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Monday, August 30, 2021

Afghanistan's Future & Regional Geo-Political/Geo-Economic Options

Following a fortnight of targetted conciliatory statements issued by Taliban spokespersons Zabihullah Mujahid and Suhail Shaheen on mainstream English-language Indian TV channels, the Taliban’s head of political office in Doha, Sher Mohammed Abbas Stanekzai in an audio-visual Facebook post in Pashto spoke about the end of the war in Afghanistan and plans for forming an Islamic Emirate based on Shariah. Here is his message:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g4pn7cqolEE

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lAkf_x7v82w

He also spoke about relations with key countries in the region, including China, India, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. “India is very important for this subcontinent. We want to continue our cultural, economic and trade ties with India like in the past… Trade with India through Pakistan is very important for us. With India, trade through air corridors will also remain open.” Interestingly, Stanekzai did not say anything about Afghanistan’s support for or participation in the  International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) project, which brings together India, Iran, Russia and recently Uzbekistan. Perhaps Akhunzada will bring up the INSTC project whenever he broadcasts his detailed views on the future of Afghanistan-Iran ties.

India’s Imperatives

Unfortunately, for most New Delhi-based commentators (especially former Indian diplomats and retired senior military officers), the Taliban’s ascendancy in Kabul continues to be seen through the lens of the India-Pakistan conflict and India’s friction with China, making the fall of the India-friendly Ashraf Ghani government a significant challenge to India’s national security imperatives. Many of them in New Delhi are describing the US military withdrawal and the subsequent Taliban takeover of Kabul as a triumph of Pakistan’s Afghan policy. India chaired the special session of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) earlier last week and pushed for a resolution calling for the immediate cessation of all hostilities in Afghanistan and the establishment of a new government that is united, inclusive and representative. Before the Taliban takeover, there was discussion in New Delhi about possible full-spectrum engagement with the Taliban at Doha, while maintaining support for the Ashraf Ghani government. However, with the fall of Kabul on August 15, India is now primarily concerned about regional fallout. India’s principal concerns regarding the Taliban revolved around the future of the Taliban’s relationship with Pakistan, whether the group ceases violence and how it manages its links with trans-national terrorist groups that threaten India. It is my considered assessment that India evacuated all her diplomatic personnel and Indian nationals (based in Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif and Jalalabad) by special military flights from Kabul rather prematurely. While it is acceptable that India withdrew the bulk of its diplomatic staff and citizens, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) should have left the door half-open by maintaining a Charge d’Affaires there along a skeletal support staff at the Embassy, since India as an all-inclusive democracy is rightly to be expected to place a premium on enduring people-to-people ties. India has also offered special emergency visas for Afghan nationals, with the priority of Hindu and Sikh Afghans. India has also offered to allow Afghan citizens to stay in India as refugees while being processed for resettlement to third countries.

Another widespread falsehood is that India has not maintained any communications channel with the Taliban. It may be recalled that the former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Abdul Salaam Zaeef was granted a visa by the Govt of India to attend the the TEHELKA Group-organised annual THiNK festival in Goa November 2013 in Goa:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wGHyK_E5EOg&t=116s


And here is Mullah Abdul Salaam Zaeef again spelling out the Taliban’s perception of India last week:


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wtwooGcRuRA

Needless to say, the Doha-based Zaeef has been used by India as an unofficial interlocutor since 2013. Looking to the future, India’s expectations from Afghanistan are likely to be similar to those of Russia, i.e. both want the Emirate of Afghanistan to adopt, at the very least, MINIMALLY CIVILISED attitudes and governance norms. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has described the recent events in Afghanistan as constituting “the revenge of history” over “modernity and globalism.” After all, both India and Russia have full diplomatic ties with countries like Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Myanmar and the People’s Republic of China—countries that are not exactly ‘model’ states as far as the human rights records go. However, both India and Russia will not establish formal diplomatic ties with Kabul until the 135 members of the Taliban gouping are removed from the UN Sanctions List. Unlike Al Qaeda, ISIS, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and many other similar groups, the Taliban is not specifically listed on any UN sanctions list, but it remains sanctioned nonetheless. In 2011 the sanctions regime established in UNSCR-1267 was split up to create separate tracks for the Taliban (UNSCR-1988) and Al Qaeda (UNSCR-1989) in part to provide momentum to the Afghan-led peace process by creating incentives for the Taliban to improve its behaviour. This split, however, has created some of the confusion. The original criteria for listing Al Qaeda were for supporting the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and it strains credulity to think that the UN Security Council had not intended to impose sanctions on the Taliban itself via UNSCR-1267, given that the asset freeze language is clear. Therefore, statements from the Security Council and key member-states support the existence of the broader assets-freeze on the Taliban.

Pakistan’s Conundrum

As far as Pakistan goes, on August 16, Pakistan’s National Security Committee, chaired by Prime Minister Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi, reiterated Islamabad's commitment to an inclusive political settlement representing all Afghan ethnic groups as the way forward. The Pakistani Foreign Office’s official statement also lauded the fact that the Taliban had averted major bloodshed and violence in Afghanistan, and it called on all parties in Afghanistan to respect the rule of law, protect fundamental human rights and ensure that Afghan soil is not used by any terrorist grouping against any country. Pakistan has not yet officially recognised the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan and has largely evacuated its diplomatic personnel. In contrast to the careful official statements, there is a sense of triumphalism within Pakistan that its policy of hedging and supporting the Taliban has paid off. Through the lens of its rivalry with India, the Taliban victory is seen as the defeat of a pro-India Afghan government. Also, many right-wing Pakistani politicians are painting the Taliban ascendancy as a pan-Islamist victory over the superpower United States, a theme that plays well to right-of-centre domestic politics. In recent remarks, PM Niazi said that the Afghans are breaking “the shackles of slavery,” referring to Western cultural imposition and democratic values on Afghanistan. His comments have been controversial and seen as a tacit approval of the Taliban’s preference for an Emirate that does not tolerate any form of elections and democratic processes, but Pakistan insists that his statements were taken out of context. Within the Pakistani intelligentsia, there are pragmatic voices worried about the future security implications. There is significant worry about the extremist religiosity’s spillover into Pakistan, especially amid the re-emergence of the TTP and the emboldening of other violent sectarian groups. With Pakistani leverage over the Taliban evolving, Pakistan continues to push for a political settlement that allows for Taliban legitimacy but includes other Afghan groups like the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras. Early last week, a group of non-Pashtun former Northern Alliance Afghan Tajik politicians met with Pakistani leaders in Islamabad to discuss the possibilities of engaging with the Taliban to form a new “inclusive” government. Worried about a spillover from the fighting, Pakistan had shut its side of the border prior to the Taliban's takeover. But after a brief closure, it was re-opened for trade and restricted pedestrian movement.

Despite all this, it has always been and continues to be Afghanistan that constitutes the principal existential threat to Pakistan. After all, Afghanistan was the only country that had formally opposed the creation of Pakistan at the UN. And this was due to the geopolitical cartography drawn by the then British Colonial administrator led by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand in 1893 through a pact with the then Amir of Afghanistan, Abdur Rahman, covering a vast stretch of terrains both rugged as well as plains (though strategically significant) of over around 1,519 miles. One of the major legal implications of the Durand line Agreement of 1893 is that the delimitation of territories which created a de facto frontier (not boundary) between Afghanistan and India. As part of the Agreement, the Amir retained his position in the Wakhan Corridor, thus separating the Tzarist Russian and British troops. At the same time, he also ensured his control over the “Asmar district and the Wazir district of Birmal”. On the other hand, the Amir as part of the Treaty had agreed to transfer Pashtun-dominated regions like “Chitral, Swat, New Chaman, Khabiar Pass, Chagai, North Waziristan”, etc. The Treaty was not ratified by any legislative bodies of either sides, and hence it is legally untenable. The Durand Line and the boundary (administrative border) between the Tribal Agencies and Settled Districts of the North-West Frontier Province (now Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province) were simply delineating zones of influence and responsibility. Thus, it can be stated that it was not a legally-binding demarcated and delineated international boundary (IB) at all, but was rather a de-facto arrangement keeping the geopolitical developments in mind at that point of time. In 1921 Afghanistan and British Colonial administration signed another agreement that provided a three-year term for the Treaty and “revocation” of the Treaty if “both the parties agree”. In addition, legal luminaries and scholars have stated that the British colonial administration “signed the treaty using duress” in 1893, hence any law which was signed “under duress is invalid” in the domain of International Law.


Up until 2017, Pakistan tried in vain to legalise the status of the Durand Line by making it a legally-binding IB by requesting the Taliban’s political office in Doha, Qatar, to issue a statement to this effect. But the Taliban rebuffed Islamabad and instead told Pakistan to settle this issue with the Ashraf Ghani government. Kabul too refused to acknowledge the legality of the Durand Line and only after this did the Pakistan Army begin to fence the 2,611km-long (1,622-mile) Durand Line. The physical barrier between the two countries comprises two sets of chain-link fences separated by a 2-metre (6.5-feet) space that has been filled with concertina wire-coils. The double-fence is about 4 metres (13-feet) high. The Pakistan Army has installed surveillance cameras to check any movement along the fence.

In a further blow to Pakistan, the Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid has stated that Kabul will not hand over TTP and Baloch separatists residing within Afghanistan to Islamabad and will instead encourage reconciliation negotiations between Pakistan and its separatist groups.

Iran’s Leverage

The Islamic Republic of Iran’s top concerns include stemming the flow of migrants and refugees, containing narcotics trafficking, maintaining cross-border trade, mitigating the threat from the Islamic State Wilayat Khorasan (IS-WK) branch, sharing water resources and ensuring the safety of Afghanistan’s Shia Hazara minority. To deal with the influx of Afghan refugees, Iran has set up temporary camps in three border provinces—Razavi Khorasan, South Khorasan, and Sistan-Balochistan. As of 2020, Iran already hosted some 950,000 documented Afghan refugees and at least 2 million more undocumented Afghans. Iran had already taken precautions on the ground. Earlier this month, Teheran reduced staff at its Embassy in Kabul and evacuated staff from three out of four of its Consulates to the capital. Only guards and local workers remained in Jalalabad, Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif. Diplomats remained in the Herat Consulate after the Taliban took control of the western city, but are safe. However, Teheran has enough reasons to feel confident about the cards that it holds, i.e. with each passing day, as Afghanistan’s stockpiles of perishable commodities and foodgrains gets reduced to dangerous levels and Kabul’s purchasing powers get greatly diminished, the Taliban will will have no other choice but to ask for humanitarian assistance from any and all quarters, especially through Iran’s Chabahar-based FTIZ. Consequently, India can confidently expect such a request to emanate from Kabul anytime now and India is likely to reciprocate by sending emergency shipments of foodgrains to a grateful Kabul.

The CARs’ Collective Stance

The Central Asian Republics of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan lived with the Taliban in the 1990s and will adjust to living with them again. Leaders of these four countries had no particular interest in maintaining the status quo in Afghanistan and no motivation for supporting the weak, fragmented and corrupt government in Kabul. An Afghanistan engulfed in civil war would pose serious security and economic challenges to Central Asia. A descent into chaos could return Afghanistan to a hub for Jihadist and criminal groupings that would greatly destabilise the entire region and impede any progress on South-Central Asia economic connectivity, trade and transit. The Taliban, on the other hand, are trying to position themselves to be a centralised and strong government in Afghanistan—something that the Central Asian, Russian and Iranian leaders are very familiar with. As long as the Taliban are willing and able to fight the IS-WK group and eliminate or contain other transnational violent extremist groups such as Al Qaida and the remnants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; secure their borders; and provide for safe passage of goods and trade between Central and South Asia, the Central Asian Republics are likely to adjust to working with them again, of course after Russia’s approval. The Taliban has even promised to eliminate the narcotics trade. The frontline Central Asian countries of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have all reacted with a demonstrative flexing of military muscle by shoring up border security. Afghan Army special operations forces and Afghan Air Force pilots have fled in large numbers to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as have several bureaucrats dealing with internal security, national defence and civilian provincial governors. Tajikistan has already accepted Afghan refugees and has also requested support from the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) in anticipation of more refugee flows across the IB. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, on the other hand, have been very cautious in opening up their IBs for refugees, with the Uzbek authorities even turning back Afghan Army personnel who had escaped to Uzbekistan after their bases were overrun by Taliban combatants earlier this month.

China’s Predictable Mercantile Attitude

On the heels of the Taliban takeover, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi told US Secretary of State Antony Blinken that China desired a “soft landing” for Afghanistan. What did Beijing’s top diplomat mean? Wang’s words highlight China’s paramount priority for Afghanistan: stability above all else. What Beijing fears most is a period of uncertainty during which the country devolves into protracted chaos marked by widespread violence, a humanitarian catastrophe of epic scale and an Afghanistan that is once again an epicenter and exporter of transnational terrorism. While never comfortable with the US military presence in Afghanistan—which via the Wakhan Corridor abuts China’s westernmost and sensitive frontier province of Xinjiang—Beijing had privately hoped that Washington DC’s efforts would bring lasting stability to the troubled country. However, today, Beijing’s leaders view the abrupt US exit from Afghanistan with mixed emotions. Beijing’s Communist totalitarian rulers are pragmatists and have long been agnostic about who governs Afghanistan as long as China’s vital interests are safeguarded. Today, these vital interests boil down to a smooth transition to a new national-unity government that can maintain stability and domestic order. Over the years Beijing has shrewdly continued to engage diplomatically with the Taliban, most recently welcoming a high-level delegation to Tianjin last July. Beijing is actively pursuing an accommodation with the new authorities in Kabul as it seeks assurances that a Taliban administration will neither foment trouble in Xinjiang nor disrupt China’s Belt & Road Initiative-related economic endeavours in Afghanistan.

Mapping The Journey Of A Still-Evolving Taliban

Since its removal from power in late 2001 and formation of a resilient insurgency, the Afghan Taliban has been described as comprising little more than a loose network, dis-organised, lacking a command-n-control hierarchy, and having “a tendency toward fragmentation”. This narrative was drawn in part from notions of disarmament and reconciliation that had been promoted, since at least 2005, by Afghanistan’s then President Hamid Karzai. From a counter-insurgency (COIN) perspective, it stood to reason that if a number of Taliban combatants were driven primarily by local grievances, rather than by the strict ideology that made the movement notorious during its previous Islamic Emirate regime (1996–2001), these members could perhaps be coaxed away from the insurgency. Afghans themselves have long drawn a distinction between the movement’s ideological, fighting core and its “part-time,” inactive, and other more pragmatically motivated members. The string of senior-level deaths and arrests in 2006 and 2007 that hinted at competitive backstabbing; the rampant criminality and notorious brutality among field commanders, in contravention of the Amir Mohd Omar’s issued guidance; some figures’ cultivation of financial resources and external relationships that ran contrary to the agenda of the Amir’s Quetta-based Shura—all took place well before Omar’s death, before suspicion, deception, and combatants’ faltering faith could be blamed for eroded cohesion.

In 2007 the Taliban reached a turning point when the group’s senior military commander, Mullah Dadullah Akhund, was killed in a raid by NATO special operations forces on May 13, 2007 in Helmand’s Girishk district. Dadullah was notoriously ruthless, having controversially introduced suicide bombings to the conflict, and had taken an unorthodox stance by actively engaging with the Western press, including making provocative statements of support for Al Qaeda. Reports of Dadullah’s death hinted that he had been betrayed, corresponding with rumours of antipathy among other leaders. The eventual death or arrest of three other senior figures during this period, and the Taliban’s later actions against commanders considered to have “gone rogue,” added to suspicions of behind-the-scenes internecine struggles. Of the several reasons why factionalism grew within the movement, one was the shift in the origins and distribution of external support and resources. Beginning around 2009, resources began to be dispersed more evenly across the leadership Shuras in Quetta, Peshawar, Miran Shah, Mashad, and “the North.” As the Taliban expanded its reach across the country, changing the way the movement connected to new local communities at the same time that its internal hierarchy was evolving, the grouping effectively experienced growing pains. The movement had expanded to the point that wholesale organisational adaptation, while necessary, left it less cohesive and vulnerable to external shocks. In any case, it was several years before another Taliban commander came into the public spotlight for disagreeing with the central leadership—even as it became increasingly clear that alternative centres of power were emerging within the grouping.

 By 2012, there were signs that growing factionalism was leading to fragmentation. Amid broader wrangling between the Shuras over financing and operations, tensions escalated between top military commander Mullah Zakir and his deputy Mullah Amir Mansour (the slain Dadullah’s younger brother), eventually resulting in Zakir’s demotion. Moreover, a faction was appearing to distance itself and emerging as a distinct group: claims had occasionally surfaced from the Mullah Dadullah Feda’i Mahaaz, or “Sacrificing Front,” ever since Amir Mansour had adopted his namesake and his command. The younger “Mansour Dadullah” was demoted and punished by the Taliban for disobedience, and thereafter his followers made the occasional claim of brutal attacks—including on a former Taliban Minister and High Peace Council member. There was no evidence at the time that the Mullah Dadullah Front had entirely separated itself from the Taliban, but by 2013 the splinter group appeared to have split once more: under a commander Najibullah, the Feda’i Mahaaz actively began to seek publicity, carrying out brutal high-profile killings. By 2014, a spokesperson was claiming that the Feda’i Mahaaz opposed the Taliban’s stance on peace talks, mocking the group as a “Qatari militia.” At a strategic level, the Taliban failed to respond in a unified fashion to the Afghan government’s 2014 elections, with subsequent reporting by international observers pointing to disparate agendas and approaches among the group’s regional commands. Disagreements over the use of violence, discordant political stances on peace talks and covert Pakistani patronage, and raw power struggles had all been fomenting for several years before the perfect storm of 2015 broke, comprising the leaked news of Mullah Omar’s death in Zaabul, the ensuing succession struggle, and the emergence of the Islamic State–Wilayat Khorasan (IS-WK). So what actually happened in 2015? Why did the Taliban fragment the way it did, and, just as important, why had it largely resumed its pre-2015 cohesiveness less than a year later?

It is true that a cadre of dissatisfied hard-liners defected to IS-WK from Taliban ranks, but these members were mostly localised in pockets of the eastern provinces of Nangarhar and Kunar. Ultimately, the movement’s most prominent ideological opponents of peace talks did not openly split from the group, despite a full year of tension and dysfunction within the leadership. Indeed, the highest-ranking defector from the Taliban in 2015, Mullah Rasoul, later announced that he was in favour of a peaceful settlement. Moreover, the highest-ranking leader publicly known to oppose talks in earlier years, Mullah Qayum Zakir, who never broke with the group, was promoted back into upper echelons of leadership after years of pariah status, at the same time that leadership Shuras finally affirmed their consensus in favour of peace talks in January 2020. Even as weak results led the US and Afghan governments to wind down the various stratagems intended to disarm and reconcile the Taliban combatants, hints of divide-and-defeat methods persisted—such as the US blacklisting the Haqqani Network without enforcing new sanctions against the “core” Taliban membership. By 2015, the Taliban had violently reasserted their presence across the country, but a confluence of events—the displacement of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) combatants across the eastern border, the related emergence of an IS-WK satellite, and the public revelation that Taliban founder Mullah Omar had been dead since 2013—sent shock-waves through the movement and halted faltering back-channel peace talks. While some well-informed observers speculated as to the group’s fragmented nature and the potential for open schisms, other scholars and practitioners rightly noted that insurgencies and extremist groups often grow more violent in the aftermath of leadership transitions as new leaders seek to establish credibility. An expectation of fragmentation persisted after the death due to a US drone-strike of a second Taliban leader, Mullah Omar’s successor, Mullah Akhtar Mansour in the Dalbandin area of Pakistan’s Balochistan province on May 21, 2016.

Mansour had managed to corral many high-ranking dissenters back into the fold, obtaining delayed and begrudging oaths of allegiance, but his tenure remained characterised by internal polarisation and discord. The very nature of Mansour’s death seemed to highlight the persistence of a “forcing fragmentation” strategy, even if US foreign policy circles had dropped most public emphasis on intentionally fragmenting the Taliban. In its place, however, the Afghan government rigorously took up the strategy. As late as 2017, then commander of US forces in Afghanistan General John W Nicholson noted that the long-term strategy of the Afghan security forces was “fight, fracture, talk.” Yet the paradigm of splitting insurgent groups persisted in some corners. Some continued to suggest that the key to a political settlement lay in the Taliban’s internal divisions. Others hopefully pointed to the Afghan government’s 2017 political settlement with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his Hezb-e Islami party (HIG) as a model for future agreements with the Taliban. These hopes leaned on an implicit characterisation of the HIG peace deal as successfully dividing Afghanistan’s insurgency, splitting Gulbuddin’s “reconcilable” combatants off from an “irreconcilable” Taliban. Afghan political figures then said as much since Hekmatyar’s return to Afghanistan, suggesting more than once that the Taliban should be negotiated with along similar terms. But this perspective ignores the fact that HIG had always been a rather separate and distinct movement from the Taliban, not a faction that was successfully “peeled off.”Even amid the fracas of 2015, the Taliban’s credibility was boosted under Mansour’s leadership after the provincial capital of Kunduz briefly fell, the most dramatic military achievement of the group since before 2001.

Cohesive groups requiring a strong horizontal network of ties is critical. It is not the ideal of loyalty to an Amir that constitutes the core strength of these horizontal ties, but the very nature of the Taliban’s Mahaaz structure (multiple fronts), and its continued relevance, that have made and keep the group so cohesive. The Mahaaz structure lacks intermediary ranks that might separate top figures from field commanders, operates via the direct collection and distribution of funds, serves as the predominant recruitment mechanism for the movement’s combatants, and functions through personalised relationships among the leadership. It is this structure has kept the movement intact despite the external pressures and internal factionalism, tribal tensions, and national expansion that it has faced over the past three decades. There was a period, just before the fractious year of 2015, when the Taliban’s institutional reforms appeared to have replaced its informal Mahaaz structure, down to the fundamental order of its military chain of command. Yet in the years since, the movement has returned to the reliability of Mahaaz networks even as it has institutionalised at a steady pace, a concurrent approach that has, over the years, somewhat confounded Afghanistan-watchers. This organisational contradiction may have come about as a result of the Taliban’s forays into military centralisation, which proved highly contentious and may have been at the root of faltering cohesion within the movement. This was likely because full military professionalisation of the movement would have removed the benefits the Mahaaz system afforded to each individual in the movement’s leadership. By preserving the Mahaaz structure, the Taliban’s leadership remains cohesive, and the organisation has instead increased institutionalisation through its civilian-oriented commissions and positions for governance, casualty recording and prevention, and information and media operations, including internal messaging and guidance. This practice has strengthened what the vertical ties between insurgents and the local rural communities that host them.

Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, upon assuming power on May 26, 2016, intentionally split operational control of the Taliban’s military forces between Sirajuddin Haqqani and Mullah Mohd Yaqoob (son of Mullah Mohammad Omar) in order to prevent the two from creating potentially powerful breakaway factions. An attempt on Haibatullah’s life (or at least the killing of his brother, a cleric in Quetta) in August 2019 appeared to barely affect the movement; such an affront to the core of the Taliban’s bond might have been expected to trigger a more visible response. Yaqoob took charge as chief of operations and the Afghanistan affairs portfolio. He has also set up a new financial commission to manage the Taliban’s expenditure. Among his supporters were Qayyum Zakir, who was influential in the narcotics-producing Afghan province of Helmand, and Ibrahim Sadar, a powerful voice in the Helmand Shura, or council. From the time of his initial bid for leadership, Yaqoob also enjoyed the backing of the Taliban’s Interior Minister and Kandahar’s shadow governor Sharafuddin Taqi (who was killed after a US air-strike close to the Musa Qala market on April 1, 2019). Yaqoob gained the loyalty and operational resources of the most vigorous Taliban factions in the south, where the Haqqani Network had always been unpopular.  Yaqoob favoured the peace process with the US and rapprochement with India. On the other hand, Sirajuddin Haqqani, the head of the Haqqani Network and deputy leader of the Taliban, was and is an ally of Pakistan and Al Qaeda. Anas Haqqani is Sirajuddin’s brother. It is under the Haqqani Network’s patronage that Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), an extremist group based in Bahawalpur, Pakistan, is operating three training camps in Nangarhar province. With an estimated strength of 5,000 loyal combatants along with a sophisticated and independent financing network, the Haqqani Network remains a formidable threat in its own right. Even cut off from the broader Taliban grouping, it remains capable of inflicting significant damage. Then there are about 500 combatants active in Afghanistan’s Kunar and Nangarhar provinces that are loyal to the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).

Tectonic Policy-Shifts

The latter half of the previous decade witnessed the decisive steps required for achieving an end-state in Afghanistan. In 2016, the Republican Party-controlled US Congress passed legislation to block US$450 million in aid to Pakistan for failing to “demonstrate its commitment” and taking action against the Haqqani Network. The legislation which made $450 million of Coalition Support Fund (CSF) to Pakistan ineligible for the US Secretary of Defense’s waiver authority unless the Secretary provided a certification to the Congressional defence committees. There was a similar certification requirement in the year ending on September 31, 2016, but the amount was $300 million. The US Defense Secretary was not able to give necessary certification for the release of the CSF to Pakistan. According to the US National Defense Authorization Act 2017, of the total amount of reimbursement and support authorised for Pakistan during the period beginning on October 1, 2016 and ending on December 31, 2017, $450 million would not be eligible for a national security waiver unless the Secretary of Defence certified that Pakistan continued to conduct operations against the Haqqani Network. This was followed on August 21, 2017 by President Trump outlining his Afghanistan policy, saying that though his “original instinct was to pull out,” he will instead press ahead with an open-ended military commitment to prevent the emergence of “a vacuum for terrorists.” Differentiating his policy from Obama’s, Trump said that decisions about withdrawal will be based on “conditions on the ground,” rather than arbitrary timelines. He invited India to play a greater role in rebuilding Afghanistan, while castigating Pakistan for harbouring the Taliban insurgents. He also pledged to loosen restrictions on combat even as the UN reported a spike in civilian casualties caused by Afghan and coalition air-strikes. A political settlement with the Taliban, Trump said, was far off. In January 2018 the Taliban carried out a series of bold terror attacks in Kabul that killed more than 115 people amid a broader upsurge in violence. The attacks came as the Trump Administration implemented its Afghanistan plan, deploying troops across rural Afghanistan to advise Afghan National Army Brigades and launching relentless air-strikes against Opium laboratories to try to decimate the Taliban’s funding sources. The Administration also cut off security assistance worth billions of dollars to Pakistan for what President Trump called its “lies and deceit” in harbouring Taliban combatants. Furthermore, the Financial Action Rask Force (FATF) in June 2018 placed Pakistan on its ‘Grey List’ for failing to implement effective measures to stop terror-financing and money laundering practices and networks.

The financial strangulation had its desired effect and Pakistan began taking a series of corrective steps, starting with Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar being allowed to depart Pakistan for Qatar on October 25, 2018 on the solicitation of Qatar after Qatar’s Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed Bin Abdulrahman Al Thani visited Islamabad and held meetings with Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan and Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi. On February 15, 2010, Abdul Ghani Baradar was arrested by Pakistani authorities in the southern port city of Karachi. The ISI took him into custody, promising the CIA that he would be handed over to them the next day. To the amazement of the ISI, Baradar subsequently disclosed to the ISI that his capture was arranged for him to negotiate a deal with the CIA unbeknownst to Mullah Omar and to the ISI. Mullah Baradar, was commander of the Taliban's formation in the western region (Herat) as well as Kabul. In 2001, he was the Deputy Minister of Defence. His wife is Mullah Mohd Omar’s sister. He was born in Weetmak village in Dehrawood district, in the Uruzgan province of Afghanistan, in 1968. But he is also part of the Popalzai branch of Durrani tribe, the same as Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the founder-King of Afghanistan, Ahmed Shah Durrani (Abdali). This tribe is also close to the Ghilzai tribe, to which Mullah Umar belonged. In 1989, after the USSR’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and the country was torn by civil war, Baradar set up a Madrassa in Kandahar with Mohd Omar. The duo then launched the Taliban movement in 1994 and came to power in 1996.

Pakistan had by then assessed that if all went well, then the Taliban would be able to negotiate a treaty on the withdrawal of foreign military forces from Afghanistan by 2020. If that did happen, then extensive investments needed to be made on convincing the Taliban to have an all-inclusive national unity government operating from Kabul, failing which Afghanistan would once again descend into an unending civil war, which in turn would totally knock Pakistan’s already perilous economy off its legs. If this were to happen, then more than half of the Pakistan Army (PA) would be required to be deployed along the Durand Line to prevent it from being breached by successive influxes of fleeing Afghan refugees. This in turn would drastically alter the balance of military power in India’s favour along both the Working Boundary astride Jammu and the Line of Control (LoC) along Kashmir. Consequently, the PA under its Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa came up with the ‘Bajwa Doctrine 1.0’, which was publicly outlined by the PA COAS himself at the Munich Security Conference in February 2018 and again a month later in an informal discussion with selected Pakistani journalists on March 25. Key elements of this doctrine were the PA’s adherence to democracy, ensuring proper respect for all state institutions, exterminating terrorism, mainstreaming of the estimated 47,000 extremist Jihadists, and viewing the 18th Amendment to Pakistan’s Constitution (which delegated more autonomy to the provinces) with great skepticism. What he did not reveal then was that through the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, he had already initiated a series of parleys with India’s Research & Analysis Wing (R & AW) in London (because both India and Pakistan trusted the UK as a party entrusted with displaying ‘fairplay’), which were facilitated by the British Chief of the General Staff, Gen Sir Nicholas Carter, following a visit by Gen Bajwa to the UK in May 2017 where he gave a speech at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). This was followed by the PA’s Rawalpindi-based GHQ inviting the Indian Army’s Sanjay Vishwasrao, India’s Military Attache at the Indian High Commission to Pakistan to the Pakistan Day military parade on March 23 in Islamabad. Such signals were a way of conveying to India that: 1) Pakistan was sincere about its desire for seeing the emergence of an all-inclusive government of national unity in Afghanistan that would be at peace with all its immediate neighbours and neighbouring countries. 2) Pakistan was ready for adopting a modus vivendi regarding the issue Jammu & Kashmir, under which each party would keep what it already had and this would be formalised at a later day into a permanent solution.  

On January 26, 2019 the Afghan Taliban and US officials in Doha, Qatar, agreed on a preliminary draft of a likely peace accord, including US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 18 months. The talks between US special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad and Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar centered on the US withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan in exchange for the Taliban pledging to block international terrorist groups from operating out of Afghan soil. The ramped-up diplomacy followed signals that President Trump planned to pull out 7,000 troops, about half the total US deployment. Khalilzad said that the US will insist that the Taliban agree to participate in an intra-Afghan dialogue on the country’s political structure, as well as a cease-fire. It was unclear whether Trump would condition the troop withdrawal on those terms. Events took a turn for the worse when the JeM orchestrated the Pulwama suicide bombing on February 14, 2019 and India militarily retaliated by conducting an air-strike of the JeM’s terrorist training camp at Jabba Top (at an elevation of 4,000 feet above sea-level) at Kagan Gali along the Kunhar River inside KPK. However, after India on August 5 that year converted Jammu & Kashmir from a State into a Union Territory (UT), carved off Ladakh as a separate UT and terminated the applicability of Articles 370 and 35A on J & K UT, the response from the PA was muted, since, according to the PA, Pakistan had never recognised the princely state of J & K’s accession to India on October 26, 1947. However, to allay the Pakistani public’s anger about such a muted response, the PA began putting both the WB and the LoC under stress by engaging in almost-daily shelling of areas along the WB and LoC—which continued for another 17 months. In addition, Gen Bajwa got a three-year extension of tenure as COAS in August 2016. On September 7, 2019 President Trump abruptly broke off peace talks a week after Khalilzad announced that an agreement had been reached in principle with Taliban leaders. In a tweet, Trump said that he cancelled a secret meeting with the Taliban and Afghan President Ghani at Camp David after a US soldier was killed in a Taliban attack. The Taliban said that it remained “committed to continuing negotiations,” but warned that the cancellation will cause an increase in the number of deaths.

On October 8, 2019 Gen Bajwa accompanied PM Niazi on a visit to Beijing where both of them met China’s President Xi Jinping, National People's Congress (NPC) chairman Li Zhanshu and Premier Li Keqiang. Separately, Gen Bajwa called on Xu Qiliang, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and discussed China’s plan to engage in a major military standoff with India along eastern Ladakh (thereby tying down Indian military power along the Line of Actual Control, or LAC) until Pakistan finished conducting the Assembly elections in PoJK’s Gilgit-Baltistan  in November 2020 and the General Election in ‘Azad Kashmir’ in late July 2021. Finally, on February 29, 2020 the Doha Peace Agreement was inked between the Taliban and the US. The agreement said that intra-Afghan negotiations should begin the following month, but Afghan President Ghani insisted that the Taliban must meet his government’s own conditions before it enters talks. The US-Taliban deal did not call for an immediate cease-fire, and in the days after its signing, Taliban combatants carried out dozens of attacks on Afghan security forces. US forces responded with an air-strike against the Taliban in the southern province of Helmand. In May 2020, a Taliban spokesman made a shocking statement describing India’s revocation of Kashmir’s autonomy and subsequent military crackdown as an Indian “internal affair.” On February 25, 2021 a joint statement from the militaries of India and Pakistan proclaimed that both had agreed to strict adherence to the November 2003 ceasefire understanding along both the WB and LoC. Next, on April 23 in an ‘off-the-record’ interaction with about 35 selected journalists during an official iftar event, the PA’s COAS stated that Pakistan would be satisfied if India restored statehood to J & K and desisted from altering the UT’s demographic profile. This was an attempt to test the waters to see how Pakistan’s print and broadcast media and then the nation would react to actually ‘burying the past and moving ahead’ as dictated by geo-economic rather than geopolitical ground realities. Such official thinking on relations with India is said to have been influenced by the fact that wars did not produce a solution and neither did the Kashmir Jihad. Consequently, the PA is said to be thinking in terms of ‘strategic patience’. This policy was reportedly based on a realisation that a ‘hot LoC’ was posing a major drain on the economy. According to this ‘Bajwa 2.0 Doctrine’, Pakistan’s geo-economic vision centered on four fundamental pillars: lasting lasting peace at home and abroad; non-interference of any kind in the internal affairs of neighbouring and regional countries; stimulating intra-regional trade and connectivity; and ensuring sustainable development and prosperity through the creation of investment and economic poles in the region. 

By mid-August, it took just approximately 80,000 Taliban combatants (almost all of them Afghan-origin but Pakistan-based) a few days to convince the 300,699 troops (abruptly abandoned by the US military and civilian contractors) serving the Afghan government to surrender and fade away without any major fight. In fact, the Taliban’s military leadership (mostly Kandaharis) had since 2018 employed the Chanakyian stratagem of gradually causing the adversary’s deployment footprint to decrease from the outer edges before attacking the centre-of-gravity. Consequently, the Taliban began befriending the Tribal elders and provincial Governors of the bulk of the provinces all around Kabul before laying siege to Kabul. It may be recalled that: When Chanakya/Kautilya first met Chandragupta Maurya in Takshashila around 1516 BCE, Chandragupta had just failed in his fifth or sixth attempt to overthrow the Nanda dynasty by a coup in their capital Pataliputra in Magadha/Bihar and fled to the North West. Kautilya then asked him, when you eat a hot dish of rice do you plunge your fingers into the centre or do you start at the cool fringes.

Present-day Kandahar’s ancient name was ‘Quandhar’, derived from the name of the region of GandharaEven during the Mahabharata period, the Gandhara region was very much culturally and politically a part of India. King Œakuni, brother of Gandhârî, fought with the Pandavas in the Mahabharata War at Kurukshetra. The Gandhara kingdom covered portions of today’s northern Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan. It was spread over the Pothohar Plateau, Peshawar Valley and the Kabul River-Valley. The word Gandhāra finds a mention in the Rig Veda, Uttara-Ramayana and Mahabharata. The word means Gandha (fragrance), i.e. the land of fragrances. It is said that Gandhara is one of the names of Lord Shiva as mentioned in the Sahastranaam (thousand names) that was obtained by Sri Krishna from Sage Upamanyu in the Mahabharata. The same was narrated to Yudhisthira, Bhishma and other members of the Kuru clan. It is possible that the devotees of Shiva were the first inhabitants of Gandhara. The people there lived on the banks of River Kabul (also Kabol or Kubhā) right till its confluence with the River Indus since the Vedic times. King Subala ruled Gandhara some 7,500 years ago. He had a daughter named Gandhari, who was married to the Prince of Hastinapur kingdom, Dhritrashtra. Gandhari also had a brother, Shakuni, who later took over the kingship of Gandhara after his father’s death. After losing the Mahabharata War, several Kaurava descendants settled in the Gandhara kingdom. Later, they slowly migrated to today’s Iraq and Saudi Arabia. With the spread of Buddhism in the Gandhara region, including parts of Asia, Shiva worship was slowly wiped out. A few Mauryan Kings ruled Gandhara for some time until the invading Muslims, including Mahmud Ghazni, took over the reins in the early 11th century.

Monday, August 23, 2021

A Very Bleak Future For Afghanistan

Afghanistan has a population of 38 million. About 4.5 million people (12% of the country) live in the capital Kabul, which is located in the east of the country. Other major provinces include Herat (1.9 million), Nangarhar (1.5 million), Balkh (1.3 million) and Kandahar (1.2 million). The Central Asian country is among the top 40 most populated countries in the world. At 652,860sq km (252,071 sq miles), the country is roughly the size of the US state of Texas and more than twice the size of the UK. It is the eighth most mountainous country in the world making many parts difficult to access. The country’s capital Kabul reaches a mean elevation of just more than 2km (6,562 feet) above sea level. The Hindu Kush mountain range spans the northeast of the country, while the southwest is mainly covered in desert. Afghanistan is the biggest producer of opium in the world. Most of the opium poppy, used to produce the highly addictive heroin drug, is grown in the southwest of the country. In 2020, 224,000 hectares (about 553,500 acres) of land was used to cultivate opium poppy across the country. More than half of all poppy cultivation—115,597 hectare (285,650 acres)—was cultivated in the southwestern province of Helmand alone. According to UN estimates, ​​about 6,300 tonnes of opium, with a value of $350m, was produced in 2020. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, at least 54.5% of the country lived below the poverty line, with current estimates reaching up to 72%. Literacy rates in Afghanistan are among the lowest in the world at 43%. Just over half of all males above the age of 15 can read and write, while the ratio is much lower among females—less than one-third. At least 389,645 people, of which 59% are children, were displaced within Afghanistan from January 1 to July 24, 2021. In June alone, 109,000 people were internally displaced within the country. Three quarters of the displaced people came from 10 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces: Kunduz (92,000), Nangarhar (38,000), Takhar (25,000), Kandahar (24,000), Faryab: (20,000), Kunar: (19,500), Wardak: (19,000), Daykundi (18,300), Laghman (18,000), and Helmand (17,000). The highest internal flows within the same province occurred in Kunduz (85,000), Nangarhar (38,000) and Takhar (25,000). The total number of Afghan refugees globally in 2020 reached 2.6 million. Almost 86% of those registered refugees are in three of the neighbouring countries, with an additional 12% living in Europe.

By August 12, 2021, the Taliban had encircled Kabul and began negotiating for a peaceful handover of the capital city. The armed group had by then captured 26 provincial capitals, including the cities of Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, Khost, Sar-e-Pul, Sheberghan, Aybak, Kunduz, Taluqan, Pul-e-Khumri, Farah, Zaranj, Faizabad, Ghazni, Herat, Kandahar, Lashkar Gah, Feruz Koh, Qala-e Naw, Pul-e-Alam, Terenkot and Qalat. The Taliban had already gained vast parts of rural Afghanistan since launching a series of offensives in May 2021 to coincide with the start of the final withdrawal of foreign forces.

Will the Taliban be able to prove itself to be the dominant unifying force in Afghanistan instead of repeating the brutal infighting after the seizure of power back in 1996? Or will Afghanistan inevitably sink into the quagmire of tribal, sectarian, ethnic and other disputes? As long as land-locked Afghanistan is full of betrayals, conspiracies, civil wars in the same house, its ‘popular’ politicians will tend to turn back and forth. Consequently, even if the Taliban can offer short-term stability, in terms of economic issues alone, the Taliban will soon feel the severe economic pressure, and the day their trophies are exhausted will be theirs. The principal reason why Afghanistan had remained unstable for the past 200 years is its landlocked territorial nature, which had forced it (ever since its founding in 1747) to be accorded the status of a ‘predatory state’ that periodically launched wars of aggression for the sake of plundering India, and using spoils to create temporary bonded tribal alliances. More than three-quarters of its revenues at that time came from looting India. However, this way of living could not be sustained beyond 100 years.

People regard food, clothing and shelter as their existential imperatives. Presently, the food scarcity is the first to create the greatest negative impact in Afghanistan. The eve of the Taliban’s invasion of Kabul coincided with the latest report released by the United Nations World Food Programme, predicting that by the end of this year, 270.5 million people in 80 countries will face food shortages, 41 million people in 43 countries will be on the verge of hunger, and Afghanistan will suffer from severe food shortages. Afghanistan topped the list, surpassing the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela and Yemen. The food shortages are a long-term chronic illness of Afghanistan’s economy and peoples’ livelihoods. There is no hope of any solution in the future. Afghanistan’s land is barren and arable land accounts for a small proportion. In ancient times, epidemics and wars barely achieved a balance of food supply-and-demand. When modern medicine was introduced to significantly reduce its mortality rate, it didn’t take long before the domestic food production could not keep up with population growth. In 1946, the poor agricultural harvest in Afghanistan led to the first time in its history to import food. Domestic prices soared and the inflation rate reached 30.5%. The history of Afghanistan's increasing dependence on imported food began.

From 1950 till today, the population of Afghanistan has expanded from 11.83 million to an estimated 32.2 million as per the population data of Afghanistan’s Central Bureau of Statistics in 2020), but the combined grain output of wheat, barley, corn, and rice (which had reached its peak of 4.584 million tonnes in 1976) has been in steady decline. In 1987, it fell to 1.279 million tonnes, which was only 48% of the output in 1954 (2.677 million tonnes). It was only 2.52 million tonnes in 1993 on the eve of the rise of the Taliban. Afterwards, it stagnated for many years. After the US military defeated the Taliban regime and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan government in 2001, the relatively stable environment and super-strength international assistance promoted a marked rebound in Afghanistan’s food production. Its food production in the 2018 was only 4.124 million tonnes, equivalent to 90% of its peak production in 1976. As a result, Afghanistan’s per capita food production reached 215kg in 1954, peaked at 288kg in 1978, and fell to 142kg in 1993. After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, during the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, its infant mortality rate was reduced by about 50%, while population growth nearly doubled, causing its per capita food production to further drop to about 128kg. The gap between food demand and domestic food production has been widening since then.

During the 20 years of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s government rule, the food shortages were mainly resolved by international aid, and most of the international aid came from the US, Europe and India. Now, the situation facing Afghanistan is that the uncertain risk of domestic food production that has risen sharply due to the regime change. Since last year, food prices in the international market and the domestic market of developing countries have soared, while existing international aid has been substantially reduced, especially in the US, Europe, and India. Aid may not be restored in the foreseeable future. Pakistan and some Gulf Cooperation Council member-countries may provide partial assistance, but it is difficult to expect them to fill all the gaps in aid cut off by the US, Europe and India.

In the US, the average price of soft red winter wheat in 2019 and 2020 will be US$211.3/tonne and US$227.7/tonne, respectively. The average price from the third quarter of 2020 to the first quarter of this year will be US$213.8/tonne, US$248.1/tonne and US$275.2/tonne, respectively. The price from February to May this year was US$276.6/tonne, US$272.6/tonne, US$281.4/tonne and US$271/tonne. The food price index in the World Bank's low- and middle-income countries commodity price index (2010=100) will be 87.0 and 92.5 for the whole year of 2019 and 2020, respectively. The averages from the third quarter of 2020 to the first quarter of this year are 91.0, 101.7 and 114.2, respectively. , From February to May this year, it was 115.2, 113.8, 117.9 and 126.0 in turn. In March 2020, the then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tried to coordinate the relationship between Afghan President Ghani and CEO Abdullah, but to no avail. He announced a reduction of US$1 billion in aid to Afghanistan that year and also continued a reduction of US$1 billion in 2021. This time, when the Taliban have seized power, the US and Europe have no hope of resuming aid to Afghanistan in the foreseeable future. India’s aid to Afghanistan totals about US$3 billion, but this too has now been terminated.

In the field of non-agricultural industries, the development environment that Afghanistan faces after the regime change is also severe. The construction industry has been one of Afghanistan’s industries with the largest growth in the past 20 years, which has led to the development of metallurgical and other related industries. However, most of the demand for the construction industry in Afghanistan comes from international aid investment. These industries will most likely come to a standstill after the regime change. Even if some are hoping for the mineral resources of Afghanistan to be commnercially exploited, it will take at least a decade for the required road/rail transportation networks to be built for the sake of ferrying the exploited minerals. And given the sky-high transportation costs, people should not expect too much. Yes, most of Afghanistan’s proven reserves of natural gas, coal, salt, chromium, iron, copper, mica, emeralds, lithium and other mineral resources are not large. For example, its coal reserves are only 73 million tonnes, which is not enough to sustain 32.2 million Afghans. The country’s copper resources are relatively rich, and the iron ore resources may be relatively large. The Aynak copper mine south of Kabul has a total proven ore reserves of about 700 million tonnes and a total copper metal volume of 11.33 million tonnes. It may be the world’s third largest copper ore belt. Afghanistan may also have the fifth largest iron ore vein in the world, but even if the total amount of these minerals reaches the level of optimistic estimates, is it enough to pull the overall economic and social development of Afghanistan out of the quagmire? Look at the large-scale development of Zambia and others. It is not difficult to make an objective and rational judgment in a large copper mining country. International relations have also created huge obstacles to the development of mineral resources in Afghanistan. There are certain oil and natural gas resources in northern Afghanistan. With the help of the USSR, its natural gas fields were put into production in 1967, and the output reached 2.635 billion cubic metres in 1971, becoming the main export commodity. However, in the wars since the late 1970s, its natural gas production has plummeted. Moreover, the natural gas export pipeline in northern Afghanistan leads to Central Asian countries, and the relationship between the Taliban and Central Asian countries is generally quite bad. If it is exported to Pakistan or even India, its sales revenues are not expected to recover the investment in new oil and gas pipelines due to insufficient production. As for the Central Asia-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India oil and gas pipeline concept that has been hyped in the so-called ‘Caspian Oil Game’ since the 1990s, it has already encountered bloodshed. Looking at it from a broader background, claims that Afghanistan is a ‘civilised crossroads’ and how important it is to China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ are just illusions behind closed doors. In fact, since the great geographical discovery at the end of the 15th century led to the great shift in international seaborne trade routes, Afghanistan has been completely marginalised in the international trading system. The increasingly closed, regressive, and accelerated tribalisation of Afghan society is largely due to this. The development of modern rail/air/sea transportation technologies has not changed the trend of Afghanistan’s marginalisation in the international trading system. On the contrary, it is exacerbating this trend to a considerable extent. Therefore, in terms of economic significance, Afghanistan is insignificant to the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’.

China has had good relations with the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan established after the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. In December 2001, Beijing sent a working team to participate in the establishment ceremony of the Afghan interim government, re-opened the embassy in Afghanistan, which had been closed for eight years, and provided US$ in cash as a government startup fund, plus 30 million Yuan in emergency supplies. During President Ashraf Ghani’s visit to China in 2014, China announced that it would provide 500 million Yuan in free aid to Afghanistan in 2014 and another 1.5 billion Yuan in free aid from 2015 to 2017. For reconstruction activities, China has assisted in the construction of a number of livelihood projects such as the Parwang Water Conservancy Rehabilitation Project and the Kabul Republic Hospital, and has trained more than 2,000 professional and technical personnel in various fields for Afghanistan through bilateral and multilateral channels. In 2020, while the bilateral trade volume between China and Arab states was US$550 million, a year-on-year decrease of 11.7%; the value of Chinese companies’ new projects in Afghanistan was US$110 million, a year-on-year increase of 158.7%; the completed turnover was US$34.25 million, a year-on-year decrease of 62.3%. . After the regime change, a considerable part of the above-mentioned engineering projects may be unfinished. Many of the professional and technical personnel trained by China for Afghanistan are expected to flee overseas. In the short term, if payment and security are guaranteed, the Afghan market will be actively and steadily supplied by China with consumer goods for civilian use. However, fixed-asset investment projects, especially large-scale investments, will definitely get delayed.

Thursday, August 5, 2021

Builder's Sea-Trials For Project 71 VIKRANT IAC-1 Commence, Plus Details Of ASW-SWC


Designed by the Directorate of Naval Design (DND) of the Indian Navy (IN) under Project 71, the 37,500-tonne Project 71 Vikrant Indigenous Aircraft Carrier’s (IAC-1) construction at a cost of Rs.3,261 crore was sanctioned by India’s Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) in January 2003, despite the conceptual design-work being initiated back in 1993. However, metal-cutting commenced only in November 2006 (due to non-availability of steel and hull-launch skis from Russia), while the keel-laying was done on February 28, 2009 at the MoD-owned Cochin Shipyard Ltd (CSL). The 260-metre-long and 14-storey high vessel was launched on August 12, 2013 in a pontoon-assisted technique, in a first in India, when limited dock space prevented further construction. CSL made a special jig to move the 104-tonne ‘A bracket’ that buttresses the propeller shafts—as long as 99 metres and 69 metres—on the aircraft carrier’s hull. It was then envisaged that the IAC-1 would be delivered to the IN by December 2018, followed by service-induction in October 2020. The three-year delay happened due to non-availability of 18 types of major equipment related to the IAC-1’s on-board Nevskoye Design Bureau-designed aviation hanger from Russia. This in turn led to a 600% project cost overrun, or Rs.19,341 crore. The IAC-1 successfully completed the contractor’s dry-dock work package (fast-cruise workup trials) in December 2019, while the wet-basin trials, conducted for proving of the propulsion, transmission and shafting systems, were held between September and November 2020. The Builder’s Sea-Trials commenced on August 4, 2021.

The IAC-1 has a beamwidth of 62 metres at the widest part and has a draught of 30 metres minus the superstructure. Up to 90% of the body of the IAC-1 was designed and made in India and involved about 200 big and small companies from the public-sector DPSUs and the private-sector. However, only 76% of the material content is of indigenous origin. The vessel has 2,300 compartments designed to user specifications for crew, systems, piping, fluids, ventilations and cabling. The sailor living spaces (with provision to accommodate eight women officers) on the sixth deck from the top, also houses 92 impressive state-of-the-art sanitation spaces, with modern showers and vacuum toilets. The DRDO’s Naval Materials Research Laboratory along with CSL trained about 500 new welders for fabricating the vessel’s superstructure. The Defence Metallurgical Research Laboratory- (DMRL) developed DMR-249A steel came from SAIL’s plants in Raurkela in Orissa, Bokaro in Jharkhand and Bhilai in Chattisgarh; the Main Switch Board, steering gear and watertight hatches were manufactured by Larsen & Toubro in its plants in Mumbai and Talegaon; the high-capacity air conditioning and refrigeration systems were manufactured in Kirloskar’s plants in Pune; most of the pumps were supplied by Best & Crompton, Chennai; Bharat Heavy Engineering Ltd (BHEL) supplied the eight diesel alternators, each generating 3mWe power; the massive gearbox was supplied by Gujarat-based Elecon Engineering; the tens of thousands of electrical cabling (running into 1,500km length) was supplied by Kolkata-based Nicco industries; Kolkata is also where the ship’s anchor chain cable is manufactured. The propulsion system comprises four HAL licence-built General Electric LM-2500 marine industrial gas-turbines. Fincantieri of Italy was hired by the DND as prime consultant for designing the propulsion system.

The CMS-71 combat management system (CMS) was developed by Tata Power Strategic Engineering Division (TO-SED) in collaboration with the IN’s in-house Weapon and Electronics System Engineering Establishment (WESEE) and Russia-based FRPC MARS JSC (which supplied the Integrated Bridge Control System). Its installation work began on March 29, 2019 and was completed by July that same year. The CMS-71 is the second CMS to be developed by a private-sector entity for the IN, the first being the SARAANSH CMS for the INS Arihant S-73 nuclear-powered SSGN.

The IAC-1 will be able to accommodate 20 MiG-29K MRCAs, five Ka-28PL ASW helicopters and five Ka-31 AEW helicopters. Its crew complement will comprise 160 officers and 1,400 sailors. Powered by four HAL-assembled and GE-developed LM-2500 marine industrial gas-turbines, the IAC-1 will have an endurance of around 7,500 nautical miles while cruising at a speed of 18 Knots. For the IAC-1/INS Vikrant, the IN selected the Mk.7 hydraulic damping arresting system from the US Navy, while US-based Wire Rope Industries Inc has supplied the arrester cables. Another US-based company, Engineered Arresting Systems Corp, has supplied the arrester barriers. Italy-based AVIO supplied the Integrated Platform Management System (IPMS). Other hardware to go on board IAC-1 include twin side-mounted aircraft elevators and their chain-drives from UK-based MacTaggart Scott, while Wire Rope Industries has supplied the ammunition hoisting elevators. The CBRN detection sensors were supplied by US-based Bruker Daltonics, which has for the past decade supplied almost all the CBRN detection sensors for all three of India’s armed services (while the remaining have come from French OEMs). The IAC-1’s ring-laser gyro-based inertial navigation system (RLG-INS) uses SAFRAN/SAGEM-built SIGMA-40 ring laser-gyros. UK-based TEX Special Projects and its Indian industrial partner PRATEX Power Vision Pvt Ltd–India’s leading supplier of marine glazing solutions designed, manufactured and project managed the installation of the ultra-high specification glazing, frames and ancillaries. Russia-based Concern CSRI Elektropribor JSC has supplied the LUNA-3E optical landing system and its Ladoga and Saturn deck-lighting systems, plus the Rezistor K4 aircraft homing system.

The IN’s Warship Overseeing Team (WOT) along with CSL is responsible for the conduct of the three-stage trails process of the IAC-1 prior to the warship’s delivery to the IN. All three stages are detailed below.

Fast-Cruise Work-up Trails

The fast-cruise work-up trails comprised of the following activities:

1. Make all preparations for getting underway.

2. Station the manoeuvring watch/sea and anchor detail.

3. Simulate getting underway and return to port. (Day and Night)

4. Walk through all major sea-trial evolutions.

5. Walk through the cycling of hull and back-up valves to be tested.

6. Exercise the reduced visibility detail.

7. Spot-check storage and availability of spare parts and tools. Verify adequacy of stores and provisions.

8. Conduct the following emergency drills: a. Fire b. Collision c. Flooding d. Toxic gas emission e. Abandon Ship f. Man Overboard h. Loss of AC Power i. Emergency Ventilation j. Loss of Air Conditioning/ACW k. Loss of Lighting l. Loss of Interior Communications m. Loss of Steering n. Engine Casualty Control o. Flight deck and hangar deck crash/fire drills, barricade drills, and MOVLAS drills.

9. Set General Quarters and exercise the crew at battle stations.

10. Conduct communications and ECM drills.

11. Anchor (walk-through).

12. Exercise damage-control party with emergency and damage control equipment.

13. Operate atmosphere control equipment and take air samples.

14. Operate air conditioning plants to demonstrate ability to carry the maximum existing ship's air conditioning load or 100% capacity.

15. Operate fresh water/seawater heat exchangers at sufficient load to demonstrate proper operation.

16. Simulate underway conditions, performing all evolutions and operating all equipment.

17. Conduct exercises in casualties to LR-SAM tube-breather valves to include flooding and introducing toxic gases in the LR-SAM VLS cells from gas generator.

18. Simulate crew transfer at sea.

19. Conduct competitive and non-competitive drills and exercises such as aircraft tracking and aircraft control.

20. Light-off main propulsion plant, shift to ship's power and run all engines with steam for a short period of time.

21. Man Towing/Salvage/Fueling Stations.

22. Set Flight Quarters as applicable.

23. Operate the 40-tonne aircraft salvage crane.

Wet-Basin Trials

These comprised of the following activities:

1) Check all sound powered/interior communications circuits between all stations.

2. Test all alarms, i.e., General Quarters, Collision, etc.

3. Test each indication on Ballast Control Panel.

4. Test whistle.

5. Check emergency lights.

6. Operate all hydraulic plants using each installed pump.

7. Conduct a complete air charge using only the vessel’s compressors.

8. Flood sanitary tanks and then blow/pump them.

9. Operate each main vent valve in hand and power. Following operation, with vent valves shut.

10. Operate the outboard induction valve in hand and power.

11. Operate the diesel engine exhaust valve in hand and power.

12. Operate on-board induction valves.

13. Test operation of all radio transmitters and receivers using all antennas.

14. Operate all radar equipment at rated conditions.

15. Operate all sonar equipment at rated conditions.

16. Take and plot fixes using all navigation equipment and each antenna.

17. Test operation of drain pump(s) from all operating locations using each bilge suction.

18. Test operation of portable submersible pump from each installed outlet.

19. Operate each lube oil system, including pumps, controllers, purifiers and indicators.

20. Start RLG-INS/ESGN and gyrocompass; determine that they settle out; take azimuth; check all repeaters.

21. Check fresh water system, have water samples analysed.

22. Test capstans.

23. Test stabilisers and rudders as applicable and tilting in hand, normal power and emergency. Test normal and emergency plane angle indicators.

24. Operate steering system. Test normal and emergency rudder angle indicators.

25. Operate each watertight door and hatch.

26. Check operation of compartment hatches/scuttle fittings.

27. Operate each bulkhead flapper and each inter-compartment air-salvage valve.

28. Turn on and check navigation/running lights for brightness and proper lenses (to be done at night). Includes Flight Deck lighting.

29. Check air conditioning, chill water, ventilation, and heating systems.

30. Check out all galley, messing, and service equipment.

31. Check bilge flooding alarms.

32. Check dummy log.

33. Check all high-pressure (HP) and low-pressure (LP) air system.

34. Operate distilling units.

35. Check out anchor windlass and brake operation.

36. Check battery water system.

37. Check out atmosphere monitoring equipment, both installed and portable.

38. Operate oxygen generator, CO2 scrubbers, CO burners, and emergency air breathing system.

39. Engage and disengage the clutch.

40. Test Main Engines.

41. Check out all TV monitoring systems.

42. Check out small arms lockers and security devices.

43. Check out all IFF equipment.

44. Check out degaussing equipment (where applicable).

45. Check out Hangar-Bay doors.

46. Check out damage-control equipment.

47. Inspect and operate oxygen and nitrogen systems.

48. Check out all tank-level indicating systems.

49. Check out Flight Deck communications.

50. Check out meteorological equipment.

51. Check out graphics preparation/display equipment.

52. Check out Weapon Systems. Check to include loading of dummy LR-SAM at each launch station, transmission of fire-control signals and operation of launchers in all modes.

53. Operate all electrical/mechanical medical equipment.

54. Inspect all compartments for proper stowage and cleanliness.

55. Inspect diesel fuel-oil systems.

56. Test and inspect jet blast deflectors.

57. Test and inspect JP-5 fuel systems.

58. Test and inspect all aircraft starting and handling equipment.

59. Test and inspect aircraft landing equipment including landing signals officer equipment, arresting gear, aircraft crash-barriers, as applicable.

60. Operate all RAS equipment.

61. Inspect paint lockers and sprinkling systems.

62. Operate all accommodation ladders.

63. Operate all conveyors.

64. Launch and raise motor whaleboat.

65. Operate all RHIBs.

66. Test and inspect lifeboat/life-raft stowage and launch equipment.

67. Test and inspect all elevators in all modes of operation.

68. Test and inspect all fire-fighting systems.

69. Test and inspect refrigeration systems.

70. Test and inspect all seawater cooling systems.

71. Operate stern gate doors.

72. Operate boat-handling cranes.

73. Test and inspect aircraft elevators.

74. Test and inspect aircraft launch/recovery equipment.

Builder’s Sea-Trials

Warship construction is a meticulous process and still for all practical reasons, many shortcomings of a vessel emerge out during sea-trials. The ‘Builder’s Sea-Trials’ are what actually put a vessel to test and must be carried out diligently in a punctilious manner, with every concerned person present on board to assess and record the measurements and at the same time try to identify the cause of any malfunctioning. It wouldn’t be an exaggeration to say that these tests, once conducted and analysed, help make a warship safer as well as allowing it to sail smoothly by conforming to all rules and regulations of the classification societies. Every shipyard after constructing and launching a vessel performs a set of tests to ensure that all systems of the vessel meet the corresponding requirements assigned by the owner under the contract and at the same time conform to the rules and regulations of the approving classification society. Typically, 10% of the total contract amount is yet to be paid to the shipyard after successful delivery of the warship to the customer/end-user and in case of any faults, the penalties will take the form of a deduction from the same. Broadly, there are 11 parameters that are validated during the sea-trials.

Draught Measurement. Draught is an important matter of concern for any warship as it shapes and regulates a number of hydrostatic and hydrodynamic parameters. Before measuring the draught, it is imperative to measure the density of water in which the warship ought to be floating and hence the specific gravity of seawater is measured. Accordingly, the draught is measured in that fluid (same water) and in case the warship is not floating at the required draught it is corrected since the very purpose of the sea-trials is to prove guaranteed speed at a particular draught.

Anchor Test. A warship’s Anchor plays an important part in keeping a vessel stationary as per the requirement such as in ports and harbours. It is imperative for a vessel’s position to become dynamically stable to prevent any mishap such as collision with other nearby vessels in port. Hence, the Anchor Test is performed to check the functioning of the entire anchoring mechanism. The following are the points outlining the test procedure and requirements during sea-trials: A) The anchor test is conducted up to a depth of sea of 80 metres. B) The anchor chain is dropped freely (both from Port and Starboard one after the other). During this the dropping brake is applied up to three times to test its capacity. C) Finally, the Anchor is heaved and the heaving speed is measured by noting the downtime on the stopwatch for heaving each chain length. As per rule, the hoisting speed should not be less than 9 metres/minute.

Steering Gear Test. Imagine a situation where a warship’s manoeuvrability has been compromised due to malfunctioning of the steering gear. The following points shed light on the test procedure and the necessary requirements for the same. A) First of all, the vessel should be moving at full ahead speed. B) Now the rudder is moved from 35-degree Port to 35-degree Starboard (called hard to port and hard to starboard in nautical verbiage) by using pressure from one hydraulic pump and then subsequently using two pumps. C) As per class requirement, the time taken by the rudder in going from hard port to hard starboard or vice versa should be less than 28 seconds.

Main Engine Endurance Test. The driving and prime component of a warship on failure can make even the most experienced sailors and engineers worried and hence almost nine (09) measurements are taken while testing the propulsion system during sea-trials. The marine gas-turbines should be run for six (06) straight hours at full rated r.p.m in order to test their performance at full load. For the initial two (02) hours, the marine gas-turbines are run on Light Diesel Oil (LDO) and for four (04) hours on Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) and lastly again for two hours on LDO. This is done in order to check the change-over process from HFO to LDO. The following are the measurements recorded during this test: Noise levels are recorded at various places on the warship; Similarly, vibration levels are recorded at different places; The capacity of Fresh Water Generator is recorded; The performance of Exhaust Gas Boiler is assessed; Fuel Oil Consumption in litres/hour is recorded and Specific Fuel Oil Consumption (SFOC) in gm/kW/hr is calculated; Power is recorded from Shaft Horsepower Meter; Load on Diesel Generator Sets is recorded; All systems are checked for any leakages; and the temperatures and pressures of all systems (Fresh Water (FW)/ Lube Oil (LO)/ Fuel Oil (FO)/ Sea Water (SW) / Exhaust Gas) are measured and recorded.

Speed Trials. Suppose the warship’s end-user cited a speed requirement of 15 Knots, but the vessel is operating at a speed of 14 knots at the required draught. What happens next is a penalty imposed on the shipyard. However, there is a grace margin of 0.3 Knots above which for every 0.1 Knots the penalty increases. Speed Trials are carried out to check the speed of the vessel at the required draught as per the contract. The test is carried out at a minimum of three (03) powers—75%, 85%, 100%, Maximum Continuous Rating (MCR), or any other power-rating as per the contract. The speed at each power is measured using the Global Positioning System (GPS) by running the warship in two opposite directions (called double-run). Now the speed measured as per the supposed three powers are plotted to give a speed-power curve. Finally, from the curve, the speed corresponding to the required power as outlined in the contract is noted.

Crash-Stop Tests. In this, the stopping ability of a warship is assessed. When the vessel is moving at full ahead speed, the engine is reversed to full astern to commence stopping of the vessel. The time taken by the vessel to come to a complete halt is recorded. The distance travelled by the warship starting from the moment the lever was put to full astern until the warship stopped is noted. This test is also carried out from full astern to full ahead condition.

Astern Running Test. All vessels should have the manoeuvring capability to run in the astern direction as per rules. Hence during the sea-trials, the vessel is run in the astern direction at about 70% ahead MCR by running the engine in reverse direction.

Turning Circle Test. This test is carried out to measure the diameter of the circular path which the warship starts to traverse as soon as the rudder is put hard to port or hard to starboard. The vessel is run to complete one circle. The diameter of the completed circle is measured using GPS. In addition, the tilt of the vessel when making such turns is also measured.

Black-Out Test. This is aptly called ‘black-out test’ as there is a complete blackout on board a warship. This happens as during this test all the main generators (typically three in number) are shut down and the automatic starting of Emergency Diesel Alternator (DA) set is observed. As per rule, the emergency DA set should come online within a time span of 45 seconds.

Mission Electronics Equipment Tests. Operation of equipment such as radars, fire-control systems, optronic sensors, communications systems, EW suites etc. are also checked out for seaworthiness in various sea-states during sea-trials.

Aviation Operations. These, involving both fixed-wing and rotary-winged platforms, include both staggered and surge  launch and recovery of such platforms in fully weaponised modes while out at sea in various sea-states by both day and night, validation of arming and de-arming such platforms, and validation of aircraft stowage/dispatch-to-the top-deck protocols.

Indian Navy ASW-SWC Detailed

It was in December 2013 that the Indian MoD’s Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) approved the purchase of 16 shallow-water anti-submarine warfare craft (ASW-SWC) at a cost of Rs.13,440 crore. In June 2014, under the ‘Buy and Make India’ initiative, the MoD issued an RFP to local public-sector and private-sector shipyards, including Larsen & Toubro (L & T), ABG Shipyard, Pipavav Shipyard, Goa Shipyard Ltd, Cochin Shipyard Ltd (CSL) and Garden Reach Shipbuilding & Engineering (GRSE). In October 2017, CSL and the industrial partnership of GRSE and L & T emerged has the L-1 and L-2 bidders, respectively. They will each manufacture eight ASW-SWCs.

On April 29, 2019, the MoD and GRSE inked a contract valued at Rs.6,311 crore for eight ASW-SWCs to be delivered between October 2022 and October 2026 at a rate of two vessels every 12 months. The next day, on April 30, the MoD and CSL signed a similar contract for eight ASW-SWCs on identical terms.

The entire project is to be completed within 90 months from the date of signing the contract. On December 2, 2020, the first steel plate for Ship No.BY-523 ‘Mahe’ was cut at CSL. On December 31, 2020, steel-cutting of the first GRSE-built ASW-SWC was conducted at L & T’s Kattupalli-based shipyard near Chennai. GRSE commenced steel-cutting of the second and third ASW-SWC (Yard 3030 & Yard 3031) on July 14, 2021. L & T will build five of the eight ASW-SWC that are on order from GRSE (with GRSE handling the procurement and supply of raw materials and equipment), with GRSE building the remaining three in Kolkata.

The ASW-SWC fleet will replace the Indian Navy’s (IN) three upgraded Project 1241PE ASW corvettes (INS Abhay, INS Ajay and INS Akshay). Each ASW-SWC will have a complement of 7 officers and 50 sailors. The ASW-SWC has an overall length of 77.6 metres, beamwidth of 10.5 metres, draught of 2.7 metres, and a deep displacement of 900 tonnes. The waterjet-powered ASW-SWC, with a steel hull and aluminium superstructure, has been designed for a top speed of 25 Knots and a range of 1,800nm.

On board will be the DRDO-developed and BEL-built IAC Mod-C ASW suite that will include the NPOL-developed ABHAY low-frequency hull-mounted sonar, Germany-based ATLAS Elektronik’s ACTAS ultra low-frequency active/passive towed-array sonar, L & t-developed IRL mortar launcher and two triple-tube ITTL torpedo launcher for launching NSTL-developed ALWTs.

The ASW-SWC will also feature a mast-mounted, DRDO-developed and BEL-built RAWL-03 L-band surface-search/air-search active phased-array radar, and a roof-top Pharos Ka-band fire-control radar (above the bridge) jointly developed by BEL and THALES. It will provide fire-control for the OTOBreda/BHEL 76/62 SRGM, two AK-630M six-barrelled guns, and up to 16 DRDO-developed SR-SAMs.

Also on board will be the Nayan COMINT suite, Varuna ESM suite, Shakti EW suite, ORBIT-supplied RUKMANI naval VSATs for data-linking, and BEL-built Link-2 Mod-3 terminal, advanced composite communications system, and Gigabit Ethernet ship data network.
GSL-built Fast interceptor Craft for Indian Army