in West Bhutan.
4) It
projects into the Tibetan plateau.
Given the strategic importance of
Sikkim, the Indian Army has identified three levels of threats from the PLA.
The first is PLA’s border management posture, which is wholeheartedly offensive
in nature. With little territorial claims and designs in the TAR, the Indian
Army has adopted a defensive border management posture, which has two elements:
to hold those passes that are likely ingress routes round the year, and to
undertake regular internal patrolling to ensure that there are no intrusions
made by the adversary. For example, with the Singalia mountain range and huge
massifs in west Sikkim, the PLA’s intrusions in the adjoining Muguthang Valley
of north Sikkim will be resource- and logistics-intensive, and therefore are
unlikely. However, in the Kerang Plateau, Giaogang and Dongkya La provide the
key to the Lachen and Lachung Valleys. Therefore, the Indian Army has ensured
by its presence that these launch-pads are denied to the PLA. Similarly, the
threat in north-east Sikkim comes from Tangkya La, Phimkaru La and Gora La in the
same order, as these provide the shortest routes to Chungthang, a prominent
town on the North Sikkim Highway (NSH), which links up with Gangtok in the
south. In the mountains, the likely ingress routes are along the rivers, which
are the Teesta, running from north to south, and the Dongkya La Chu in
north-east Sikkim. In east Sikkim, the Indian Army holds all passes except
Jelap La, which is held by the BDR. However, the dominating shoulders of this
pass are with the Indian Army.
According to the Indian Army, the PLA,
as part of a short border war campaign, could launch a limited offensive to
ensure the security of Chumbi Valley, or capture areas in north and north-east
Sikkim to deny launch-pads to the Indian Army. This would require the PLA to
deploy two Highland Mechanised Infantry Divisions. On the other hand, a
theatre-level campaign aimed at severing the Siliguri corridor, and capturing
the important towns of Gangtok, Rhenok, Rangpo or Siliguri, would require the PLA
to commit 20 Divisions. Moreover, the PLA could capture areas in west Bhutan,
which it has claimed since 1989. Even as such a scenario looks improbable in the
foreseeable future, and it has been assessed that adequate warning (of at least
two weeks) would be available before it materialises, there is unease over
PLA’s border management posture, which could easily snowball into a localised
threat. The Indian Army’s deployments in Sikkim are primarily meant to thwart
such localised conflicts. Considering that the Govt of India would be extremely
reluctant to open a military front against China, the PLA’s shenanigans in
Sikkim, if not checked in time, could well become a political and diplomatic
embarrassment. Moreover, as the PLA is known to have transgressed the LAC in
nearby Arunachal Pradesh on many occasions, a determined action by the Indian
Army there could encourage the PLA to open a second military front in Sikkim to
release pressure. The XXXIII Corps HQ, therefore, has an added responsibility
to monitor the development in the more active IV Corps HQ in Tezpur (which is Arunachal
Pradesh-centric). The defensive operational taskings of XXXIII and IV Corps are
thus intertwined. For this reason alone, suggestions that with limited military
activity in Sikkim, the Army could dispense with XXXIII Corps HQ make little
military sense.
All these apart, roads remain an endemic
problem in Sikkim, which is compounded by the twin assault of weather and
terrain. There is only one main artery, the National Highway 31A, that links
Gangtok with Siliguri in north Bengal. Jawaharlal Nehru Marg (JNM), named after
India’s first Prime Minister, who converted the dirt-track into a metalled road
in 1958, connects Gangtok with Nathu La. Though single-lane roads, these two are
the only ones which seem to resist the vagaries of weather. But movement on the
JNM is impeded by heavy fog and low-hanging clouds, which in monsoons reduce
visibility to less than 10 metres. The other crucial passes in the east are
connected only through unmetalled roads. The sparsely-populated and vulnerable
north Sikkim is connected through a North Sikkim Highway (NSH) from Gangtok to
Giaogang via Chungthang, which is also the confluence of River Teesta and
Lachung. From Chungthang another road goes east via the Lachung Valley towards
Zadong in the Kerang plateau. Currently, the NSH is the only lifeline that
connects Gangtok with north Sikkim and consequently the plateau region.
Essentially a Class 30 road, militarily the weakest link on this is a Class 12
bridge. However, the weakest link on this road is the impact of weather, which
renders the road non-existing in parts. Innumerable waterfalls and springs run
across the road, which in monsoons make driving dangerous. Steep ascends and
descends through sinking soil, shooting rocks and landslide-prone slopes and
gushing streams make this road a nightmare even on a good day. To cheer the
frazzled driver, the BRO and the state government has placed thoughtful
messages all along the road: ‘You have seen the Niagara Falls, now drive
through Myanchhu Falls’, ‘Tasted Coca Cola? Now see Lantha Khola,’ and so on.
Lantha Khola, incidentally, is not a Sikkimese soft drink. It is a highly
precarious stretch which was closed for traffic for 63 days in 2011 following
severe slides. The problems are compounded by the fact that this is also a
single-lane road, which implies that every time you see an oncoming vehicle,
you have to either veer very close to the mountainside or balance precariously
on the ridge side, hoping that the road does not sink below your tyres, to let
the other vehicle go by. The responsibility of maintaining this road rests with
the Indian Army, which is reluctant to invest too much money in it. It reasons
that the lifespan of the road is over. Either it needs to be abandoned
completely, or major reinforcements are required to make it motorable. To tide
over the monsoon mania, the Indian Army has posted monsoon detachments all
along the road, which carry out temporary clearing and repair work in case of a
landslide or retrieve vehicles that slip down the edge. But these are temporary
means, what the Army needs are solutions. Hence the Army has proposed to build
an Alternative NSH, taking over the existing track from Singtam in south Sikkim
to Dikshu and then to Sanglang. From Sanglang, the road goes towards Toong
covering a distance of 42km, of which 30km is completed and after that it will
culminate in Chhaten, about 70km short of the plateau, where the existing NSH
finishes. The ambitious road-building project, however, is stuck at two places
at the moment. The state government is reluctant to give up its stretch of
Singtam and Dikshu to the Army as it plans to develop it on its own. Besides,
beyond Toong, the road will have to traverse a few portions inside the
Kanchenjunga Reserve Forest. Once the state government objected, the Army
appealed in the Supreme Court, which directed the disputing parties to sort out
the issue by carrying out joint surveys. But Sikkim is against the Alternate
NSH and does not see any reason for that. A road has to be economically viable.
Even today, there is hardly any traffic on the existing highway and the Army
can easily repair that road, according to Sikkim. What neither says is that the
alternative highway will probably not be open to civilian population, which is
why it does not suit the state government. But if the Army were to repair and
relay the existing road then it will also help tourism in north Sikkim. And
therein hangs the road.
However, throughout the LAC
in the North-East, the Indian Army’s field artillery scores over that of the
PLA, since the latter suffers from across-the-board restricted high-angle capability
considering that up to 90% of artillery targetting is with high-angle fire. The
infantry firepower with direct-fire application compares favourably with both
sides. The rough mountainous terrain will force both sides to use
shoulder-launched recoilless guns, flamethrowers, shoulder-launched LAWs and
AGLs in direct-fire application during a ground offensive, since as the field artillery’s
firepower mass would lag behind or get
diluted due to inadequate deployment space. The Indian Army’s ground commanders
would be forced to either allot troops to guard rear-logistics maintenance areas,
or emplace Corps reserves nearby.
The PLA elements deployed opposite
Arunachal Pradesh are drawn from the Kunming-based 14 GA (nicknamed Forest
Tigers), which is part of the 2nd Field Army and specialises in
jungle warfare. 14 GA comprises the 40 Specialised Jungle Infantry Division
based in Dali/Yunnan that in turn comprises the 110 Motorised Infantry
Regiment, 118, 119, and 120 Infantry Regiments, and the 18 Artillery Regiment;
31 Mechanised Infantry Division in Dali/Yunnan that includes the 307 AAA Regiment;
32 Motorised Infantry Division (this being a reserve formation); 49 Mechanised
Infantry Division headquartered in Kaiyuan, Yunnan; 149 Highland Mechanised
Infantry Division at Emei in Sichuan; the 4 Artillery Brigade headquartered in
Kunming/Yunnan; one Armoured Brigade in Kunming along with one Engineering
Regiment; one Communications Regiment; one Reconnaissance Unit; one
Transportation Regiment; one EW Battalion; one NBC Battalion; and the People’s
Armed Police’s 38 and 41 Divisions.
There
are two main areas where the PLA’s Light Mechanised Infantry (LMR) differs from
its Motorised Infantry:
1) Compared
to the latter, the former enjoys increased overall mobility, especially
enhanced air mobility, enabling rapid vertical envelopment over mountainous,
jungle, and desert terrain.
2) Compared
to the latter, the former has increased organic firepower.
In addition, command-and-control is
another area where the LMR differs from other PLA Infantry Regiments. While
the latter is commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel, a Colonel commands the LMR.
Each Battalion within the LMR has a large headquarters staff with PLAAF liaison
officers, digital satellite telecommunications equipment (both manpack and
vehicular for two-way voice/data transmission/reception), live-feeds of UAV
imagery, and the unusual authority to make all tactical decisions. A small
Regimental HQ exists for only administrative and logistics purposes. Within
the LMR, tactical formations are task-organised Groups instead of the
traditional 3 x 3 structured organisations. Groups are Battalion-sized
formations assembled for a specific mission-tasking. Digital messaging in the
form of ‘Call-for-Fire’ is standard norm, along with an automated situational
awareness protocol. In a style of warfare where the ‘shock-and-awe effect’
really matters, the impact of an LMR overrunning hostile command-and-control
nodes and logistics centres could truly be devastating. While a full PLA
Infantry Regiment normally consists of three manoeuvre Battalions, in the LMR
only one Manoeuvre Group exists. At the heart of the LMR is its Light Mechanised
Infantry Companies (LMIC), which combine the flexibility of dismounted infantry
with the mobility of motorised forces without having a significant logistics
tail. Unique to the LMIC is the fleet of 8 x 8 ATVs. It routinely
carries six infantrymen: a squad leader, gunner, driver, and three others that
form a dismounted fire-team. Each APC is also equipped with a winch,
tactical radio, GPS receiver, and tactical data terminal. It is capable of
negotiating very rough terrain and with a quick modification, is amphibious. The
ATV can be armed with either a QJZ-89 12.7mm heavy machine-gun (HMG) or a W-87
35mm AGL, or one 82mm mortar. The ATV also has a provision for mounting the QBB-95
5.8mm squad automatic weapon on a pintle at the front-left of the ATV.
Augmenting the already formidable
firepower of the LMIC is the Fire Support Company (FSC). The mainstay of
the FSC are the 4 x 4 ‘Brave Warrior’ and ‘Iron Eagle’ families of fast attack
vehicles (FAV), comprising the SX-1 and XZ-AT-400 models, that have been in
service with the PLA’s airborne and special operations forces for some
time. For direct fire-support, one XZ-AT-400 FAV mounts a Type 87 25mm single-barrel
cannon, while for indirect fire-support this FAV comes armed with the W-99 82mm
mortar (similar to the Russian 2B9 Vasilyek). Several air-defence versions
with a secondary direct fire-support role are armed with the Type 87 twin-barrelled
25mm cannon and dual FN-6 VSHORADS, or HJ-8L ATGMs and 35mm W-87 AGLs. The
FAVs, unlike the ATVs, cannot be loaded inside a tactical transport helicopter,
but with all FAVs featuring prominent sling-points they are sling-load
compatible. Also within the FSC is one Sino-Mab Group Industries-Built
XZ-AT-400 4 x 4 FAV that carries a sniper team with a QBU-09 12.7mm
sniper/anti-materiel rifle. Another novel formation embedded within the LMR is
the Artillery Battery, which replicates the tube, rocket, and anti-tank Batteries
of a typical PLA Artillery Battalion in a microcosm. The Artillery Battery
comprises a Platoon of PP-87 82mm mortars carried in BJ-2020SJ 4 x 4 jeeps, and
a Platoon of 8-tube 107mm MBRL launchers mounted on 6 x 6 ATVs. The PTL-02
105mm 6 x 6 assault gun provides anti-tank firepower. The Reconnaissance
Platoon comprises three BJ-2020SJs and two SX-1 FAVs. While one BJ-2020SJ
carries the command-and-control element and two FN-6 missiles, and also tows a
small cargo trailer, two BJ-2020SJs each mount a 12.7mm HMGs and two HJ-8L
ATGMs. Two sling-load capable SX-1 FAVs carry another reconnaissance element armed
with PF-89 80mm RCLs.
Specialised heliborne air-assault
credentials of the LMIC make it ideally suited for sub-conventional warfare
scenarios, while offering greatly increased tactical flexibility (in terms of
pickup, insertion, and extraction of forces) when performing special operations
against hostile air bases, POL sites and ammunition storage
warehouses. There is no requirement to carry slings on a mission, no
specialised sling-load training is required for the troops, and no time is
spent in the ‘combat ineffective’ mode while the vehicles are rigged for
under-slinging. Furthermore, for the utility helicopters there is no
airspeed reduction while en route, nor any manoeuvring restrictions at the
landing zone due to the pendulous sling-load. Logistically, the LMIC has a
small footprint. All ammunition consumed by the LMIC does not require
material handling equipment to move, and can thus be internally loaded within
helicopters. Fuel consumption for an entire LMIC during a 450km march is
estimated at a modest 225 gallons (846 litres) of diesel. Resupply of an
inserted LMIC is easily accomplished via medium-lift utility helicopters like the
Mi-171E, which is routinely capable of carrying two 242-gallon (915 litre)
internal fuel tanks for ferry-flight purposes and these fuel-tanks can be
re-configured for refuelling vehicles.
All these advantages make the LMIC a
superb tool for executing the lightning fast air-assault raids. While
dismounted air-assault forces traditionally land on their objective, the added
mobility of an LMIC allows it the option of being inserted a terrain-feature
away from the objective. By inserting the LMIC away from the defenders
instead of on top of them, the most vulnerable phase of an air-assault
operation is thereby avoided. Land, unload, form up, orient leaders, and
then advance toward the objective is the typical sequential mission protocol
that’s followed. While some surprise may be lost, the tremendous tactical
mobility of the LMIC adds an element of deception as its actual objective is
not obvious.
Regarding TAR’s land-based
transportation infrastructure, over the past five years, China has poured more
than US$10 billion into TAR for financing 188 infrastructure projects.
Presently, all counties within TAR are already connected with the existing
network of national highways, with the road networks being increased to
58,000km. Plans to increase black-topped roads by another 70,000km are now on
the anvil. In addition to these, a 1,080km oil pipeline between Gormo and Lhasa
(Qinghai-Tibet), built by the PLA’s General Logistics Department (GLD), has a
designed capacity to deliver 5,00,000 tonnes of oil annually, but currently
transports 1.25 million tons per year, given the limited demand within TAR. The
electrified 1,142km railway line between Gormo and Lhasa that was completed in
June 2006 has 34 stations. Its assessed capacity is eight trains (one-way) per
day and 3,200 tonnes of cargo per train. In November 2009, the Lanzhou MR
completed its first digital survey and GIS mapping of all the railroads within
and leading into TAR (from the Chengdu and Lanzhou MRs), which involved the surveying
and mapping by satellite for 518,000 basic points and 110,000 key points along
the 1,142km-long track line. To undertake this mission, the PLA’s surveyors had
developed a temperature-preserving and wind-avoiding satellite-based surveying
and mapping track vehicle, which was used to realise the dynamic measurement of
the altitude, longitude and latitude along the railway route. The error in
measurement precision was only 0.3 metres. Soon after that, the PLA’s surveyors
successfully tackled more than 50 technological difficulties, innovated 12
operational methods, and accomplished the accurate measurement of 518,000 sets
of 3-D coordinates and 110,000 sets of key-point data. Once this was done, the
GLD moved in to equip all railway stations within TAR with military
transportation facilities aimed at enhancing the PLA’s strategic power
projection capabilities. The facilities included materials loading and
unloading infrastructure and construction of customised military platforms.
In addition, two new railway lines
connecting Lhasa to Yatung (a major trading town just about 30km from the LAC)
and to Linzhi (about 80km from the border) will be completed by 2017. Yatung is
situated at the mouth of the Chumbi Valley and is connected to Sikkim via the
Nathu La pass. Work on two other railway lines from Lhasa to Khasa near the
China-Nepal border and Kashghar above Jammu & Kashmir will begin soon. The
rail link to Khasa will be aligned with the Friendship Highway from Shigatse to
Khasa, and further on till Kathmandu. Work has also begun on building six new
railway tracks that include one from Lhasa to Nyingchi (directly above
Arunachal Pradesh, with the 253km-long extension costing about $2 billion), one
from Lhasa to Shigatse (half of this line, or some 115km will be laid in
tunnels or on bridges, and the ultimate goal is to extend the railway line to
Dali in Yunnan province), three tracks that will originate from Golmud in
Qinghai province and run to Chengdu in Sichuan province ( due to be built over
an eight-year period at a cost of $7.9 billion and spanning 1,629km, 650km of
which will be in Sichuan, with the trains due to travel at a maximum speed of
200kph and will taking only eight hours to reach Lhasa), Dunhuang in Gansu
province, and Kuerle of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. The last railway
track will link Xining, capital of Qinghai, with Zhangye in Gansu province.
The
Lhasa-Nyingchi-Dali route is significant as it runs in an east-west direction
almost parallel and quite close to the LAC along Arunachal Pradesh, and will
enable the Kunming-based 14th GA and its combat formations at Dali,
Kaiyuanand and Kunming to rapidly move westwards from Sichuan province into TAR
by rail. In addition, formations of the 13th GA from their peacetime
locations in Chengdu will be able to make use of this railway network to deploy
to the TAR.