Prasun now that you have mentioned that IN will mostly be going for a 60,000 Ton IAC-2.
Can any French help be expected in this regard if its powered by Nuclear Reactor. As they will be working on the SSGN. French had problems with their Nuclear powered carrier Charles deGaulle. Can IN learn from these valuable lessons. Can India seek any design assistance to BARC w.r.t the Nuclear Reactor.
Who will be the design consultant for the IAC-2
Apart from reactor there are other challenges like the heat exchangers, catapult etc. Will IAC-2 house the EMALS instead of convention steam catapults.
As bigger vessel it will have a bigger contingent of fighters and support aircrafts, will this reflect into new type of deployments of the IAC-2 Carrier Fleet for extended duration.
Is there any chance for the IN to go for E-2D Hawkeye or a V-22 mounted AWACS for this vessel.
sir , sine this post was about the navy..i just became curious about the MARCOS..can u tell about its numerical strength..is it being expanded just like para SF ? & y does the Indian navy need a separate sagar prahari bal & marine infantry..y cant they be a single component..like just the marines..?
prasun sir , there were reports some time earlier about india negotiating with russia for additional talwar class frigates over & above the 6 already in service/being built.. what's the update on that front ? is there any plan to fit tomahawk kind of missiles on any future indian naval ship ? thanks sir
Regarding the artillery would it be fruitful if 155MM/52Cal howitzer developed by OFB from FH-77B and mount it on Arjun chassis for tracked and a 155mm/45cal variant on a 6x6 for motorized version ?
If we compare the performance of 155MM 39 n 45 n 52Cal howitzers,will they only differ in range or their punch too vary?
Good to hear that IAC-2 will be a CATOBAR ... will it use Steam or Electric power(as in newest US ACs) to propel?
What is the expected time for the FICV development and when will the production start...how many will be ordered?
Why do you think that there is no requirement for towed artillery(which are cheaper)? Cas in a battle there will be sites where presence of atleast 3-4 howitzers over an area will be wanted throughout the war ... so in those cases need for motorized version may not arise ... also working with a howitzer on the ground will be easier to crew ... as M777 will be used for mountain warfare towed ones could be mobilized by C-17s or IL-76 or C-130Js if possible... anyway at the moment lets just hope that OFB will smoothly 'develop' atleast a 45cal of FH-77B.
Hi, i have a few ques regarding the follow on Talwar class. 1. What is the use of the anti sub rocket mortar system RBU-6000. It has a range of only 4 km. No enemy subs will ever venture so close to an adversary's warship. The sub will be at a minimum standoff distance of 30 km during a torpedo attack. Also all modern subs operate at depths of ~ 200 m . Is the RBU effective at such depths. Instead of hosting the Rbu, the deck space can be used for installing 8-16 VLS for the 550 km range Brahmos block 3 which will make the Talwar a major surface combatant. 2. Why did the Navy go for the AK-630 CIWS instead of the Kashtan ? The kashtan was fitted on the earlier batch of Talwars. The combination of gun and missiles makes it effective against both sub and supersonic seakimming antiship missiles. The 630 is only effective for creating a wall of leads in front of an incoming target.The AK-630 is incapable of intercepting of both subsonic and supersonic missile threats. U nly said so in one of your earlier comments. So what is the logic behind the navy going for the Ak630 instead of the Kashtan. Pls clarify.
Prasun, Given the current state of economy, is it even viable to think of a 60,000ton aircraft carrier, leave alone nuclear propulsion ,CATOBAR EMALS? Dont we need SSNs and some DSRVs much sooner than a second AC?
Also what he had meant by second ship is much more neatly build. Is there any design difference in 1st & 2nd ship hull structure or its just the layout of the cabins and crew compartment?
To Spanky’s Blog/Swarop: I did not come across any new revelations in that interview. Frankly, the contents of the interview were all about mediocre responses to some pretty stupid questions. For instance, what was stated as the LR-SAM is in fact, the Navy’s MR-SAM. It is the IAF that has exercised the LR-SAM option. Secondly, the IAF (and rightly so) is well ahead of the DRDO when it comes to evolving an anti-cruise missile doctrine and developing a continental network-centric airspace control-cum-management system. Lastly, Dr Saraswat should have explained more about the ‘missile monitoring system’, i.e. the space-based early warning network reqd for BMD, something he had first explained way back in February 2010 and without which any BMD network will be almost useless from an Indian standpoint. It all boild down to this: you will only find out things if you know what to look out for. Regretably, for these ‘desi’ journalists, only the tip-of-the-iceberg suffices, with the rest being all erroneous reportage. Take for instance these recent claims by both INDIAN EXPRESS & FORCE about Rheinmetal being the supplier of the Arjun MBT’s main gun. This mistake was repeated by Shekhar Gupta (of INDIAN EXPRESS, who blindly accepted an erroneous report filed earlier by one of his reporters as being the gospel truth), who made the very same mistake when interviewing Dr Saraswat (at: http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/walk-the-talk/walk-the-talk-with-drdo-chief-vk-saraswat/230667?hp). If you watch between 14.05 and 14.33 you will realise how such ‘highly experienced’ journalists can make such stupid mistakes. That brings us to http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-3IPyEqgM-aQ/T5uiAArBlPI/AAAAAAAAP8w/kq3bIfeYscE/s1600/1111.jpg Read this report in detail and it will emerge that the story is NOT about the grounded Mirage 2000s, but about almost the entire fleet of MiG-27M interdictor/strike aircraft that have been grounded for quite some time now due to unavailability of spares for the R-29B turbofans, and no one seems to ask A K Antony why such a state of affairs is prevailing, when IRAL (the JV between HAL & United Aircraft Corp) is mandated to be supplying the reqd quantum of spares. Nor will anyone dare ask why was the option of re-engining the MiG-27Ms with AL-31F turbofans not exercised as far back as 2005.
Continued from above: The problem with most Indians, especially those like the ‘desi’ mass-media personnel, is that they always get emotional and MISREPRESENT the facts and tell LIES. For instance, have any of these ‘desi’ journalists seen with their own eyes the 1949 Karachi Agreement & the LoC Demarcation Agreement of October 1972? If they had seen it, they then would never have written lies like: "direction of the CFL beyond NJ 9842 was unambiguously stated as ‘thence running north to the glaciers’. If you can lay your hands on these two agreements, you will notice that in NONE of these agreements is there any sentence which states that the LoC will run “thence north to the glaciers”. What really happened is this: the ceasefire line (CFL) of 1949 and LoC of 1972 both ended at NJ9842. Beyond that there was no demarcation or even a mention of any line going anywhere BECAUSE in 1949 India's then PM Jawaharlal Nehru had remarked that "since the glaciated regions were areas where not even a blade of grass grew, it would therefore be unfit for human inhabitation and therefore these areas should be left undemarcated” as no-man’s land. At that time, Pakistan too agreed with this line of thought. Consequently, when the CFL was changed into the LoC in October 1972, the newly delineated line ran from the Shyok River west of Thang (a village) to Point NJ 9842. The area north of it was left BLANK and open to encroachments. After that, both Pakistan & India developed perceptional differences. While India interpreted that the LoC should extend from the last demarcated point NJ 9842 northeasterly along the Saltoro Range to the Sino-Indian border up to Aksai Chin, Pakistani interpreted that the LOC extends straight from NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass towards the Sino-Pakistan border. Also, regarding the 1963 Sino-Pakistan border agreement, it was Pakistan that gained more than China, since the dispute involved five tracts, of which China ceded control of three of them to Pakistan and kept the remaining two. Therefore, what led to OP Meghdoot on April 13, 1984 was a feeble attempt by the then PM Mrs Indira Gandhi to try to correct the mistakes made by her father (who blatantly disregarded all advice by his colleagues back in 1949 to clearly demarcate the India-Pakistan & Sino-Indian borders), this being Error-1. But in this process, the Govt of India made another fatal error (Error-2): it unilaterally violated the Shimla Agreement by resorting to military means to alter the status of the LoC. And by doing this, it made another blunder (Error-3): instead of securing the approaches to the Karakoram Pass northeast of NJ9842, the Indian Army went on to secure the Saltoro Ridge, which is well WEST of the imaginary line that is now erroneously often being quoted as running "thence north to the glaciers”. Such errors are only possible if the then Govt of India was WRONGLY briefed by both Army HQ and its HQ Northern Command. Logically, if the idea had been to drive a wedge and prevent a link-up of Pakistan and China within the glaciated areas, then the Indian Army should have established a firm foothold at Dansum (at 16,000 feet ASL which is exactly where the Pakistan Army's Siachen Brigade is now located), and NOT over Saltoro Ridge, as it does not confer any kind of military advantage (operationally or logistically) to India at any point in time for any kind of future military operation. What I've explained above are the facts, devoid of the kind of sentiments and emotions that usually cloud an average Indian's judgement. But of course if you were to embrace objectivity and logical reasoning, then the habitually ill-informed Indian 'danda maar' brigade will most definitely descend upon you!
To SK: The IAC-2 is now only at the conceptual design stage and expressions of interest have been sought from both Russia and France. Between these two, the French will have the upper hand IF the Indian Navy insists on nuclear propulsion. Once that happens, there will be convergences between what India desires from France for the SSGN programme (in terms of specific technologies), and what can France offer for the IAC-2 programme by way of DCNS acting as a design consultant for not just the vessel, but also its propulsion system. For the PWRs for both the SSGN and IAC-2, much will depend on how quickly the BARC is able to come up with a viable design for the S-5 SSBN. Right now this is a big question-mark since the Arihant’s PWR is of 1970s design (the BARC never designed any of it, and was only responsible for developing its fuel-rods, while L & T and BHEL fabricated the PWR and related heat-exchangers), and the BARC still faces some critical design challenges when designing new-generation PWRs with substantially enhanced power generation capacities. By the time the IAC-2 is to be launched (in the following decade), EMALS will be the only viable option. As for on-board aircraft fleets, the naval variant of the FGFA is definitely being looked at, as is the Rafale & NLCA Mk2. As for AEW & C platforms, a fixed-wing solution capable of being refuelled in mid-air will be the preferred choice over helicopters. Whether an AEW & C variant of the Bell/Boeing V-22 Osprey emerges by the end of this decade remains to be seen.
To Anon@11.16PM: MARCOS won’t be expanded like the Para (SF). And there will be no separate Sagar Prahari Bal & naval infantry. Eventually, the Sagar Prahari Bal will emerge as the naval infantry. That’s why the Sagar Prahari Bal’s sanctioned strength is 15,000—enough for a reinforced amphibious brigade + personnel reqd for protecting the Navy’s numerous shore-based establishments/bases.
To Anon@12.39AM: There won’t be a Batch 3 programme involving Project 1135.6 FFGs. The only additional FFGs to be acquired by the Navy in future will be the seven Project 17A vessels. Tomahawk-type TLAMs are not reqd for any Indian warship, since the Klub-N & BrahMos can both do the job. However, vertically launched variants of the Prahaar are being examined.
To Anon@7.14AM: Not, the OFB, but CVRDE & ARDE could develop such variants of the 155mm/52-cal FH-77B. For the tracked reqmt, the hull of a T-72M1 powered by a 1,000hp engine will more than suffice, and will be far cheaper than the hull of Arjun MBT. If the idea is to go for calibers beyond the existing 39-cal, then the jump should be made straight to the 52-cal standard, and leave the 45-cal solutions behind. Both tracked & motorised 155mm/52-cal howitzers, in terms of both engagement envelope and punch, are way ahead of 39-cal solutions.
TO KSK: It will be electric power for IAC-2. The FICV CAN be developed over a period of 6 years, with production beginning by 2019. The reqmt is for 2,200 in all versions. In future battlefields, towed tube artillery will be a logistical drain simply because long gone are the days of linear static firing positions. The proliferation of weapon locating radars and long-range MBRLs capable of firing sensor-fuzed munitions, plus the fast-moving pace of manoeuvre warfare demands that field artillery assets too be appreciably land-mobile so that their engagement envelopes are always well ahead of the ground mechanised/armoured formations that too will always have to be on the move, so as to maintain the reqd tempo of operations. Whether one uses rail or air transport for towed artillery howitzers, there’s always the need to cater for two pieces—the howitzer & its tow-truck—whereas for motorised howitzers, the 2-in-1 solution does away with the need for a separate tow-truck. The benefits are obvious. As for the OFB developing a 155mm/45-cal towed howitzer, in all probability, the Army will, rightly so, insist on procuring 52-cal solutions and therefore, the best course of action, which is also financially more attractive, is for the OFB to team up with Mahindra/BAE Systems and develop a 155/52-cal solution. 45-cal can be retained only for the M-46 upgrade/upgunning, but for the FH-77B it is a wasted proposition.
To Deba2233: Not to the best of my knowledge.
To Anon@11.33PM: The ASW mortars are never used for attacking submarines. Instead, the mortar rounds are timed to explode underwater so that the incoming torpedo and/or its towed-wire are both destroyed by such explosions. All Project 1135.6 FFGs have Kashtan on board, and not AK-630.
To Shaurya: In terms of topmost priorities, the reqmts include additional P-8Is, at least two submarine tenders, two DSRVs, six oceanographic survey catamarans, six SSGNs, and up to 12 coastal ASW corvettes. IAC-2 will have to come after all this only in the following decade. There are internal differences within the hull structure in areas like hangar and aircraft maintenance bay, ammo storage bay, etc.
To Mr.RA 13: These forthcoming user-trials will likely conclude smoothly, since the modifications for the Arjun Mk1A don’t involve any major structural changes to the hull or turret. Instead, all the mods are aimed at only increasing overall systems reliability and effectiveness, and consequently, no big challenges are expected to be encountered. All these mods will then be incorporated from the start on the follow-on new-build 124 Arjun Mk1As, plus the new vectorics suite and related wiring, which will all result in higher levels of reliability and effectiveness by 2016, since by that time the BMS & a new lightweight comms suite (that can also handle tactical internet traffic dealing with sharing of voice, imagery & data emanating from the battlefield surveillance system, or BSS) will be available for operational usage on the battlefield. Also, the new 120mm APFSDS ammo capable of penetrating 600mm or RHA (as revealed by Dr Saraswat in the NDTV interview last Saturday) should be available from 2014.
To Anon@11.33PM: Correction to my comment@3.28AM. You’re right, there’s no Kashtan on board, just the twin AK-630s. The first three Project 1135.6 FFGs of the Talwar-class had encountered serious problems with the Kashtan’s performance. But right next to the AK-630M, there’s enough space available for a Barak-1 8-cell VLS installation.
Prasun you said the SPB are to be the naval infantry of the IN ( along the line of Marines in other countries) so are they being trained in conventional infantry tactics like assaults/amphibious assaults, ambushes, survival etc? And who is training them? The IN in their own schools or the IA in infantry schools? Also what will subsequently happen to the IA units that currently take care of Ampbibious operations in India?
And what mind of equipment are these guys to field? INSAS/Tavor-21? Will they have the standard IA green camo (which is pointless in their role IMO) or a new specialised camo? And will these guys subsequently be eligible for F-INSAS or will they end up getting whatever future combat system the MARCOS get (maybe in a watered down configuration)?
And would you classify these guys as "elite" as in other countries where the Marines are usually the "tip of the apear" and considered more than just grunts with an entirely separate identity (USMC for eg takes pride in not being regular or part of the army).
Will the SPB be deployed on the IN's LHD/LPD in the future then as the nodal amphibious force of Indian forces then? And will they be given their own air assets, a force of 15,000 (even if operating only as one reinforced brigade) is going to need some serious helo lift capability especially in amphibious warfare/assaults. And will these guys to have to make do with outdated BMP-IIs as their ICVs/ampbiobus assault vehicles or is there any chance of the IN getting something up to date like the Marine Expeditionary Vehicle?
And does the IN have any plans to field dedicated attack helos as of yet (a Sea Apache/Super Cobra/Naval LCH) With this kind of force this seems vital.
Hi, what serious problems regarding performance of the Kashtan system is being faced by the navy? Can the AK-630 offer good protection against sea skimming subsonic and supersonic ASHM like the Brahmos? What improvements innterms of sensors and stealth are there on the 2nd batch over the first? Does the new Talwars have improved surface and air search radars or the feature the same old radar suite? What new sensors such as ESM apart from the radar are present. Pls reply.
sir can u write an article on y India still remains reluctant to ink bilateral pacts like the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum Agreement (CISMOA) and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation (BECA)
can u mention the merits and demerits of these bilateral pacts
We can test TN warhead design without live testing. Currently this simulation testing capability is available only to USA and France.
Of these two the French LASER MEGAJOULE simulation program is the best one available. But access to it is extremely difficult to india.
But there is a rumor that by offering MMRCA to dassault france india has secretly inked a pact with france for accessing MEGAJOULE facilities for testing TN warhead designs.
for more information on MEGAJOULE please go to below link.
To Unknown: SPB trains at both Kakinada and at Chilka Lake. The Navy has its own training curriculum that is based on numerous visits conducted by Navy personnel to both Japan and the US since 2005 to observe multilateral combined-arms amphibious exercises conducted in these two countries. Indian Army expertise, therefore, it not required here. The Indian Army and Navy have till this day never conducted any kind of combined-arms amphibious warfare/assault exercises. All exercises done to date have only involved beach landings by Army personnel from naval vessels. And during such landings, no artillery assets were ever employed. Also, if you were to look at previous operations involving such beach-landings (like OP LAL DORA in the 1970s in Mauritius), these were nowhere like the kind of amphibious assaults staged by the likes of the USMC. Choice of crew-served weapons and clothing-colour depends on the type of terrain/topography over which future amphibious operations will be conducted. Therefore, one mustn’t leave out the OGs. Instead of F-INSAS, the SPB will have the Future Combat System. Marine formations have never been ‘elite’, though they’ve had integral ‘elite’ detachments. In the US the system is totally different in that in the event of any crisis, the first responders have inevitably been the US Navy’s Carrier Battle groups & the accompanying Marine Expeditionary Forces. But that does not make them ‘elite’ in any way. Of course once the LPHs and their integral hovercraft/air cushion vehicles are inducted into service, the SPB will be making use of them for expeditionary operations. Consequently, there will arise reqmts for MBTs, tracked AIFVs, light field artillery and attack helicopters. Therefore, T-90S-type MBTs, upgraded BMP-2Ks and BMP-T-type tank destroyers, along with 105mm field guns & 81mm/120mm mortars mounted on BMP hull, and LAH versions of the LCH. The masterplan for this was prepared in 2010 itself by Navy HQ.
To Anon@3.10PM: The Kashtan had severe performance deficiencies when operating in the waters around India. The problems were related to the fire-control electronics and they continue to linger. That was also one of the reasons Vietnam’s Navy preferred the PALMA over the Kashtan. For defence against both high-subsonic sea-slimming anti-ship cruise missiles & supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, neither the Kashtan nor the Barak-1 can be viewed as being suitable. They may be effective against P-20 Termit or AS-39/SM-39 missiles, but not against the MM-40 or Harpoon or C-802. On-board sensors of the Batch 2 Project 1135.6 FFGs have remained more or less the same as those of the Talwar-class FFGs.
To Anon@11.54PM: The Indian Navy does not yet share the US Navy’s concept of staging expeditionary air-land campaigns and therefore there’s been no need to acquire Tomahawk-type LACMs. The only available LACMs are the ship-launched and sub-launched Novator 3M-14Es.
To KSK: No, it ain’t true. India will have true credible nuclear deterrence only after the deployment in future of long-range SLBMs and the SSBN that can carry at least eight such SLBMs.
To Anon@12.53AM: LSA & CISMOA are not that necessary, but the BECA is, although I personally have nothing against the LSA & CISMOA.
To Raviprakash: Live testing? No way.
To Anon@7.03PM: Most TN warhead designs can be validated by using simulation programmes like the French LASER MEGAJOULE. But there is reason to believe that such programmes have also been evolved and developed by the BARC for boosted-fission warheads. There’s thus no need to approach France in this matter.
I am surprised when you say that the Barak-1 is not effective against the harpoon , mm-40 and c-802 unless the latter has a supersonic terminal stage Please explain why. I was under the view that all subsonic missiles were not a problem for the barak-1
Prasun, Can you show us any graphic illustration of INS Vikramaditya pointing out different electronics sensors/equipment, weapons/sam/ciws already/to be installed, like the one you did for Shivalik? Alreport so according to another INS Vikramaditya will have no air defense until 2017 just to save the cost. Is it true?
Hi Prasun, i wanna know few things about the Mig 27. 1. How many MiG-27 are currently in active service with the IAF. We purchased and license procured around 160+ migs from USSR. Are all those in service with the IAF( barring those lost in accidents) 2. The IAF earmarks the mig 27 for lowlevel BAI sorties. Can it fly low level missions and navigate over complex terrain in adverse weather conditions when visibility is low. 3. Can the MiG-27 fly at night. Ofcourse the pilots are provided with NVGs. But it provides just to a distance. What is provided to get a picture of the terrain below? 4. A no of MiG-27 squadrons are deployed in the NE. The Ne suffers from bad weather conditions and is dotted with hills and undulating terrain. Also there is heavy fog. in winter. During hostilites with China, the Mig 27s will fly interdiction missions against the PLA. How will it be able to navigate the complex terrain and fly through the Himalayas at low level. 5. How does the MiG-27 aquire and engage targets under obscure weather conditions, at night and all these from standoff ranges beyond the enemy's MRSAM and point SRRAM , AAA engagement envelope. 7.The entire MiG-27 fleet has been grounded due to lack of spares. So what the hell is the jv of HAL and UAC doing. Why isnt it providing the spares. Has the IAF solved the problem? How long will the fleet suffer? Pls Try to reply.
It claims RAW'S ARC is set to only recieve 2 Bobadier spy a/c but you stated that the recent RFP for 9 such planes issued by IAF is actually for RAW ARC but with IAF as procurer only. If what you said previously is true why the need for this new and seperate tender? So will RAW get 11 such platforms then?
To RAD: The answer is simple. The Barak-1 was never developed for intercepting ASCMs like the C-802 & MM-40 & Harpoon. That’s why in mid-2006 the Hezbollah succeeded in attacking an Israeli corvette with a shore-launched C-802. The best defence against incoming sea-skimming ASCMs is the IIR-guided missile system like the RAM, VL-MICA & AIM-132 ASRAAM. China too has developed a similar system like the FL-2000N.
To Anon@7.14PM: Infinitely more than your’s, rest assured.
To Shaurya: Will try to do so. By the way, the sensor inside the ‘drum’ on the island contains the tactical navigation aid for the carrier-based MiG-29Ks. For point air-defence, the Barak-1s will be installed AFTER the carrier arrives in India.
To Anon@11.06PM: 165 + 40 MiG-29Ms were acquired. About 140 remain in service. During bad weather/low-visibility the MiG-27Ms cannot get airborne fir low-level flight sorties. Flying at nighttime with NVG is done, but not for low-level sorties. For acquiring & engaging targets at nighttime when flying at medium altitudes, the Litening-2 LDP pod is used.
To Unknown & KSK: The two reqmts are separate. One concerns ELINT/SIGINT aircraft and the other concerns belly-mounted SAR-equipped boundary surveillance platforms. Both types of platforms will be used by RAW’s ARC, but will be flown and maintained by the IAF. But the two types of platforms have totally different mission profiles. The SAR-equipped Bombardier 5000s will be employed for monitoring the deployment of forces along India’s borders and for generating data for RAW’s national security threat assessments once every six-months. These platforms are thus the long-awaited replacements for the MiG-25Rs.
To Dashu: In all probability the HTT-40 project will be scrapped in favour of 75 + 106 PC-7 Mk2s.
if barak 1 was not developed to protect against c-802 type missiles.how is the navy planning to counter the proliferation of such missiles in our neighborhood.
how is the AK-630 different from phalanx ciws(the latter being closed loop,whatever the hell that means!!!)
Prasun, Do we really need a 8000 Km SLBM or ICBM ? Instead of spending so much resources in this hugely expensive missiles. It will be much more economical to develop MIRV with Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS). Soviets developed this against US in the 70-80s.
There might be treaties banning weaponisation of outer space but should Nuclear weapons be used against Indian than treaties would be of least concern.
ISRO did demonstrate re-entry capsule technology couple of years back. We can use a SLBM launched FOBS MIRV with unlimited range cap.
Good Post Prasun , its good to see Indian Naval professionals are held in high esteem by Russian counterpart and there is so much they have learnt from us.
Keep providing us good info , can you tell me the magazine from where this scan article was posted from ?
"If they had seen it, they then would never have written lies like: "direction of the CFL beyond NJ 9842 was unambiguously stated as ‘thence running north to the glaciers’. If you can lay your hands on these two agreements, you will notice that in NONE of these agreements is there any sentence which states that the LoC will run “thence north to the glaciers”."
It is obvious that you, yourself haven't read the Karachi Agreement 1949. Let me quote the relevant part:[Part II/B/2/d]
'From DALUNANG eastwards the cease-fire, line will follow the general line Point 15495, ISHMAN, MANUS, GANGAM, GUNDERMAN, Point 13620, JUNKAR (point 17628), MARMAK, NATSARA, SHANGRUTH (Point 17531), CHORBAT LA (Point 157000), CHALUNKA (on the SHYOK River), KHOR, thence north to the glaciers. This portion of the cease-fire line shall be demarcated in detail on the basis of the factual position as of 27 July 1949 by the local commanders, assisted by United Nations Military Observers. [ref. United Nations - Treaty Series]
The 'cease fire' line mentioned here later became 'Line of Control' or LoC via Simla Agreement, 1971.
If you want to be arrogant at least try to be correct.
To Hoods: Firstly, for anti-ship missile defence, there is no standalone solution, and therefore Barak-1’s employment is only one of the few options. Secondly, the first warning of an inbound ASCM comes from the targetted warship’s ESM sensors, which can acquire those signals emanating from the hostile radar (shipborne or airborne) that is ‘painting’ the targetted warship. At this stage, offboard countermeasures are dispensed. If this doesn’t work, then the data-link providing mid-course updates to the ASCM and the terminal seeker of the ASCM are also both subject to directional jamming. Even if this doesn’t work, then the last course of action is the physical destruction of the ASCM by the Barak-1. Closed-loop system refers to a standalone system comprising the missile and its integral fire-control system, i.e. the fire-control system is meant to be used by only a particular weapon system, and is not shared by any other weapon (like the primary & secondary naval guns). Both the Barak-1 and the Tulamashzavod JSC-built A-213 Vympel-A point defence system are closed-loop systems. In case of the Barak-1, the suite comprises the missiles and EL/M-2221 STGR fire-control system comprising both the twin target illumination radars and twin optronic trackers, while the A-213 Vympel-A comprises twin AK-630M 30mm guns, twin MR-123-02 fire-control radars and twin SP-521 optronic trackers. Therefore, one can state that the Indian concept of last-ditch ASCM defence calls for the synchronised usage of both the Barak-1 & A-213 Vympel-A. However, it remains to be seen if such a concept can be called a ‘proven’ scheme of shooting down ASCMs, since this ‘scheme’ has yet to be test-fired by the Indian Navy against ASCMs like the Uran-E or 3M54E1 Klub.
To SK: I don’t think in today’s era one can go against international treaties/conventions. That being the case, the next best option is to go for a credible deterrent with robust retaliatory strike capabilities. If this is to be achieved, then developing a survivable SSBN-based arsenal of SLBMs is a must. No Indian nuclear deterrent will be credible for as long as the SLBM remains absent. And for that to happen India requires a fleet of no less than three SBBNs each capable of housing eight SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, plus at least nine SSGNs to protect the SSBNs. In fact, deploying a fleet of cannisterised road-mobile ICBMs & MRBMs will prove to be a far greater liability since the general area of their peacetime locations and their pre-surveyed launch-pads will always be known and will therefore be vulnerable to a ‘counter-force’ first-strike by the enemy, and the only way to avoid or neutralise that is to deploy a BMD network, which only adds to the cost of having a land-based n-deterrent.
To AUSTIN: VMT. The pages were from the in-house publication of Russia’s United Shipbuilding Corp, which was distributed during the trade show days at DEFEXPO 2012. This issue is a collector’s item since it contains several more pages detailing USSR/Russia-India cooperation in naval matters from the start till to date.
To Anon@8.01PM: If you want to be arrogant at least try to be correct and stop being economical with facts. For instance, where is there any mention of NJ9842 in the para that you copy-pasted from god-knows-where? And since when was the Simla Agreement inked in 1971? What you need to read is this: On July 29, 1949 when the CFL was formally demarcated, the extreme (last) point to be demarcated was in Baltistan, valley of Shyok-river, and called point NJ 9842. From there on about a 75km stretch of snowy land leading up to the Chinese border was not demarcated for two reasons. a) The area beyond the line consisted of glaciers, which were extremely difficult to map. b) In the 14-month war, no fighting had taken place between the two countries in that area, and it was presumed by both countries that because of extreme weather, no fighting shall take place till the final settlement. When the CFL was changed into a mutually accepted line of control (LoC) in October 1972 and was formally embraced by both India & Pakistan on December 11, 1972, the newly delineated line ran from the Shyok River west of Thang (a village) to Point NJ 9842 and ended there. The area north of it was once again left blank and open to encroachments by both countries. There were no lines drawn from NJ 9842 to any other direction. I therefore challenge you produce any document which states in black-and-white that after NJ 9842 there was a straight line or dotted line drawn by either country on the set of maps that showed the LoC.
To Anon@9.56OM: Not that many, in my view. Here’s the list: Exercise Divya Astra (Divine Weapon) from February 21 to March 3, 2004 Exercise Vajra Shakti (Power of Thunder) from May 1 to May 10, 2005 Exercise Desert Strike from November 1 to November 14, 2005 (biggest since EX Brass Tacks of 1986-1987) Exercise Sanghe Shakti (Joint Power) from May 3 to May 19, 2006 Exercise Ashwamedh (Valour and Intellectual Illumination) from April 29 to May 3, 2007 Exercise Shatrunash (Destruction of the Enemy) from May 11 to May 14, 2007 Exercise Dakshin Shakti (Southern Power) from March 3 to March 13, 2008 Exercise Hind Shakti from May 3 to May 6, 2009 Exercise Amogh Raksha in January 2010 Exercise Dakshin Shakti-II in February 2010 Exercise Vijayee Bhava (Be Victorious) from May 9 to May 14, 2011 Exercise Pine Prahaar from May 29 to June 2, 2011 Exercise Sudarshan Shakti from December 1 to December 15, 2011 Exercise Shoor Veer between March and June 2012
Hi, PRASUN thanx for answering offtopic. Have a few more doubts. If the MiG-27 cannot fly low level missions under all weather conditions then why dis the IAF went for such ac instead of Su-24 which is an all weather strike platform . The enemy will attack us whenever it wants to irrespective of weather conditions whereas the MiG-27 will not be able to do so. Cannot a mig -27 fitted with Litening 3 pod fly at low level over complex terrain and engage targets at bad weather and at night as it contains a 3rd gen FLIR and high resolution FLIR imagery of the terrain forward as well as target of interest can be obtained and displayed in the HUD or head down display . Also can't the Flir map the terrain of interest from good standoff range (50 km). U said About 165+40 MiG-27 had been bought. So why only 140 are in service? Are the rest lost to accident or they are serving as attrition reserve ?
Can the Jaguars fly at low level under bad weather? Are they all weather strike aircraft . What improvements in strike capabilty, target aquisition and engagement does the DARIN 3 upgrade bring? Why aren't the Jaguars being fitted with multi mode radars to improve their capability?
Prasun, What's the status of the Saryu class OPVs for the Navy and the Pipavav project for OPVs ?
Also, I notice that the EOFCS system from Elta has now made it to the whole Car Nicobar class, and to most Coast Guard XFPVS, IPVs and OPVs but what about the problems with the BEL Radamec EOFCS for the 76mm guns on the Samar class ?
To Anon@11.25PM: The MiG-27Ms were acquired as dedicated MBT-busters, and were meant to be used during daytime when the Indian Army’s T-72M/M1 MBTs would find it unbearably hot during daytime to operate in the Thar/Cholistan deserts. The MiG-27Ms’s secondary role is to attack hostile forward air bases with BAP-100 runway-cratering bombs, and lend close air support by dropping gravity bombs. Regarding all-weather operations, even the Su-24 or Su-30MKI or Jaguar is not up to the task. For only those combat aircraft that have an on-board multi-mode radar—especially with the weather scanning mode—can be truly labelled as all-weather combat aircraft. Only those aircraft equipped with AESA-MMRs can offer weather-scanning modes. Litening-2/3 are all targeting pods, and not navigation pods like LANTIRN. In addition, for seeing the FLIR imagery of the terrain ahead on a HUD, one requires a holographic HUD, which is not present on any existing IAF combat aircraft. No FLIR can map the terrain below, for that either terrain-mapping radars are reqd, or AESA-MMRs having a terrain mappinf operating mode are reqd. Those MiG-27Ms that are no longer in service had to be decommissioned as they had reached the end of their total technical service lives (TTSL). Had they been re-engined with the AL-31F turbofans, then their TTSLs could have been extended. The DARIN-3 avionics upgrade for the Jaguar will result in a far better man-machine interface, reduce the pilot’s workload, and will enable the Jaguars to make optimum use of the Litening LDPs. Installation of MMRs on the IAF’s Jaguars will call for extensive changes to the aircraft’s nose-section to not only accommodate the radar, but also its related environment control system. However, installation of a low-cost IRST sensor like the Skyward from Selex-Galileo is feasible.
To Anon@11.40PM: What’s the use of employing MRAPVs in naxal-infested areas—which are all in hilly and jungle terrain—when such vehicles can only be used in flat, open terrain or on wide roads, eliminating them from use in narrow and more rugged terrain? For combating the Naxals, what’s reqd most is an effective information-gathering network of the type created in Andhra Pradesh for the Greyhounds. The HUMINT should be backed up by tactical UAVs and mini-UAVs, 5-tonne multi-role utility helicopters plus long-range recce patrols of specialised CAPF personnel. In other words, dedicated counter-insurgency CAPF formations like the world’s largest existing counter-insurgency force—the 60,000-strong Rashtriya Rifles (equal to at least three infantry divisions). Had such a specialised force comprising the CRPF, BSF, Assam Rifles & Arunachal Scouts been raised since the 1990s, then by the year 2004 there would have been no need for Rashtriya Rifles, there would have been no need for raising four additional infantry divisions for the Army, and there would have been no need to enforce AFSPA in any insurgency-ridden area of India.
To SBM: The delivery of four 105.34-metre Saryu-class NOPVs is definitely behind schedule and over-cost. That was the reason why Pipavav won the contract for delivering five new-build NOPVs. Metal-cutting for the latter has already commenced. The EOFCS is not from ELTA, but ELBIT Systems. The problems are not with the EOFCS from ULTRA Electronics (which bought over Radamec), but with its integration with the NOPV’s combat management system (CMS). For unlike the dedicated shore-based systems integration facility now coming up at MDL, GSL has no such facility and consequently, systems integration is done at the laboratory-level by BEL. This in turn poses great risks since the wiring configurations &power-supply arrangements on board a vessel are distinctly different from what’s available in a laboratory. Therefore, once the CMS and all accompanying sensors & weapons are installed on board the intended vessel, there’s a lot of fine-tuning and engineering/electrical validation to be done, especially on the lead/first-of-type vessel, all of which is a very time-consuming process. Sometimes, even structural changes have to be resorted to for accommodating the reqd modifications & fine-tuning. It is for this very reason that the lead boat of any class of warship designed by the IN’s Directorate of Naval Design (DND) takes a long time to be commissioned. What complicates matters even more is the absence till this day within India of any independent body/agency/consultant that is reqd to undertake a technical audit of every warship design emanating from the DND. Consequently, the inevitable always happens, in which the DND is often at loggerheads with the Navy’s Directorate of Marine Engineering & Directorate of Warship Construction during a warship’s construction phase. Unless this mess is sorted out, warship production schedules will never be adhered to. Thus far, only shipyards owned by MDL and L & T have in-house facilities like virtual reality design labs and shore-based systems integration facilities. Pipavav plans to have one, but since its NOPV design has been outsourced from Russia’s Severnoye Design Bureau, it is deemed as a reliable product from a risk-management standpoint, something that cannot be said about the Saryu-class NOPV.
To SBM: If you check out my threads on DEFEXPO 2012 you will see the illustration of Pipavav's NOPV. Armaments will be the same as that on the four GSL-built NOPVs. The problems with the GSL-built NOPV, as I had stated above, are related to systems integration issues. It is not for the ICGS to order Dhruvs. It is the IN that dictates the ICGS' hardware reqmts and if the Navy were to suggest procurement of Dhruvs for the ICGS, then questions will be raised about the Navy not ordering the Dhruvs for SAR as well, something the Navy wants to avoid because its list of priorities is totally different and as far as the Navy is concerned it is the procurement of 10-tonne MRHs that is most important. For replacing the Navy's existing SAR helicopters like SA.316B Alouette IIIs, the Navy wants a single-engined helicopter, not twin-engined models. That is why I've been trying to explain for quite some time now as to why the ICGS must have a DG from its own ranks, rather than being sent on deputation from the Navy. For as long as the DG of ICGS comes from the Navy, it is the IN that will dictate what the ICGS can and cannot have. Folks first need to understand the powerplay at the apex levels and how it influences the budgetary and procurement processes, before even going down to the details of what's reqd or not reqd for the ICGS. That's why there's a chirade being played out now about the IN requiring SAR amphibians, when it is crystal-clear that it is the ICGS that needs them far more.
Hi Prasun, what is the inventory of the ARC. I am talking about the intelligence gathering, recon , ELINT, SIGINT aircraft apart from the recent 2 Bombardier 5000. The ARC also have transport aircrafts for transport of personel of establishment 22. Arent the ELINT, SIGINT ac nt fitted with SAR for radar imagery? The 9 ac for Sigint, elint & the 2 ac fitted with SAR, are they meant for replacing the existing inventory. Inspite of all the existing high tech aircraft why cant RAW detect the presence of pakistani jihadis and pakistani intrusion in the Kargil sector. Pls ans. And why dont you write an article on the ARC , about its capabilities.
Hey, TRISHUL I am extremely thankful to find out these kinds of fantastic information becoming discussed openly online. Appreciate you for sharing these kinds of wonderful ideas.
In your opinion, which platform has a superior all weather strike capability - the F/A-18D with Nitehawk and late NAVFLIR pods or the Su-30MKM with Damocles?
What advantage is to be gained from having FLIR imagery displayed on a HUD as opposed to a display in the cockpit? Are any of China's Su-27s, J-11s and Su-30MKKs fitted with a holographic HUD?
What was the rationale in the RMAF getting Chobham refuelling pods, given the Su-30MKMS have sfficient internal fuel and that unlike the IAF, theRMAF will have no requirement for very long range strikes?
Are you still of the opinion that RAM and gun CIWS are incapable of engaging supersonic missiles? What about ESSM and ASTER 15?
63 comments:
Hi Prasun,
An interesting interview by India Today with Dr.Saraswat. The link is below
http://idrw.org/?p=10988
he made various statements
1. Regarding AGNI-V technologies
2. About ASAT
3. BMD capabilities and deployment
4. INS Arihant
5. LRSAM.
would be glad to know ur views.
Thanks
Swarop
Prasun now that you have mentioned that IN will mostly be going for a 60,000 Ton IAC-2.
Can any French help be expected in this regard if its powered by Nuclear Reactor. As they will be working on the SSGN. French had problems with their Nuclear powered carrier Charles deGaulle. Can IN learn from these valuable lessons. Can India seek any design assistance to BARC w.r.t the Nuclear Reactor.
Who will be the design consultant for the IAC-2
Apart from reactor there are other challenges like the heat exchangers, catapult etc. Will IAC-2 house the EMALS instead of convention steam catapults.
As bigger vessel it will have a bigger contingent of fighters and support aircrafts, will this reflect into new type of deployments of the IAC-2 Carrier Fleet for extended duration.
Is there any chance for the IN to go for E-2D Hawkeye or a V-22 mounted AWACS for this vessel.
sir ,
sine this post was about the navy..i just became curious about the MARCOS..can u tell about its numerical strength..is it being expanded just like para SF ?
& y does the Indian navy need a separate sagar prahari bal & marine infantry..y cant they be a single component..like just the marines..?
prasun sir ,
there were reports some time earlier about india negotiating with russia for additional talwar class frigates over & above the 6 already in service/being built..
what's the update on that front ?
is there any plan to fit tomahawk kind of missiles on any future indian naval ship ?
thanks sir
Regarding the artillery would it be fruitful if 155MM/52Cal howitzer developed by OFB from FH-77B and mount it on Arjun chassis for tracked and a 155mm/45cal variant on a 6x6 for motorized version ?
If we compare the performance of 155MM 39 n 45 n 52Cal howitzers,will they only differ in range or their punch too vary?
Good to hear that IAC-2 will be a CATOBAR ... will it use Steam or Electric power(as in newest US ACs) to propel?
What is the expected time for the FICV development and when will the production start...how many will be ordered?
Why do you think that there is no requirement for towed artillery(which are cheaper)?
Cas in a battle there will be sites where presence of atleast 3-4 howitzers over an area will be wanted throughout the war ... so in those cases need for motorized version may not arise ... also working with a howitzer on the ground will be easier to crew ... as M777 will be used for mountain warfare towed ones could be mobilized by C-17s or IL-76 or C-130Js if possible...
anyway at the moment lets just hope that OFB will smoothly 'develop' atleast a 45cal of FH-77B.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Y_TDafiqow
CAESER SPH
http://idrw.org/?p=11005
8 Billion$ deals with US???waht r they???
22 Apache
145 M777
Javelins anymore???
Dear Prasun da,
Do India has W88 warhead..? If not then any future plan to uprade/test of W88 WARHAD..?
Hi, i have a few ques regarding the follow on Talwar class. 1. What is the use of the anti sub rocket mortar system RBU-6000. It has a range of only 4 km. No enemy subs will ever venture so close to an adversary's warship. The sub will be at a minimum standoff distance of 30 km during a torpedo attack. Also all modern subs operate at depths of ~ 200 m . Is the RBU effective at such depths. Instead of hosting the Rbu, the deck space can be used for installing 8-16 VLS for the 550 km range Brahmos block 3 which will make the Talwar a major surface combatant. 2. Why did the Navy go for the AK-630 CIWS instead of the Kashtan ? The kashtan was fitted on the earlier batch of Talwars. The combination of gun and missiles makes it effective against both sub and supersonic seakimming antiship missiles. The 630 is only effective for creating a wall of leads in front of an incoming target.The AK-630 is incapable of intercepting of both subsonic and supersonic missile threats. U nly said so in one of your earlier comments. So what is the logic behind the navy going for the Ak630 instead of the Kashtan. Pls clarify.
Prasun,
Given the current state of economy, is it even viable to think of a 60,000ton aircraft carrier, leave alone nuclear propulsion ,CATOBAR EMALS? Dont we need SSNs and some DSRVs much sooner than a second AC?
Also what he had meant by second ship is much more neatly build. Is there any design difference in 1st & 2nd ship hull structure or its just the layout of the cabins and crew compartment?
To Spanky’s Blog/Swarop: I did not come across any new revelations in that interview. Frankly, the contents of the interview were all about mediocre responses to some pretty stupid questions. For instance, what was stated as the LR-SAM is in fact, the Navy’s MR-SAM. It is the IAF that has exercised the LR-SAM option. Secondly, the IAF (and rightly so) is well ahead of the DRDO when it comes to evolving an anti-cruise missile doctrine and developing a continental network-centric airspace control-cum-management system. Lastly, Dr Saraswat should have explained more about the ‘missile monitoring system’, i.e. the space-based early warning network reqd for BMD, something he had first explained way back in February 2010 and without which any BMD network will be almost useless from an Indian standpoint. It all boild down to this: you will only find out things if you know what to look out for. Regretably, for these ‘desi’ journalists, only the tip-of-the-iceberg suffices, with the rest being all erroneous reportage. Take for instance these recent claims by both INDIAN EXPRESS & FORCE about Rheinmetal being the supplier of the Arjun MBT’s main gun. This mistake was repeated by Shekhar Gupta (of INDIAN EXPRESS, who blindly accepted an erroneous report filed earlier by one of his reporters as being the gospel truth), who made the very same mistake when interviewing Dr Saraswat (at: http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/walk-the-talk/walk-the-talk-with-drdo-chief-vk-saraswat/230667?hp). If you watch between 14.05 and 14.33 you will realise how such ‘highly experienced’ journalists can make such stupid mistakes.
That brings us to http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-3IPyEqgM-aQ/T5uiAArBlPI/AAAAAAAAP8w/kq3bIfeYscE/s1600/1111.jpg
Read this report in detail and it will emerge that the story is NOT about the grounded Mirage 2000s, but about almost the entire fleet of MiG-27M interdictor/strike aircraft that have been grounded for quite some time now due to unavailability of spares for the R-29B turbofans, and no one seems to ask A K Antony why such a state of affairs is prevailing, when IRAL (the JV between HAL & United Aircraft Corp) is mandated to be supplying the reqd quantum of spares. Nor will anyone dare ask why was the option of re-engining the MiG-27Ms with AL-31F turbofans not exercised as far back as 2005.
Continued from above:
The problem with most Indians, especially those like the ‘desi’ mass-media personnel, is that they always get emotional and MISREPRESENT the facts and tell LIES. For instance, have any of these ‘desi’ journalists seen with their own eyes the 1949 Karachi Agreement & the LoC Demarcation Agreement of October 1972? If they had seen it, they then would never have written lies like: "direction of the CFL beyond NJ 9842 was unambiguously stated as ‘thence running north to the glaciers’. If you can lay your hands on these two agreements, you will notice that in NONE of these agreements is there any sentence which states that the LoC will run “thence north to the glaciers”. What really happened is this: the ceasefire line (CFL) of 1949 and LoC of 1972 both ended at NJ9842. Beyond that there was no demarcation or even a mention of any line going anywhere BECAUSE in 1949 India's then PM Jawaharlal Nehru had remarked that "since the glaciated regions were areas where not even a blade of grass grew, it would therefore be unfit for human inhabitation and therefore these areas should be left undemarcated” as no-man’s land. At that time, Pakistan too agreed with this line of thought. Consequently, when the CFL was changed into the LoC in October 1972, the newly delineated line ran from the Shyok River west of Thang (a village) to Point NJ 9842. The area north of it was left BLANK and open to encroachments. After that, both Pakistan & India developed perceptional differences. While India interpreted that the LoC should extend from the last demarcated point NJ 9842 northeasterly along the Saltoro Range to the Sino-Indian border up to Aksai Chin, Pakistani interpreted that the LOC extends straight from NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass towards the Sino-Pakistan border. Also, regarding the 1963 Sino-Pakistan border agreement, it was Pakistan that gained more than China, since the dispute involved five tracts, of which China ceded control of three of them to Pakistan and kept the remaining two. Therefore, what led to OP Meghdoot on April 13, 1984 was a feeble attempt by the then PM Mrs Indira Gandhi to try to correct the mistakes made by her father (who blatantly disregarded all advice by his colleagues back in 1949 to clearly demarcate the India-Pakistan & Sino-Indian borders), this being Error-1. But in this process, the Govt of India made another fatal error (Error-2): it unilaterally violated the Shimla Agreement by resorting to military means to alter the status of the LoC. And by doing this, it made another blunder (Error-3): instead of securing the approaches to the Karakoram Pass northeast of NJ9842, the Indian Army went on to secure the Saltoro Ridge, which is well WEST of the imaginary line that is now erroneously often being quoted as running "thence north to the glaciers”. Such errors are only possible if the then Govt of India was WRONGLY briefed by both Army HQ and its HQ Northern Command. Logically, if the idea had been to drive a wedge and prevent a link-up of Pakistan and China within the glaciated areas, then the Indian Army should have established a firm foothold at Dansum (at 16,000 feet ASL which is exactly where the Pakistan Army's Siachen Brigade is now located), and NOT over Saltoro Ridge, as it does not confer any kind of military advantage (operationally or logistically) to India at any point in time for any kind of future military operation. What I've explained above are the facts, devoid of the kind of sentiments and emotions that usually cloud an average Indian's judgement. But of course if you were to embrace objectivity and logical reasoning, then the habitually ill-informed Indian 'danda maar' brigade will most definitely descend upon you!
To SK: The IAC-2 is now only at the conceptual design stage and expressions of interest have been sought from both Russia and France. Between these two, the French will have the upper hand IF the Indian Navy insists on nuclear propulsion. Once that happens, there will be convergences between what India desires from France for the SSGN programme (in terms of specific technologies), and what can France offer for the IAC-2 programme by way of DCNS acting as a design consultant for not just the vessel, but also its propulsion system. For the PWRs for both the SSGN and IAC-2, much will depend on how quickly the BARC is able to come up with a viable design for the S-5 SSBN. Right now this is a big question-mark since the Arihant’s PWR is of 1970s design (the BARC never designed any of it, and was only responsible for developing its fuel-rods, while L & T and BHEL fabricated the PWR and related heat-exchangers), and the BARC still faces some critical design challenges when designing new-generation PWRs with substantially enhanced power generation capacities. By the time the IAC-2 is to be launched (in the following decade), EMALS will be the only viable option. As for on-board aircraft fleets, the naval variant of the FGFA is definitely being looked at, as is the Rafale & NLCA Mk2. As for AEW & C platforms, a fixed-wing solution capable of being refuelled in mid-air will be the preferred choice over helicopters. Whether an AEW & C variant of the Bell/Boeing V-22 Osprey emerges by the end of this decade remains to be seen.
To Anon@11.16PM: MARCOS won’t be expanded like the Para (SF). And there will be no separate Sagar Prahari Bal & naval infantry. Eventually, the Sagar Prahari Bal will emerge as the naval infantry. That’s why the Sagar Prahari Bal’s sanctioned strength is 15,000—enough for a reinforced amphibious brigade + personnel reqd for protecting the Navy’s numerous shore-based establishments/bases.
To Anon@12.39AM: There won’t be a Batch 3 programme involving Project 1135.6 FFGs. The only additional FFGs to be acquired by the Navy in future will be the seven Project 17A vessels. Tomahawk-type TLAMs are not reqd for any Indian warship, since the Klub-N & BrahMos can both do the job. However, vertically launched variants of the Prahaar are being examined.
I have read that Arjun Mk1A is soon undergoing the user trials. What are your expectations from the same at this juncture.
To Anon@7.14AM: Not, the OFB, but CVRDE & ARDE could develop such variants of the 155mm/52-cal FH-77B. For the tracked reqmt, the hull of a T-72M1 powered by a 1,000hp engine will more than suffice, and will be far cheaper than the hull of Arjun MBT. If the idea is to go for calibers beyond the existing 39-cal, then the jump should be made straight to the 52-cal standard, and leave the 45-cal solutions behind. Both tracked & motorised 155mm/52-cal howitzers, in terms of both engagement envelope and punch, are way ahead of 39-cal solutions.
TO KSK: It will be electric power for IAC-2. The FICV CAN be developed over a period of 6 years, with production beginning by 2019. The reqmt is for 2,200 in all versions. In future battlefields, towed tube artillery will be a logistical drain simply because long gone are the days of linear static firing positions. The proliferation of weapon locating radars and long-range MBRLs capable of firing sensor-fuzed munitions, plus the fast-moving pace of manoeuvre warfare demands that field artillery assets too be appreciably land-mobile so that their engagement envelopes are always well ahead of the ground mechanised/armoured formations that too will always have to be on the move, so as to maintain the reqd tempo of operations. Whether one uses rail or air transport for towed artillery howitzers, there’s always the need to cater for two pieces—the howitzer & its tow-truck—whereas for motorised howitzers, the 2-in-1 solution does away with the need for a separate tow-truck. The benefits are obvious. As for the OFB developing a 155mm/45-cal towed howitzer, in all probability, the Army will, rightly so, insist on procuring 52-cal solutions and therefore, the best course of action, which is also financially more attractive, is for the OFB to team up with Mahindra/BAE Systems and develop a 155/52-cal solution. 45-cal can be retained only for the M-46 upgrade/upgunning, but for the FH-77B it is a wasted proposition.
To Deba2233: Not to the best of my knowledge.
To Anon@11.33PM: The ASW mortars are never used for attacking submarines. Instead, the mortar rounds are timed to explode underwater so that the incoming torpedo and/or its towed-wire are both destroyed by such explosions. All Project 1135.6 FFGs have Kashtan on board, and not AK-630.
To Shaurya: In terms of topmost priorities, the reqmts include additional P-8Is, at least two submarine tenders, two DSRVs, six oceanographic survey catamarans, six SSGNs, and up to 12 coastal ASW corvettes. IAC-2 will have to come after all this only in the following decade. There are internal differences within the hull structure in areas like hangar and aircraft maintenance bay, ammo storage bay, etc.
To Mr.RA 13: These forthcoming user-trials will likely conclude smoothly, since the modifications for the Arjun Mk1A don’t involve any major structural changes to the hull or turret. Instead, all the mods are aimed at only increasing overall systems reliability and effectiveness, and consequently, no big challenges are expected to be encountered. All these mods will then be incorporated from the start on the follow-on new-build 124 Arjun Mk1As, plus the new vectorics suite and related wiring, which will all result in higher levels of reliability and effectiveness by 2016, since by that time the BMS & a new lightweight comms suite (that can also handle tactical internet traffic dealing with sharing of voice, imagery & data emanating from the battlefield surveillance system, or BSS) will be available for operational usage on the battlefield. Also, the new 120mm APFSDS ammo capable of penetrating 600mm or RHA (as revealed by Dr Saraswat in the NDTV interview last Saturday) should be available from 2014.
To Anon@11.33PM: Correction to my comment@3.28AM. You’re right, there’s no Kashtan on board, just the twin AK-630s. The first three Project 1135.6 FFGs of the Talwar-class had encountered serious problems with the Kashtan’s performance. But right next to the AK-630M, there’s enough space available for a Barak-1 8-cell VLS installation.
Thanks Prasun!!!! Tht was quite a detailed explanation
Prasun you said the SPB are to be the naval infantry of the IN ( along the line of Marines in other countries) so are they being trained in conventional infantry tactics like assaults/amphibious assaults, ambushes, survival etc? And who is training them? The IN in their own schools or the IA in infantry schools? Also what will subsequently happen to the IA units that currently take care of Ampbibious operations in India?
And what mind of equipment are these guys to field? INSAS/Tavor-21? Will they have the standard IA green camo (which is pointless in their role IMO) or a new specialised camo? And will these guys subsequently be eligible for F-INSAS or will they end up getting whatever future combat system the MARCOS get (maybe in a watered down configuration)?
And would you classify these guys as "elite" as in other countries where the Marines are usually the "tip of the apear" and considered more than just grunts with an entirely separate identity (USMC for eg takes pride in not being regular or part of the army).
Will the SPB be deployed on the IN's LHD/LPD in the future then as the nodal amphibious force of Indian forces then? And will they be given their own air assets, a force of 15,000 (even if operating only as one reinforced brigade) is going to need some serious helo lift capability especially in amphibious warfare/assaults. And will these guys to have to make do with outdated BMP-IIs as their ICVs/ampbiobus assault vehicles or is there any chance of the IN getting something up to date like the Marine Expeditionary Vehicle?
And does the IN have any plans to field dedicated attack helos as of yet (a Sea Apache/Super Cobra/Naval LCH) With this kind of force this seems vital.
Hi, what serious problems regarding performance of the Kashtan system is being faced by the navy? Can the AK-630 offer good protection against sea skimming subsonic and supersonic ASHM like the Brahmos? What improvements innterms of sensors and stealth are there on the 2nd batch over the first? Does the new Talwars have improved surface and air search radars or the feature the same old radar suite? What new sensors such as ESM apart from the radar are present. Pls reply.
Thanx! Your reply says it all.
sir is this true that mk1 was sabotaged by army during its earliar trials ??
is it true that only after when it was pitted against t90 they saw it true potential and got interested in it ??
how many Tomahawks does each Arleigh Burke class destroyer have?
Should IN be interested in these type of super destroyer instead of buying frigates n corvets ?
India’s purported ICBM is named “Surya” and is believed to have a planned range of 12,000 km.
Is this true?
I think it is not required , the money is better spent on accelerating the R&D of 7500Km SLBM
sir can u write an article on y India still remains reluctant to ink bilateral pacts like the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum Agreement (CISMOA) and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation (BECA)
can u mention the merits and demerits of these bilateral pacts
thanks in advance
Is there any way that India can test TN Warhead without getting caught by the world.
@ Raviprakash
unless US let others know India tested a TN , no one will get a clue about that testing .
HI
TRISHUL
Great post! and incredible blog ! Very helpful post! I must say. Simple & interesting. Wonderful work!
thank you!
Hi Dashu & Raviprakash,
We can test TN warhead design without live testing. Currently this simulation testing capability is available only to USA and France.
Of these two the French LASER MEGAJOULE simulation program is the best one available. But access to it is extremely difficult to india.
But there is a rumor that by offering MMRCA to dassault france india has secretly inked a pact with france for accessing MEGAJOULE facilities for testing TN warhead designs.
for more information on MEGAJOULE please go to below link.
http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simulation_(programme_nucl%C3%A9aire)
Prasun da, can u please reconfirm whether whether it is possible to test TN design using MEGAJOULE?
If so , Do france allow india to access it?
Dear Prasun da,
Currently what is the maximum yield of Indian TN warhead.
To Spanky’s Blog/Swarop: VMT.
To Unknown: SPB trains at both Kakinada and at Chilka Lake. The Navy has its own training curriculum that is based on numerous visits conducted by Navy personnel to both Japan and the US since 2005 to observe multilateral combined-arms amphibious exercises conducted in these two countries. Indian Army expertise, therefore, it not required here. The Indian Army and Navy have till this day never conducted any kind of combined-arms amphibious warfare/assault exercises. All exercises done to date have only involved beach landings by Army personnel from naval vessels. And during such landings, no artillery assets were ever employed. Also, if you were to look at previous operations involving such beach-landings (like OP LAL DORA in the 1970s in Mauritius), these were nowhere like the kind of amphibious assaults staged by the likes of the USMC. Choice of crew-served weapons and clothing-colour depends on the type of terrain/topography over which future amphibious operations will be conducted. Therefore, one mustn’t leave out the OGs. Instead of F-INSAS, the SPB will have the Future Combat System. Marine formations have never been ‘elite’, though they’ve had integral ‘elite’ detachments. In the US the system is totally different in that in the event of any crisis, the first responders have inevitably been the US Navy’s Carrier Battle groups & the accompanying Marine Expeditionary Forces. But that does not make them ‘elite’ in any way. Of course once the LPHs and their integral hovercraft/air cushion vehicles are inducted into service, the SPB will be making use of them for expeditionary operations. Consequently, there will arise reqmts for MBTs, tracked AIFVs, light field artillery and attack helicopters. Therefore, T-90S-type MBTs, upgraded BMP-2Ks and BMP-T-type tank destroyers, along with 105mm field guns & 81mm/120mm mortars mounted on BMP hull, and LAH versions of the LCH. The masterplan for this was prepared in 2010 itself by Navy HQ.
To Anon@3.10PM: The Kashtan had severe performance deficiencies when operating in the waters around India. The problems were related to the fire-control electronics and they continue to linger. That was also one of the reasons Vietnam’s Navy preferred the PALMA over the Kashtan. For defence against both high-subsonic sea-slimming anti-ship cruise missiles & supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, neither the Kashtan nor the Barak-1 can be viewed as being suitable. They may be effective against P-20 Termit or AS-39/SM-39 missiles, but not against the MM-40 or Harpoon or C-802. On-board sensors of the Batch 2 Project 1135.6 FFGs have remained more or less the same as those of the Talwar-class FFGs.
To Anon@6.39PM: I don’t think so.
To Anon@11.54PM: The Indian Navy does not yet share the US Navy’s concept of staging expeditionary air-land campaigns and therefore there’s been no need to acquire Tomahawk-type LACMs. The only available LACMs are the ship-launched and sub-launched Novator 3M-14Es.
To KSK: No, it ain’t true. India will have true credible nuclear deterrence only after the deployment in future of long-range SLBMs and the SSBN that can carry at least eight such SLBMs.
To Anon@12.53AM: LSA & CISMOA are not that necessary, but the BECA is, although I personally have nothing against the LSA & CISMOA.
To Raviprakash: Live testing? No way.
To Anon@7.03PM: Most TN warhead designs can be validated by using simulation programmes like the French LASER MEGAJOULE. But there is reason to believe that such programmes have also been evolved and developed by the BARC for boosted-fission warheads. There’s thus no need to approach France in this matter.
To Deba2233: About 150kT.
HIPrasun
I am surprised when you say that the Barak-1 is not effective against the harpoon , mm-40 and c-802 unless the latter has a supersonic terminal stage
Please explain why. I was under the view that all subsonic missiles were not a problem for the barak-1
Mr Prasoon
You have said the following things
1. Saltoro Ridge is Irrelevant
2. BARC was NOT much Involved with INS ARIHANT
3. YOU have Nothing against LSA
and CISMOA
DO you REALLY expect that you have still Some Credibility LEFT
Prasun,
Can you show us any graphic illustration of INS Vikramaditya pointing out different electronics sensors/equipment, weapons/sam/ciws already/to be installed, like the one you did for Shivalik? Alreport so according to another INS Vikramaditya will have no air defense until 2017 just to save the cost. Is it true?
Thanks
Hi Prasun, i wanna know few things about the Mig 27.
1. How many MiG-27 are currently in active service with the IAF. We purchased and license procured around 160+ migs from USSR. Are all those in service with the IAF( barring those lost in accidents)
2. The IAF earmarks the mig 27 for lowlevel BAI sorties. Can it fly low level missions and navigate over complex terrain in adverse weather conditions when visibility is low.
3. Can the MiG-27 fly at night. Ofcourse the pilots are provided with NVGs. But it provides just to a distance. What is provided to get a picture of the terrain below?
4. A no of MiG-27 squadrons are deployed in the NE. The Ne suffers from bad weather conditions and is dotted with hills and undulating terrain. Also there is heavy fog.
in winter. During hostilites with China, the Mig 27s will fly interdiction missions against the PLA. How will it be able to navigate the complex terrain and fly through the Himalayas at low level.
5. How does the MiG-27 aquire and engage targets under obscure weather conditions, at night and all these from standoff ranges beyond the enemy's MRSAM and point SRRAM , AAA engagement envelope.
7.The entire MiG-27 fleet has been grounded due to lack of spares. So what the hell is the jv of HAL and UAC doing. Why isnt it providing the spares. Has the IAF solved the problem? How long will the fleet suffer?
Pls Try to reply.
how many Tomahawks does each Arleigh Burke class destroyer have?
Prasun,
how do you react to this article:
http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/After-20-years-R-amp-AW-upgrades-to-super-spy-jets/Article1-849802.aspx
It claims RAW'S ARC is set to only recieve 2 Bobadier spy a/c but you stated that the recent RFP for 9 such planes issued by IAF is actually for RAW ARC but with IAF as procurer only. If what you said previously is true why the need for this new and seperate tender? So will RAW get 11 such platforms then?
seems HTT-40 got some life saving shots
http://www.hindustantimes.com/Images/Popup/2012/5/03_05_12-metro1c.jpg
It seems R&AW bought 2 of these with Electronics from ELTA.....i think the Embraer 145 would have given some commonality.
wat will these Rec planes be used for?
To RAD: The answer is simple. The Barak-1 was never developed for intercepting ASCMs like the C-802 & MM-40 & Harpoon. That’s why in mid-2006 the Hezbollah succeeded in attacking an Israeli corvette with a shore-launched C-802. The best defence against incoming sea-skimming ASCMs is the IIR-guided missile system like the RAM, VL-MICA & AIM-132 ASRAAM. China too has developed a similar system like the FL-2000N.
To Anon@7.14PM: Infinitely more than your’s, rest assured.
To Shaurya: Will try to do so. By the way, the sensor inside the ‘drum’ on the island contains the tactical navigation aid for the carrier-based MiG-29Ks. For point air-defence, the Barak-1s will be installed AFTER the carrier arrives in India.
To Anon@11.06PM: 165 + 40 MiG-29Ms were acquired. About 140 remain in service. During bad weather/low-visibility the MiG-27Ms cannot get airborne fir low-level flight sorties. Flying at nighttime with NVG is done, but not for low-level sorties. For acquiring & engaging targets at nighttime when flying at medium altitudes, the Litening-2 LDP pod is used.
To Unknown & KSK: The two reqmts are separate. One concerns ELINT/SIGINT aircraft and the other concerns belly-mounted SAR-equipped boundary surveillance platforms. Both types of platforms will be used by RAW’s ARC, but will be flown and maintained by the IAF. But the two types of platforms have totally different mission profiles. The SAR-equipped Bombardier 5000s will be employed for monitoring the deployment of forces along India’s borders and for generating data for RAW’s national security threat assessments once every six-months. These platforms are thus the long-awaited replacements for the MiG-25Rs.
To Dashu: In all probability the HTT-40 project will be scrapped in favour of 75 + 106 PC-7 Mk2s.
if barak 1 was not developed to protect against c-802 type missiles.how is the navy planning to counter the proliferation of such missiles in our neighborhood.
how is the AK-630 different from phalanx ciws(the latter being closed loop,whatever the hell that means!!!)
Prasun,
Do we really need a 8000 Km SLBM or ICBM ? Instead of spending so much resources in this hugely expensive missiles. It will be much more economical to develop MIRV with Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS). Soviets developed this against US in the 70-80s.
There might be treaties banning weaponisation of outer space but should Nuclear weapons be used against Indian than treaties would be of least concern.
ISRO did demonstrate re-entry capsule technology couple of years back. We can use a SLBM launched FOBS MIRV with unlimited range cap.
Whats your next article about?
Good Post Prasun , its good to see Indian Naval professionals are held in high esteem by Russian counterpart and there is so much they have learnt from us.
Keep providing us good info , can you tell me the magazine from where this scan article was posted from ?
Thanks
Austin
Prahun @ April 30, 2012 2:34 AM
You wrote:
"If they had seen it, they then would never have written lies like: "direction of the CFL beyond NJ 9842 was unambiguously stated as ‘thence running north to the glaciers’. If you can lay your hands on these two agreements, you will notice that in NONE of these agreements is there any sentence which states that the LoC will run “thence north to the glaciers”."
It is obvious that you, yourself haven't read the Karachi Agreement 1949. Let me quote the relevant part:[Part II/B/2/d]
'From DALUNANG eastwards the cease-fire, line will follow the general line Point 15495, ISHMAN, MANUS, GANGAM, GUNDERMAN, Point 13620, JUNKAR (point 17628), MARMAK, NATSARA, SHANGRUTH (Point 17531), CHORBAT LA (Point 157000), CHALUNKA (on the SHYOK River), KHOR, thence north to the glaciers. This portion of the cease-fire line shall be demarcated in detail on the basis of the factual position as of 27 July 1949 by the local commanders, assisted by United Nations Military Observers. [ref. United Nations - Treaty Series]
The 'cease fire' line mentioned here later became 'Line of Control' or LoC via Simla Agreement, 1971.
If you want to be arrogant at least try to be correct.
Is it just me,or is the army carrying out a hell of a lot of exercises in western theater these days?
To Hoods: Firstly, for anti-ship missile defence, there is no standalone solution, and therefore Barak-1’s employment is only one of the few options. Secondly, the first warning of an inbound ASCM comes from the targetted warship’s ESM sensors, which can acquire those signals emanating from the hostile radar (shipborne or airborne) that is ‘painting’ the targetted warship. At this stage, offboard countermeasures are dispensed. If this doesn’t work, then the data-link providing mid-course updates to the ASCM and the terminal seeker of the ASCM are also both subject to directional jamming. Even if this doesn’t work, then the last course of action is the physical destruction of the ASCM by the Barak-1. Closed-loop system refers to a standalone system comprising the missile and its integral fire-control system, i.e. the fire-control system is meant to be used by only a particular weapon system, and is not shared by any other weapon (like the primary & secondary naval guns). Both the Barak-1 and the Tulamashzavod JSC-built A-213 Vympel-A point defence system are closed-loop systems. In case of the Barak-1, the suite comprises the missiles and EL/M-2221 STGR fire-control system comprising both the twin target illumination radars and twin optronic trackers, while the A-213 Vympel-A comprises twin AK-630M 30mm guns, twin MR-123-02 fire-control radars and twin SP-521 optronic trackers. Therefore, one can state that the Indian concept of last-ditch ASCM defence calls for the synchronised usage of both the Barak-1 & A-213 Vympel-A. However, it remains to be seen if such a concept can be called a ‘proven’ scheme of shooting down ASCMs, since this ‘scheme’ has yet to be test-fired by the Indian Navy against ASCMs like the Uran-E or 3M54E1 Klub.
To SK: I don’t think in today’s era one can go against international treaties/conventions. That being the case, the next best option is to go for a credible deterrent with robust retaliatory strike capabilities. If this is to be achieved, then developing a survivable SSBN-based arsenal of SLBMs is a must. No Indian nuclear deterrent will be credible for as long as the SLBM remains absent. And for that to happen India requires a fleet of no less than three SBBNs each capable of housing eight SLBMs equipped with MIRVs, plus at least nine SSGNs to protect the SSBNs. In fact, deploying a fleet of cannisterised road-mobile ICBMs & MRBMs will prove to be a far greater liability since the general area of their peacetime locations and their pre-surveyed launch-pads will always be known and will therefore be vulnerable to a ‘counter-force’ first-strike by the enemy, and the only way to avoid or neutralise that is to deploy a BMD network, which only adds to the cost of having a land-based n-deterrent.
To AUSTIN: VMT. The pages were from the in-house publication of Russia’s United Shipbuilding Corp, which was distributed during the trade show days at DEFEXPO 2012. This issue is a collector’s item since it contains several more pages detailing USSR/Russia-India cooperation in naval matters from the start till to date.
To Anon@8.01PM: If you want to be arrogant at least try to be correct and stop being economical with facts. For instance, where is there any mention of NJ9842 in the para that you copy-pasted from god-knows-where? And since when was the Simla Agreement inked in 1971? What you need to read is this:
On July 29, 1949 when the CFL was formally demarcated, the extreme (last) point to be demarcated was in Baltistan, valley of Shyok-river, and called point NJ 9842. From there on about a 75km stretch of snowy land leading up to the Chinese border was not demarcated for two reasons.
a) The area beyond the line consisted of glaciers, which were extremely difficult to map.
b) In the 14-month war, no fighting had taken place between the two countries in that area, and it was presumed by both countries that because of extreme weather, no fighting shall take place till the final settlement.
When the CFL was changed into a mutually accepted line of control (LoC) in October 1972 and was formally embraced by both India & Pakistan on December 11, 1972, the newly delineated line ran from the Shyok River west of Thang (a village) to Point NJ 9842 and ended there. The area north of it was once again left blank and open to encroachments by both countries. There were no lines drawn from NJ 9842 to any other direction. I therefore challenge you produce any document which states in black-and-white that after NJ 9842 there was a straight line or dotted line drawn by either country on the set of maps that showed the LoC.
To Anon@9.56OM: Not that many, in my view. Here’s the list:
Exercise Divya Astra (Divine Weapon) from February 21 to March 3, 2004
Exercise Vajra Shakti (Power of Thunder) from May 1 to May 10, 2005
Exercise Desert Strike from November 1 to November 14, 2005 (biggest since EX Brass Tacks of 1986-1987)
Exercise Sanghe Shakti (Joint Power) from May 3 to May 19, 2006
Exercise Ashwamedh (Valour and Intellectual Illumination) from April 29 to May 3, 2007
Exercise Shatrunash (Destruction of the Enemy) from May 11 to May 14, 2007
Exercise Dakshin Shakti (Southern Power) from March 3 to March 13, 2008
Exercise Hind Shakti from May 3 to May 6, 2009
Exercise Amogh Raksha in January 2010
Exercise Dakshin Shakti-II in February 2010
Exercise Vijayee Bhava (Be Victorious) from May 9 to May 14, 2011
Exercise Pine Prahaar from May 29 to June 2, 2011
Exercise Sudarshan Shakti from December 1 to December 15, 2011
Exercise Shoor Veer between March and June 2012
Hi, PRASUN thanx for answering offtopic. Have a few more doubts. If the MiG-27 cannot fly low level missions under all weather conditions then why dis the IAF went for such ac instead of Su-24 which is an all weather strike platform . The enemy will attack us whenever it wants to irrespective of weather conditions whereas the MiG-27 will not be able to do so. Cannot a mig -27 fitted with Litening 3 pod fly at low level over complex terrain and engage targets at bad weather and at night as it contains a 3rd gen FLIR and high resolution FLIR imagery of the terrain forward as well
as target of interest can be obtained and displayed in the HUD or head down display . Also can't the Flir map the terrain of interest from good standoff range (50 km). U said About 165+40 MiG-27 had been bought. So why only 140 are in service? Are the rest lost to accident or they are serving as attrition reserve ?
Can the Jaguars fly at low level under bad weather? Are they all weather strike aircraft . What improvements in strike capabilty, target aquisition and engagement does the DARIN 3 upgrade bring? Why aren't the Jaguars being fitted with multi mode radars to improve their capability?
Pls reply.
http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/05/02/a-savior-for-many-u-s-troops-struggles-to-find-a-home-in-a-changing-military/
May be we can buy some of them for cheap and employ them in naxal infested areas.....can those displayed by M&M , TATA recently match them?
Prasun,
What's the status of the Saryu class OPVs for the Navy and the Pipavav project for OPVs ?
Also, I notice that the EOFCS system from Elta has now made it to the whole Car Nicobar class, and to most Coast Guard XFPVS, IPVs and OPVs but what about the problems with the BEL Radamec EOFCS for the 76mm guns on the Samar class ?
To Anon@11.25PM: The MiG-27Ms were acquired as dedicated MBT-busters, and were meant to be used during daytime when the Indian Army’s T-72M/M1 MBTs would find it unbearably hot during daytime to operate in the Thar/Cholistan deserts. The MiG-27Ms’s secondary role is to attack hostile forward air bases with BAP-100 runway-cratering bombs, and lend close air support by dropping gravity bombs. Regarding all-weather operations, even the Su-24 or Su-30MKI or Jaguar is not up to the task. For only those combat aircraft that have an on-board multi-mode radar—especially with the weather scanning mode—can be truly labelled as all-weather combat aircraft. Only those aircraft equipped with AESA-MMRs can offer weather-scanning modes. Litening-2/3 are all targeting pods, and not navigation pods like LANTIRN. In addition, for seeing the FLIR imagery of the terrain ahead on a HUD, one requires a holographic HUD, which is not present on any existing IAF combat aircraft. No FLIR can map the terrain below, for that either terrain-mapping radars are reqd, or AESA-MMRs having a terrain mappinf operating mode are reqd. Those MiG-27Ms that are no longer in service had to be decommissioned as they had reached the end of their total technical service lives (TTSL). Had they been re-engined with the AL-31F turbofans, then their TTSLs could have been extended. The DARIN-3 avionics upgrade for the Jaguar will result in a far better man-machine interface, reduce the pilot’s workload, and will enable the Jaguars to make optimum use of the Litening LDPs. Installation of MMRs on the IAF’s Jaguars will call for extensive changes to the aircraft’s nose-section to not only accommodate the radar, but also its related environment control system. However, installation of a low-cost IRST sensor like the Skyward from Selex-Galileo is feasible.
To Anon@11.40PM: What’s the use of employing MRAPVs in naxal-infested areas—which are all in hilly and jungle terrain—when such vehicles can only be used in flat, open terrain or on wide roads, eliminating them from use in narrow and more rugged terrain? For combating the Naxals, what’s reqd most is an effective information-gathering network of the type created in Andhra Pradesh for the Greyhounds. The HUMINT should be backed up by tactical UAVs and mini-UAVs, 5-tonne multi-role utility helicopters plus long-range recce patrols of specialised CAPF personnel. In other words, dedicated counter-insurgency CAPF formations like the world’s largest existing counter-insurgency force—the 60,000-strong Rashtriya Rifles (equal to at least three infantry divisions). Had such a specialised force comprising the CRPF, BSF, Assam Rifles & Arunachal Scouts been raised since the 1990s, then by the year 2004 there would have been no need for Rashtriya Rifles, there would have been no need for raising four additional infantry divisions for the Army, and there would have been no need to enforce AFSPA in any insurgency-ridden area of India.
To SBM: The delivery of four 105.34-metre Saryu-class NOPVs is definitely behind schedule and over-cost. That was the reason why Pipavav won the contract for delivering five new-build NOPVs. Metal-cutting for the latter has already commenced. The EOFCS is not from ELTA, but ELBIT Systems. The problems are not with the EOFCS from ULTRA Electronics (which bought over Radamec), but with its integration with the NOPV’s combat management system (CMS). For unlike the dedicated shore-based systems integration facility now coming up at MDL, GSL has no such facility and consequently, systems integration is done at the laboratory-level by BEL. This in turn poses great risks since the wiring configurations &power-supply arrangements on board a vessel are distinctly different from what’s available in a laboratory. Therefore, once the CMS and all accompanying sensors & weapons are installed on board the intended vessel, there’s a lot of fine-tuning and engineering/electrical validation to be done, especially on the lead/first-of-type vessel, all of which is a very time-consuming process. Sometimes, even structural changes have to be resorted to for accommodating the reqd modifications & fine-tuning. It is for this very reason that the lead boat of any class of warship designed by the IN’s Directorate of Naval Design (DND) takes a long time to be commissioned. What complicates matters even more is the absence till this day within India of any independent body/agency/consultant that is reqd to undertake a technical audit of every warship design emanating from the DND. Consequently, the inevitable always happens, in which the DND is often at loggerheads with the Navy’s Directorate of Marine Engineering & Directorate of Warship Construction during a warship’s construction phase. Unless this mess is sorted out, warship production schedules will never be adhered to. Thus far, only shipyards owned by MDL and L & T have in-house facilities like virtual reality design labs and shore-based systems integration facilities. Pipavav plans to have one, but since its NOPV design has been outsourced from Russia’s Severnoye Design Bureau, it is deemed as a reliable product from a risk-management standpoint, something that cannot be said about the Saryu-class NOPV.
Thanks. What are the details of the Pipavav OPVs - armament, aviation etc ?
What's with the Samar class OPVs - there were problems with the FCS and main armament ?
On the plus side, the EOFCS turrets now seem to be everywhere !
Why hasn't the Coast Guard not ordered more Dhruvs ? I mean surely there is a place for them in SAR ?
To SBM: If you check out my threads on DEFEXPO 2012 you will see the illustration of Pipavav's NOPV. Armaments will be the same as that on the four GSL-built NOPVs. The problems with the GSL-built NOPV, as I had stated above, are related to systems integration issues. It is not for the ICGS to order Dhruvs. It is the IN that dictates the ICGS' hardware reqmts and if the Navy were to suggest procurement of Dhruvs for the ICGS, then questions will be raised about the Navy not ordering the Dhruvs for SAR as well, something the Navy wants to avoid because its list of priorities is totally different and as far as the Navy is concerned it is the procurement of 10-tonne MRHs that is most important. For replacing the Navy's existing SAR helicopters like SA.316B Alouette IIIs, the Navy wants a single-engined helicopter, not twin-engined models. That is why I've been trying to explain for quite some time now as to why the ICGS must have a DG from its own ranks, rather than being sent on deputation from the Navy. For as long as the DG of ICGS comes from the Navy, it is the IN that will dictate what the ICGS can and cannot have. Folks first need to understand the powerplay at the apex levels and how it influences the budgetary and procurement processes, before even going down to the details of what's reqd or not reqd for the ICGS. That's why there's a chirade being played out now about the IN requiring SAR amphibians, when it is crystal-clear that it is the ICGS that needs them far more.
Hi Prasun, what is the inventory of the ARC. I am talking about the intelligence gathering, recon , ELINT, SIGINT aircraft apart from the recent 2 Bombardier 5000. The ARC also have transport aircrafts for transport of personel of establishment 22. Arent the ELINT, SIGINT ac nt fitted with SAR for radar imagery? The 9 ac for Sigint, elint & the 2 ac fitted with SAR, are they meant for replacing the existing inventory. Inspite of all the existing high tech aircraft why cant RAW detect the presence of pakistani jihadis and pakistani intrusion in the Kargil sector. Pls ans. And why dont you write an article on the ARC , about its capabilities.
Thanks Prasun , Please post other interesting article from the Sevmash Book when ever you get an opportunity to do so.
To AUSTIN: Will do.
Hey,
TRISHUL
I am extremely thankful to find out these kinds of fantastic information becoming discussed openly online. Appreciate you for sharing these kinds of wonderful ideas.
Prasun,
In your opinion, which platform has a superior all weather strike capability - the F/A-18D with Nitehawk and late NAVFLIR pods or the Su-30MKM with Damocles?
What advantage is to be gained from having FLIR imagery displayed on a HUD as opposed to a display in the cockpit? Are any of China's Su-27s, J-11s and Su-30MKKs fitted with a holographic HUD?
What was the rationale in the RMAF getting Chobham refuelling pods, given the Su-30MKMS have sfficient internal fuel and that unlike the IAF, theRMAF will have no requirement for very long range strikes?
Are you still of the opinion that RAM and gun CIWS are incapable of engaging supersonic missiles? What about ESSM and ASTER 15?
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