Pakistani Falsehoods Finally Exposed By Native Pakistanis

To uphold one lie, several more lies have to be uttered. This is what best sums up all that has been emanating from Pakistan over the past 48 hours. The original lie unleashed by Pakistan was on February 27, 2019—this being the failed air-strike mounted earlier that day by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) against Indian military installations located in southern Jammu & Kashmir. To recollect, it was at 9:42am that the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) Integrated Air Command and Control Station (IACCS) at Bhatinda warned of an increase in PAF air activity over central and western Pakistan. The PAF had launched clusters of combat aircraft from Kamra, Murid, Chander, Sargodha, Rafiqui and Jacobabad. While some of them were seen cruising at medium altitude and had initially switched on their identification friend-or-foe transponders initially (as a decoy—they were showing themselves to the IAF’s IACCS to make it seem like routine activity), the others tried to hide at low-altitude. Soon, the PAF combat aircraft clusters regrouped into strike-packages and turned east for the attack. The first enemy strike-package turned east over the Chicken’s Neck area at 9:58am on the Akhnoor axis, and approached the LoC at 10:06am. Another package approached further north along the Poonch axis, staggered by five to seven minutes. A third package was opposite Anupgarh in northern Punjab state of India. Each package had eight to ten aircraft, supported by multiple combat air patrols, Saab 2000 AEW & CS platforms and Dassault Falcon-20s for electronic jamming support. On the Indian side there were two upgraded Mirage-2000Ns on combat air patrol (CAP) east of Udhampur, and two Su-30MKIs near Srinagar. In addition, two MiG-21 Bisons were scrambled in two lots (10:01am and 10:03am) from Srinagar, two more Bisons from Awantipur, two upgraded MiG-29UPGs from Adampur and two Su-30MKIs each from Halwara, Bathinda and Jodhpur—totalling 18 platforms. The PAF ensured that its combat aircraft did not cross either the IB or the LoC. Two MiG-21 Bisons, flown by Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman and Squadron Leader Vyas, were scrambled from Srinagar at 10:03am for intercepting the PAF strike-package on the Poonch axis. On reaching the sector, Abhinandan spotted enemy aircraft flying at low-level, and the IACCS Station informed him that all aircraft to his west were hostile. He went for the target-in-contact on close combat mode with Vympel R-73E short-range air-to-air missiles. The IACCS Station had subsequently asked that IAF formation to turn back because of the threat developing on them. Vyas heard the call and turned around. PAF electronic jamming prevented Abhinandan from getting the call. In the melee, it is presumed that his MiG-21 Bison shot down a PAF F-16D, while breaking off from the attack. The PAF dropped 11 weapons—two each at Kishan Ghati Top (Nangi Tekri), Bhimber Gali (Hamirpur), Kesbowl and Tackundi Bowl, and one each at the 251 Ammunition Point in Rajouri and the FSD at Narian, and one at Bharat Gala—but could not cause any damage. The debris indicated the use of DENEL-supplied H-4 TV-guided gliding PGMs (range 120km) and China-supplied range extension kits or REK (60km) fitted to Mk.83 bombs.

Why did such weapons not cause any material damage? There are two reasons. First, the PAF’s two strike-packages were forced to turn back by the IAF’s interception packages before the former could complete the weapons targetting procedures. Second, the PAF’s strike-packages were not allowed effective follow-through, i.e. the time taken for ensuring uninterrupted man-in-the-loop targeting was denied, and in turn prevented the PAF from obtaining the real-time video imagery required for conclusively proving to the world that it had indeed achieved what it had set out to do. Five AIM-120C-5 AMRAAM beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles were fired by the PAF’s F-16s. But why were such BVRAAMs ineffective? One theory is that PAF wanted to draw the IAF’s interceptor packages into a planned kill box without crossing the LoC and use the AMRAAMs to score aerial kills. Since this ploy did not succeed, the PAF launched the AIM-120C-5s at longer ranges. The IAF thus simply defeated the PAF’s AMRAAMs with superior manoeuvring and EW tactics.

Therefore, by afternoon on February 27, the IAF and PAF had two all-new taskings. For the IAF, it was all about securing the immediate and unconditional release of Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, while for the PAF it was all about trying to convince Pakistan’s domestic audience that its conventional deterrent posture had indeed produced the desired results. The Govt of India used the back-channels established by the Prime Minister’s Office with POTUS Donald Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner and with the ruling royal family of the United Arab Emirates to convey to Pakistan its 1-point demand about Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman’s immediate and unconditional release (a fully justified demand since Abhinandan’s MiG-21 Bison was shot down while conducting a purely defensive air operation, and his flight was neither intended nor armed for causing any material damage to life or property on the ground and hence did not qualify as an aggression-driven mission). India also conveyed that any attempt by Pakistan to either refuse to or delay the release of Abhinandan within 48 hours will result in the IAF conducting pulverising air-strikes lasting up to a week against all eight Brigades of the 60,000-strong, PoK-based Mujahid Force that comes under the command of the Pakistan Army’s (PA) Rawalpindi HQed X Corps. The Mujahid Force exists as irregular combatants and owes allegiance to the ‘Azad Kashmir Regiment’, which has 32 Infantry Battalions distributed among 8 Brigades. The 1 AK Brigade is located in Muzaffarabad, the 2 AK Brigade in Rawalakot, the 3 AK Brigade in Kotli (has an area of responsibility located opposite to the Rajouri, Poonch, Naushera and Sunderbani sectors), the 4 AK Brigade in Bandli, the 5 AK Brigade in Dhani, the 6 AK Brigade in Bagh, the 7 AK Brigade in Bhimber, and the 32 AK Brigade in Kel. The Mujahid Force comprises the 640, 641, 647, 652, 654, 655, 815, 834, 841, and 886 Battalions of the PA. The 656 Battalion is the Mujahid Force Training Centre at Bhimber.

For Pakistan, the Indian demand and threat posed a double whammy: how could the PAF justify its claim of having restored credible conventional deterrence vis-à-vis the IAF on February 27 if just a short while later it was seen unable to prevent the IAF from decimating the eight AK Brigades that were forward-deployed in PoK along the LoC, especially at a time when the PAF’s POL stockpiles were way below its 20-day general service aviation fuel reserves and consequently, at best, the PAF would have ceased to be an effective fighting force after the first four days of intensive flying under war-like conditions? Only later did become known that it was this very reason that caused Pakistan to extend the ban on its airspace for all India-origin commercial flights till June 28, 2020—this being the only way of minimising the quantum of CAP sorties required to be flown by the PAF along the IB, WB and LoC.

Thus, by the night of February 27, the stage was set for Pakistan to commence drafting a series of indefensible falsehoods in a vain attempt to domestically acquire moral ascendancy. The first falsehood, the brainchild of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Directorate, was selectively released on February 28 to a few Pakistani journalists (who are on the ISPR’s regular payrolls) who via their respective VBlogs claimed that India, with Israel’s help, was all set to fire 12 missiles of an unspecified type from Rajasthan against five sites inside Pakistan. The second consequent falsehood, also the ISPR’s brainchild, was next propagated first by Pakistan’s PM Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi himself during a press-conference with local journalists on the same day, during which he also went on to claim that Pakistan had achieved success in thwarting such Indian missile-strikes, but did not go into specifics. It was only in the afternoon of March 1 that the Pakistani PM revealed on the floor of Pakistan’s National Assembly that Abhinandan would be released unconditionally later that same day as a unilateral gesture of goodwill. Three days later, on March 4, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi made the final sensational claim: it was Pakistan’s magnanimity that had resulted in Abhinandan’s swift and unconditional release and that it was this gesture that was responsible for thwarting India’s planned missile-strikes.

In addition, a series of elaborately-staged actions followed throughout March 2019 to try to reinforce the earlier falsehoods about India’s planned missile-strikes and to justify the continued denial of transit overflights by India-origin airliners through Pakistani airspace. For instance, on March 4, 2019 at around 11am a PAF-operated Falco UAS, which had taken off from Bahawalpur Airport, entered Indian airspace near the BSF’s Soorma and K K Tibba outposts at Anupgarh in Rajasthan’s Sri Ganganagar district. The UAS was intercepted and shot down with 30mm cannon-fire by a Su-30MKI belonging to Jodhpur-based 31 ‘Lions’ Sqn with Su-30MKIs. Debris of this UAS fell just inside Pakistan. Five days later, Indian Army (IA) troops shot down a locally-made Pakistani drone in Sri Ganganagar sector (Rajasthan) as it entered Indian airspace 7.30pm. Earlier in the day, a similar drone tried to enter Indian territory at 5am at Hindumalkot border near Sri Ganganagar, but the drone had to take u-turn as it was sighted by IA troops who started firing. Another such drone was destroyed after it came across in Sri Ganganagar on March 24 evening. The drone was near the Satrana and Jagdev border outposts in the area when it was detected by radars, which led to anti-aircraft guns opening up to prevent its ingress further into Indian territory.

And yet, 20 months later, in Pakistan the debate still rages on about the swift and unconditional release of Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman; while the PAF till this day has not been able to produce any video or HUD camera imagery of its air-strikes on Indian targets on the morning of February 27, 2019; nor has any native of Jammu & Kashmir UT been able to capture any video footage of the Su-30MKI that the PAF claims to have downed on that same day—this being the most embarrassing reality, especially if one were to believe Islamabad’s repeated claims about every Muslim native of J & K UT preferring Pakistan’s two-nation theory and rejecting secular India.

Indigenous Warship Construction: Laudable Objective, But Unsustainable Practice

While indigenisation of the design, development and construction of naval principal surface combatants is a laudable objective, it is the apex-level project management of successive warship construction projects that has consistently, since the late 1990s, serve to sabotage the laudatory objectives, with no tangible changes being expected for future domestic warship construction projects as well. For instance, the cost escalation has been about 225% for the three Project 15A guided-missile destroyers (DDG), about 260% for the three Project 17 guided-missile frigates (FFG), and about 157% for the four Project 28 guided-missile corvettes, each of which is likely to cost $435 million. 

In fact, the project cost of these four anti-submarine warfare (ASW) corvettes has inflated from a sanctioned amount Rs.28 billion or $560 million  (Rs.7 billion or $140 million per 2,500-tonne vessel) to an estimated Rs.70 billion ($1.4 billion) now. Similar estimations are now doing the rounds on the projected four 6,800-tonne Project 15B DDGs (approved by the MoD’s Defence Acquisitions Council in February 2009).

Two principal reasons are to blame for such a sad state of affairs: the inability of the Indian Navy’s (IN) in-house Directorate of Naval Design’s (DND) Naval Design Bureau (NDB) to freeze a warship’s design prior to the commencement of metal-cutting for hull construction; and the failure of the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) bureaucracy to synchronise the warship construction schedules with other Ministries responsible for supplying raw materials like specialised steel and on-board other sub-systems—both of which are procured from either public-sector undertakings like the Steel Authority of India Ltd (SAIL) or defence public-sector undertakings (DPSU). Instead, the ones who are almost everytime blamed for the delayed warship deliveries are the MoD-owned DPSUs like the shipbuilding yards.

Take, for instance, the delivery schedule of the fourth Project 28 ASW guided-missile corvette—INS Kavaratti P-31, which was handed over by the MoD-owned, Kolkata-based Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers Ltd (GRSE) to the IN on February 18, 2020. This corvette’s keel-laying had taken place on January 20, 2012, followed by hull-launch on May 19, 2015. Yet, it took more than five years for this vessels to be service-inducted (on October 22, 2020).

The first three in the series, INS Kamorta P-28 (whose metal-cutting began on March 1, 2006; keel-laying took place on November 20, 2006; the hull was launched on April 19, 2010; her maiden sea-trial took place in June 2013; was handed over to the IN on July 12, 2014; and she was commissioned on August 23, 2014), INS Kadmatt P-29 (keel-laying on September 27, 2007; hull-launching on October 25, 2011; and commissioned on January 7, 2016) and INS Kiltan P-30 (keel-laying on August 10, 2010; hull-launch on March 26, 2013 and commissioned on October 16, 2017) took between seven and nine years to be delivered. The principal reason for such delayed deliveries was a critical miscalculation by the DND of the warship design’s displacement and weight, which had led to the first three corvettes becoming top-heavy and consequently a laborious and time-consuming weight-shedding effort had to be carried out by GRSE.

For the INS Kavaratti, the NDB decided to make extensive use of composites-based sub-structures, especially in the mast section, in order to reduce weight and for this both fabrication expertise and raw materials supplies were sought and obtained from Sweden’s Kockums AB. In addition, other weight-reduction measures adopted included doing away with the French SAMAHE rail-based helicopter traverse system and instead, adopting a wire-based system known as Rail-Less Helo-Traversing System. GRSE has a licenced production agreement for a period of 10 years with UK-based Mac Teggart, Scott & Co Ltd for fabricating such Rail-Less Helo-Traversing System. Also, the concept of foldable hanger-doors developed by Larsen & Toubro was adopted for the helicopter deck, thereby doing away with rolling hanger-doors.

Earlier, back in 2003, the IN had planned on using Russia-origin D40S/B-quality high tensile strength steel for construction of the four corvettes. However, due to the high cost of import, indigenously developed DMR-249A special grade high-tensile steel was decided to be used. However, due to mis-communication between the MoD and the Department of Heavy Industries, there was delay in the bulk production of indigenous steel (by SAIL) and associated complexities related to the development of new weld-consumables and welding techniques (by MIDHANI). Finally, the delay in identification of a suitable propulsion package by the NDB to meet the stealth requirement of the corvettes, and delays in the development of indigenous weapons and sensors by the MoD-owned defence R & D Organisation (DRDO) also resulted in cost escalation.

The ASW corvette incorporates a state-of-art low-noise CODAD (combined diesel and diesel) propulsion system with hydraulic coupling between main engines and gearbox. Engines used are four Pielstick 12 PA6 STC diesel engines, each with a power of 5,096hp (3,800kW). France’s Naval Group entered into a contract with the GRSE encompassing the delivery of four shipsets of raft-mounted gearboxes with stealth features (total of eight gearboxes), machinery system integration expertise for the whole propulsion system, technical assistance to GRSE for integration of the gearboxes and all related warship-trials, and licencing Walchandnagar Industries Ltd (WIL) for manufacturing the gearboxes under a transfer-of-technology package. On each corvette, two controllable-pitch propellers driven by the two raft-mounted gearboxes are capable of twin output or single output as required. A DRDO-developed infra-red signature suppression system is fitted in the engine exhausts for reducing infra-red signatures.

Each corvette also comes fitted with a Larsen & Toubro-built stabilisation system, a reverse-osmosis plant for freshwater generation, sewage treatment plant with vacuum toilet facilities that are totally compliant with International Maritime Organisation regulations, and an operator friendly Total Atmospheric Control System for high combat readiness with improved habitability and features a fully air-conditioned modular type accommodation. Electrical generation comes from four diesel-engine sets each producing 3mWe, thereby ensuring 100% redundancy at all times. Also on board are indigenously-developed Integrated Platform Management System and an Integrated Bridge System.

However, all four Project ASW corvettes have entered naval service in sub-optimal configuration, since none of them as yet have neither the ATLAS Elektronik-developed ACTAS active/passive towed-array sonar suite, nor the SR-SAM SHORADS for self-defence.

Consequently, at best only 70% material content can be claimed as being indigenous for each of the four corvettes.

The Predecessors

The IN’s previous ASW-specific warships were the 10 Project 159AE Storozhevoi Korabl vessels that were built in successive tranches by the USSR’s Khabarovsky Shipyard in the Far East between 1968 and 1974 and equipped with IN’s 31 Patrol Vessel Squadron of the Eastern Naval Command and the 32 Patrol Vessel Squadron of the Western Naval Command. The first tranche comprised the INS Kamorta P-77 (commissioned on November 21, 1968 and decommissioned on October 31, 1991), INS Kadmatt P-78 (commissioned on December 23, 1968 and decommissioned on November 30, 1992), INS Kiltan P-79 (commissioned on October 30, 1969 and decommissioned on June 30, 1987), INS Katchall P-81 (commissioned on December 23, 1969 and decommissioned on December 31, 1988), and INS Kavaratti P-80 (commissioned on December 23, 1969 and decommissioned on July 31, 1986). The second tranche was built at Shipyard No.820 in Kaliningrad (Baltisky Zavod, now Yantar Shipyard) and comprised the INS Arnala P-68 (commissioned on June 29, 1972 and decommissioned on April 9, 1999), INS Androth P-69 (commissioned on June 30, 1972 and decommissioned on April 9, 1999), INS Anjadip P-73 (commissioned on December 23, 1972 and decommissioned on December 13, 2003, INS Amini P-75 (commissioned on December 12, 1974 and decommissioned on September 16, 2002) and INS Andaman P-74 (commissioned on December 28, 1973, and was lost at sea in storm conditions 230km east of Visakhapatnam on August 21, 1990).

Crew: 106.

Standard Displacement: 970 tonnes.

Full-Load Displacement: 1,110 tonnes.

Length: 82.3 metres.

Beamwidth: 9.2 metres.

Draught: 2.89 metres.

Maximum Speed: 32 Knots.

Range: 2,000nm at 14 Knots cruise speed, 1,500nm at 16,5 Knots, 800nm at 18 Knots.

Endurance at Sea: 10 days.

Propulsion: 2 x 15,000hp M-2B gas-turbines, 1 x 6,000hp Type-61B diesel engine, 1 x diesel-generator rated at 400kW, 1 x diesel-generator rated at 200kW, 1 x diesel-generator rated at 100kW.

Armament: 2 x 2 AK-726 76mm turret-mounted naval guns using the Fut-B fire-control system, 2 x 5 PTA-40-159 400mm torpedo tubes (10 SET-40 torpedoes carried on-board), 2 x 12 RBU-6000 Smerch-2 (RGB-60) ASW mortar launchers using the Burya fire-control system, and 22 mines.

Electronics: MR-302 Rubka radar, Bizan-4B ESM suite, Don navigation radar, MG-312 Titan and MG-311 Vychegda sonar suites.

160Km-Range RUDRAM-1 NG-ARM Test-Fired

Preliminary conceptual studies got underway in April 2012 at the DRDO’s Defence Research & Development Laboratory (DRDL), following which financial approval for Rs.317.2 crore was accorded in December 2012, project completion being targetted for 2017. The detailed feasibility study phase lasted for a two-year period till 2013, following which prototype development commenced.

The airframe design selected was a scaled-up variant of the Astra-1 BVRAAM, and measured 5.5 metres and weighed up to 600kg. Propulsion was to be provided by a  dual-pulse solid-fuelled rocket motor, while the sensor package comprised a wide-band passive seeker, with a W-band millimetric-wave active seeker (a variant of the seeker meant for use by the SANT anti-armour guided missile) being employed in the terminal phase of flight.

The maiden Captive Flight Trials of the RUDRAM-1 NG-ARM was conducted by an IAF Su-30MKI H-MRCA in April 2016, while Drop Flight Trials (DFT) were conducted in December 2016, when the NG-ARM was released by the Su-30MKI while cruising at a speed of Mach 0.8 at an altitude of 6,500 metres. The maiden airborne test-firing (minus the sensor package) took place on January 18, 2008, followed by another one with a fully functional sensor package on January 25, 2019 that saw the NG-ARM covering a distance of 100km over the Bay of Bengal and achieving a 10-metre CEP. The third test-firing took place on October 9, 2020.

The ejection pylon employed is the same as that for the Astra-1 BVRAAM.

The RUDRAM-1 NG-ARM will be used in conjunction with the existing in-service SIVA HADF pod (developed by DRDO’s DARE laboratory back in the previous decade). The SIVA is presently used primarily for real-time detection and location of hostile ground-based air-defence radars, with the targetting cues then being uploaded into the IAF’s in-service Russia-supplied Kh-3P Krypton anti-radiation missile’s on-board mission computer.

Now being developed is a ground-launched version of the NG-ARM, dubbed the RUDRAM-2, four of which will be carried in a cannister-encased configuration by a 4 x 4 LAMV. To be used by the Indian Army (IA), the RUDRAM-2 will be employed against hostile ground-based battlefield air-defence systems and networks, with high-accuracy direction-finding cues being provided by the IA’s Samyukta and Him Shakti battlefield EW networks.

New Garrison HQ For PLA’s 361 Border Defence Regiment (Unit 69310)

The new Garrison HQ of the PLA’s 361 Border Defence Regiment (Unit 69310) was commissioned into service on October 1 in the Zanda County of Tibet’s Ali (Ngari) Prefecture. This is one of three Regiments under the South Xinjiang Military District that is deployed along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) along India’s Ladakh UT.

The other two are the 362 BDR (Unit 32160) located at Ritu County and 363 BDR (Unit 69316)—both in Ali Prefecture. In addition, there are 11 PLA-BDR Regiments deployed along the LAC from Himachal Pradesh in the west right up to Arunachal Pradesh to the east.

And below is the Ladakh-specific logistics hub created by the South Xinjiang Military District for the on-going campaign season.

The PLAGF’s Changsha-based University of Engineering (which also has campuses at Nanjing, Wuhan, Hefei and other field locations, has developed removable self-powered thermal insulation cabins (below) for the Aksai Chin area, to keep the interior temperatures at 15° Celsius when it is -40° Celsius outside.

PLA-BDR Detachment At Panggong Tso North Bank In August 2020

And East Of Kongka La