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Tuesday, February 19, 2019

Aero India 2019 Highlights-1

Highlights of February 22
Highlights of February 21
I wonder who was the 'Genius' at HAL that conceived of the idea of showcasing a shipborne naval multi-role variant of the Dhruv ALH (above) with an executive seating layout!
Highlights of February 20
Looks like ADA has taken all my earlier recommendations quite seriously, if the maiden display of the Tejas AF Mk.2 MWF is to be believed!
The 23mm GSH cannon will be located on the red-coloured section between the canard and wing-rrot on the starboard side. Below is the Jaguar MAX being developed by HAL.
HAL is now also into turbofan-powered UAS platforms that can be remote-controlled by MRCAs!
ISRO this time has a sprawling pavilion, but its exhibits are extremely poor, scarce and there is no one to man this pavilion!
Miscellaneous Exhibits
The BrahMos-2 missile will have an X-band imaging monopulse seeker (below) developed and built by DATA PATTERNS, while a similar-looking Ku-band seeker developed by ECIL will go on-board the Nirbhay LACM.
Highlights of February 19
To Be Concluded

Saturday, February 9, 2019

LCA-AF Mk.2's Fuselage Design Details Emerge, Plus BVRAAMs, LRAAMs & ASMs Powered By SFDR

The release of global RFIs on January 19, 2019 by India’s state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) for the supply of three separate aircraft fuselage assembly jigs (one unit of each type) meant for fabricating the front, centre and rear fuselage sections of a single full-scale engineering-test model of the projected LCA-AF Mk.2 multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) is indicative of what the DRDO’s Bengaluru-based Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) had proposed back in 2014, and which can be viewed here:

It can thus be safely inferred that ADA has passed on the Design Applicability List (DAL) and Standard of Preparation (SOP) documentation to HAL for the full-scale engineering-test model of the projected LCA-AF Mk.2, which in turn will be used for optimising the design and location of the various mission avionics sub-systems/LRUs and related wiring harnesses, hydraulic pipings, accessories, and skin-level distributed apertures for sensors of the integrated EW suite, inclusive of radar warning receivers-cum-jamming emitters, laser warning receivers, and missile approach warning systems.

Simply put, jig-less assembly aims at reducing or eliminating the need for product-specific jigs during airframe assembly by developing new assembly concepts, models, tools and procedures. In the new concept of jig-less aircraft assembly, the end locators are replaced by transferring the holes directly on to the part. These holes are made by high-precision machines. In this approach, all the parts will have at least two holes so that one part can be assembled with the adjacent part. These holes are termed as ‘key holes’. In this method, the tooling elements (end locators) are eliminated and only the jig is used as the main assembly structure. This approach reduces the tool manufacturing time, reduces the product-dependent fixture and also increases the accuracy of the assembled product. It also results in a reduction of the number of tools and joints (rivets), and subsequently weight as well. And going hand-in-hand with jig-less assembly is the practice of using modular tooling solutions.
The most common tooling technology for aircraft assembly used today is conventional tooling consisting of steel beams that are welded together. Such toolings are tailored for a specific tooling operation. Since conventional tooling is designed to a specific application, each assembly has its own dedicated tooling, or product-specific tooling. In addition, when building a complex product like a MRCA, the final design is forced by changes that immediately affect the tooling design. This necessitates modifying the tooling/ locating holes or shimmed pick-ups to new locations. Hence, the preferred solution today is modular tooling, which is built for a dedicated purpose as well, but the surrounding system and distance supports are designed from a toolbox of modular components. The framework of modular tooling is screwed together. It thus helps in reducing the cycle-time of assembly, thereby enhancing the production rate. Modular tooling also helps to design jigs/ fixtures that will meet a group of components.
The front fuselage assembly jig for the LCA-AF Mk.2 will be made up of various modules like the composite radome, floor assembly, canopy, windscreen, starboard and portside air-intakes, twin canards, starboard and portside wing leading-edge root extensions. The assembly will comprise approximately 1,300 individual parts, out of which 40% are estimated to besheet metal, 30% being machined parts and the remaining 30% being made of carbon-fibre composites (CFC). The length of the assembly is 6,100mm, with a maximum width of about 1,100mm. The assembly will comprise 23 stations, and the entire assembly will weigh some 500kg. The component assembly will comprise the following attachment points: 1) Bulkheads for cockpit avionics 2) Nose landing gear pivot 3) Nose landing gear jack-point 4) Nose landing gear up-lock 5) Windscreen 6) Canopy 7) Wing leading-edge root extensions 8) Air intakes 9) Radome 10) Starboard side fixed air-to-air refuelling probe 11) Longerons 12) RLG-INS and GPS receiver mounting structure 13) Cockpit floor 14) Shear walls 15) Inclined bulkhead 16) Doors/hatches 17) Canards 18) Mooring points 19) Hauling points 20) Ejection seat brackets 21) Symmetry check-points 22) System installation brackets 23) Air data probes: Nose air data probe (NADP)/side air data probe (SADP)/Angle-of-attack/Angle-of- Side-slip (AOSS) locating points 24) Equipment bay housing the environmental control system (ECS), digital flight-control computer (DFCC), mission avionics, and an on-board oxygen generation system (OBOGS).
The centre fuselage assembly jig will be made up of modules such as: air-ducts and side-skins, spine, main landing gear bay, shear wall, fuel tanks, and a dividing wall structure. The assembly will comprise approximately 1,600 parts, out of which 40% will be sheet metal, 30% will be machined parts and remaining 30% are to be made of CFCs. The length of the centre fuselage is about 4,500mm with a maximum width of some 2,100mm. The centre fuselage assembly will comprise 15 stations and the it will weigh about 900Kg. Since the centre fuselage section needs to be coupled with the front and rear fuselage sections, the inter -changeability (ICY) media are critical. The centre fuselage assembly will comprise the following: i) Bulkheads 2) Trouser duct 3) Circular duct 4) Side-skin structure 5)Top-skin structure 6) Fuel Bay side-walls 7) Longerons 8) Shear walls 9) Doors and hatches 10) Fuel tanks 11) Main undercarriage 12) Spine structure 13) Wing pick-up points 14) Landing gear doors 15) Gun-bay structure (meaning the Gryazev-Shipunov GSh-23 cannon has been repositioned to the starboard side of the upper centre fuselage) 16) Lifting points 17) Other systems installation inter-changeability requirements 18) Symmetry points.
The Rear fuselage assembly jig will be made up of modules like the engine bay doors, spine and fin attachment, and brake parachute. This assembly will comprise approximately 900 parts, out of which 30% will be sheet metal, 40% will be machined parts and remaining 30% will be made of CFCs. The length of this section will be about 3,300mm with a maximum width of about 1,800mm. The rear fuselage assembly will comprise eight stations and the total shell-weight will be some 400Kg. The rear Fuselage needs to be coupled with the centre fuselage and hence the ICY media are critical. The assembly will include the following: 1) Bulkheads 2) Shear walls 3) Floors 4) Engine mounts 5) Doors 6) Wing attachment points 7) Covers/Hatches 8) Fin attachment points 9) Spine structure 10) Hauling attachment 11) Tie beam 12) Shroud 13) Trailing-edge extension 14) Elevon inboard actuator attachment 15) Symmetry points.
OEMs expected to respond to the RFIs will likely include Airbus Military Aircraft, BAE Systems, Leonardo Group’s Alenia Aeronautica subsidiary, Boeing, Dassault Aviation, Lockheed Martin, SaabTech and Russian Aircraft Corp. Subject to a contract award taking place by the year’s end, the three different assembly js will begin arriving at HAL by 2022, following which another three years will be required for optimising the design and location of the various mission avionics sub-systems/LRUs and related wiring harnesses, hydraulic pipings, accessories, and skin-level distributed apertures for EW sensors. Consequently, only by late 2026 will be it possible to roll out the first flying prototype of the LCA-AF Mk.2. Add to this 2,000 hours of flight-tests with four flying prototypes over a period of three years. So, for all intents and puposes, the LCA-AF Mk.2 will not enter series-production until 2030.
In another development, the successful ground-launch and flight-testing on February 8, 2019 of a solid-fuel ducted ramjet (SFDR) as the propulsion sustainer component that has been indigenously developed by the MoD-owned Defence R & D Organisation’s (DRDO) Hyderabad-based Defence R & D Laboratory (DRDL) for a futuristic beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM) meant to destroy hostile MRCAs, makes India the sixth country after the US, Russia, France, South Africa and China to have achieved success in this arena of rocket propulsion.
The DRDL-developed SFDR on the DRDO-developed BVRAAM, which is initially using the missile-body of the indigenously developed Astra Mk.1 BVRAAM, comes attached to a solid-fuel rocket booster to propel the BVRAAM to speeds at which SFDR can start operating.
The SFDR cycle is the same as the ramjet cycle except that the fuel exists in solid form within the chamber and the stoichometry of combustion is controlled by the regression rate of the fuel. The fuel is not a propellant in the solid rocket motor sense, but a pure fuel, inert without external oxidizer much like in a hybrid rocket motor. A wide range of fuels can be used from polymers such as PMMA or PE to long-chain alkanes such as paraffin or cross-linked rubbers such as HTPB. Because the fuel exists in the solid form, inclusion of solid metals is significantly easier than in a liquid-fuelled ramjet. SFDRs also offer significant advantages such as: Extremely simple compared with liquid-fuelled rockets or ramjets since, in its simplest form, a SFDR is basically a tube with a fuel grain cast in it; higher fuel density in the solid phase for pure hydrocarbons and even higher if metal additives are used; easy inclusion of metal fuels such as boron, magnesium or beryllium, which raise the heat of combustion and/or the density and therefore the density impulse capability compared with liquid ramjets; solid fuel acts as an ablative insulator, allowing higher sustained combustion chamber exit temperature levels (and hence specific thrust) with less complexity; fuel is stored within the combustion chamber, allowing for more efficient packaging and higher mass fractions than liquid ramjets; and no need for pumps, external tankage, injectors or plumbing for fuel delivery.
The earliest known SFDR Patent was filed in the US by Cordant Technologies Inc as far back as 1959. The patent can be viewed here:

While the solid-fuel booster rocket/SFDR combination has been a tried-and-tested means of propulsion, it has limitations of maximum engagement ranges against agile and manoeuvring targets like manned combat aircraft, which can bleed the energy of the BVRAAM. To improve terminal-stage manoeuvring, present-day BVRAAMs use multi-pulse solid-fuel rocket motors, with the second pulse-firing taking place only in the terminal stages after the BVRAAM’s Ka- or Ku-band active seeker has locked on to its target. The MBDA-developed Meteor BVRAAM was the first to do away with the need for multi-pulse solid-fuel rocket motors by incorporating a throttleable ducted rocket (TDR) version of a solid-fuel ramjet developed by Germany-based Bayern-Chemie. The TDR functions as an extended sustainer with variable thrust being generated by a solid propellant, but can sustain high thrust-levels for far longer periods since it acquires its oxidiser from the air. However, both BVRAAMs and LRAAMs using SFDR have a limitation: ramjet motors are heavier and take time to reach maximum speed in the initial phases, and are thus less agile. Consequently, BVRAAMs and LRAAMs using SFDRs will be less effective against agile MRCAs, but the LRAAM will be highly effective against lumbering combat-support platforms like AEW & CS aircraft and aerial refuelling tankers.
Elsewhere in the world, Russia’s Vympel JSC (now part of Tactical Missiles Corp) had by the early 1990s completed developing the SFDR-powered RVV-AE-PD BVRAAM, which hosts rear-mounted lattice-type aerodynamic control surfaces. However, this BVRAAM has not yet been series-produced.
Instead, Russia has opted for a two-stage solid-propellant rocket propulsion system for its Novator R-172S LRAAM.
In the US, Raytheon had in the 1990s developed a SFDR-equipped FRAAM variant of the AIM-120 AMRAAM. But like the RVV-AE-PD, the FMRAAM has not yet entered series-production.
Throughout the late 1970s and 1990s, Somchem of South Africa pursued R & D on SFDR-based propulsion under Project Integral, with the objective being to power both BVRAAMs and MR-SAMs (developed by KENTRON) using SFDRs. The latter, known as SAHV, was first displayed in 1995 with a rounded glass nose-section housing an IIR guidance system.  To avoid over-heating of the IIR seeker during the MR-SAM’s Mach 2.3 flight to its target, the SAHV’s nose-section was fitted with a cap that was jettisoned only in the final stages of the engagement.
Making its debut at the Airshow China 2018 expo in Zhuhai last November was the HD-1, China’s first anti-ship missile using a solid-fuel ramjet combustor and a SFDR—both developed by CASC’s No.4 Institute. Developed and built by the Guangdong Hongda Mining Co, the 2,200kg HD-1’s maiden flight-test took place in October 2018. The HD-1, like the still-classified YJ-18 anti-ship missile, employs a tandem single-stage solid-propellant rocket booster—as opposed to wraparound boosters to reduce drag—for missile launch and acceleration to a forward velocity suitable for efficient operation of the ramjet’s intake system, which comprises four air-intakes arranged in an ‘X’ configuration around the missile body. Tapered control surfaces are mounted on the intake housings near the nozzles. The HD-1 has a length of 8.3 metres, with a missile body and booster diameter of 375mm and 650mm, respectively. Cruise speed is quoted as 2,716kph, while terminal cruise speed being 4,321kph, with the missile cruising at altitudes of up to 15km (49,212 feet) and performing sea-skimming manoeuvres at altitudes between 16 and 32 feet. The missile’s maximum range is 290km.
Coming back to the DRDO’s efforts to develop a BVRAAM or LRAAM using SFDR, the principal challenge remains the development of an internal data-link that will receive targetting cues from a friendly AEW & CS platform, since the AESA-MMR of the MRCA launching such an LRAAM will not be able to detect or track hostile combat-support platforms flying at distances beyond 300km. Furthermore, if the LRAAM is tasked with the destruction of hostile combat-support platforms, then the LRAAM will have a launch-weight of more than 250kg. However, if the idea is to develop a BVRAAM like the Meteor, then a maximum engagement range of 150km will suffice, while the launch-weight will have to be kept down to 220kg at most.

Saturday, January 26, 2019

End Of A Sordid Chapter, While A New Positive Chapter Begins


On January 25, 2019, when India and South Africa on formally agreed on a three-year programme to boost their two-decade-old strategic partnership in key areas such as trade, defence, maritime security and information technology (the “strategic programme of cooperation” was announced by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and visiting South African President Cyril Ramaphosa after delegation-level talks at Hyderabad House in Delhi), it was indicative of formally ending a sordid and highly embarrassing fiasco, for which India’s UPA-1 government is the sole party to be blamed. Due credit for achieving such a success must also be given to the relentless and inexhaustible behind-the-scenes efforts of Ms. Ruchira Kamboj, High Commissioner for India to South Africa & Lesotho.
The needless fiasco was the creation of rival, offshore-based weapons import/export lobbies that was entirely successful for derailing for the next 13 years the growing India-South Africa cooperation in the arenas of military-technical and military-industrial cooperation that formally began in late 1995 when South Africa’s DENEL Group began cooperating with the Indian MoD-owned Combat Vehicles R & D Establishment for co-developing the ‘Bhim’ 155mm/52-cal tracked self-propelled howitzer (for which the CVRDE supplied the hull of the Arjun Mk.1 MBT while DENEL supplied and integrated the T-6 howitzer turret for/with the hull).
Fast-forward to June 1999, when against a requirement projected by the IA, the MoD concluded a contract with the NASCHEM subsidiary of DENEL in January 2000 for 7,300 rounds of 155mm illuminating rounds at a total cost of $11.98 million (Rs.52.47 crore). Subsequent audit scrutiny by the CAG revealed that:
(A) At the time of the induction of the 155mm/39-cal Bofors FH-77B towed howitzers in 1986, illuminating ammunition of only 18km range had been procured from Bofors. The requirement was changed in 1997 to 24km-range, which was then available only with NASCHEM, making it a single vendor situation.
(B) As against the rate of $1,440 per round inclusive of transfer of technology (ToT) for licenced-assembly by the MoD-owned Ordnance Factory Board (OFB), which had been contracted for by the MoD with the NASCHEM subsidiary of DENEL in 1997, the MoD contracted a rate of $1,641 in January 2000 (without ToT). The escalation of 14% over two years in US$ terms with no ToT rights appeared high and partly attributable to the weak negotiating position because of a single vendor situation.

(C) In the follow-up to the ToT contracted for in 1997, the OFB had taken steps to create industrial facilities for licenced-manufacture of the 24km-range illuminating rounds and reported in August 2000 that it could start production by December 2000. However, no orders were placed.

(D) Although the requirement was projected in June 1999, the contract was concluded only in January 2000, with the deliveries commencing only in May 2000.
Against a requirement projected by the IA mid-June 1999 for OP Vijay, a contract was concluded with Electronics Corporation of India Ltd (ECIL) in October 1999 for 67,000 electronic fuzes for 155mm artillery rounds and 400 fuze-setters at a total cost of Rs.81.59 crore. The fuzes were to be imported/assembled from components imported from the REUTECH subsidiary of DENEL. Approval of the Defence Secretary was obtained based on the technical offer of ECIL, which indicated that the fuzes would not be of a vintage earlier than 1994. As per the contract, the delivery was to begin in October 1999. After failing to adhere to this time schedule, ECIL made a request in November 1999 for the supply of one category of fuzes (M-8513) of 1989 to 1992 vintage being held by the South African Army as against the 1994 vintage indicated in the technical offer. The approval was communicated by ECIL to REUTECH in May 2000. Subsequent audit scrutiny revealed the following:
(A) The technical offer from the ECIL/REUTECH team had indicated that the M-8513 fuzes would have a minimum shelf-life of 10 years without deterioration when stored under controlled “arsenal magazine storage condition” i.e. 21 +/- 2 degree Celsius and relative humidity not greater than 60% and six months when stored in open terrain. However, based on the submissions made by ECIL during negotiations, the contract indicated a shelf life of 15 years. Therefore, in terms of the technical offer, the 6,118 fuzes of 1989 and 1990 vintage proposed in November 1999 to be supplied had completed their shelf-life and the balance 8,882 fuzes would be completing their shelf-life within the next two years.

(B) In fact, even before the MoD had accorded the approval to the proposal, the ECIL/REUTECH team had supplied 15,000 fuzes of 1989-1990 vintage in December 1999 and 95% of the contracted amount for these fuzes (Rs.17.27 crore) was paid to the team. The MoD was only able to withhold the balance 5% and negotiate it as a discount.

(C) The interest of the MoD was sought to be protected by obtaining a corporate bank guarantee worded in very general terms stipulating that the ECIL/REUTECH team would undertake to perform its obligations under the contract. No signed corporate guarantee was, however, available in the records of the MoD furnished to the CAG for auditing in April 2001. In this context, is is pertinent to note that ECIL is a company wholly owned by the Government of India and the final obligation would ultimately vest with the Govt of India itself.
(D) While the original approval was accorded by the Defence Secretary, being the competent financial authority, the decision for accepting fuzes worth Rs.17.27 crore of such vintage was taken by the Joint Secretary himself. In any case, the first lot of fuzes of the old vintage came only towards the end of December 1999. But since OP Vijay was over by August 1999, this merely resulted in transfer of old fuzes from the stockpiles of the South African Army to the IA at a cost of Rs.17.27 crore to the Consolidated Fund of India.
The MoD concluded a contract in July 1999 with the Mechem subsidiary of DENEL Denel for the supply of 100 NTW-20 Anti Material Rifles (AMR) and 1 lakh rounds of ammunition (14.5mm and 20mm) at a total cost of US$5.4 million (Rs.23.22 crore). Even though the AMR fell short of the range specified in the GSQR by 24% and there was no assurance regarding performance of the 20mm ammunition (which had only been designed for altitudes up to 6,500 feet ASL), the AMR and its ammunition were selected in view of the then-prevailing operational urgency (due to OP Vijay). The AMRs also did not have a carrying handle, open telescopic day sight and a compatible night-sight, which were recommended for inclusion in the contract by Indian Army (IA) Headquarters. Subsequent audit scrutiny by India’s Comptroller & Auditor-General (CAG) revealed that acceptance of the equipment could not serve the operational requirements of OP Vijay as the delivery of the first six AMRs scheduled within 15 days of the signing of the contract actually came only in December 1999, several months. Another 35 AMRs with 1 lakh rounds of ammunitions came only in March/May 2000. The balance came later. Audit scrutiny further revealed that the modifications pertaining to night-sight and carrying handle were never made in the contract. Inspection of the AMRs in June 2000 revealed that they had been supplied without the telescopic open sight and that the conversion kit for the 14.5mm barrel lacked accuracy. The AMRs were, therefore, not cleared for issue. The MoD stated in August 2001 that IA HQ had informed it that the Directorate General for Quality Assurance (DGQA) had cleared the NTW-20s for service-induction in November 2000.
Against an urgent requirement projected by the IA on June 17, 1999) for 155mm red-phosphorous rounds to gain the advantage of incendiary effects in addition to smokescreen-laying during OP Vijay, a contract was concluded in August 1999 with NASCHEM for 9,000 rounds at a total cost of $12.69 million (Rs.55.1 crore). A technical delegation of the MoD and IA had visited South Africa in June/July 1999 and cleared NASCHEM as a single vendor. The contract also envisaged free ToT to be finalised with the OFB. Even though the ammunition was projected as required for OP Vijay, the contract concluded on August 20, 1999 stipulated the delivery of the first 1,200 rounds only four months after the export licence was obtained by Pretoria, and the balance from six to nine months. However, the first lot of 1,200 rounds were received at the Central Ammunition Depot at Pulgaon only in June 2000, 10 months after OP Vijay was over and the inspections had not been completed as of October 2000. The MoD intimated that the delay was caused primarily due to problems in getting chartered ships through the Ministry of Surface Transport for the consignments. CAG audit scrutiny revealed that this issue had been raised by NASCHEM during negotiations in July 1999 and steps could, therefore, have been taken by the MoD in advance to arrange emergency transportation of at least the first consignment. Alternatively, the problem in shipping should have been considered before deciding to source this ammunition, which was required urgently.
On November 29, 2001 the SOMCHEM subsidiary of DENEL was contracted to supply the OFB with a complete ToT package worth Rs.2,160 crore for setting up an industrial facility by November 2005 at Nalanda in Bihar’s Rajgir district for licence-producing 800.000 bi-modular charges (BMCS) per annum. However, the MoD in April 2005 blacklisted the entire DENEL Group after unsubstantiated allegations that it had paid kickbacks to Vara Associates, a company based in the Isle of Man, to help secure five contracts from India between July 1999 and April 2005, to supply the IA with 1,000 NTW-20 AMRs and more than 300,000 rounds of ammunition. No irregularities were found during subsequent investigations in South Africa, the Isle of Man, Switzerland, India and the UK. By the time DENEL was blacklisted by the MoD for no discernable reason, SOMCHEM had already passed on the industrial know-how to OFB for producing the BMCS modules, while 400 NTW-20s had been delivered by MECHEM. The contracts with India involved the supply of 700 NTW-20s off-the-shelf, plus knock-down kits for another 300 NTW-20s (for licenced-assembly by the OFB’s Trichy-based factory) and 398,000 rounds of ammunition.
The OFB Trichy-assembled NTW-20s are now known as the Vidhwansak multi-calibre AMR and contrary to widespread rumours, they have not been indigenised. The same goes for the Mk.1 AGLs supplied by MILKOR of South Africa, which were licence-assembled by OFB Trichy, while their 40mm grenade rounds are still being supplied in kit-form to a dehra Dun-based private company for final assembly.
Meanwhile, in order to replace SOMCHEM, Israeli Military Industries (IMI) was contracted in March 2009 to partner with OFB Nalanda for a Rs.1,200-crore project for producing the BMCS modules. In addition, IMI was contracted to partner with the OFB’s It is also in a joint venture with the OFB’s factory at Khamaria in Madhya Pradesh to make 155mm cargo ammunition (howitzer-delivered cluster munitions designed to maim hostile infantry forces. However, IMI too got blacklisted by the MoD in 2011, following which the OFB’s Nalanda-based factory is now scheduled for commissioning only in March 2019, when series-production of the BMCS modules (whose industrial know-how from SOMCHEM has since been mastered by the DRDO’s HEMRL) will commence.
The MoD announced on September 6, 2018 that it had formally terminated the blacklisting of the DENEL Group after the MoD and the “South African side” signed a “final settlement agreement” on July 19, 2018 following a South African delegation’s visit to India between July 16 and 19 July of the BRICS Summit. In a statement the MoD said that its decision 13 years after it had blacklisted DENEL came after inking a ‘Settlement Agreement’ under which DENEL waived off nearly $100 million that it would have been entitled to after arbitration proceedings following DENEL’s blacklisting. So now, in the words of President Ramaphosa, DENEL is now looking at a “result-oriented” partnership with India. It may be recalled that the strategic partnership between India and South Africa was established in March 1997. DENEL is thus now well-positioned to bag the contract for military-industrial cooperation with the OFB’s Khamaria-based factory for producing 155mm cargo rounds. In contrast, Pakistan Ordnance Factories had in 2014 teamed up with France’s Nexter Systems for licence-producing such rounds, while NORINCO of China began producing such rounds earlier this decade. To date, the OFB has succeeded ion producing only the following types of 155mm rounds:

Yet another lesser-known fact is that the SaabTech-supplied AMLCD-based display processors, radar warning receivers, laser warning receivers and missile approach warning systems found on-board the Dhruv WSI/Rudra and the Light Combat helicopter are in fact originally developed and built in South Africa by AVITRONICS, which is now a subsidiary of Saab. These very sensors are also on board the Su-30MKMs of the Royal Malaysian Air Force, while the AVITRONICS-developed-and-built laser warning receiver is part of TATA Power SED’s offer to install them on the IA’s T-90S MBTs as parts of Saab’s LEDS-150 active protection suite.
In addition, the health-and-usage monitoring suite (HUMS) on board the Indian Air Force’s Su-30MKI H-MRCAs and Hawk Mk.132 AJTs too are sourced from South Africa. For further details about them, read this:
http://trishulgroup.blogspot.com/2009/05/hums-for-su-30mki.html