Pakistan Navy's Project S-26/Type 032 Qing-Class & Project S-30/Type 032 Qing-Class Submarines

China’s R & D programme to develop the double-hulled Project S-26/Type 032 Qing-class and Project S-30/Type 032 Qing-class SSK submarines—all to be powered by China-developed Stirling Engine air-independent propulsion systems—was begun in January 2005. 

The first and only S-26 was launched at Wuchang Shipyard in Wuhan in September 2010, and it completed its harbour-trials by September 2012. Its sea-trials commenced on October 16, 2012 in the Bohai Sea. The S-26 has a length of 92.6 metres, width of 10 metres, hydroplane width of 13 metres and a height of 17.2 metres. It has a draught of 6.85 metres when surfaced with a displacement of 3,797 tons. It operates at a submerged depth of 160 metres, but can dive as deep as 200 metres. Maximum surfaced speed is 10 Knots and maximum submerged speed is 14 Knots. It can operate with a crew of 88 for 30 days without resupply, or 200 crewmen for three days.

The S-30 will have a submerged displacement of 6,628 tons, and will be armed with four vertically-launched Babur long-range land-attack cruise missiles and two submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), most likely the upgraded JL-1 SLBM. Construction of the first S-30 is presently underway at Wuhan. Deliveries, however, will not commence until 2020 at best.  

The S-26 and S-30 submarines are being developed by China solely for the Pakistan Navy, and they will not enter service with the PLA Navy. The Pakistan Navy will procure four S-26s and four S-30s. China will also supply Pakistan with a submarine rebuild centre (SRC) that will be located at Ormara, and a VLF communications facility that will be located at Turbat. Deliveries of the S-26 submarines will begin by 2017.

Taking The Final Call On What Was Originally Proposed By France On February 20, 2006

Chronology Of The M-MRCA Procurement Saga

* Indian Air Force (IAF) formulates its Air Staff Qualitative Requirement (ASQR) for medium multi-role combat aircraft (M-MRCA) in the late 1990s.

* Request for Information (RFI) for 126 M-MRCAs, with an option for another 63, issued in late 2001. 

* Dassault Aviation offers to supply 40 Rafale M-MRCAs to the IAF in a single-source G-to-G deal. The offer is made by Charles Edelstenne, the then CEO of Dassault Aviation, when he calls on the then Minister of State for Defence Rao Inderjit Singh in New Delhi on February 20, 2006. The IAF’s then Deputy Chief of the Air Staff Air Marshal A K Nangalia is also present at this meeting. Edelstenne is part of the entourage of the then visiting French President Jacques Chirac.

* Issuance of a Request for Proposals (RFP) was planned for December 2005. However, the formal 211-page RFP is released only on August 28, 2007. The RFP contains single-stage two-bid system criterion (separate quotes for the technical and for commercial evaluation forming part of the submissions from various concerned OEMs). Bidders are given a time-frame of six months to respond to the RFP by March 2008. The RFP includes a direct industrial offsets obligation of 50%, raised from the original official requirement of 30% as contained in the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) Defence Procurement Procedures of 2006. The RFP states that the IAF will initially acquire of 86 single-seat and 40 two-seat M-MRCAs, and retain the option to acquire another 63 M-MRCAs at a future date. Of the 126, 12 single-seaters and six tandem-seaters are required to be supplied off-the-shelf in flyaway condition, while the remaining 108 are to be licence-built in India. This will include 74 single-seaters and 34 tandem-seaters, of which 11 will be built from semi-knocked down (SKD) kits, 31 will be built from completely knocked down (CKD) kits, and 66 made from indigenously manufactured kits (IMK).

* By late May 2009, the IAF’s Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) concludes its technical and staff evaluations of the RFP responses from the six bidders.

* Sequential in-country flight evaluations of all six contenders begin in mid-August 2009 and continue through to May 2010. Two teams of IAF test-pilots conduct the flight evaluations at Bengaluru, Leh and Jaisalmer. Besides possessing cold-weather terrain, Leh is a high-altitude location, while Jaisalmer is a desert area where hot winds blow. Planning for the trial schedule began in early 2009, with the IAF test-pilots being trained at the respective bidder’s country of origin to fly the aircraft, under Phase-1. Phase-2 calls for flight-trials in Indian airspace and in Phase-3, the six M-MRCA contenders are run through a series of tests to check the efficacy of their guided-munitions by firing them at firing ranges located within the respective bidder’s country of origin.

* All six flight evaluation reports, duly vetted by the Technical Oversight Committee (TOC), are completed by mid-July 2010.

* In April 2011, the IAF shortlists Dassault Aviation’s Rafale and Eurofighter GmbH’s EF-2000 Typhoon.

* On January 31, 2012, the MoD announces that the Rafale has been selected as the IAF’s new-generation M-MRCA and estimates that contractual negotiations should be completed by October 2012 by the MoD’s Commercial Negotiations Committee (CNC) after receiving approvals from the Competent Financial Authority (CFA).

* On April 10, 2015, the Govt of India formally requests both the French government and Dassault Aviation to supply on a G-to-G basis 36 Rafales (32 single-seaters and four tandem-seaters) as soon as possible, subject to contract negotiations for these 34 Rafales being successfully concluded within a 90-day period. Concurrently, supplementary contracts will be inked with SNECMA Moteurs for two spare M88 turbofans, with Dassault Aviation for ground-support hardware for first- and second-line MRO, with THALES for a cockpit procedures trainer and a full-flight tactical training simulator, with MBDA for the guided-weapons package, and with Dassault Aviation for a maintenance training simulator.

Eventually, in the fullness of time, the IAF will end up with 189 Rafale M-MRCAs. That's a given. But the negotiations had got stuck over the cost of licenced-production of the 108 units. India was haggling over the labour cost parameters that are graded from 1 to 10. While the Russians had obtained Grade 6 for the Su-30MKI licenced-production programme, the French were asking for 8, while the Indians wanted it to be limited to 7. So, in the end, a compromise was struck under which India would order 36 Rafales off-the-shelf without any offsets of any kind and the French in turn would tone down their stance & come down to 7. Therefore, in nett terms, the French have won and India’s illogical negotiating shortsightedness (from 2012 till now) has been fully exposed. And NaMo too has realised at last that there are clear technological and human resource limits to how far the ‘Make in India’ mantra can be flogged. And this deal for 36 Rafales was conceived entirely by Union Finance Minister Arun Jaitley and was fully endorsed by the PMO. Everyone else was in the dark on this issue. If 153 Rafales can be similarly ordered in successive tranches, then that will be the ideal solution. Because paying an exorbitant price for the so-called licenced-production of Rafales just to keep a few thousand employees of HAL gainfully employed for the next 20 years DOES NOT stand up to logic. Nor does such licenced-production lead to self-reliance of any kind anywhere. Far better therefore to utilise the money saved for the Tejas Mk2/LCA (Navy) Mk2 R & D effort, where at least 80% indigenisation can be expected in all domains except for the propulsion system.

‘Make in India’ For Rafale Has Already Begun

As for those ‘desi’ journalists claiming that the off-the-shelf procurement/s of the Rafale M-MRCA will pose a huge setback to the Govt of India’s ‘Make in India’ industrial promotion policy, the poster below shows just how totally wrong these ‘desi’ journalists are. They obviously did not do their homework during the Aero India 2015 expo last February!  

Ukraine-Origin Products On-Board Su-30MKI

When the Soviet Union dissolved in late 1991, Ukraine was left with about 30% of the Soviet-era military-industrial facilities on its territory, including about 750 factories and 140 scientific and technical institutions. Presently, 300 enterprises, institutions and organisations  employing more than 250,000 people are producing military equipment in Ukraine. Of these, 75 are registered as manufacturers of military products and services that are subject to state secrecy, including rocket and guided-missile technologies. 

The state holding company Ukroboronprom, established in 2010, oversees 134 Ukrainian state-owned military-industrial enterprises that employ 120,000 workers. Ukraine exports the rest, in the amount of US$1.3 billion worth of arms annually, which made Ukraine the eighth-largest weapons exporter in the world between 2009 and 2013. Ukroboronprom’s sales reached US$1.79 billion in 2013, an increase of 17% in 2012. Russia was the third-largest buyer of Ukraine-origin military hardware from 2009 to 2013, after the PRC and Pakistan. 

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, Ukroboronprom decided to halt all exports of weaponry and military-industrial hardware to Russia, whose outstanding orders from Ukraine in the civilian and defence sectors were at that time valued at more than US$15 billion. Terminating these contracts has adversely affected 79 Ukrainian and 859 Russian military-industrial firms. Ukrainian exports represent only a small fraction—between 4% and 7%—of Russia’s overall military imports. The number of buyers of Ukraine’s nuclear and ballistic missile technologies is fairly small but includes the PRC, North Korea, Syria, and Iran. PRC and North Korean agents have on several occasions been caught attempting to break into YUZHMASH for trying to acquire long-range ballistic missile technologies.

Ukraine’s total arms exports have been growing steadily, from US$20 million in 1994 to US$600 million in 1997 and US$1.5 billion in 2001. In 2002 the Industrial Policy Ministry of Ukraine and China’s Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) signed a protocol on cooperation in the military-industrial arena. Ukraine’s present-day weapons shipments to China in 2002 amounted to a mere US$50 million a year.  In 2002, Ukraine became the world’s fourth-largest weapons exporter and sold weapons and military technologies to China worth US$700 million, which accounted for 31% of Ukrainian exports that year. In 2011, 43% of Ukraine-built weapons were sold to the PRC, while in 2013 Ukraine became the PRC’s second-largest trade partner in the CIS, while China became Ukraine’s biggest military customer in Asia.

Walkaround Of 5.54-tonne Zhi-10 (WZ-10) Thunderbolt Attack Helicopter Of Pakistan Army’s Aviation Corps

The WZ-10 was originally designed by Russia’s Kamov OKB, and was subsequently developed by the PLA’s 602nd Research Institute, Changhe Aircraft Industries Group (CAIG) and China Helicopter Research and Development Institute (CHRDI).

Guidance system: semi-active laser

Launching platform: attack helicopters, UAVs

Effective range: 2,000 metres to 7,000 metres

Diameter: 170mm

Length: 1,775mm

Weight: 47kg

Hit probability: no less than 88% within effective range

Warhead: Tandem HEAT

Penetration: 1,400 mm/0°

Stabilised EO sight

TV detection range: 10km

TV identification range: 8km

Thermal imager detection range: 6km

Thermal imager identification range: 5km

Ground laser illuminator

Maximum illuminating range: 6km

The Great Aero India 2015 Tamaasha

On February 18, when Shri Narendra Damodardas Modi becomes India’s second ever Prime Minister to inaugurate the Aero India expo (the first was Shri H D Deve Gowda), he, accompanied by Defence Minister Shri Manohar Parrikar and Minister of State for Defence Shri Rao Inderjit Singh, can be expected to view both the aerobatic demonstrations by both home-grown and foreign platforms as well as visit those exhibition halls housing the exhibits of India’s Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSU) as well as those of the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO). It remains to be seen if the expo organiser—the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) Defence Exhibition Organisation (DEO)—will take the assembled VVIPs to view the exhibits of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). In case the VVIPs do make it there, this by itself will constitute a grim reality check. Why so? Because traditionally, the booth—itself left segregated in an insignificant corner inside a makeshift exhibition hall—is largely left unmanned. Anyone familiar with ISRO’s exploits and achievements will indeed find this hard to believe or digest, but this has been a fact of life for far too long! One therefore can only hope that NaMo takes stock of this and demands urgent remedial measures from the DEO. 

Let’s now venture into the expo proper: although it has been hailed as an aerospace expo, Aero India has traditionally been strictly for military aviation. Why? Simply because the DEO has no idea about what exactly constitutes the aerospace industries and markets. Consequently, no one from the DEO bothers to canvass abroad for participation by the space agencies and OEMs from countries like the US, France and Russia. Similarly, you won’t find any reputable foreign MRO service provider, nor any original equipment manufacturer (OEM) producing commercial aircraft interiors, galley equipment, avionics, in-flight entertainment systems, etc. etc. Likewise, if anyone thinks that the expo will play host to OEMs for airport ground support hardware or aerobridges, he/she will definitely draw a blank. Of the 328 OEMs from 33 countries participating in Aero India 2015, the US will have the largest representation with 64 companies, followed by France with 58 companies, the UK with 48, Russia with 41 and Israel with 25. Although the total number of foreign companies participating has risen sharply from 212 in Aero India 2013 to 328 this year, rest assured that 99% of them will be hawking their products for off-the-shelf purchases.

Participation by Indian exhibitors, which has risen from 156 companies in 2013 to 266 this year, will be accounted for mostly by the DPSUs and DRDO laboratories, with only a tiny sprinkling of MSMEs. For the very first time there will be participation from three states—Karnataka, Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh—that wish to attract foreign OEMs setting up shop in their territories. 

Suggested Reality Checks

Here are a few questions that NaMo and Shri Parrikar ought to ask their Mod-owned DPSU hosts if and when they visit their respective pavilions:

Why has the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) consistently shied for a full decade now away from obtaining EASA airworthiness certification for the Dhruv ALH?  

Why has the Indian Army’s Aviation Corps not yet raised its first squadron of the ‘Rudra’ helicopter-gunship despite taking delivery of the first such helicopter back in February 2013?

What is the Dhruv ALH’s percentage of claimed indigenisation by weight, by volume, by cost, and by technological content? This is because imported equipment may constitute only 20% of the platform by weight and volume, but could account for as much as 80% of the cost and technology content.

Similarly, what will be the claimed indigenisation by weight, by volume, by cost, and by technological content of the HAL -developed Light Utility Helicopter’s (LUH) and Light Combat Helicopter’s (LCH)?

Which entity—HAL or the DRDO’s Aeronautical development Agency (ADA)—should be primarily responsible for commercially marketing the Tejas family of multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA)? And this is why I’m asking this question: If a certain customer, let’s say Egypt, is interested in procuring the Tejas Mk1 MRCA’s tandem-seater version configured as a lead-in-fighter trainer (LIFT), but it wants to procure the aircraft with non-Israeli multi-mode pulse-Doppler radars, helmet-mounted displays and laser designation pods, which entity should be held accountable for delivering the customer-specified end-product: HAL, the aircraft manufacturer, or ADA, the aircraft designer-cum-systems integrator?

Which OEM supplies all the synthetic resins that are used for fabricating all the co-cured composite airframe structures for the Dhruv ALH, LCH, LUH and the Tejas MRCA? Is the OEM a ‘desi’ one?

Why does India still need to import Ni-Cd batteries for the Tejas MRCA, Dhruv/Rudra ALH, HJT-36, Mi-25 and Mi-35P platforms, as well as for the Searcher Mk2 and Heron UAVs?

Why has no one in India ever thought about devising indigenous alternatives to imported weapons ejector racks/pylons for platforms like the Dhruv/Rudra ALH and Tejas MRCA?

Why has the DRDO failed to develop chaff countermeasures kits for both fixed-wing and rotary-winged manned military platforms?

If the hybrid RLG/GPS-based inertial navigation system developed by the DRDO’s RCI laboratory has been successfully flight-tested numerous times on board different types of ballistic and cruise missiles, then what prevents it from being used on-board platforms like the Tejas MRCA and LCH?

When will the fully functional DRDO-developed Rustom-1 MALE-UAV begin entering service? Why has the DRDO failed to adhere to the original service-entry deadline of late 2013?

Why has the DRDO failed so far to develop COMINT and ELINT payloads for both the Rustom-1 and Rustom-2 MALE-UAVs?

Why does the DRDO-developed Ku-band synthetic aperture radar (SAR) occupy twice as much space volume as that of the in-service EL/M-2055D SARs delivered by the ELTA Systems subsidiary of Israel Aerospace Industries?

Does the DRDO possess any technological roadmap for developing a family of airborne AESA-MMRs? Or has it restricted itself to developing only the ‘Uttam’ AESA-MMR for the projected Tejas Mk2/LCA (Navy) Mk2 MRCA when, worldwide, established OEMs and developers of AESA-MMRs are busy introducing newer mission-specific applications, such as the EL/M-2022ES that can go on-board both UAVs and manned maritime surveillance/ASW platforms?

Will the MoD insist on procuring left-hand-drive TATRA heavy-duty trucks from BEML for mounting the DRDO-developed and BEL-built S-band Arudhra MPRs and Ashwini MRSRs? Or will the MoD ensure a level playing-field by soliciting competitive bids from both BEML and India’s private-sector truck manufacturers?