In December 2009, SUARAM filed an initial suit against X at the Paris court for “active and passive corruption, trading of favours and abuse of corporate assets”. The state prosecutor Jean-Claude Marin then opened a preliminary investigation. At the time, it was suspected that a bribe of 114 million euros had been paid by the company Armaris (a subsidiary of DCNI and Thalès) to the Malaysian Prime Minister Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Razak and his entourage, through the company Perimekar Sdn Bhd. This company, which was officially established to “coordinate” the sale of the three submarines, had Abdul Razak Baginda’s wife as its majority shareholder. However, in the suit filed in December 2009, the plaintiffs argued, that in light of the way the company operated: “There is no doubt that this legal entity [Perimekar] was created with a single goal: to organise the payment of commission and distribute the amount amongst the different beneficiaries--Malaysian officials and/or Malaysian or foreign intermediaries”. However, this contract was signed after the OECD Convention came into force in France in 2000, which punishes corruption of foreign public officials with ten years’ imprisonment and a 150,000 euro fine. Following this complaint, a preliminary investigation was conducted by French prosecution agencies. Hearings were conducted and searches were made at the premises of DCNS and THALES. Revealed in September 2008, the notebooks of Gérard-Philippe Menayas, former chief financial officer of DCN, who was indicted in the Karachi case (involving the sale of three Agosta 90B SSKs to Pakistan), also confirm the suspicions of hidden commissions. In his memorandum, Menayas mentioned the Malaysian submarine contract as follows: “Since the entry into force of the OECD Convention regarding the fight against corruption in September 2000, only two contracts have been signed; the first with India, and the second with Malaysia in 2002. These two contracts are the result of commercial actions undertaken prior to the OECD Convention’s entry into force. Furthermore, they are both suspected of non-compliance with this Convention. I have evidence to support this”. At the time of the contract’s signature Alain Richard was France’s Minister of Defence, in Lionel Jospin’s government (socialist party). With the Malaysian indictment, and the revival of this case, new items have been contributed to the case by the plaintiffs. First, according to sources cited by the plaintiffs, it was not the company Armaris that paid 114 million euros to Perimekar, but rather the Govt of Malaysia, “with the sole purpose of circumventing the OECD Convention”. This is a true revelation, while the Malaysian Minister of Defence has since ended up ‘confessing’ to the payments made by foreign companies to Perimekar. Where did this money go? Were there retro-commissions to French politicians? Secondly, there does not appear to have been a single commission, but rather three. In addition to that of 114 million euros, there are two further installments:
• one paid by the DCNI to the commercial networks of THALES, for over 30 million euros, corresponding to “commercial fees relating to the negotiation and execution of the contract”;
• the other for 2.5 million euros.
However, according to Gerard Philippe Menayas: “Until the OECD Convention against corruption came into force in France, no contract for the sale of defence equipment to an emerging country could take place without the payment of commissions to policy makers (euphemistically called “commercial fees for exports” or ‘FCE’)”. The second commission was paid by THALES to a recipient, who remains unknown, in order to convince the Malaysian government of the need to conduct additional work. Finally, according to the complaint filed by the firm Bourdon, SUARAM’s lawyer, the company GIFEN, which was established by Jean-Marie Boivin in Malta, intervened in the negotiations “so as to facilitate the money transfers in this case,” and particularly finance the trips of Abdul Razak Baginda and Altantuya Sharribuu. The ‘catch’ is that Jean-Marie Boivin is also cited in the Karachi case... for his role in the system for supplying slush funds to political parties.
Chronology Of Events
June 5, 2002: Malaysian government signed an agreement with French DCNS and Spainish Navantia for the procurement of two (2) Scorpene-class submarines. The procurement contract was through direct negotiation with the manufacturing companies, said to be with the service of Perimekar Sdn Bhd. According to the Government explanation, the contract was divided into two parts:
a. Cost of two Scorpene SSKs together with the package that covers Integrated Logistic Support and training amounted to Euro 969.15 million (however on May 14, 2008, then Defence Minister Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Tun Razak told the Parliament that this part cost Euro 999.15 million).
b. Payment to Perimekar Sdn Bhd in the name of “coordination services” for a period of six years, the sum was Euro 114.96 million. It is widely believed that payment for the second package was in reality the commission for Najib/Rosmah through Abdul Razak Baginda as the owner of Perimekar. With the exchange rate at the time, the cost was equivalent to:
1) Payment for submarine cost between: RM2.14 billion (Euro=RM3.2 in 2002) – RM5.43 billion (Euro=RM5.6 in 2008) (now Euro=RM4.7)
2) Commissions: probably about RM540 million (exchange rate at the time of payment)
July 26, 2006: The Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) announced that these vessels will be named after the first and second prime ministers. The first hull will be named KD Tunku Abdul Rahman and the second hull KD Tun Razak.
October 24, 2007: The first vessel, KD Tunku Abdul Rahman, was launched by then Defence Minister Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib on at the DCNS dockyard, Cherbourg, France. (According to Sharribuu, Altantuya was in France with Najib during the launch).
September 3, 2009: The first Scorpene SSK, KD Tunku Abdul Rahman, arrived at a Port Klang naval base after a 54-day voyage from France. The second of the series, KD Tun Razak, was scheduled for delivery in late 2009. However it only arrived in mid-2010.
February 10, 2009: It was reported that KD Tunku Abdul Rahman could not dive due to technical faults. RMN sources admitted that the defect had prevented it from diving for three months. However the Govt of Malaysia claimed that the problem was fixed in early February and it was allowed to undergo tropical water trial since then. As a result, submarine builder DCNS extended the warranty for the submarine, which was supposed to expire on January 25, 2010, until May 2010 so the submarine could complete its trials as the first step to obtaining its Initial Operational Capability (IOC).
May 25, 2010: KD Tunku Abdul Rahman’s warranty expired.
July 2, 2010: KD Tun Razak, the second Scorpene SSK, arrived at the Lumut RMN Base. It was more than six months behind schedule.
July 7, 2010: Marhalim Abas of the Malay Mail again reported that Malaysian submarine crews had remained on dry land since the first arrival due to continuous problems of KD Tunku Abdul Rahman; the crews risked to lose their submarine rating for unable to participate any trial dive. Both submarines are now parked at Sabah’s Sepanggar Bay Naval base, to date neither of them had undergone the necessary tropical water trial dive.
What is the actual cost of the Scorpene submarines?
The agreement signed with DCNS/Navantia cost Malaysian taxpayers Euro 1.08 billion (with Euro 114.96 million commission for Perimekar). Nonetheless, we later found out that the price did not include many items. What are the missing items that need additional payments?
Maintenance services: Malaysian government had awarded a contract to the joint venture company Boustead-DCN Bhd (BDCN) as the services provider for the submarines’ maintenance. Until today the cost has not been finalised. Nonetheless, in June 2009 Boustead Heavy Industries in a statement to Bursa (Stock Exchange) Malaysia informed that the government had expressed an intent to award a contract worth RM600 million to its joint-venture unit for in-service support for submarines.
March 2010: Defence Minister Dr Ahmad Zahid Hamidi clarified that for the first year’s maintenance would cost about RM270 million and the annual maintenance cost will be capped at RM600 million per year for both SSKs.
December 2009: Defence Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi announced an additional contract worth Euro37.5 million (about RM150 million) for the supply of Support and Test Equipment (S & TE) for the two Scorpene SSKs.
June 22, 2010: The Defence Minister answered a parliamentary question in which he revealed that the government has paid Euro219.265 million (about RM890 million) for 40 units of Exocet SM-39 missile and 30 units of Black Shark torpedo, to be delivered by 2013.
Infrastructure cost for submarine base in Sabah?
Training for crews, support staff etc?
Grand total (rough estimate):
Hardware: two Scorpene-class SSKs: RM5,430 million
Commissions in the form of services by Perimekar: RM540 million
Package for simulation and training, S & TE: RM150 million
Weapons: 40 SM-39 Exocet missiles and 30 Black Shark torpedoes: RM890 million
Total: RM6.98 billion
Maintenance services (under negotiations): RM270 million (first year)/RM600 million (maximum)
Money spent to date: RM7.3 billion. If RM600 million is added for maintenance, then the total jumps to RM7.58 billion (for 3 years).
59 comments:
how is our Scorpene Submarine Procurement Project going
Prasun,
Isn't 40 Exocets and 30 Blacksharks a bit too much for just 2 boats? For 2 Lekiu class frigates with 32 cell Seawolf VLSs, exactly 32 rounds were bought.
how many Exocets and Blacksharks IN is getting
To FARIS: The number of Black Sharks is fine but the number of SM-39s sounds excessive.
To Anon@1.42PM: IN has ordered 36 SM-39s. Black Sharks have not yet been ordered.
To FARIS: By the way, Malaysia didn't buy two, but three submarines, the third being the Agosta 70 SSK which was used for training in France and which is now being brought to Melaka for conversion into a museum. The total goes up to five if the two ex-Dutch SSKs bought by Business Focus Sdn Bhd are included.
Prasun,
You mentioned that the 2 boats are parked at Teluk Sepanggar. Are you saying that they're not operational? Both have taken part in 2 exercises recently.
It's funny but even though they were old and would have required a major upgrade, the Zwaardis and Tigerhaai, if operated by the RMN, would have been more useful, having more range and endurance, plus more internal volume to carry more sensors and weapons. Do you have any idea if they are quieter boats than the Scorpenes though?
Prasun,
There was an incident recently PLAN frigate] and one last year [fisheries department ships] in which Chinese ships were near Layang Layang but later moved away after the MAF deployed surface and air assets. What do you think is the purpose of these ''visits''? Are they meant to test Malaysian reaction times, make a political statement or maybe these were simply the work of overzealous or bored Chinese Captains? Photos of these ships being escorted out by RMN ships have appeared on Chinese blogs. More dangerously, what would happened if in some time in the future, such ships refuse to leave even after being ordered to do so?
Dear Sir
Please answer my question
Some Chinese in Some Forums BOAST about A very LONG RANGE ROCKET ARTILERY That they say can touch DELHI
Is it true ?
What is the MAXIMUM Range of MBRL that is available anywhere in the world
To FARIS: Parking as in home-ported. The secondary submarine base is in Langkawi. Of course they are operational, in fact the RMN has even proposed that since there is spare capacity available, Indian Navy personnel can undertake some conversion training on board these two SSKs. Compared to the two ex-Dutch SSKs that were optimized for deep-sea patrols, the Scorpenes are optimised for shallow water patrols and since they’re made of the same steel as that used for SSNs, the Scorpene’s diving depth is more than those of any other SSK. That gives an added element of survivability and stealth. On top of that the RDM shipyard had almost a decade ago stopped building SSKs and therefore product-support would have been almost non-existent. The Scorpene can be extremely stealthy if the MESMA AIP module is on board. But for me the larger issue is this: does the RMN really require SSKs? Especially when there are other greater priorities, such as replacing those warships that have far outlived their usefulness, at least two acquiring LPDs and up to 12 multipurpose guided-missile corvettes, and procuring medium-range maritime recce/ASW aircraft. In addition, the MMEA needs to be strengthened ASAP since the MMEA came into being too late (it should have been created by the mid-1990s). Therefore, overall, the RMN’s SSK procurement plans could have waited till RMK-11.
AS for PLAN vessels come too close to Pulau Laying Layang, they’re only testing the RMN’s reaction times and intent at the moment. The day the PLAN’s oceanographic survey/surveillance vessels (600-tonne catamarans) are spotted near the islands, that’s when things will have to be taken far more seriously since such moves will be indicative of the PLAN’s intention to send warships to these shallow waters. Then, there will be no other choice but to install a marine surveillance/target illumination radar and some warships equipped with MM-40 Exocets in that area.
To Anon@7.13PM: Rocket artillery owned by the PLA’s 2nd Artillery Corps includes ballistic and cruise missiles as well, and not MBRLs. Therefore, it is the PLA’s 2nd Artillery Corps (and not the PLA Army, PLA Navy or PLA Air Force) that owns and operates ICBMs, MRBMs, IRBMs, TBMs and LACMs. Therefore don’t assume wrongly that the term rocket artillery includes only MBRLs and NLOS-BSMs.
Prasun,
I totally agree with you, the procurement of additional MRCAs , UAVs, MPAs and LPDs should have come first before SSKs. An instead of blowing away millions, a APC should have just been bought off the shelf, as this would have made more sense than the decision to customise the Pars.
Just to clarify something - apart from reducing the need to snorkel, does AIP actually make a sub quiter or more stealthy? A lot has been written about AIP but in reality it does not transform an SSK into super ''uber'' SSK and there is a reason why navies like the JMSDF and others have been slow at jumping into the AIP game.
Given that the RMN has a huge coastline to cover, and that some of its operating areas are in deep waters - Sulu sea and parts of the South China Sea, wouldn't a slightly larger sub have been more useful? With a larger sub, not only do you have more endurance and range, you also have more internal volume to accomodate weapons/mission sensors, special forces, etc.
Given that there are only 2 subs and that ensuring 1 is ready for deployment at all times is a major challenge, how can there be time to offer anyone training slots on the 2 Scorpenes?
You mentioned that the Scorpene can dive deeper than other SSKs. According to HDW because higher grade steel is used for the Type 214, it can dive deeper than the Scorpene. The only SSKs that come closing to having U.S. Navy SUBASAFE standards in build quality, damage control/hull integraty, etc, are the Collins class. According to DCN, HDWs fuel cell is not ''safe'' and is problematic as specialised facilities will be needed for refueling, unlike MESMA which uses standard gear available at any port.
A recent statement by our joke of a Defence Minister has indicated that the MRCA programme has been postponed yet again.
Hi Prasun,
Is this true that the range of Indian missiles reported in India is with Maximum Payload..? Are we deliberately under reporting the range..
I read in missile tests their maximum range and then the test only shows the missile covered 200-300km. Doesn't anyone need to let it travel the full distance to ensure that the missile will indeed reach its maximum range?
Regarding Project-75I Program ... it costs about 12 Billion $$
That is each submarine costs $2 billion i think its too expensive given The Virginia class SSN costs 2.1 Billion dollars
Explain what India will get from this project??????
To FARIS: AIPs make use of chemical reactions for energy release to drive the generators and turbines, as opposed to diesel engines using pistons for internal combustion, and therefore AIPs generate no noise, thereby dramatically reducing the acoustic signatures. The JMSDF was the first to introduce AIPs in the Asia-Pacific region by adopting the Stirling engine concept, and it was followed by Pakistan (MESMA), South Korea (fuel cell-based AIP), Singapore (Stirling), and China (fuel cell-based AIP). A larger for the RMN would have translated into the need for submarine tender vessels for replenishment at sea. However, the Scorpenes are optimized for operations in littoral waters and therefore they will not venture out into the open seas for extended durations. The Scorpene of today accommodates more firepower and ELINT/SIGINT sensors than the Collins-class SSKs, and the latter is a disaster for the RAN. Also, since the Scorpene’s hull design is derived directly from those of French nuclear submarines, DCNI has the expertise reqd for building SSK hulls with greater diving depths. German shipbuilders do not have such experience. Fuel cell-based AIPs do require specialised refuelling facilities, but the advantage is such AIP modules are smaller and more efficient and therefore the Chinese, Russians and Germans have all embraced fuel cell-based AIP solutions for SSKs that are smaller in size compared to the bigger SSKs of Japan, Singapore and Pakistan, which have the internal volume required for fitting other AIP solutions. Regarding the RMAF, a far better solution for the M-MRCA would be to upgrade the existing MiG-29Ns to the MiG-29SMT standard, as the Indian Air Force has done. Such upgraded MiG-29s could also make use of the Phazotron JSC-built Zhuk-AE AESA-based multi-mode radar, which will bring the aircraft on par with the F-15SGs of the RSAF.
To Saurav Jha: Regarding strategic missiles like RBMs, IRBMs and MRBMs, the ranges with max payload are never under-reported, as that would nullify the very essence of strategic deterrence.
To Anon@3.20PM: That’s why a floating range is coming up near the Andaman & Nicobar island chain, which will enable the MRBMs and IRBMs to be tracked by over-the-horizon radars out to their maximum ranges.
To Shree: The Project 75I programme is not just a procurement programme, but a submarine-building programme by a new shipbuilder which will involve the construction of shore-based submarine construction infrastructure. That explains the additional cost. I personally would therefore stick to MDL building six SSKs of a design which too comes from DCNS, as this will not only save non-recurring costs, but will also ensure swifter deliveries. But the most worrisome aspect of this deal remains the court proceedings that are currently underway in France about the issue of retro-commissions paid by ARMARIS to secure the submarine deals in Malaysia and India. Even if the case involves Malaysia, a lot of dirt involving the Indian Scorpene deal is also bound to come out sooner rather than later. Thus far, only those who benefitted from the previous NDA govt have been pit behind bars, while those allied to the present UPA govt who benefitted financially from the deal have yet to be unmasked and are now roaming scott-free. That story has yet to break out in India and I wonder what the ‘desi’ journos have been doing about it so far, or why are they still quiet about it. That is the main reason why I gave the details above for the Malaysian Scorpene contract; the idea was never to delve deeper into any matter of corruption associated with the procurement of Scorpene SSKs for the Royal Malaysian Navy.
Prasun,
Thank you for your insight.
You mentioned the RMN Scorpene has better ELINT/SIGINT sensors than the Collins. But would you agree it has a much more better or comprehensive sonar suite - a hull sonar, flank array and towed sonar - than the Scorpene which due to costs, has reportedly only a very basic hull mounted active/passive sonar?
A major headache now for RMAF is that Boeing has indicated that it needs an order fast as production of the SH will soon cease. The RMAF, I've been told is still very keen on the Super Hornet, due to having a good experience with its 8Hornets. It is also less than happy with it's MKMs - you heard anything about this?
sir,
an off topic question and i might sound childish but couldn't refrain my self from asking.....as you know there was a missile test today(agni 2) and i want to ask whether these missiles are capable of being launched in very bad weather conditions like heavy rain or high turbulent wind conditions(also so in case of our anti ballistic missiles) and if they r indeed capable of that then how come they r not tested in such conditions to validate such capabilities.......thanks in advance if my question is answered.....
^^^^^^
and sir,i don't think i have ever seen
any pics of them being launched from their road mobile or rail mobile launchers...wonder what new knowledge they earn by launching missiles from same location,under same conditions again and again.....then again i am no missile scientist,just a collage boy with a big mouth....
Interesting you say Scorpene SSK uses SSN tech in hull from the french.
I think thats why we chose them instead of 214s(cheaper) to help with development of Arihant.
Is it true?
And what kind of technical expertise did we get from this deal?
How do they compare with the Qing and yuan class SSK of chini????
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htsurf/articles/20110928.aspx
Pakistani Azmat fast patrol boats have 8 C802 .........
And about the Agni test is it normal Agni2 or the "prime" varient
Why did the IAF opt for Zhuk ME For Mig 29s instead of Zhuk AESR
was it not available?
Which ones do the Mig 29K uses?
To FARIS: The Scorpene’s sonar suite is a generation ahead of that on the Collins-class SSK. The only thing the Scorpene lacks is the thin-line towed-array. Regarding the SH, Boeing has other orders to cater for—possibly from Brazil or Kuwait. I don’t think the MRCAs will be bought for the RMAF that soon. The RMAF has always been keen on the SH simply because it can be ‘spoonfed’ by the US Navy in terms of SH-related airpower doctrine/tactics development, i.e. why do your homework when someone else does it for you in the interests of inter-operability? Also, the SHs will be compatible with the RAAF’s AEW & C platforms which could periodically deploy to Butterworth. When it comes to the Su-30MKM, there are no such free rides and the RMAF has to begin taxing its own mind in terms of airpower doctrine/tactics development with some assistance from the likes of the Indian Air Force. In addition, the Su-30MKMs don’t have an on-board JTIDS-type operational data-links, meaning they won’t be able to obtain situational awareness data from the RAAF AEW & C platforms (the Su-30MKIs on the other hand have such data-links in order to communicate with the A-50I PHALCON AEW & C platforms). But all this does not mean that the Su-30MKM is an inferior platform or lacks capabilities.
To Soumyadeep: No modern ballistic missile can be launched under bad-weather conditions, as they have to make use of GPS navigation in order to align their on-board inertial navigation systems, and for this one needs to receive GPS coordinates through VSAT antennae, much like the FTH antennae. And such VSAT terminals don’t work when the weather is bad or the sky is heavily overcast. Secondly, bad weather also prevents the telemetry tracking systems—be they land-based or shipborne—from doing their jobs. That is why in present times, no one in the world test-fires such missiles when weather conditions are not favourable. The latest Agni-2 test-firing was from a rail-mobile launcher, similar to what the Chinese had developed in the 1960s and 1970s for their MRBMs and IRBMs. The missi9le’s launch location is immaterial. What matters is whether the launch-control procedures and protocols produce the desired results in terms of accuracy of the on-board inertial navigation systems.
To SHREE: No, that’s not the reason why the Scorpene was chosen. It was selected simply because it was the only available option left on the table, as HDW was still blacklisted by the MoD at that time. As for acquiring any kind of technical expertise from this deal, well, MDL learnt how to re-invent the wheel (by re-acquiring all the hull fabrication expertise from DCNS which it had obtained earlier in the late 1980s from HDW), and it has also acquired the expertise to conduct stepped life-extension programmes on the Scorpenes in-country, which now does away with the need for such SSKs to go back to France for such upgrades to be conducted (unlike the Project 877EKM Kilo-class SSKs which still have to go to Russia for such upgrades). Compared to the Qing- and Type 041 Yuan/Improved Yuan-class SSKs, the Type 1500/Class 209 SSKs and Scorpenes both have a state-of-the-art combat management suite, sonar suite and SATCOMS communications suite, plus the thin-line towed-array active/passive sonar, which is a real force-multiplier for conducting undersea warfare. The Pakistan Navy’s three Agosta 90B and two upgraded Agosta 70B SSKs too will have such capabilities. But the Qing-class SSKs scores over the Indian SSKs by virtue of incorporating fuel cell-based AIP modules and also land-attack cruise missiles.
Regarding PNS Azmat, kindly refer to the photo I’ve posted two threads ago and the scale-model of the ship clearly shows only four C-802A ASCMs. And the size of the vessel is way too small to displace 600 tonnes. It it were that large, then it nwould have become a corvette, instead of the FAC-M that it is.
Regarding yesterday’s Agni-2 MRBM test-firing, this is where the ‘desi journalists’ have once again failed to do their homework. What they did not say was that this test-firing was from a new batch of Agni-2s that entered production three years ago. The earlier batch of Agni-2s produced since the late 1990s have already reached the end of their shelf-life (10 years) and require replacement. Hence the need to produce a second tranche of Agni-2s. Now, as we all know, the first two test-firings of missiles from this tranche failed due to quality-control problems. Once the reqd amount of re-engineering was completed and the fixes were developed, the test-firings resumed and yesterday’s event was the first such test-firing of the re-engineered Agni-2. It is only after this that the tranche-2 Agni-2s will be operationally deployed, while the earlier Agni-2s will be decommissioned concurrently. The Agni-2A Prime is an altogether different piece of cake and by the looks of it, it will be cannisterised, just as the Agni-5 will. What is now reqd is a floating range somewhere in the southern end of the Bay of Bengal which can be equipped with a LRTR-type tracking radar so that it can track future launches of Agni-2/Agni-5 type of missiles all the way from the ITR to their impact points in the southern Indian Ocean. Right now, such long-range tracking is impossible and therefore the missiles are not being test-fired out to their maximum ranges.
To SHREE: Why the Zhuk-AE is not on board the IAF's MiG-29UPGs and Navy's MiG-29Ks? Your guess is as good as mine, but I suspect in this case the respective armed services HQs did not do their homework properly.
Hi Prasun,
Why does the NATO want india's help in tackling cyber warfare from china?
There are plans to borrow from china by private entities.this wil be a disaster as China wil surely use this leverage in future isnt it?
Who are the public figures in UPA II who may be named in scorpene deal?
To SHREE: For real-time missile flight-tracking, two Indian Navy AOPVs are presently equipped with C-band and S-band precision monopulse tracking radars developed by L & T’s Defence & Aerospace SBG’s HED-Weapon Systems & Sensors Division. While the C-Band radar can track the missiles in transponder mode, the S-Band radar tracks the missiles in skin mode.
To Anon@3AM: Why not, since India has been and continues to be a target for cyber-attacks originating from Chengdu in Sichuan province? I don't think procuring ICT hardware from China will be in any way detrimental to national security, so long as India acquires the requisite capacities in detecting malware and handles the applications software development/installation on such hardware. The public figure? The person hails from southern India and is a sitting MP. Need I tell you any more? As for the modus operandi, I had explained it in great detail in 2009 at http://trishulgroup.blogspot.com/2009/03/new-untouchables.html
What one is now learning about the Aircell-Maxis or SUN TV/Maxis quid pro quo deals is exactly what I had revealed and explained way back in 2009!!! If only the CAG and CBI had as far back as then bothered to read what I had written (sigh!).
"yesterday’s event was the first such test-firing of the re-engineered Agni-2. It is only after this that the tranche-2 Agni-2s will be operationally deployed, while the earlier Agni-2s will be decommissioned concurrently."
Thanx! That is almost new and a new news.
To Mr.RA 13: Very many thanks. Always willing to throw light where others either tremble or don't bother to tread!
Hi Prasun,
Can u please enlighten some of us on why Agni missiles have the stages separated by welded scaffolds? I have never seen this on missiles of other countries..
Dear Sir
I have a REQUEST
Please write an ARTICLE About the THREAT Posed by BANGLADESH To Indian Security Especially to North East And West Bengal
Prasun,
Another reason why the RMAF loves its Hornets because they have had better operational rates than any other fighter operated and product/technical support provided via FMS beats what anyone else can offer. It's very silly when you think of it - the RMAF was unable to get Russian Air Force assistance in developing a combat syllabus for the simple reason that the MKM is not operated by Russia [the same would also apply with the Scorpene and France's lack of littoral sub experience, unlike Sweden and Germany]!! On the other hand, imagine the training and support advantages it would have received if it had ordered F-15s or boats from Kockums. During one of our discussions years ago, we both agreed that the F-15 would have been a much better choice than Su-30s. Another advantage in buying ''Made in the U.S.''fighters, apart from support via FMS, and the fact that all integration has been done at Uncle Sam's expense, is that practically all the air to air and ground to air ordnance offered with the F-16/F-15/F-18 has been tested in combat, unlike the R-77, KH-31P, Yakhont, etc. It was only due to the Ethopia/Eritia war, that we know the Alamo didn't performed as advertised by Vympel.
To Anon@5.59PM: Such welded scaffolds also exist for the following missiles: Soviet RT-2/8K98 (see: http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/icbm/rt-2_2.jpg); Chinese DF-5 (see: http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/theater/DF-4-2.jpg) & Chinese/Pakistani M-18/Shaheen-2 (see: http://www.b14643.de/Spacerockets_1/Rest_World/Taimur_SLV/Description/Text.htm).
To Anon@7.26PM: Are you kidding? There is no foreseeable threat emanating from Bangladesh at least for the next 50 years!
To FARIS: It is for future historians to judge the actions of successive Malaysian governments between 1989 and 2002 in terms of weapons procurement decisions. From my perspective as a neutral observer, the following fatal flaws were committed:
1) When it came to the RMAF’s force modernisation, instead of procuring the Hawk Mk208s and MiG-29Ns, the govt of the day should have acquired an entire squadron of 24 F/A-18Ds. Instead, by deciding to break up the MRCA orders into three—F/A-18Ds, Hawk Mk208s and MiG-29Ns), the govt took a retrograde step by acquiring two types of combat aircraft that were not equipped with fly-by-wire flight control systems and FADEC-equipped turbofans. This in turn led to commercially unwise and avoidable financial commitments reqd for supporting three separate fleets of combat aircraft when only one was reqd.
2) When it came to acquiring the heavy M-MRCA, again the decision should have gone in favour of the Super Hornet. Instead, by acquiring the Su-30MKM, the RMAF’s already deficient operational and maintenance budgets were overstretched, which in turn can only lead to high unserviceability levels.
3) In terms of upgrading and expanding the air transportation aircraft fleet, again Tun Dr Mahathir’s weird and unjustifiable notion of ‘strategic defiance’ of the US and his passion for procuring European solutions has only led to financial misery, given the strong Euro and things will only get worse in future thanks to the Eurozone crisis. What should have been the logical choice (C-130J-30 Super Hercules) was discarded in favour of the cost-prohibitive A-400M, whose delivery schedules have been postponed god-knows-how-many-times! Instead of spending the money on the A-400Ms, the financial allocations would have been better spent on acquiring up to four additional L-band or S-band long-range airspace surveillance radars for East Malaysia, and six low-level medium-power radars for Peninsular Malaysia.
4) If the intention at all was to nurture and promote a national shipbuilding industry, then MINDEF ought to have bought outright the modular design of a contemporary warship (like the MEKO) and then tweak it as per domestic requirements to create a common family of warships like frigates, corvettes and NGPVs, with local content increasing progressively. Instead, breaking up the order between BAE Systems, Fincantieri and Blohm + Voss, has prevented shipbuilding industry consolidation and denied achievement of economies of scale for the related manufacturing sector. And it appears that such mistakes are still being perpetuated.
5) No matter how hard one tries, no one in the world can justify the ATM’s induction of four different types of MANPADS, starting with the Starburst, then the Anza Mk1, then the Igla-1 and lastly the FN-6. Such decisions can only result in the ATM becoming the world’s laughing stock.
6) The money spent on the Scorpene SSKs would have been better spent on acquiring a fleet of armed medium-range maritime recce/ASW platforms (about eight) like the C-295MPA for the RMN (and not for the RMAF), and up to six medium-lift shipborne multi-role helicopters (like the NH-90 or S-70B Seahawk).
I wouldn’t say the French lack littoral undersea warfare experience or have lost it for good; instead the latest Barracuda SSN, along with designs for the SMX-22, SMX-24 and SMX-24 is all proof of France’s intention to remain a serious player in this area of undersea warfare for many more years to come. Regarding the performance of Russian BVRAAMs during the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, there are several variables involved here, such as the age of the missile stocks, their storage conditions, implementation of proper protocols for their usage, etc.
HI Prasun,
the iraq war was waged to gain control of its oil fields.Libya too was targetted by the Europeans for its oil wealth.Now Afghanistan stands colose to central Asia.The US wants the petro dollar recycling to continue so as to provide for its growth and so does the EU.Why does India not see the obvioius benefits of getting into this game ?if not for complete control of oil fields atleast talking to Iran on Heavily subsidised oil in return for a 'strategic partnership' woul do.Dont u think.Our fertlizer subsidies are unsustainable and might be rolled back in near future with the GOI's expected growth not happeniung and our deficit growing wider.Desperate times have ppl taking desperate measures.So this should be a viable option.
The gulf invest their money in western banks fom oil profits.So they should have greater leverage over the west.SWhy this is not so? they could threaten to pull the money out of these banks.
To Anon@12.57AM: As I had stated earlier several times, India's political elite post-independence has been and continues to be bereft of that vital virtue that's reqd for national self-resilience: strategic visioning. Had India's leaders been gifted with this virtue, then there would have been no Azad Kashmir or LoC, and no LAC today. In more recent times, the problems in Sri Lanka would have been resolved with much less bloodshed and suffering way back in the early 1990s had India taken a pro-active role and made the Sri Lankan economy totally dependent on the Indian economy, thereby reducing Sri Lanka to a mere vassal state. In return, India could have had access to the still unexplored vast oil and gas fields that lie to the east and south of Sri Lanka, stretching all the way to the southern Indian Ocean. This in turn would have drastically reduced India's annual import bill for hydrocarbons-based natural resources. The same goes for India-Bangladesh relations. But in India, the political class don't view or plan developments on a long-term basis since a political party in power has only a five-year shelf-life and consequently, all of India's macro-economic planning too is limited to only five years. In conclusion, therefore, what needs to change is not the system (as Anna Hazare and his followers believe), but our way of thinking. There can be no material or administrative Parivartan (like the ones being touted by the TMC in WB) unless the Parivartan begins inside one's head. Is this happening? Evidence on the ground strongly suggests that no such development is taking place. India's political elite will have harsh choices to make in the years to come: either embrace the concept of 'Dharamyudh' (righteous war, or Jihad in Islamic parlance) in every sphere of life, or stay resigned to the concept of passive bleeding liberalistic non-violence whose main objective has always been and will always be reaching a compromise at all costs, even if it involves abdicating from one's core principles. If the latter prevails, then the ruling political elites will always be in a state of perpetual paralysis, and harsh, decisive measures/decisions will never materialise. To me personally, Dharamyudh is the bedrock of Hindutva as defined by Vedantic philosophical thought, and not the kind of corrupted and perveted Hindutva being propagated by the likes of the BJP, VHP, Bajrang Dal etc etc.
There is a problem, that the oil suppliers are not necessarily the opponents of terrorism. So it creates a paradox.
This is over and above the fact that the so-called turncoat friends of anti-terrorism are really the friends of terrorism. All this everywhere creates a catch-22 situation, wherein USSR failed and now USA is almost nearing to it, if it really withdraws now.
The situation is worsened by the factor that the turncoat friend has enough nukes and it has befriended the ambitious and expansionist China.
Only a joint command of US, India and Russia without angering the Iran can now resolve the problem, to which all their Gods may not agree necessarily now. So it is now an impasse may be leading to weird sequences with diabolical results.
To Anon@12.57AM: What you call 'desperate' measures, I would rephrase it as 'harsh' measures that are long overdue. For instance, strategic divestments in DPSUs should have taken place yesterday. And agricultural income should have been made taxable more than 20 years ago. What's been happening since the early 1970s is that all such non-taxable income has been channeled into unproductive areas like Bollywood, Tollywood, Kollywood etc etc, when such funds could have easily been collected via taxes and then allocated for mega-infrastructure development projects like national railways and highway construction.
To Mr.RA 13: There's another probable solution as well: In the long run, the U
S playbook on Pakistan should grow to resemble that of India’s. The way to neuter an enemy is to carve them up into multiple states—such was Germany’s treatment by the allies after World War II, as well as the Soviet Union’s fate after its fall. India has already cut Pakistan in half, dividing it between modern Pakistan and Bangladesh. It seeks to do so again, exploiting the ethnic fault lines in Pakistani society to carve it up even further. With its parting shots in Afghanistan, the US should use its military might to aid in this strategy. In its least extreme form, this strategy might merely ensure that Baloch-dominated provinces within Afghanistan retain a high degree of autonomy from the Afghan federal government. In its most extreme form, the US could funnel arms to Baloch nationalists in southern Pakistan or take direct action in support of a free Balochistan. Where the US should fall on this spectrum of policy choices is open to debate—what must be avoided is the naive optimism that Pakistan will have a Damascene moment and suddenly become the ally that the US requires. Now is the time to restructure Afghanistan in the way that makes Pakistan weakest, not to dither in a non-existent middle ground.
Source: http://tech.mit.edu/V131/N41/pakistan.html
Yes! Dharamyudh can create diabolical results to the Danavas. Lol...
Agreed. Complete dismemberment of Pak666 is the ultimate choice enabling a peaceful and democratic Afghanistan to be elevated to the status of a buffer state between India and Iran.
sir,
i wish you a very happy DURGA PUJA.....
sir why is that we are developing 2 aircraft in similiar category ie the rta 70 and hal mrta ???
is rta 70 going to have 2 variants , i mean one with turbo props and other with a turbofan ??
sir how capable is kamov aew chopper when comparaed to other naval aew craft ??
are looking at its replacements ??
Prasun,
Apart from the Raytheon Master L band radar ordered recently for deployment in Sarawak, are there any more military radars in East Malaysia?
Whilst I undertand the rationale behind wanting a laser guided [Starburst] and an IR MANPADS [Igla], the decision to operate 3 kinds of IR guided missiles is, at you pointed out, ludicrous!!
To replace the Starburst, there should be one and only one contender, the Starstreak with ADADS for target alerting.
This illogical and expensive policy of buying a bit of everything from different suppliers is thanks to Dr.M and his emphasis on placing more importance in ToTs and industrial offsets [which have not benefited Malaysia], rather than standardisation and buying what suits the MAF. The Fulcrums, Flankers, PT-91Ms and Hawks deals were because of him.
Was the Scorpene indeed the RMNs main choice or was it strictlty ''political''? And instead of buying Jernas, they should have waited a few more years for VL MICA!
As the army now has MBTs and added firepower, don't you think it would be perfect to bin the 90mm Cockerills on the Scorpions, and replace them with 30mm auto cannons to perform the armed recce role? And instead of being sent to the scrap yard after the AV8 enters service, part of the Sibmas fleet could be converted as engineering, 120mm mortar and fitted with MANPADs.
Sir ,
i have a few ques that r completed unrelated to this article..but nthng abt these following ques is available on the net..
actually sir , i m an engg student & wud like to join the army as an infantry or engg officer..but i know nthng abt the career progression in the army..
can u plzz throw some light on the mandatory & voluntary courses in these 2 arms/services..from commisioning till atleast 10 yrs..
it wud really help sir if u cud tell in a lil detail abt various field & staff courses that 1 has to go through at each rank & for promotions.. n also abt bombay sappers..
thankyou sir..
Dear Sir
Wishing You a Very Happy Durga Puja
May Goddess Durga Give you ALL that you desire ie Health Wealth and Happiness in the world
To Soumyadip: The very same to you as well.
To Anon@11.22AM: The RTA-70 is a colossal waste of both time and money, just as the Saras Duet project has been. It would be a lot better if the money is instead spent on the IL-214 MRTA for developing civilian and military air transportation variants.
To FARIS: Master-L is from THALESRaytheon. It isn’t a pure Raytheon product. ToTs and industrial oaffsets are fine, provided they benefit the local industries that are supporting the procured weapon systems. But the industrial offsets policies devised by the ERPU were meant only for facilitating the likes of DRB-Hicom & PROTON. That’s when things began going wrong. The Scorpene procurement was indeed a political choice. As for the Scorpions and Sibmas vehicles, they still have a lot of life left in them to be employed as fire-support vehicles after they’ve been refurbished and upgraded.
To Anon@4.07PM: Why are you limiting yourself to only the Army? Why not consider the more capital-intensive armed services like the Navy or Air Force?
To AUSTIN: The requirement for seeking replacements for the Bofors L-70s was drafted about six years ago and since then, the Army has zeroed in on the Skyshield. And that’s precisely why Rheinmetall Defence Systems two years ago offered the Skyshield coupled to a BMP hull to the Indian Army and has even advertised this product several times in some India-produced military-industrial magazines. Two tears ago TATA Motors teamed up with Rheinmetall to offer the Skyshield on one of its heavy-duty vehicles (see: http://www.defencesolutions-tatamotors.com/pdf/tata-8x8.pdf) and also (http://www.defencesolutions-tatamotors.com/tactical/high-mobility.html). I’m pretty sure as anyone else is that TATA Motors wouldn’t have wasted money on developing such a solution had an operational reqmt not existed. As for the upgraded L-70s with help from Sweden’s Ericsson, this upgrade package was rejected by Army HQ way back in 2001, while an alternate upgrade solution devised indigenously by the Army’s Corps of EME was rejected by the MoD (!) back in the early-1990s when Sharad Pawar was the Defence Minister. Smell something fishy here now?
To Anon@6.03PM: Many thanks and the same to you as well, although I'm not a Puja buff and refrain from idol worship of all types.
To Anon@11.22AM: New naval helicopters are being sought to replace the earlier Sea King Mk42As and Kamov Ka-25s, while the existing Ka-28PLs and Sea King Mk42Bs will undergo deep upgrades.
Sir , army is the only thing i hv been ever interested in..moreover due to weak eyes i cant be a pilot..
sir..will u plzz ans my ques..
How efficiently can Boing P-8I detect SSKs,SSN,SSBN.
Generally the only chance for a SSK to be detected is when it emerges to charge its batteries..
Given deployment of AIPs the Pak N chini SSKs can dive for more number of days and no SONAR however advanced , can find it..
Do you think we are doing enough to counter our depleting Submarine fleet...
What additional steps are required to develop indigenous submarines ?
Interesting Article
http://defpro.com/news/details/28374/?SID=a320d52cc0c2279bd9415750c03ec017
What do you think of our Nuclear doctrine and its implications ?
What will happen if Pak strikes with Nuke NASR???????
Since both India and China have 'No First Use' policy there can be no nuclear war betwwen the two RIGHT????
I agree with the sensible point made in this article....
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndianNuclearPostureConfusingSignalsfromDRDO_vnarang_260911
To Anon@8.01PM: There are several branches in the IAF that don’t require perfect eyesight. At least if you joing the Navy or IAF, you will have a greater chance of travelling abroad and seeing distant lands, something about which the prospects are far lesser if you join the Army.
To Shree: The P-8I also has a magnetic anomaly detector to help in the detection of submerged submarines in littoral waters. As for India’s depleting SSK fleet, the only logical answer is to order a follow-on batch of four to six Scorpenes.
To KSK: Firstly, no one has emphatically stated that the Nasr or Prahaar NLOS-BSMs will be nuclear-armed. They MAY well be nuclear-capable, but as of now they’re not nuclear-armed. The same goes for the Babur land-launched cruise missile and the Ra’ad air-launched cruise missile. And for as long as India doesn’t arm its BrahMos missiles with n-warheads and does not deploy the nuclear warhead-armed supersonic air-launched cruise missiles, Pakistan will not feel the need to escalate matters. Western self-styled analysts like Hans Christiensen often in order to further their own non-proliferation objectives, mischievously attribute nuclear capabilities to nsuch NLOS-BSMs, when in reality they will be armed with conventional warheads. As for the nuclear doctrine, there is indeed a dire need for the Govt of India to come up with a White Paper detailing what missile-types are nuclear-armed and which ones aren’t. The need for this White Paper was already felt after the CBMs like a strategic restraint regime were inked in February 1999. And I totally agree that the DRDO often bits more than it can chew. This is very dangerous and the Govt of India has a moral obligation to sensure that matters relating to strategic deterrence aren’t the exclusive preserve of just the technocrats and scientists from the DRDO and DAE. I totally agree that senior DRDO officials should be made to shut up as all they’re contributing to is misinformation and confusion, and making tall claims that cannot be substantiated. Instead, whenever an operational strategic weapon system is flight-tested it should be the C-in-C of the Strategic Force Command (SFC) that should make the press announcement, and not the DRDO.
Sir , i don't know y r u adamant on the air force or navy..but i can tell u that army has been a childhood passion..moreover in the IAF & navy it is only the flying branches m interested in..
it wud be very kind of u if u cud tell me..
Hello Anon @ Oct 3, 1:00 AM,
I do not know why you are so adement on Indian Army? if Army is your passion why to ask Prasun. Go ahead my dear Anon. No one is stopping you.
Hei man, I sincerely feel that you should not join Indian Army. Because person like you will do more harm for Indian Army and India's security than an illiterate person does.
Indian Navy to Order Carrier Capable Rafale Fighter Jet
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