South Asia’s
first aerial engagement in 48 years, which took place on the morning of
February 27 this year, was noteworthy for two reasons. Firstly, the engagements
between the two opposing air forces saw the successful usage of both
beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles (BVRAAM) and short-range air-to-air
missiles (SRAAM), with the former being a first for the skies of South Asia.
Secondly, both opposing air forces engaged one another not only with their
respective multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) fleets, but also with
combat-support platforms like airborne early warning & control (AEW &
CS) aircraft—the world’s first -ever such engagement in the history of aerial
warfare. And it is in these two areas that witnessed outcomes that were not
entirely surprising when analysed in detail, and which will have a profound
impact on both future force modernization projects of both air forces, but also
on the employment of offensive airpower in the next round of limited
hostilities in South Asia.
In the arena of
air combat with BVRAAMs, the Indian Air Force (IAF) had an appreciable head-start
over the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) when in the 1980s it had procured Vympel
R-23R and Matra Super 530D missiles along with its MiG-23MF and Mirage-2000H/TH
combat aircraft, whereas the PAF could procure its first BVRAAMs—the
Raytheon-built AIM-120C-5 AMRAAMs—only in the previous decade. Consequently,
the IAF was expected to have acquired a very degree of proficiency in putting
its present holdings of BVRAAMs to good use by applying innovative tactics. But
surprisingly, this did not turn out to be the case, with the PAF ending up
scoring the first air combat kill with a BVRAAM. On the other hand, the IAF’s
successful employment of the Vympel R-73E SRAAM with the help of the Sura-1
helmet-mounted display system (HMDS) once again proved that even
third-generation legacy-MRCAs—when suitably upgraded—can be lethal tools in the
hands of experienced air warriors. But if the ‘deep upgrade’ efforts are
half-hearted, then a heavy price will have to be paid, which is exactly what
the IAF seems to have now discovered.
Take, for
instance, the MiG-21 Bison upgrade project, which in the late 1990s was meant
to give a new lease of life to 125 of the IAF’s 225 those MiG-21 Bis
light-MRCAs that were scheduled to be phased out on the expiry of their total
technical service-life (TTSL) of 20 years/2,400 flight-hours. Known as the
MiG-21-93 project, it involved the following: extending the TTSL of the
airframe and its Tumansky R-25-300
turbofan (producing 97.1kN thrust with afterburning) for up
to 40 years and 4,000 flying hours; installing the Phazotron NIIR-developed
Kopyo (Spear) multi-mode airborne pulse-Doppler X-band radar (MMR), and a new
navigation-and-attack system developed by THALES of France that included a
TOTEM ring laser gyro-based inertial navigation system (RLG-INS) coupled to a
NSS-100P GPS receiver, ELBIT/El-Op Type 967 heads-up display, a MFD-55 active-matrix
liquid-crystal display (AMLCD), locally-developed Tarang Mk.1 radar warning
receiver (RWR), radar altimeter, hands-on-throttle and stick (HOTAS) controls,
digital flight data recorder, autopilot, and a stores management system. The
entire project was co-developed by RAC MiG, Phazotron-NIIR, GosNIIAS and Sokol
Joint-Stock Company. Thus, the MiG-21 Bison was made capable of airborne target
detection and lock-on range both in look-up and look-down while using R-27R and
R-77/RVV-AE BVRAAMs; ground and sea-surface target detection and improved
communications and navigation aids; airborne target detection and engagement
range in action in the front hemisphere; improved PGM guidance and engagement
capabilities in action against ground targets of any type; track-while-scan
mode with the capability of tracking up to 10 targets and engaging two of them
concurrently; and self-protection through the usage of the ELTA Systems-built
EL/L-8222 high-band self-protection pod, plus newly-installed chaff/flare
countermeasures dispensers. And yet, on the morning of February 27, one such
MiG-21 Bison (armed with two Vympel R-77/RVV-AE BVRAAMs and two R-73E SRAAMs) of
the IAF’s 1 Wing’s No.51 ‘Sword Arms’ Sqn operating out
of Avantipora air base in Jammu &
Kashmir (J & K) was lost to enemy fire. So what went wrong?
Lessons
From The ‘Furball’
At around 9:30am
on February 27, IAF flight controllers noticed a large package of 24 PAF combat
aircraft taking off in a matter of 15 minutes from three different air bases.
These included at least 12 F-16C/Ds. As they approached the Line of Control
(LoC), they split up into two different formations, with airborne battle
management cues being provided by a Saab 2000 AEW & CS platform. The
formations included four Mirage-VPAs, four Mirage-IIIEAs and four JF-17s headed
for the Sundarbani-Rajouri-Naushera sub-sectors; and eight F-16s headed for the
Rajouri-Mendhar sub-sector and Nangi Tekri in Karmara. Pitted against them
were two of the IAF’s upgraded Mirage-2000INs and four MiG-21 Bisons flying
north of the Pir Panjal Range, and four Su-30MKIs to the south of the Range. The main PAF strike force comprised four F-16C/Ds armed with DENEL
Dynamics-supplied Raptor-IID TV-guided gliding munition, while the remaining
four F-16C/Ds and four JF-17s were tasked with the protection of the strike
package while remaining in a rear area over the Mangla Dam near the PoK-Pakistan
Punjab border. Targets selected by the PAF for the air-strikes were the Indian
Army posts at Bhimber Gali (elevation of 5,479 feet), Krishna Ghati Top
(Nangi Tekri) at a height of 4,665 feet, Potha at an elevation of 4,073 feet, and
an ammunition storage area in Narian (belonging to the 25 Infantry Division of
the Indian Army) at an elevation of 2,000 feet. These targets, falling in
India’s Rajouri sector, were deliberately selected for the sake of establishing
Pakistan’s ‘moral; ascendancy’ along this portion of the LoC—given the fact
that it is from these areas that the Indian Army dominates its opposing
adversary’s Battal sector, which is located at lower altitudes.
However, the
moment the intruding PAF F-16s gained altitude for crossing into the areas
southeast of the Pir Panjal Range and approached their designated targets in
Jammu at altitudes varying from 5,000 feet to 10,000 feet in order to launch
the Raptor-IIDs, they were detected by the A-50I PHALCON by 10.25am, which in
turn vectored the airborne MiG-21 Bisons towards their respective intercept
courses. Since these MiG-21 Bisons climbed in the shadow of the Pir Panjal Range,
the PAF’s Saab 2000 AEW & CS platform failed to detect them. This proved to
be a blessing for the IAF, since the PAF’s attacking F-16C/Ds were taken aback
and were forced to launch their Raptor-IIDs in great hurry. The Su-30MKIs
carrying EL/L-8222 airborne self-protection jammer (ASPJ) pods were kept on
standby further down south to engage the four PAF F-16s that were still
orbiting 162km further to the west. It subsequently became evident that the PAF
had no intention of creating a ‘furball’ either over PoK or over southern Jammu
and all it wanted to achieve was to drive home a ‘point’ about the PAF
demonstrating its will, means and capability to stage a ‘retaliatory sneak
attack’ inside Indian territory.
By most
accounts, while cruising at 15,000 feet altitude, the MiG-21 Bison flown by
Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman engaged a PAF F-16D of 19 ‘Sherdils’ Sqn that had approached the Indian Army’s
ammunition depot at Narian in southern Jammu and was exiting that location at
an altitude of 9,000 feet. While the MiG-21 Bison made a shallow dive to get
within R-73E firing range of the F-16, the latter’s pilot was alerted by his
wingman about the impending attack and so he took an evasive measure by going
into a steep climb to about 26,000 feet. By this time Wg Cdr Abhinandan had
skillfully manoeuvred his MiG-21 Bison behind the fleeing F-16 and had
positioned himself at a 60-degree angle of elevation below the F-16 for maximum
head-on impact. He then fired an R-73E, which effortlessly struck the nose-section
of the F-16D. However, even as the R-73E was closing on to its target, the
wingman of the F-16 (Wing Commander Nauman Ali
Khan) moved in from behind and
fired an AIM-120C-5 AMRAAM from a distance of less than 12km, hitting the
centre-fuselage of the MiG-21 Bison. A second AIM-120C-5 that was probably
fired against Wg Cdr Abhinandan’s wingman (who had gotten separated from
him) failed to hit its target and consequently it slammed into Mamankote
Mallas village, Reasi, and caused an explosion that spread splinters and
missile parts within a radius of 100 metres.
The entire aerial engagement
lasted for some 90 seconds and ended at around 10:45am. The PAF F-16D was shot down over the Jhangar area of J & K,
but its wreckage fell in Khuiratta inside Pakistan-occuiped-Kashmir (PoK),
opposite the Lam Valley. The MiG-21 Bison, on the other hand, went down
near Horra’n Kotla village, located 7km west of the LoC in PoK’s Bhimber
district.
There are two
probable reasons why Wg Cdr Abhinandan’s
MiG-21 Bison was hit by the AIM-120C-5, while that of his wingman survived the
aerial engagement: the former’s aircraft was not equipped with either a missile
approach warning system, or MAWS (which provides advance warning on inbound
guided-missiles of all types), or the EL/L-8222 high-band self-protection pod,
while the latter had the EL/L-8222 and hence was able to jam the AMRAAM’s
Ku-band active radar seeker. It needs to be noted here that universal air
combat rules call for using one high-band self-protection pod for every two
combat aircraft (comprising the flight leader and his/her wingman). However,
since it is impossible to maintain formation during air combat, it is now
preferable to have internally-mounted high-band self-protection jammers that
can provide assured self-defence.
There are
only three plausible reasons why the PAF preferred to use BVRAAMs instead of
SRAAMs for this aerial engagement: 1) The PAF was unsure whether or
not the IAF’s Su-30MKIs equipped with OLS-30 infra-red search-and-track (IRST)
sensors would join the battle (if they were to, then they would have easily had
the upper hand since they can cruise at higher altitudes from where the R-73E
SRAAM/Sura-1 HMDS combination can be used with devastating effect); 2) The
PAF, devoid of all-aspect SRAAMs that can be guided wide off-boresight by the
Boeing-built Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS), was extremely vary of
initiating within-visual-range engagements due to the guaranteed and
combat-proven lethality and superior engagement envelope of the R-73E
SRAAM/Sura-1 HMDS combination found in the MiG-21 Bison. Thus, even though
equipped with either ITT Corp-built ALQ-211V4 or Northrop Grumman-built ALQ-131V
jamming pods, the pilots of the PAF’s F-16s and JF-17 ‘Thunders’ on February 27
morning knew only too well that once the ‘furball’ started within a
hemispheric air combat ‘bowl’ measuring 10 nautical miles in diameter, MRCAs
like the Mirage-2000N and Su-30MKI (that were airborne at that time) were the
perfect ones to fly. In fact, it is universally acknowledged that thanks to
their superb aerodynamics and all-aspect SRAAM/HMDS combination,
both the Mirage-2000N and Su-30MKI are exceptional platforms for close-in
combat. 3) In the BVR arena, the IAF had a unique edge over the PAF
through the incorporation of a radar finger-printing avionics suite (which is
interfaced with the on-boasrd radar warning receiver sensors) on its fleet of
Su-30MKIs that allows the H-MRCAs to operate in an all-passive non-cooperative
target recognition (NCTR) mode (which none the PAF’s frontline MRCAs possess
till today).
NCTR
Mode: A Vital Force-Multiplier
In essence, the NCTR mode enables a
combat aircraft to approach its opponent/s in all-passive mode while at the
same time maintaining total situational awareness about the range and bearing
of the opposing aircraft whose on-board MMR is operating in the
track-while-scan mode and the subsequent target lock-on mode when firing a
BVRAAM. However, the laws of physics dictate that when the MMR is activated,
the ASPJs have to be switched off for preventing electromagnetic interference
(EMI). This is when the NCTR mode enables an aircraft like the Su-30MKI to
passively lock-on to its opponent and fire BVRAAMs like the R-77 or even IIR-guided
SRAAMs like the R-73E while at the same time keeping its EL/L-8222 ASPJ
activated for completely neutralising hostile BVRAAMs like the AIM-120 AMRAAM.
The hostile MRCA, on the other hand, remains unaware of the approaching BVRAAM
or SRAAM (until it is too late to take evasive action) because it is
illuminating the AMRAAM while at the same time being forced to de-activate its
own integral ASPJ pod.
On the other
hand, the sleek MiG-21 Bison in combination with the R-73E SRAAM/Sura-1 HMDS in
sensor-lock mode proved to be a sure-killer. The R-73E hosts a very capable
infra-red heat-seeker with a greater range and wider off-boresight sensor
cueing capability than the PAF’s Raytheon-supplied AIM-9M-8 Sidewinder. A
simple monocular lens in front of Wg Cdr Abhinandan’s right eye
enabled him to slew the R-73E’s seeker onto his adversary at a high angle off
target and achieve lock-on even though his MiG-21 Bison’s nose was pointed far
away from its target. The Sura-1 comes mounted via a spring-loaded clip to
a modified HGU-55P helmet. The pilot then connects the HMDS to a tester and
adjusts the symbology so that it is centered in the monocle. Once in the
aircraft, the simple act of plugging in the power cord means it is ready for
use. There is no alignment process required with the Joint Helmet-Mounted Cuing
System. It just worked. Being on the shooting end of the equation, one sees
shot opportunities that he/she would never have dreamed of with SRAAMs like the
AIM-9M-8 Sidewinder used by the PAF. Those on the receiving end are equally
less enthused about being shot from angles they could not otherwise train to.
IAF’s MSWS Shortcomings
Where the
IAF’s MRCAs came short of their PAF counterparts was in the arena of
self-protection suites—a situation similar to the one in mid-1999 when only
after Operation Safed Sagar did the IAF decide to equip the bulk of
its USSR-origin aircraft and helicopters with the hitherto-absent chaff/flare
countermeasures dispensers. In the MiG-21 Bison’s case, the lack of
conformally-mounted high-band self-protection hammers and MAWS is hard to
explain, since such fitments have been available to the IAF from Sweden’s
SaabTech, South Africa’s Avitronics and Grintek, and from Denmark’s TERMA since
the mid-1990s. In case of the MiG-29UPG and Su-30MKis too, such
mission-critical fitments have not yet been specified by the IAF, even though
the PAF’s F-16s and JF-17s have had these since the previous decade! It was in
March 1999 that Celsius of Sweden, which also owns SaabTech, bought a 49% share
in Grintek Avitronics, South Africa's biggest passive electronic warfare
development house, for US$4.8 million. And in
March 2011 Cassidian Optronics, part of the defence and security division of
EADS, acquired the majority shareholding in South Africa-based Grintek Ewation
(GEW) Technologies. In October 2014 Cassidian Optronics became
part of Airbus Defence & Space Optronics Airbus Group, which in March 2017
became HENSOLDT Optronics GmbH. Interestingly, on July 17, 2006, the then EADS
and India’s state-owned Defence R & D Organisation’s (DRDO) Bengaluru-based
Defence Avionics Research Establishment (DARE) had inked a Memorandum of
Understanding on the joint development of a MAWS suite (using MILDS-F
AN/AAR-60V2 dual-color IR/UV sensors) for three of the locally-developed
EMB-135I AEW & CS platforms as well as other IAF combat and combat-support
aircraft. Achieving initial operational capability for this suite was planned
for 2011, while state-owned Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) was nominated for
producing 36 MAWS suites, which were to be a part of the
multi-sensor/multi-spectral warning system (MSWS) that also included RWRs and
laser warning receivers.
However,
as of today, only the three EMB-145Is have the MSWS, while none of the existing
IAF combat aircraft fleets have them. While they have been specified for the
projected Super Su-30MKI mid-life deep upgrade programme, what remains
unanswered is why was the MSWS not incorporated into the Su-30MKI procurement
project early in the previous decade itself, and on the 63-unit MiG-29UPG
upgrade project (whose DARE-developed D-29 suite includes only the
DARE-developed and BEL-built R-118 ‘Dhruti’ RWRs and high-band active
transmit/receive units with Vivaldi-type antenna arrays) that commenced in 2010.
In comparison, when Malaysia in 2005 ordered 18 Su-30MKMs, it specified the
fitment of Saab-Grintek Avitronics-supplied MAW-300 MAWS and LWS-310 laser
warners along with the Russia-supplied Pastel L-140-30 RWRs. Incidentally, the
MAW-300, LWS-310 and the RWS-300 RWR from Saab-Grintek Avitronics were specified
early this decade for installation on the ‘Rudra’ helicopter gunships that were
ordered for the IAF and Indian Army’s Aviation Corps from state-owned Hindustan
Aeronautics Ltd (HAL).
Lack
of SDR & TDLs Affected Airborne Battle Management
The introduction
of AEW & CS platforms into the subcontinent by the PAF (four Saab 2000s of the
Kamra-based No.3 Sqn and four CETC of China-supplied ZDK-03 Karakoram Eagle
KE-3s of the Masroor-based No.4 Sqn) in the previous decade, and followed by
the IAF’s procurement of three A-50I PHALCONs from Israel and three
locally-developed EMB-145Is earlier this decade) has seen aircrew of both air
forces act like air-traffic controllers for military aircraft on operations.
Due to this, the AEW & CS platforms have become as proficient in an
offensive role as in a defensive role. In the former, the aircrew on board the
AEW & CS platforms can now guide both combat and combat-support aircraft on
to targets during offensive engagements, be they on land, in the air or at sea.
While doing this, the platforms still maintain their defensive roles by
informing friendly pilots what other aircraft are within their area of operations,
be they friend or foe. The A-50I, for instance, can detect low-flying targets
within a diameter of 400km or 215nm. At medium-altitude, it can detect targets
within 520km or 280nm. Thus, one A-50I cruising at 9,150 metres (30,000 feet)
has a radar coverage of 312,000 square kilometres.
On February 27
morning, in the world’s first-ever aerial engagement in the history
of aerial warfare that involved AEW & CS platforms by both sides, the IAF
maintained a defensive posture, while the PAF went on an offensive limited in
time and depth. While the PAF had two of its Saab 2000 AEW & CS platforms
airborne at that time (with each capable of controlling three combat air patrol
[CAP] interceptions and managing one tactical strike mission at the same time)
over an area south of Islamabad and east of Sargodha, the IAF had one A-50I from the Agra-based No.50 Sqn (capable of controlling
six CAP interceptions and managing three tactical strike missions at the same
time) over Himachal Pradesh and one EMB-145I from the Bhisiana-based No.200 ‘Netra’ Sqn (capable of controlling three CAP
interceptions and managing one tactical strike mission at the same time)
airborne near Pathankot at the same time.
But why did the
IAF not mount barrier-CAPs aimed in-strength against the F-16s and JF-17s? One
plausible reason appears to be the IAF’s laid-down rules of engagement
(emerging from the political directives issued), which discouraged the
initiation of air combat inside PoK’s airspace. And this in turn is most
probably due to the lack of UHF-/L-band two-way tactical data-links (TDL)
on-board the IAF’s fleet of combat aircraft, which prevents the AEW & CS
platforms from providing real-time airborne battle management cues to airborne
IAF combat aircraft while operating inside contested/hostile airspace. Instead,
the AEW & CS platforms are presently transmitting the air situation picture
via VHF bands to ground exploitation centres from where ground-controlled
intercept cues are transmitted within line-of-sight (and consequently over a
very limited distance) to the defending IAF combat aircraft deployed on CAPs. TDLs
required for offensive air operations inside hostile airspace include: the
L-band data-link for two-way line-of-sight communications with AEW & CS
platforms; and a UHF-band SATCOM-based data-link for communicating with
ground-based tactical air-controllers. The TDL thus forms part of the airborne
software-defined radio (SDR) suite, which the IAF had specified for procurement
in the previous decade. While the HAL-developed SDR-2010 has been available
since 2011, it was only last year that the IAF commenced efforts on
procuring 473 + 3,125 SDRs worth Rs.630 crore (including the integral TDL
component) TDLs for achieving real-time connectivity between all IAF
aircraft/helicopters and the Integrated Aerospace Command, Control &
Communications System’s (IACCCS) terrestrial and airborne elements, especially
via the GSAT-7A satellite’s on-board SATCOM transponders. For its 83 projected
Tejas Mk.1A L-MRCAs, the IAF has specified RAFAEL of Israel’s BNET-AR SDR for
installation.
During future
hostilities, there are two possible ways of severely degrading the
effectiveness of the PAF’s AEW & CS platforms: 1) investing in LR-SAMs like the Almaz-Antey
S-400 Triumf ADMS; and 2)
acquiring at least four aircraft equipped with high-power wideband jamming
hardware. Following the signature of a contract on October 5, 2018 that is
valued at US$5.43 billion, the IAF is all set to receive its initial five
squadrons of S-400 Triumf ADMS, with deliveries commencing in late
2020. Plans call for eventually expanding this LR-SAM network into five
Brigades in the following decade, and deploying them for the air-defence
(against hostile AEW & CS platforms and ballistic missiles) of major cities
and industrial corridors located in western and central India. The sector-wise
command-and-control posts of each of these Brigades will be integrated with the
IAF’s already-operational five nodes of the Integrated Air Command,
Control & Communications System (IACCCS) at Barnala (Punjab), Wadsar
(Gujarat), Aya Nagar (Delhi), Jodhpur (Rajasthan) and Ambala (Haryana). Initially,
the S-400 ADMS will come equipped with only the 380km-range 40N6E LR-SAMs,
which were declared by Russia as being ready for series-production following a
series of user-assisted successful test-firings last August. In the following
decade, the 40N6E LR-SAMs will be joined by the 77N6-N and the
77N6-NI LR-SAMs, having top speeds of 7km/second and using Ka
band millimeter-wave active phased-array radar seekers required for
fire-control and guidance of hit-to-kill interceptors.
Airborne
wideband high-power jammers (with the low-bandwidth jamming taking care of
hostile medium-power/high-power airspace surveillance radars; the
mid-band jamming countering the engagement/target illumination radars
used by ground-based surface-to-air defence systems; and the high-band jamming
neutralizing the active seekers of BVRAAMs and SAMs) using active phased-array
transmit-receive modules with microprocessors made of gallium nitride can
generate around ten times the isotropic radiated power of existing airborne
jammers. In addition, the signal itself is cleaner, which means less accidental
interference. Such new-generation jammers can also handle
quadruple the number of assignments and can switch from target to target almost
instantaneously. Also built-in is the ability to collect, analyse and jam new
hostile signals as they emanate, enabling the system to adjust in-flight to
evolving threat profiles, and apply appropriate countermeasures as the
situation develops. Furthermore, its agile jamming flexibility is further
extended by the deliberate choice of open-architecture, solid-state
electronics, which enables quick and easy updates to be made to its on-board
threat library as and when required, to meet new hostile capabilities as they
appear. Such jammers also have the potential ability
to launch a cyber-attack, involving inserting rogue data packets into hostile
ground-based air-defence networks in a so-called “network invasion.” As
effective, broad spectrum jamming increasingly becomes key to survival in the
modern contested airspace, it is therefore imperative that the IAF acquire such
new-generation wideband high-power jammers to help meet the growing capability
demand.
CSAR
Deficiencies
The results of
the Board of Inquiry (BoI) looking into the IAF Mi-17V-5 helicopter crash
that took place in an open field near Garend Kalaan village in Budgam on
February 27 at 10.10am (merely 10 minutes after it took off from
Awantipora, resulting in seven fatalities, including six IAF personnel), are
likely to result in an overhaul of the IAF’s current standard operating
protocols regarding combat search-and-rescue (CSAR) missions. The BoI,
which is looking into all possible angles (inclusive of friendly
surface-to-air fire due to mistaken friend-or-foe identification actions) due
to local eyewitness accounts of hearing a loud explosion in the
air just before the ill-fated Mi-17V-5 went down, indicating the possibility
of some external event causing the crash. Traditionally, personnel recovery
(PR) and CSAR missions have never been considered as one of the core mission
functions of the IAF and it was due to this that the IAF began procuring SARBE
hand-held personal locator beacons from the UK only from the mid-1990s,
followed a decade later by the raising of ‘Garud’ special forces units tasked
with conducting PR/CSAR missions within highly contested operating
environments. As per a RAND Corp study, if the downed aircrew cannot be
recovered in the first 2 hours or so, the recovery probability drops to about
25%, but the probability declines only slowly thereafter with increasing time
on the ground. However, the IASF till this day does not possess the kind of specially-equipped
helicopters required for CSAR missions. Despite the requirement being specified
a decade ago, the IAF only last year began developing a prototype Mi-17V-5 for
the CSAR role (which made its debut as a static exhibit at the Aero India 2019 expo
in Bengaluru last February) by equipping it with an ELBIT Systems-supplied
COMPASS optronic sensor turret and BEL-developed miniature SATCOM antenna and
secure modems. Other elements, like the MSWS suite, GPS receiver, VOL/ILS
receiver, Doppler-based terrain navigation system, IFF transponder, radar
altimeter, attitude heading reference system, and a traffic collision avoidance
system, have yet to be selected.
Overcoming The Damning Shortfalls
When it comes to
airpower projection, the gaping holes are not just limited to the Indian Air
Force’s (IAF) depleting combat aircraft squadron strength, but they also extend
to vital support infrastructure, as well as block obsolescence of guided
air-combat missiles and ground-based air-defence systems of both the IAF and
Indian Army. Three proposals are now awaiting financial clearance in the
current fiscal year: an order for 18 additional licence-assembled Su-30MKI from
state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL); the procurement of up to 50
upgraded MiG-29UPGs from Russia off-the-shelf; and commencement of the Super
Su-30MKI deep-upgrade project. The first was confirmed at the Aero India 2019
expo in Bengaluru last February by Anatoly G Punchuk, Deputy
Director of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, when he
said: “We have received an official request from the IAF for 18 more (semi-knocked-down)
kits just in January this year. We are preparing a commercial offer,” Although.
Punchuk did not confirm the cost of this projected order, it is estimated that
the figure would be a third of the last order for Su-30MKIs from Russia, which
was placed in 2012 and was valued at. Rs.17,246 crore order for an additional
42 Su-30MKIs in semi-knocked-down condition that HAL subsequently had
licence-assembled.
Earlier, in
November 2018, Russia had made an unsolicited offer for the off-the-shelf
supply of up to 34 upgraded MiG-29UBGs, each powered by Klimov RD-33MK
turbofans and using the Phazotron NIIR-supplied Zhuk-M2E multi-mode
fire-control radars. While the IAF has been invited to buy them at a
unit-cost of US$25 million or Rs.175 crore (since they are already
substantially upgraded to the MiG-29SMT standard and have not been flown ever
since they were built in 2008), each of them will cost Rs.285 crore after being
upgraded to the IAF’s specifications. An IAF technical inspection team visited
Russia last January and has since submitted a favourable report to India’s
Ministry of Defence (MoD). The IAF’s existing 69 MiG-29B-12s are presently
being upgraded to the MiG-29UPG-standard under a 2008 contract worth $900
million (Rs.3,850 crore). These are in service with the
Adampur-based 8 Wing’s 47 Black Archers and
223 Tridents squadrons and the Jamnagar-based 33 Wing’s 28 First
Supersonics squadron.
In 2010, the
IAF had issued a Rs.10,200 crore Request for Proposals (RFP) for the
deep-upgrade of 84 of its Su-30MKIs into the Super Su-30MKI configuration.
Negotiations subsequently went into a limbo since Russia’s asking price had
then exceeded the IAF’s estimated budget. The upgrade offer was resurrected
last year during the summit-level talks between Indian PM Narendra Modi and
Russian President Vladimir Putin and a contract is due to be inked later this
year. Meanwhile, Alpha-Tocol has bagged a contracted under the IAF’s ‘Eagle
Eye’ project for installing six fifth-generation R-118 digital radar warning
receivers on each of the IAF’s 148 Su-30MKIs currently based in Lohegaon
(Maharashtra), Bareilly (Uttar Pradesh), Tejpur and Chabua (Assam), Jodhpur
(Rajasthan), Bhisiana and Halwara (Punjab), Bhuj (Gujarat), Sirsa (Haryana),
Kalaikunda and Hashimara (West Bengal) and Thanjavur (Tamil Nadu).
NG-HAS Unavailability
The IAF had
initiated efforts for constructing 108 new generation hardened aircraft
shelters (NG-HAS) for housing its Su-30MKI heavy-/medium-multi-role combat
aircraft (H-/M-MRCA) back in 2012, the cost of which was then pegged at
Rs.5,400 crore. Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) was accorded by the MoD to its
Defence R & D Organisation (DRDO) in December 2012 for evolving the
NG-HAS’s detailed engineering design. SAubsequently, a proposal to rework the
project in three phases by categorising air bases within a distance of 100km,
200km and beyond 200km from the border, respectively, with a gap of two years
in each phase, came under consideration. The first phase was to involve the
construction of 36 NG-HAS requiring a cash outflow of Rs.270 crore. Under this,
the air bases at Pathankot, Srinagar, Udhampur, Bagdogra, Naliya, Hasimara,
Jaisalmer and Uttarlai were to receive top-priority. However, the Cabinet
Committee on National Security (CCNS) approved financial sanctions only at the
end of 2017, while the Union Finance Ministry released the funds only on January
7, 2019. Consequently, the project will now be completed only by 2023. The
IAF’s existing HAS, built to house smaller combat aircraft like the MiG-21
Bison, Jaguar IS, Mirage-2000IN and MiG-29UPG, are tunnel-shaped concrete
structures covered with a layer of earth and protective walls near their
openings, which are supposed to protect aircraft from the effects of blasts in
case of hostile aerial attacks.
E-SHORADS, MR-SAM, QR-SAM & VSHORADS Backlogs
The
DRDO-developed Akash-1 extended short-range air-defence system (E-SHORADS),
whose development began back in 1983, cleared its user-trials only in 2007,
following which the IAF ordered 1,000 missiles and the Indian Army 2,000
missiles. The IAF service-inducted its first Akash-1 Flight in March 2012 upon
completion of nine successful rounds of user-trials, with service commissioning
following in July 2015. Eight Akash-1 squadrons are now in
service, with 125 missiles in each squadron. Another six squadrons, worth
around Rs.3,500 crore, are now in delivery and these will use Akash-1S missiles
fitted with the same indigenously-developed Ku-band active terminal seeker as
that on the indigenous Astra-1 BVRAAM. The Indian Army expressed its desire to
order the Akash-1 in June 2010, but it was only in 2017 that the order for
two regiments (each comprising 288 launchers and 750 missiles) worth Rs.6,000
crore ($2.8 billion) was placed. In terms of hardware content, the Akash-1
is 96% indigenous and sources its components from 330 Indian public-sector and
private-sector industries.
The IAF’s medium-range
surface-to-air missile (MR-SAM) contract that was signed in 2009 had a project
cost of Rs.10,076 crore. Of this, the DRDO’s share, which constituted the
developmental costs, added up to Rs.1,680 crore, while the remaining amount of
Rs.8,396 crore was committed by the IAF towards the guaranteed purchase of the
Barak-8 missiles and other related ground-based fire-control systems. It is
only this year that the IAF will begin inducting an initial nine squadrons of
this land-mobile MR-SAM. On April 6, 2017 Israel Aerospace Industries
(IAI) and the MoD signed a contract worth $1.6 billion for the supply of two
Regiments of Barak-8 MR-SAMs for the Indian Army. Delivery of the first system
will begin within 72 months and will be deployed for operations by 2023. The
order for each MR-SAM regiment or Group, has been pegged at Rs.14,000 crore, or
Rs.6 crore per missile round.
Both the IAF and Indian Army also have a
pressing need for up to 72 land-mobile quick-reaction SAM (QR-SAM) systems, for
which the DRDO has since the earlier part of this decade been working on
developing a QR-SAM variant of the Astra-1 BVRAAM. Production deliveries by the
MoD-owned Bharat Dynamics Ltd and Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) are expected to
commence only by 2022. The requirement for manportable very short-range air-defence
systems (VSHORADS) for the Indian Army and Navy, is worth $5.2 billion and
involves the procurement of 5,175 missiles and 1,276 single and multi-launchers
with stipulated industrial technology transfers. There have been three
contenders over the past nine year—SAABTech of Sweden (offering the RBS-70),
MBDA of France (offering the Mistral) and Rosoboronexport State Corp of Russia
(offering the Igla-S). User-trials began in May 2012 and were completed only
last year, with the Igla-S emerging as the winner.
As for S-125 Pechoras,
30 Sqns were acquired in all, of which 16 are being upgraded and fully
digitised. The $272 million RFP to upgrade 16 IAF S-125 Sqns was issued in May
2016 to Tata Power SED, Larsen & Toubro, Reliance Defence, Offset
India Solutions and a partnership of BDL and BEL. The contract was awarded in
2017 to BDL/BEL, with first deliveries to commence within 42 months of contract
signature. As for SpyDer-SR, the Indian Army has acquired four Regiments worth $250
million to replace all its OSA-AK and Strella-10Ms. The IAF has acquired 18
Firing Units of Spyder-SR LL-QRMs worth $260 million that were contracted for
in September 2009. RFPs for both requirements were issued in mid-2005 to OEMs based in France, Israel, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
BVRAAM/SRAAM Shortfalls
In the aftermath of the
February 26 Balakot air-strikes, the IAF has asked the MoD to urgently purchase
new stockpiles of beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles (BVRAAM) and
short-range air-to-air missiles (SRAAM) due to the prevailing extended levels
of combat preparedness being experienced against Pakistan. The hectic flying
activity by both day and night for ensuring high-levels of operational alert
have led to an increasing number of BVRAAMs and SRAAMs being used in
fully-armed mode, which has reduced their shelf-life from eight years (in case
they are stored in cannisters) to only four sorties of service-life, following
which they have to be zero-lifed by their original equipment manufacturers
(OEM). The IAF is authorised to stockpile up to 4,000 BVRAAMs and 6,000 SRAAMs
and its present inventory holdings include the Vympel R-27ER1/ET1
and R-77/RVV-AE BVRAAMs from both Russia and Ukraine, and Mica-EM BVRAAMs from
MBDA; plus Vympel R-73E SRAAMs from Russia and MBDA-supplied Mica-IR and AIM-132
ASRAAMs.
Anti-Aircraft
Artillery Backlogs
Though the
IAF requires 430 new-generation anti-aircraft cannons and related fire-control
systems worth $400 million for close-in base air-defence, it plans to initially
procure 244 cannons, 228 target acquisition/fire-control radars and
204,000 programmable bullets for 61 Flights—only 18 of which can be delivered
directly from a foreign OEM. Five Indian companies, including Bharat
Forge/Kalyani Defence teamed with BAE Systems, Reliance Defence teamed with
Hanwha Defense Systems of South Korea , Tata Aerospace & Defence, Larsen
& Toubro and the MoD-owned Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) teamed up with BEL
and THALES of France have put in their bids. On the other hand, the Indian
Army requires 938 cannons to replace in-service Bofors L-70 and Russian
ZU-23MM-2B systems, plus 5,05,920 rounds of ammunition, including 1,63,200
smart 3P rounds—all valued at $1.7 billion (Rs.17,000 crore).
The Indian
Army also has a requirement for five Regiments (or 104 units) of
self-propelled cannon-missile systems, 97 ammunition carriers, 39 command
vehicles, 4,928 missiles and 172,260 rounds of ammunition, costing a total of
$1.6 billion. The bidding process took off in 2013, and the candidate weapons
were evaluated throughout 2015 and field-tested in 2017. Contenders
included the Hanwha Defense Systems’ Hybrid K-30 Biho (paired with the
Chiron SAM developed by aerospace manufacturer LIG Nex1), and Russian companies
Almaz-Antey, which offered its upgraded Tunguska system, and KBP Tula, which
offered its Pantsyr system. In October 2018, the Army officially declared
Hanwha Defense Systems as the only qualified company for i8mplementing the
project.
Another
requirement that has acquired greater urgency (due to the Pakistan Army’s
intentions for attacking the Indian Army’s dominating outposts south of the Pir
Panjal Range along the LoC in southern Jammu with remotely-operated quadcopters
armed with improvised explosive devices) is the need for drone countermeasures
systems capable of jamming the two-way data-links of such ‘kamikaze’
quadcopters. Expected to be ordered are a BEL-developed, manportable,
remotely-operated anti-drone jammer that can be coupled with an OFB-developed,
vehicle-mounted 12.7mm remote-control weapon station.
In the deep-upgrade
category, on June 30, 2015 Punj Lloyd and BEL were shortlisted for upgrading
the Army’s 468 ZU-23MM-2B cannons under a $100 million (Rs.670 crore)
project. While Punj Lloyd has partnered with Slovakian defence company EVPU
Defence Punj, BEL has teamed up with OFB. However, no final winner has
been announced as yet. Meanwhile, following a March 2011 contract award, BEL
on November 28, 2014 delivered the first of 48 modernised ZSU-23-4
Schilka self-propelled air-defence weapon systems to the Army.
