Is It Really CPEC? Or Is It China's Karakoram Corridor That Is Now Unravelling?-1

It was on June 2, 2004 that the US Department of Defense announced that the forthcoming simultaneous deployment of seven aircraft carrier strike groups (CSG) under ‘EX Summer Pulse 04’to demonstrate the US Navy’s ability to provide credible combat power across the globe by operating in five theatres with other US, allied, and coalition military forces. This was to be the US Navy’s first exercise of its new transformational operational construct, the Fleet Response Plan (FRP)—which is about new ways of operating, training, manning, and maintaining the fleet that results in increased force readiness and the ability to provide significant combat power to POTUS in response to a national emergency or crisis—all this being part of the US Navy’s ‘Sea Power 21’ strategy. Beginning in early June and continuing through to August 2004, the US Navy exercised the full range of skills involved in simultaneously deploying and employing its CSGs around the world. The exercise included scheduled deployments, surge operations, joint and international exercises, and other advanced training and port visits. Under the FRP construct, the US Navy is required to provide six CSGs in less than 30 days to support contingency operations around the globe, and two more CSGs can be ready in three months to reinforce or rotate with initially responding forces, to continue presence operations in other parts of the world, or to support military action in another crisis. The seven aircraft carriers involved in the exercise were the Norfolk-based USS George Washington CSG and the San Diego-based USS John C Stennis CSG (both deployed at the outset of the exercise); the Yokosuka-based USS Kitty Hawk; the Mayport-based USS John F Kennedy CSG (which began a combined and joint exercise early in June, followed by a scheduled overseas deployment); the Norfolk-based USS Harry S Truman CSG (which conducted a scheduled training exercise, followed by overseas operations with the Norfolk-based USS Enterprise CSG, beginning in early June); and the USS Ronald Reagan (which conducted operations in the US Northern Command and US Southern Command theatres during the ship’s inter-fleet transfer from Norfolk to its Pacific Fleet homeport of San Diego).

It was this unprecedented, combined show of multinational naval might that provided the spark for China to seriously contemplate the usage of land routes for trade and commerce, instead of relying solely on sea lanes of communications (SLOC). Back in 2004, China's economy was heavily dependent on foreign trade, 90% of which traveled by sea. China's near seas—the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea—are bounded by what Chinese strategists call the ‘First Island Chain’, a series of islands (many of which are controlled by US allies) that stretches from Japan to The Philippines to Indonesia. To reach ports on China’s eastern coast, seaborne trade from the west must now pass through maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca (through which 82% of China’s crude oil imports passed in 2013). Passage through these maritime chokepoints is secured by another country: the US, the world’s dominant naval power. The geographic enclosure of China’s near seas would thus make it relatively easy for an adversary to disrupt or interdict China’s SLOCs. China still faces many challenges in developing its ability to project sufficient naval power to safeguard seaborne trade as it passes through distant chokepoints. Instead, China must rely on the US to provide security of the sea-lanes. Although maritime security is ostensibly a public good, China worries that, as a potential peer competitor to the US, it will not always be able to rely on the US to protect its shipping.

Consequently, back in late 2004, Beijing conceived the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ in order to mitigate the risk of maritime interdiction by constructing transit routes along six land-based economic corridors: 1) The China-Mongolia-Russia corridor, anchored by the Trans-Siberian railway. 2) The New Eurasian Land Bridge, anchored by a set of railways running from central China (Wuhan, Chongqing and Chengdu) to Europe via Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus. 3) The China-Central Asia-Western Asia Corridor, passing through Central Asia, Iran and Turkey to reach Europe. 4) The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which would extend the Karakoram Highway, which already crosses the mountains between China and Pakistan, and build highway and rail links all the way through Pakistan to the port of Gwadar. 5) The Indochina Peninsula Corridor. 6) The Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor.

In all these corridors, China has since 2005 been enhancing existing transportation networks, constructing new roadways and building intermodal transport hubs and energy pipelines. Two of these corridors, the China-Mongolia-Russia corridor and the New Eurasian Land Bridge, will be entirely overland. They center on existing transcontinental railway lines and mainly focus on delivering relatively high value-added goods, such as consumer electronics, which are sensitive to rapid changes in demand. China will shift a small fraction of its total trade to these routes, providing an outlet for industries in China’s interior and giving the country a measure of insurance against naval interdiction. China will continue investing in port infrastructure along other corridors in the Belt and Road Initiative, particularly in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). However, China will find ways to link land and maritime routes, aiming to bypass the South China Sea chokepoints and minimise the distance of any single maritime leg of Chinese merchant shipping. For example, the CPEC could allow some China-made goods to travel overland to Pakistan before embarking for Africa and the Middle East at Gwadar. And of course, the Belt and Road investments will also serve to build political support for China. 

Crude oil represents almost one-fifth of the China’s energy demand. In the decisive year of 1993, the Middle Eastern and African countries, namely Oman, Yemen and Angola were among China’s most prominent crude oil suppliers. China’s foreign oil supplies from 1993 till 1999 originated between 40% and 61% per in the Middle East, and supplies from Africa accounted for up to 18%. Since 1995, countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, Angola, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Libya and Congo were among those which have supplied crude oil to China. CNPC had since 1996 invested substantially into Iranian, Nigerian and Sudanese oil fields.  By 2003, Sudan and Iran accounted for almost 7% and 14% of China’s imported crude oil stock,

In 2009 China needed almost 120 million tons to cover its domestic crude oil needs. By 2020, China will become the world’s largest nett importer of crude oil, reaching around 13 million barrels a day of nett oil consumption by 2035, which means nearly 80% of its crude oil consumption will depend on imported oil. In 2013, China overtook the US to become the world’s largest nett importer of crude oil and liquid fuels, and its total oil imports are expected to reach 9.2 mbd by 2020, nearly four times the level of 2005. Meanwhile, Chinese natural gas demand is growing fast, rising 11.4% last year to 163.4 billion cubic metres. China plans to boost the share of natural gas in its energy mix to 10% by 2020, from under 5% in 2010, in order to cut its dependency on coal, which now supplies 70% of its energy needs. Part of this will be met by China’s huge shale gas reserves, although large-scale production of shale gas isn’t expected before late this decade.

Trade between Iran and China soared from US$4 billion in 2003 to more than US$20 billion in 2009. By 2013, it had doubled to US$53 billion. Presently, China accounts for 25% of Iran’s foreign trade. In 2011, approximately 10% of China’s crude oil imports were from Iran. But CNPC’s rapid global expansion into easier operating environments reduced the need for it to push further into Iran. In 2012 China had cancelled a US$4.7 billion project to develop the South Pars gas field. An Iranian decree officially excluding CNPC from the $2.5 billion contract North Azadegan oilfield project’s Phase-2 near the Iraqi border came into force in April 2014. Iran’s oil reserves are one of the largest in the world after Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and Canada. The country is also home to 18% of the total natural gas reserves in the world. In the near future, Iran may re-award Phase-2 of the North Azadegan oilfield to China for development. CNPC and Iran’s PEDEC have already signed an initial agreement to produce 25,000 barrels a day from the field. CNPC had earlier also participated in Phase-1 of North Azadegan and had begun production of 75,000 bpd last October. China’s Sinopec Group and CNPC will had begin producing 160,000 bpd barrels from South Azadegan and Yadavaran in southwestern Iran from October 2016. Phase-1 of the Yadavaran oilfield will yield 85,000 bpd. Yadavaran, which Iran shares with Iraq’s Sinbad, was awarded to Sinopec about nine years ago in a US$2 billion deal to operate Phase-1 in July 2014 and raise recovery to 200,000 bpd in Phase-2.

In 2008 CNPC renegotiated a production-sharing contract to develop Iraq’s al-Ahdab oilfield, which it had previously entered into with the Iraqi government during the Saddam Hussein era. The new technical service agreement granted development rights to CNPC for 23 years. A year later, in 2009, CNPC combined with UK-based BP in a consortium that won the rights to develop the Rumaila field and to increase its output from 985,000 bpd to 2.85 million bpd. CNPC also formed a consortium in December 2009 with France’s TOTAL and Malaysia’s PETRONAS to successfully bid for the Halfaya field. The consortium’s plateau production target is 535,000 bpd. The Halfaya oilfield has estimated reserves of 4.1 billion barrels of oil. In May 2010 China National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC) acquired a stake in the Maysan oilfields along the Iraq–Iran border. Chinese companies have secured a significant foothold in the Iraqi upstream sector, with investments in roughly 20% of Iraqi oilfield projects. They have also signed deals that more than double Iraqi exports of crude oil to China, a process that started in 2013 as Baghdad lowered its export prices. In April 2014 CNPC gained its first upstream stake in the United Arab Emirates through a deal with its Emirati counterpart, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC). The deal is Abu Dhabi’s first concession deal with China, and highlights the UAE’s shift away from traditional Western international oil companies to Asian partners.

All in all, the Communist Party of China has constructed or invested in energy projects in more than 50 countries to date. This enabled Beijing to import approximately 60% of its crude oil supply in 2014 as well as about 32% of its natural gas supply. In 2011, China imported almost 5 million barrels of crude oil per day, of which almost 50% came from the Middle East, and 20% came from Russia. In addition, China’s imported crude oil from Africa totaled 1.23 mbd, which accounted for about 20% of China’s total imported crude oil. Presently, China imports at least 52% of its crude oil from the Middle East. Approximately 43% of this has to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, while 82% of all Chinese oil imports and 34% of LNG imports must pass through the Strait of Malacca. In order to minimise its dependence on SLOCs transiting through the Malacca Strait, China in June 2010 zeroed in on Myanmar for solutions. 

In late January 2015, Beijing opened a pipeline linking southwestern Yunnan to Maday Island, east of the coastal city of Kyaukpyu in Myanmar, and also began operationalising an oil tank farm accommodating 12 storage tanks. China National Petroleum Corp’s (CNPC) Huanqiu Contracting and Engineering Corp subsidiary built the 12 tanks, each with a capacity of 100,000 cu m. Total storage capacity is thus 1.2 million cu m, or about 7.6 million barrels. Maday Island, just 10 sq km in area with almost no other infrastructure, is also the origin point for both a crude oil pipeline for carrying 440,000 barrels per day, and a natural gas pipeline intended to ship 12 billion cu m annually to China’s land-locked southwestern province of Yunnan. The oil pipeline, costing US$2.45 billion to build—with US$1.20 billion coming from Myanmar and US$1.24 billion from China—starts in Maday, enters China at Ruili in western Yunnan province, then heads to Chongqing. It runs for 771km in Myanmar and 1,631km in China.  This 2,400km-long pipeline is bringing bring 23 million tons of Middle Eastern and African oil into China every year. In 2010, CNPC’s Yunnan branch started work on an oil refinery project in Kunming, designed to handle more than 10 million tons per year. The natural gas pipeline became operational in late September 2013. It brings gas from Myanmar’s offshore Shwe fields off the coast of Rakhine, a western state bordering Bangladesh, to Yunnan province. Myanmar has proven natural gas reserves of 2,540 billion cubic metres and crude oil reserves of 3.2 billion barrels. These two pipeline have saved 30% of delivery time, since the distance the crude oil and LNG from the Middle East and Africa has to travel by sea has been cut by 2,000km.

To Be Concluded

Let's End 2015 On A Sober Note

Despite the PLA Navy’s first aircraft carrier, the CV-16 Liaoning, received its first two Shenyang J-15 H-MRCAs on November 23, 2012, the J-15s to this day haven’t been flight-tested in fully weaponised modes and in the recent series of fleet exercises, the J-15s were once again seen armed with only PL-8 WVRAAMs and PL-12 BVRAAMs. No ASCMs, no ALCMs, no rocket-pods, no LGBs, no LDPs, and no gravity bombs either. Definitely, therefore, all’s not well with the AL-31F turbofan-powered J-15s, i.e. they are underpowered, period.

Here is a splendid video-clip of the J-15 during the recent fleet exercises that were witnessed by the PLAN Chief, Admiral Wu Shengli:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eJQG8jhiSsQ&hd=1

And below is a fairly accurate reportage of the challenges in turbofan R & D that both China and India are facing.

VVIP B.777-300ERs For IAF

Following the green-light from the Defence Acquisition Council last May, the process of buying back two Boeing B.777-300ERs from Air India for the Indian Air Force’s Palam-based Communications Squadron was recently completed, and by early next year they will proceed to the Bedek Aviation Division of Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), where they will be retrofitted with customised interiors (to be supplied by Germany’s Lufthansa Technik AG), as well as a state-of-the-art communications/self-protection suite of Israeli origin. The entire retrofittiong exercise involving the two B.777-300ERs and their consequent airworthiness certification as VVIP transportation aircraft will be completed by next October.

The to-be-retrofitted avionics suite’s architecture, called EL/M-2160F Flight Guard, will be installed and integrated by IAI, with ELBIT Systems Ltd, Israel Military Industries (IMI) and ORBIT Communication Systems being the principal sub-contractors. IAI/ELTA will supply the EL/M-2160(V1) radar-based MAWS (for detecting and tracking inbound radar-guided SAMs), while IMI will provide the chaff countermeasures dispensers for diverting such SAMs. For neutralising the threats posed by heat-seeking SAMs and AAMs, ELBIT Systems on December 16, 2015 was awarded a US$26.5 million contract to supply belly-mounted, conformal commercial multi-spectral infra-red countermeasures (C-MUSIC) suites. Based on Elbit Systems’ MUSIC family of directed Iinfra-red countermeasure (DIRCM) system for fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, C-MUSIC uses advanced fibre-laser DIRCM technology that is integrated with a passive airborne warning system (PAWS).

The secure SATCOM communications suite (incorporating ECIL-built encryption systems) will be ELBIT Systems’ InterSKY 4G multi-service, two-way broadband (voice, video and data) system that will be operable in the Ku and Ka bandwidths. The airborne VSAT antenna (AirTRx 60cm parabolic antenna) will be supplied by ORBIT Communication Systems.

To be retrofitted in future will be ELBIT Systems’ ClearVision enhanced flight vision system (EFVS) that covers the full flight envelope and overcomes extreme weather conditions and low-visibility situations in day and night.  Comprising TV, IR and thermal imaging sensors, and a HUD, this nose-mounted solution enables intuitive ‘out-of-the-window’ flying, minimises the dependency on airport landing aids, reduces landing minima and provides takeoff credit. The EFVS’ display fuses conformal flight guidance symbology with synthetic vision presentation and high-resolution video on a HUD. Using multi-spectral sensors to capture and display terrain and airport lights in darkness and reduced visibility, the sensors are combined and fused on the HUD, with a global terrain database (synthetic vision system, or SVS), functioning as a combined vision system (CVS). 

The CVS provides a high-fidelity view of the outside world even when actual visibility is zero and enables pilots to see the runway lights better, in conditions impairing the visibility of unaided approach. The different sensors help identify the profile of runway lights, and to penetrate atmospheric obscurants such as fog, clouds, rain, snow, dust or smoke. It also improves the pilot’s vision of both conventional floodlights and LED-based lights, which cannot be detected by conventional FLIR-based sensors. This dramatically improves the pilot’s ability to execute precision and non-precision approaches and safely land, thereby reducing the risks of controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) accidents.

From Varyag To Liaoning CV-16: The Untold Saga Of A 16-Year Journey

It was in late April 1970 that the PLA Navy (PLAN) had formed a team led by Admiral Liu Huaqing (who later became the PLAN Chief from 1982 till 1988 and was also a CMC member from 1988 to 1997) to explore ways of acquiring aircraft carriers. The Admiral later proposed that China build its own aircraft carrier, but Beijing throughout the 1970s and 1980s was wary of the idea, since such a project would raise the international community’s suspicions over China’s territorial ambitions. 

In any case, China at that time lacked the finances required for undertaking a mammoth R & D effort for developing such a warship and all its on-board sub-systems from scratch. Buying a ready-made vessel was a far more viable option, since this would help China save at least 15 years of cost-prohibitive R & D effort. Thus, when Ukraine officially invited China to bid for buying the Varyag in early 1992, the PLAN sent a delegation that included Maj Gen Zheng Ming, the then chief of the PLAN’s Naval Armament Department. On-site inspections at the Nikolayev South Shipyard in the Black Sea revealed that everything on-board the Varyag was completely new, and its eight turbo-pressurised boilers and four high-pressure steam-turbines (each costing US$20 million) were perfectly grease-sealed. The delegation recommended to the Central Military Commission (CMC) that the Varyag be procured, but Beijing was averse to this idea and declined the Ukrainian offer. For, with the USSR’s breakup and the Tiananmen Square crackdown of 1989 fresh in foreign minds, China’s then-President-cum-CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin was pursuing a US-friendly diplomatic line (such opposition lasted until May 7, 1999, when the US bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia).

It was only in April 1996 that the PLAN first approached 45-year-old Hong Kong-based businessman Xu Zengping, a former PLA basketball player of the Guangzhou Military Region and the owner of Chinluck Holdings (a Hong Kong-based company with interests in trading, catering, culture, entertainment, and property, among others) for help in procuring the Varyag without the official involvement of Beijing. In addition, two Hong Kong-based tycoons had been asked to help, but they declined to be part of this deal. Xu had by then made a name for himself by organising cross-border cultural events, and had also arranged for military troupes from the PLA, Russia and Australia to put on shows in Hong Kong in the 1990s. The PLAN officials, however, warned Xu of two major impediments: the PLAN was severely underfunded and there was no approval from Beijing for this endeavour. Despite such risks, Xu eventually decided to go ahead. Thus was born thee plan to procure the Varyag and it was hatched by one of the top PLAN leaders and was carried out in secret and in defiance of national policy at the time. The PLAN’s Vice Admiral He Pengfei and the then chief of PLAN’s military intelligence directorate Ji Shengde, were the backroom drivers of the covert deal.

Xu and Vice Admiral He met Xu six times before Xu finally agreed in March 1997 to be his proxy. Ji, the real boss behind the deal, came on board in late 1998 to coordinate operations behind-the-scenes. For executing the deal, Xu set up offices in Beijing and Kiev in mid-1997. The Kiev office was staffed by shipbuilding experts from stated-owned, Shanghai-based China State Shipbuilding Corp (CSSC) and the PLA’s Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND), some of whom had been sent by Beijing to Ukraine since 1992 to study the possibility of buying the Varyag. The Beijing office, on the other hand, was headed by retired senior Senior Colonel Xiao Yun, who had earlier left his position as deputy head of the PLAN’s Naval Aviation Armament Department, and was now tasked to issue instructions to the Kiev office.

Like Vice Admiral He and Ji, Senior Colonel Xiao is also a ‘princeling’ (his late father, Gen Xiao Hua, was one of the Communist Party of China’s revolutionary founders). Senior Colonel Zhong Jiafei, who was a senior project agency head of the CMC’s Arms Trading Company (ATC), was the middleman between Vice Admiral He and Xu (Zhong retired as deputy head of the PLA General Armaments Department’s foreign affairs bureau in the previous decade). ATC had been created on September 26, 1989, by the CMC’s then vice-chairman, Admiral Liu Huaqing (ATC is now owned by state-owned China North Industries Group Corp, or NORINCO). In addition, one Hong Kong-based business friend lent Xu HK$230 million in 1997 without any guarantee or collateral for initiating the process of buying the Varyag. In addition, a company headed by Admiral Liu’s daughter Helen Liu Chaoying became the major funding vehicle for the deal. In the 1990s, Helen was a senior executive of the state-owned China Aerospace International Holding Ltd (CASIL), a subsidiary of the state-owned space applications satellite developer China Aerospace Science & Technology Corp. Hongkong SAR-listed CASIL helped Xu put up the US$50 million demanded by Ukraine as a deposit in an international bank. CASIL’s two interim annual reports in 2007 and 2009 had stated that the company loaned HK$330 million in 1997 at 15% annual interest for two years to Chinluck Properties—Xu’s Hong Kong-based company. Chinluck used a 41,800 square metre block of land on Peng Chau as collateral for the loan. But subsequently, relations between CASIL and Chinluck soured. In June 2004, Chinluck sued CASIL, claiming that the latter only loaned it HK$251 million. The two parties settled the suit in 2007. Xu said it took 14 years but he finally repaid the HK$251 million debt in June 2011 with interest, and regained ownership of the Peng Chau-based property.

By early 1997, Ukraine wasn’t willing to sell the Varyag for refurbishment and re-use as a naval vessel to the PLAN, since it then was concerned about upsetting the US and the European Union. So Xu convinced Kiev that his objective was to convert the vessel into the world’s largest floating hotel-cum-casino. Consequently, in August 1997, Xu set up a Macau-based shell company, Agencia Turistica e Diversoes Chong Lot at a cost of HK$6 million. In early January 1998, Xu flew to Ukraine for contract negotiations, and he first set foot on the Varyag on the snowy and chilly day of January 28. A bargain-basement price of $20 million for not only the Varyag, but also for its design and engineering blueprints, was eventually agreed to. However, in mid-February, Ukraine decided to sell the Varyag through an open auction, since other parties from Australia, Japan, South Korea and the US were interested in purchasing the vessel as well, albeit these parties getting just three days to present their bids. This sudden change worked to Xu’s advantage and he emerged as the sole bidder to present a fully compliant bid. On March 19, 1998, Xu’s bid was declared as the winner and on the following day, Xu began ferrying the 40 tonnes of aircraft carrier design/engineering documentation and some critical manufactured sub-systems and components in eight truck-loads (that also included products like the UDAV-1M 254mm RBU-12000 ten-tube ASW mortar and its KT-153M launcher, plus a few sample mortar rounds) back to China. The consignment also included detailed documentation for building and operating an aircraft carrier deck simulator of the type that existed at (now called Novofedorivka) in the Crimea, plus those related to carrier-based fixed-wing aircraft/helicopter operations, design data on the Su-33 carrier-based H-MRCA, and the training syllabus for carrier-based flight-crew and aircraft/helicopter maintenance crew complements. The final payment tranche, including a $10 million late-charge, was made to Kiev on April 30, 1999.

Ukraine had earlier made it clear that it had no responsibility to ferry the Varyag from the Black Sea through to the Atlantic and onwards to its new homeport of Dalian in China’s Liaoning province. Consequently, Xu enlisted the services of The Netherlands-based International Transport Contractors to tow it all the way and on June 14, 1999, four months after the final payment, the Varyag’s all-Chinese crew and the ITC’s Sable Cape tugboat weighed anchor. It was plain sailing until they reached the Bosphorus Strait, Turkey's maritime boundary between Asia and Europe. By then, US-China relations had taken a downturn following the May 7 bombing of China’s Embassy in Belgrade during NATO’s air campaign throughout Yugoslavia. Consequently, Turkey, a NATO member-state and an ally of the US, refused permission to tow the Varyag through the Bosphorus Strait. The towing team waited a month, but Turkey was adamant and the Varyag had to be towed back to Nikolayev, where it languished for another 15 months before the tide turned in Xu’s favour. In April, 2000, when President Jiang Zemin visited Ankara, he promised to increase Chinese tourist arrivals in Turkey and to open up China’s markets to Turkish goods. In addition, Xu posted US$1 million performance  guarantee bond with Turkey for the towing operation. All these did the trick. On August 25, 2001, Ankara granted permission to have the Varyag towed through to the Mediterranean Sea. Turkish authorities closed the Bosphorus Strait on November 1 to let the Varyag and its escort of 11 towboats and 15 emergency vessels through. But sea-storms snapped the cables connecting the Varyag to the towboats. At one stage, the Varyag drifted unsecured for four days in the Aegean Sea near Skyros Island before the tugs were able to rein it back in. Subsequently, the Varyag inched its way across the Mediterranean Sea, through the Strait of Gibraltar, and out into the Atlantic Ocean. It rounded Africa’s Cape of Good Hope, navigated the Strait of Malacca and on March 3, 2002, five tugboats towed it into Dalian.

It was gratifying but bittersweet for Xu, who was left with a bill for port and towage costs. For, the US$20 million was just the Varyag’s auction price, and he had to foot the bill for another US$120 million for the deal from 1996 to 1999. The total cost of acquiring the Varyag had eventually worked out to more than US$30 million: $25 million to the Ukrainian government for the hull, nearly $500,000 in transit fees, and some $5 million for the towing. To raise this amount up-front, Xu had to sell his palatial home in Hongkong SAR (The Peak at 37, Deep Water Bay Road) in 1999 and mortgage his 280,000 square feet property on Peng Chau. Xu was saddled with the costs because many of the PLAN officials who had first approached him to take on the mission had either died or were in jail, and were therefore unavailable for lobbying on his behalf within the PLAN HQ or the CMC. For instance, Ji Shengde was sacked and given a suspended death sentence in 2000 for his role in a Fujian smuggling scandal. As delays and costs mounted, Xu had to liquidate more of his personal assets and also had to neglect his own businesses. He had to borrow from his acquaintances, including HK$230 million from one friend. He subsequently spent 18 years paying back the debt in full, with interest, with the last payment clearing in 2014. Xu had requested China’s State Council for years to be financially compensated, but Beijing ended up paying him only the $20 million auction price, and insisting that Xu would be compensated for other costs only if he provided expense receipts for project start-up and mobilisation costs, ferrying costs, and costs incurred for the meals, beverages, gifts and stacks of US dollar bills that were used by Xu and his team to buy over the involved Ukrainian parties/officials.

Significant Timelines

· Keel-laying of the aircraft carrier Riga (later called Varyag) at Shipyard 444 (now Nikolayev South) on December 6, 1985.

· On March 31, 1987, Admiral Liu Huaqing, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy commander (1982-1988), submitted an internal memo to the PLA Staff Headquarters and National Defense Technology and Industry Committee on developing the core strengths of the PLAN, which included developing aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines. the Central Military Commission in May 1987 initiated the first and only “Pilot Warship Captain Class” (feixingyuan jianchang ban) at the Guangzhou Warship Academy. The program selected the military’s most talented pilots to undergo surface warship vessels leadership training.

· Designed by the Nevskoye Planning and Design Bureau, the Riga is launched December 4, 1988.

· Riga renamed as Varyag in late 1990.

· Outfitting stops by 1992, with the ship structurally complete.

· A Macau-based company on March 19, 1998 wins the bid to buy the Varyag for $20 million. The following day, COSTIND personnel from China begin ferrying the 40 tonnes of aircraft carrier design/engineering documentation and some critical manufactured sub-systems and components back to China.

· One Su-33 carrier-based H-MRCA prototype aircraft (T-10K-3) is acquired from Ukraine in 2001, along with a fully functional UPAZ-1A buddy-buddy aerial refuelling pod (developed by Russia’s Scientific Production Enterprise Zvezda, or NPP Zvezda), both of which are subsequently back-engineered. The pod is back-engineered by China Research Institute of Aero Accessories Aerospace Life-Support Industries, an AVIC subsidiary.

· The Varyag takes six hours to cross the Bosphorus Strait escorted by 27 vessels, including 11 tug-boats and three pilot boats, 16 pilots and 250 seamen on November 1, 2001. At 11:45am on November 2, she completes her passage.

· Varyag gets caught in a force-9 gale and breaks adrift while passing the Greek island of Skyros on November 3. Sea-rescue workers try to re-capture the hulk, which is drifting toward the island of Evia.

· The hulk is taken back under tow on November 7.

· Varyag is towed through the Straits of Gibraltar, around the Cape of Good Hope, and through the Straits of Malacca. The tugs towing the Varyag maintain an average speed of 6 Knots (11kph) over the 15,200-nautical-mile (28,200km) journey, calling for bunkers and supplies at Piraeus, Greece; Las Palmas, Canary Islands; Maputo, Mozambique; and Singapore en route.

· Varyag enters China’s territorial waters on February 20, 2002.

· The vessel arrives on March 3 at Dalian in northeastern China’s Liaoning province and is moored at the Dalian Shipbuilding Industry Company (DSIC), which is owned by China Shipbuilding Industry Corp (CSIC).

· Ukraine provides marine propulsion technology in late 2002 to China’s Harbin Turbine Company for restoring the Varyag’s steam-boilers to fully functional configuration.

· A Zinc Chromate primer is applied to the Varyag’s main deck in early 2006 at Dalian.

· China expresses its wish to procure up to 50 Su-33s from Russia in early 2006, but wants to initially buy only two Su-33s for trials-and-evaluation. Russia refuses to make the Su-33 available for export.

· No.112 Factory of Shenyang Aircraft Corp, the 601 Institute (Shenyang Aircraft Design Institute), 603 Aircraft Design Institute (later named the First Aircraft Institute of AVIC-1) and the 606 Institute (Shenyang Aero-engine Research Institute) commence R & D work on developing the carrier-based J-15/J-15S ‘Flying Shark’ carrier-based H-MRCA versions in mid-2006.

· Designs of the J-15 and J-15S are frozen in July 2007.

· Production of the first J-15 and tandem-seat J-15S commences in January 2008.

· The first carrier-based J-15 H-MRCA prototype is assembled by October 2008.

· The Institute of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering of Zhengzhou (also known as 713 Institute) in 2008 succeeds in back-engineering the UDAV-1M 254mm RBU-12000 ten-tube ASW mortar and its KT-153M launcher (both designed by the Kolomna-based KBM Machine-Building Design Bureau and built by Russia’s ‘SPLAV’ Federal State Unitary Enterprise State Research & Production Association) and the 111CZG ASW mortar round. Series production of these cloned products is undertaken by the 2^nd Machinery Factory in Baotou, Inner Mongolia.

· The Varyag is moved in late April, 2009 from its pier to a dry dock about 2 miles distant.

· At the Wuhan Naval Research Institute/711 Institute or the China Ship Design Institute, the PLAN in 2009 embarks on building a full-scale deck and island mock-up of the Varyag next to Lake Huangjia near Wuhan.

· A new PLAN air base located at Xingcheng, 28km southwest of Huludao on the shore of the Bohai Sea and 300km north of Qingdao, is constructed between April 2009 and June 2010 to house two ski-jumps each inclined with a 12-degree up curve) and barrier arrested (STOBAR) facility, and 24 carrier-based H-MRCAs, and also serve as the PLAN’s premier naval aviation training facility.

· Brazil and China in mid-2009 sign a contract under which PLAN personnel are to be trained on-board Brazil’s aircraft career NAe Sao Paulo.

· The first J-15 prototype, powered by two Russian AL-31F turbofans, makes its maiden flight on August 31, 2009.

· The J-15’s first takeoff from a land-based simulated ski-jump occurs on May 6, 2010.

· Installation of weapons suites on board the Varyag takes place in April 2011.

· The PLA’s Chief of General Staff Staff, Gen Chen Bingde, confirms on June 7, 2011 that China’s first domestically designed aircraft carrier is under construction.

· Ministry of National Defense spokesman, Senior Colonel Geng Yansheng, states on July 27, 2011 that China is using an old aircraft carrier platform for scientific research, experiment and training.

· The refitted Varyag begins her first sea-trial in the Bohai Sea on the morning of August 10, 2011 after an eight-year-old refitting process.

·  Gen Ma Weiming, a professor at the PLA Naval University of Engineering, states on April 28, 2012 that Chinese engineers are trying to develop an electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS) for China’s future aircraft carriers.

· The 990 feet-long Varyag is commissioned into service as CV-16 Liaoning on September 25, 2012. The pennant number denotes the 16 years that were spent in procuring and refitting the vessel.

· Liaoning sails out in early November, 2012 for sea-trials.

· The first J-15 bolter trial on the Liaoning takes place on November 20, 2012.

· The vessel receives its first two Shenyang J-15 H-MRCAs combat aircraft on November 23, 2012. The two J-15s undertake the official takeoff and landing trials on November 25, 2012.

· In early 2013, the Liaoning enters its home-port at Dazhu Shan, 30km southwest of Qingdao in Shandong Province. The port occupies a water area of a few million square metres, with a maximum depth of more than 20 metres and a fairway that is several hundred metres wide. It is protected by a breakwater that extends almost 10,000 metres into the water.

· In mid-2013, the Changxingdao Island-based shipyard (owned by Shanghai-based Jiangnan Shipyard Co Ltd) begins hull construction of the PLAN’s first of six 22,000-tonne Type 081 helicopter carriers (LPH).

· The Liaoning makes its first visit to the Yulin Naval Base on Hainan Island in September 2013. This is its maiden voyage to the South China Sea.

· The Liaoning CV-16 sails with two Type 051C guided-missile destroyers and two Type 054A guided-missile frigates as escorts to the South China Sea on November 24, 2013 for a scientific and training mission. The convoy arrives at Yulin on November 28, 2013. It takes three days and nights sailing 1,500nm to reach Yulin at an average speed of 20nm/hour.

· In mid-January 2014, Wang Min, a Communist Party secretary of Liaoning province, tells delegates at the 12^th Provincial People’s Congress that the first indigenously built aircraft carrier is under construction at DSIC and would take six years to complete. Wang adds that the PLAN needs a total of four aircraft carriers by 2020.

· US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel on April 7, 2014 becomes the first foreign visitor to take a two-hour tour of the Liaoning.

· Construction of a 700 metre-long docking pier for the Liaoning is completed at Yulin. The pier’s construction had begun in 2012.

· Admiral Liu Xiaojiang, formerly a political commissar of PLAN; Vice Admiral Ding Haichun, a deputy political commissar of PLAN; and Rear Admiral Ma Weiming, a PLAN expert in “naval propulsion and electrical engineering” confirm in March 2015 that the first China-built aircraft carrier—Type-001A—would be a medium-sized vessel in the 53,000-ton range and its construction has been underway since 2013 at DSIC.

· China is expected to launch the Type-001A, on December 26, 2015 to mark the 122^nd birthday of Chairman Mao Zedong. Last August, President Xi Jinping had visited DSIC to inspect the progress of work on the Type-001A.