Phase-1 of the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) layered, hardened and in-depth air defence command, control and communications network, called integrated air command, control and communications system (IACCCS), is all set to achieve full operational capability by June 2012 once the IAF-owned, -operated and -managed fully secure and reliable network and gigabyte digital information grid—known as AFNet, is fully operationalised. The IACCCS—being established under a two-phase programme costing Rs16,000 crore has been designed as a robust, survivable network-centric C4I3 infrastructure that will receive direct real-time feeds from existing space-based overhead reconnaissance satellites, ground-based and aerostat-mounted ballistic missile early warning radars and high-altitude-long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles, and manned airborne early warning & control (AEW & C) platforms. The IACCCS will also coordinate the early warning and response aspects of a layered, ground-based, two-tier ballistic missile defence (BMD) network that is now at an advanced stage of development. The fibre-optic network-based AFNet, on the other hand, replaces the IAF’s troposcatter-based communications network. Developed at a cost of Rs10.77 billion in collaboration with US-based Cisco Systems Inc, HCL Infosystems Ltd and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd (BSNL), the AFNet incorporates the latest traffic transportation technology in form of internet protocol (IP) packets over the network using multi-protocol label switching (MPLS). A large voice-over-internet-protocol (VoIP) layer with stringent quality of service enforcement will facilitate robust, high quality voice, video and conferencing solutions. With these two critical elements now in place, the way ahead is now clear for plugging into the IACCCS a large number of new-generation ground-based radars that are now in the process of being delivered, be it for airspace surveillance in search of airborne targets (like manned aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, attack helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles), or coastal surveillance or ground surveillance.
For ensuring all-weather low- and medium-level airspace surveillance, the IAF by 2016 will be receiving 67 new low-level air transportable radars (LLTR), including 19 180km-range, three-dimensional THALES-built Ground Smarter GS-100 radars (ordered in November 2009), each of which will be accompanied by operational and communication shelters, an energy sub-system, a mobility sub-system and personnel living quarters. While the first six GS-100s have been supplied off-the-shelf by THALES, the remaining is being licence-assembled by BEL. Under underway now are deliveries of 24 active phased-array EL/M-2084 medium-power radars (MPR). Homegrown products to be delivered include the DRDO-developed and Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL)-built the S-band Aslesha three-dimensional micro-radar, the Army-specific Bharani manportable radar, and thirty (20 more to be ordered) 180km-range Rohini S-band central acquisition radars. The Aslesha, which weighs 250kg, uses low-probability-of-intercept frequencies to look out for terrain-hugging tactical UAVs over mountainous terrain out to 50km. The IAF has to date ordered 21 of them, and first deliveries took place in January 2008. On the other hand, the Bharani is a two-dimensional L-band gapfiller system now in series-production for the Army. It has a range of 40km and can track up to 100 airborne targets. To date, 16 Bharanis—meant to be used in conjunction with VSHORADS/MANPADS—have been ordered, with deliveries beginning this March. Also under delivery are 29 THALES Nederland-developed motorised Reporter tactical control radars for the Army’s upgraded ZU-23 air-defence guns.
The IAF is now gearing up to induct new-generation S-band long-range surveillance radars (LRSR), an additional nine ELTA Systems-built L-band EL/M-2083 ‘Airstar’ aerostat-mounted high-power radars (HPR) to add to the two already in service, and 18 L-band EL/M-2082 ADAR 3-D active phased-array airspace surveillance radars. For the LRSR requirement, a competition is presently underway between the ELTA Systems-built EL/M-2288 AD-STAR, THALES-built Ground Master 400, and SELEX Sistemi Integrati’s RAT-31SL.
These new radars will be deployed with the IAF’s existing 32 new mobile control and reporting centres (MCRC), 12 air defence control centres (ADCC), 24 air defence direction centres (ADDC) and some 40 terminal weapons control centres (TWCC) along India’s western and north-eastern borders, and will progressively replace the existing ST-68U gapfiller radars and related 19ZH6 command-and-control consoles, P-18/NRS-12 and P-19 gapfiller radars, THALES-built THD-1955 (GRS-400) 3-D long-range airspace surveillance radars, and the P-30/NRS-20, P-37 and P-40 gapfiller/target engagement radars, and THALES-built TRS-2215D and BEL-built PSM-33 Mk2 airspace surveillance radars, all of which were acquired in the 1970s and early 1980s. The Indian Army too is likely to procure up to six aerostat-mounted EL/M-2083s for detecting and tracking both ballistic missiles and terrain-hugging cruise missiles launched from Pakistan, while the Indian Navy is reportedly asking for two EL/M-2083s. The 1,700kg EL/M-2083 ‘Airstar’ is mounted inside 240 feet-long aerostat that is perched at altitudes of up to 4,000 feet, use electronically-steered multi-beam techniques to detect terrain hugging airborne targets—combat aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles and UAVs—at ranges of up to 300km, while the trajectories of ballistic missiles can be accurately plotted up to 500km away.
The most challenging and contentious part of the IACCCS’ implementation roadmap, however, remains the two-tier BMD component. While the ground-based, airborne and space-based tools required for giving early warning of inbound hostile ballistic/cruise missiles are already being acquired from both indigenous sources and abroad (primarily Israel), acquisition of the active ‘hard-kill’ component—anti-ballistic missiles and their fire-control systems—looks set to be a long drawn-out affair due to the differing perceptions of BMD among the three armed services. The initial components of such a two-tier BMD network, comprising both endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric missile interceptors, are not likely to be commissioned until 2015. For fire-control purposes the BMD system sues ELTA Systems-built EL/M-2080 ‘Green Pine’ ground-based active phased-array L-band long-range tracking radar (LRTR), an initial two of which were supplied in late 2001 under the US$50 million ‘Project Sword Fish’ to the DRDO by the ELTA Systems Group subsidiary of Israel Aerospace Industries. Three million lines of software code were written in India for the Battle Management/Command, Control, Communications & Intelligence (BM/C³I) centre, the hub of software and hardware systems. Transmission links to the interceptor missile are based on jam-proof CDMA technology and multiple data transmission links have been set up so that if one is jammed the others could function. Israeli inputs were sought and received for designing and fabricating the BM/C³I centre, which not only acts as the DRDO’s primary BMD engagement simulator, but is also being used for evolving BM/C³I concepts, for defining BMD goals and developing BMD doctrine, for evaluating candidate systems architectures, for serving as the principal prototyping-cum-validation tool for the BMD’s BM/C³I algorithms, and for defining the human role in the BMD battle. The BMD’s endo-atmospheric element makes use of the THALESRaytheon-supplied S-band Master-A engagement radar.
In order to enhance its airspace management-cum-surveillance capabilities in both peacetime and wartime, the IAF has initiated a multi-phase $1.3 billion programme under which a state-of-the-art joint civil/military sub-continental airspace control system is being developed using the following fundamentals: unity of effort, common procedures, and simplicity. Also being upgraded are the IAF’s terminal area air traffic services and airfield management expertise, and en route airspace/air corridor management. The net result of all this will be the creation of a vastly expanded air defence identification zone (ADIZ) and provision of a real-time recognised air picture (RAP). The upgraded ADIZ will extend the IAF’s airspace management and surveillance coverage (using ground-based sensors) up to 500 nautical miles away from India’s territorial boundaries. When fully implemented, new-generation ATCR-33S and SIR-S primary/secondary surveillance radars and their related joint air traffic control and reporting centres (JATCRC) will be operational at IAF air bases in Adampur, Agra, Ambala, Bagdogra, Bareilly, Bhatinda, Bhuj, Bidar, Chabua, Chandigarh, Gorakhpur, Gwalior, Halwara, Hashimara, Hindon, Jaisalmer, Jamnagar, Jodhpur, Jorhat, Kalaikunda, Nal, Naliya, Pathankot, Pune, Sirsa, Suratgarh, Tezpur, Uttarlai, Yelahanka and Zopuitlang in Lunglei district in southern Mizoram.—Prasun K. Sengupta
60 comments:
Love it. Very interesting.
Two issues come to mind:
1) What's replacing the Thd-1955 ?
2) Will the ADGES extend to South India in totality ?
The other thing is that I know that optronic pedestals were developed and tested for the Zu-23-2 and the L70/40 with LRFs and Thermal Imagers etc. Have these been accepted for service and has modernization started for both types ?
In fact, how many of each type are still around ?
I presume the IACCCS will also tie into the LR/MR SAM (that's the 120km and 70km range Barak models) so the question remains, with all these radars, how many LR SAM and MR SAM will be procured ?
Thanks for everything.
To SBM: Very many thanks. The THD-1955s and TRS-2215s are being replaced by the ELM-2082 active phased-array ADAR. Anti-cruise missile early warning for these ADARs will be provided by the GS-100 LLTRs. The ELM-2084 MMR/MPR radar’s primary role will be for early warning against inbound land-launched/air-launched cruise missiles headed for major IAF air bases, & against massed MBRL/TBM/NLOS-BSM fire-assaults in northern and northeastern J & K. The LRSRs to be acquired (either AD-STAR or Ground Master 400) will be primarily for the airspace surveillance of southern and north-eastern Indian airspace corridors. The Rohinis will be employed as anchor air-defence radars (along with the Akash Mk1 E-SHORADS and in future the 35km-range Akash Mk2) for both base air-defence as well as for defences of vulnerable points (VP). Area air-defence will be provided in concert with the Barak-8 LR-SAMs and accompanying EL/M-2258 radars, primarily along the North East and northern India. Aerostat-mounted EL/M-2083s will be integrated with the BMD network, & will also act as gapfillers in the absence of AEW & C coverage along the country’s western borders. IACCCS will cover the entire Indian airspace, inclusive of the whole of southern India. To be noted here is that the IACCCS will also receive inputs from the Indian Navy’s projected OTHR facility, which forms part of Project Varsha in the eastern seaboard.
For the ZU-23 the optronic fire-director is a derivative of the EON-51 naval optronic director. Main elements of the ZU-23 upgared comprise the optronic director, elevation gearbox, traverse gearbox, traverse & elevation brushless motors, stabilisation computer, AMLCD display, an ELBIT Systems-designed & BEL-built thermal imager, a CCD camera, & a laser rangefinder. For the L-70 the earlier upgrade (devised by Ericsson) for the 200+ Super Fledermaus in the early 1990s did not work out and instead the Flycatcher (inclusive of a thermal imager & laser rangefinder) is now employed. Around 400 L-70s & some 600 ZU-23s (between the Army & IAF) are in service, along with 48 ZSU-23-4 Schilkas and 24 Tunguska-M1s.
Regarding the Barak-2 MR-SAM & Narak-8 LR-SAM, the IAF has committed to only the LR-SAM, but these are meant for sector-specific deployments along the LAC and the numbers will not be high (not exceeding 200 as of now). The IAF has yet to formally decide whether or not it will in future deploy a composite SAM squadrons comprising both the MR-SAM & LR-SAMs. The Army has yet to commit to the Barak-2 MR-SAM and it is unlikely to make an early commitment until it receives the Akash Mk1/2 in adequate numbers.
So the next question would be - I assume that the 200 LR SAM means 200 launchers or approx 20 sqn - what will the rest of the SAM defences consist of in the rest of the country ?
I mean each air base even in the South would need some modicum of defence.
I would assume therefore that the BMD systems would be deployed to cover specific areas and targets nationwide.
One word - thanks.
It would be interesting to set up an experiment with the PAD and AAD as SAMs if there were any targets for them - such as high flying slow moving bombers !{I know and understand about the technical constraints but still they would work against something like a B-52}.
To SBM: Here's what known about the LR-SAM thus far: On February 27, 2009 India signed a US$1.4 billion procurement contract with IAI for the Barak-2 LR-SAM. In January 2009, TATA Advanced Systems and IAI had entered into a military-industrial partnership for creating Nova Integrated Systems and pumped in an initial investment of $200 million. IAI held 26% and TATA 76% in the joint venture. NOVA Integrated Systems subsequently acquired an initial 30 acres of land at the Aerospace and Precision Engineering Special Economic Zone (being developed by the Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corp) in Adibatla, near Hyderabad, with work on infrastructure development taking off in August 2009. The vertical launch cell modules for the Barak-2 LR-SAM have been developed by Mumbai-based Larsen & Toubro Ltd (this being the photo that was earlier mistakenly identified as the TEL for the Prahaar). Command-and-control plus fire-control will be provided by a containerised system weighing only 1,300kg. Target search and tracking will be performed by a ground-based version of the MF-STAR, known as the EL/M-2258. The IAF will be acquiring about 1,000 LR-SAMs, and each motorised TEL will hold 8 LR-SAMs, and 3 TELs will make a Battery, or 24 rounds. So we're talking of around 40 Batteries, or some 13 squadrons. As the LR-SAMs will be China-specific, the rest of India will be taken care of by the Akash Mks1/2 as of now, but WILL SURELY see sizeable inductions of Barak-2 MR-SAMs in future, since this MR-SAM, using the EL/M-2084 ‘Arudhra’ MMR/MPR, will be the only available counter to cruise missiles (Like the Babur and Ra’ad) that would be targetting the IAF’s air bases and ground transportation/logistics hubs. In case of conventional missile-strikes against India, the TBMs and MRBMs will be used primarily against major cities and consequently, the BMD's PDV-AD-1/2 combination will be for the National Capital Region & Mumbai, for starters.
To SBM: The Barak-8 LR-SAM could well take care of a B-52-type threat. But as I had remarked earlier, the AD-1/AD-2 combination will come in much more handy when countering the growing threats posed by the large numbers of deployed NLOS-BSMs along India's northern & northeastern borders. As the above-mentioned radar procurement trends bear out, the IAF has already done its homework on this and is therefore walking along a roadmap that places a high premium on anti-cruise missile defence and on a BMD network optimised for countering the immediate threats posed by BLOS-BSMs, followed by countering the ballsitic 'terror' missiles.
How would the Barak-8/LR-SAM fare against an M-9 missile ?
The Akash Mk-1 and Mk-2 could they be used as a last ditch defence against say a Haft-1 or M-11 ? I mean the radar and the design specs should indicate a limited ability to do so - limited to be sure - but still a capability.
Hey Parasun,
Yet another outstanding article. You are able to offer information/analysis available nowhere else on the net and I really appreciate you taking th time to constantly update your blog.
A few questions if you don't mind-
Where are the IAF/IN/IA plans for dedicated MILSATS? As I believe the IN's SAT launch has been delayed from this year.
Also when are the IA/IN likely to get their equivalent to this IACCCS?
And for what reason is it that it is the IAF that has recieved such a system first? As you'd think given the future projection issues the IN would be the most in need for such a system.
Also how possible/likely is it for SOFs (of all services) to be "plugged-in" to such a network? I know this particular system primarily relates to air defence but taking ground level defene inputs into a bigger picture is a must and a reson why the US army has been so successful in the past.
In regards to the above point, how far is the mindset changing/changed of politicians in regards to SOFs in seeing such units as strategic assets? As we saw in Kargil where SOFs were used wrongly as "super infantry" due to little understanding to their role.
Also is it possible at any point in the future you will do a piece on the SPG? These guys are so little known yet they fascinate me and would love to know more about them. (anything at all), I know this isn't your primary area of concern though.
Thanks so much.
To SBM: The Barak-8 LR-SAM has been touted as being much better than the Patriot PAC-3 when it comes to intercepting TBMs like both the M-9 & M-11 (Ghaznavi & Abdali), one will have to wait and see how the actual test-firings will pan out. In all likelihood the LR-SAM for the IAF won't be the optimum solution for intercepting ballistic missiles like the Shaheen-1/2, and one will therefore have to rely on the PDV-AD-1/AD-2 combination for an assured two-tier interception. The Akash Mks1/2 relies on radio command-line-of-sight target engagement practice, unlike the LR-SAM's on-board active phased-array terminal guidance radar. Therefore, if one's contemplating last-ditch point-defence, then it would be better to make use of the Barak-2 MR-SAM, which also will have an on-board terminal guidance active phased-array radar and which will be available in appreciable deployed numbers for base air-defence as well as for the air-defence of select vulnerable points.
Fully understood.
I accept that the Barak is better and for all the reasons you cite.
I am just asking if the Akash can do it to any extent - I mean on paper it should be able to do something.
One other thing - if the IAF has not yet committed to MR-SAM how can we say that it will be available in numbers ?
To Unknown: Very many thanks. For the three armed services, the GSAT-7 (which was originally meant to go for the now-cancelled DEVAS Multimedia-proposed civilian comms network) will be the first MILSAT. Uts launch has been delayed due to certain mandatory modifications to be carried out (as it was earlier configured for civilian usage). The IACCCS will not be entirely IAF-specific, since the Navy's projected OTHR will also be plugged. If you're referring to the Navy's network-centric air defences, most of the tools are already in place, and will be fully operationalised once the GSAT-7 goes into orbit. That's why you will see ALL of the Indian Navy's principal surface combatants and even AOPVs and fleet tankers are now equipped with SATCOM antennae installations supplied by ORBIT Technologies. All these warships will be networked for real-time voice/data/imagery sharing/transmission via the LINK-2 server-based naval internet. The Army's various tools for acquiring various spectrums of battlefield situational awareness are also falling into place (especially the tactical internet & intranet networks) and will become fully operational once the F-INSAS project goes for across-the-board implementation by 2015.
Will deal with the SOF and SPG issues later.
To SBM: The MR-SAM being a Navy-initiated project, priority is being given to first developing the MR-SAM variant capable of intercepting inbound combat aircraft or inbound supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, following which the MR-SAM variant optimised for intercepting combat aircraft as well as inbound land-attack cruise missiles will be developed, and be made available by 2015. The IAF therefore has another two years before placing its bulk procurement contracts for the MR-SAM. It’s like how the PC-7 Mk2 basic turboprop trainer contractual negotiations process is now underway. Everyone knows that while the IAF requires the initial 75 BTTs, the Navy too has an equally pressing reqmt for about 20 BTTs. But instead of placing a unified joint services procurement contract (which will bring down the per-unit flyaway cost), separate procurement contracts will be inked for each individual service, with the service whose order is larger in terms of unit numbers of the item to be procured being given priority over the rest (as was the case with the BAE Systems Hawk Mk132 LIFTs).
just one word prasunda and that is AWESOME.
however after reading your piece i would like to also know about the following questions.
1. you have mentioned there are differing perceptions of the BMD in the three services. could tell us what they are?
2.while the IACCCS predominantly involves the IAF albeit certain contributions from the IN with regards to the OTHR, can throw some inputs as to how the IN and IA are planning to have their own network centric air defence mechanisms in place and what their components are?
3.with regards to the IA, could you tell us what or how the IA plans to provide air defence to its formations in the fields in the event of a combat from incoming choppers, combat aircrafts, MLRS/MBRLs, NLOS-BSM, artillery fires, ATGMs, PGMs, and the like.
thanks :)
^^ and i would also like to know what the difference between IACCCS phase-1 and phase-2
hello sir,
do consider that i am a complete amateur when it comes to military affairs ,there is one question that is bothering me....suppose....a hostile aircraft is detected by both army and iaf radars approaching a army base near the border.....whose responsibility is it to counter the threat,is there any mechanism right now which would avoid both of them firing missiles at the same target.....
and who is responsible to create strategy in times of emergency say war....is it ministry of defense who has no idea what military strategy is...or is it the army.if it is the army then does iaf and navy has to listen to them what to do and what not to do......can't we have some sort of joint command who are totally aware of the situation,wise in terms of military strategy...who will instruct all the services what to do without any argument...of course taking their views into account,but their decision is ultimate......they will also decide who will have what military assets...then we won't have such spats regarding the ownership of attack choppers,the kind there is right now between the army and the IAF
thank you
Prasun, thanks a lot. I appreciate the situation now.
Still asking - if needed could the Akash effect an intercept of a M-11 class missile with some chance (not necessarily a great chance)of success ?
Also what is going on with the non-clearance of the PC-7 deal by the CCS so far ?
Hey Mr Parasun,
I too would like some of the Qs asked by Anon at 7.17am answered, regarding the SFs and SPG, any chance of that?
Regards,
JB.
Hi PRASUN, the Spyder system currently in service with the IA & IAF are SR SAM though they are haveing a logistics base of a MRSAM. Will it not be better if there was 8 launchers per TEL or even 6 like the OSA-AKM , the system which Spyder replaces . Can the IA & IAF replace it 4 round SR TEL with the 8 round TEL like that of the Spyder MR? Also what about the tender of purchasing MR-SAM by the IAF, Has the IAF come to a decision regarding this? When will the 196 Light helicopter deal be signed by the IA? Is there any plans of replacing the Kh-29 & AS-30L with a longer ranging standoff air-ground missile ? If so will the guidance of this missile be laser guidance or IIR / mmR? Will the French standoff AASM be purchased in bulk by the IAF and are they to be used by only the Mirages or other ac like the Su, MiG-27 , Jaguar ?
Great article...
" While the ground-based, airborne and space-based tools required for giving early warning of inbound hostile ballistic/cruise missiles are already being acquired from both indigenous sources and abroad (primarily Israel)"
CAn you explain this in detail ? What are these tools ?
What all things will be there in naval network ? Are we gonna start monitoring our shores and important sea lanes via satellites sometime in future ? Will naval aerial assets like MALE and HALE UAVs and ASW aircrafts like P8i feed information to this network ?
The way the things are progressing in our BMD program, if history repeats itself, the armed forces will go for a foreign BMD system instead of waiting for domestic one. Can we expect armed forces to go for Israeli or US or Russian BMD system instead of waiting for a domestic system ?
Has IAF done studies on BMD system ? I mean have they put up their requirement as to what India's BMD system should be like ?
Is india planning to replace L-70, Zu-23, Tunguska etc. ? With what, in what number and by when ?
Is there any talks of including US or Israeli companies in BMD development plans especially when US has now officially declared that they will help if India wants ?
I read India has issued a RFI for a long range radar (4500 km) last year. Only one company makes such radar and its a US based comapny. It has sold two such radars to Israel in the past. Any information about this development ?
IAF is looking for surveillance aircrafts like Raytheon ASTOR. How many such aircrafts will be inducted in indian armed forces ? Are all the 3 services going to induct such air-crafts ?
You said for protection against NLOS-BSM, AD-1,2 will be much better. So can we expect deploment of AD-1,2 in large numbers against NLOS ?
Whats the progress of Akashdeep and Nakshatra Aerosta projects ?
Do we have X band radar, recently news reports says that A5 shall be tracked by Ship mounted X band radar. If yes, is it indigenous or foreign.
To ABS: VMT. The IAF, being involved with the strategic employment of airpower, is more focused on the threats emanating from conventionally armed long-range land-attack cruise missiles (air- and ground-launched), IRBMs and MRBMs. The Indian Army is concerned about ground-launched land-attack cruise missiles, conventionally armed non-line-of-sight battlefield support missiles (NLOS-BSM) and long-range MBRLs capable of delivering sensor-fuzed munitions. The Indian Navy’s primary missile-based threat perceptions involve warship-/submarine-launched cruise missiles and supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles. What is therefore reqd is a harmonisation of all the three separate threat perceptions so that a single integrated R & D plan can be evolved to counter the varying missile-based threats. Development & deployment of a BMD/anti-cruise missile defence system therefore ought to be a joint services effort (a top-down approach is reqd here, with the MoD coming out with a set of written directives, which translates into a missile defence policy and a technological/operational roadmap of sorts), which presently is not the case. Therefore, in the absence of such institutional underpinnings, all that the DRDO can do is develop technology demonstrators that MAY SOME day translate into operational capabilities.
Regarding naval inputs for the IACCCS, the OTHR in the eastern seaboard will have a range of up to 3,000km and as such it will not only be able to monitor naval movements up to the Malacca Straits, but will also be able to generate a RAP covering the entire Andaman Sea and southern part of Bay of Bengal. This will prove to be an enormous force-multiplier when it comes to the strategic defence of the Andaman & Nicobar island-chain. I’ve already explained above how the GSAT-7 and LINK-2 combination, plus inputs from MR/ASW aircraft (P-8I, Tu-142ME & IL-38SD) and Ka-31 AEW helicopters will help generate a RAP of the Navy’s tactical area of operations. The Army’s concept of battlefield air-defence calls for providing air-defence only over the tactical battlefields and for this the tracked Akash Mk1/2 Batteries, upgraded ZSU-23-4 Schilkas & Tunguska-M1s, and the Rudra & light observation helicopters (both armed with Mistral ATAMs) will suffice for combatting hostile attack helicopters and manned combat aircraft. For neutralising the NLOS-BSMs & cruise missiles, there’s a reqmt for interceptors like the AD-1/AD-2 and the Barak-2 MR-SAM. MBRL rounds are best countered by directed-energy weapons, for which the DRDO has begun doing some preliminary R & D. IACCCS’s Phase-1 involves the northern half of India, while IACCCS’s Phase-2 will cover the country’s southern part.
To Soumyadip: If the threat is against a land-based facility/base within India, then it is the IAF’s responsibility to ensure layered air-defence. Presently, within the three armed services, there’s a lot of coordination, but not jointness. Joint operations will be possible only when there’s a joint theatre command operating, meaning the area command’s GOC-in-C from the Army and the AOC-in-C from the IAF will be seating under one roof next to one another and acquiring a common appreciation of the evolving battlefield. Presently, all the prevailing problems persist due to institutional paralysis & total lack of strategic visioning displayed by the executive branches of the Govt of India since 2001. It is due to this that at the operational level, India’s armed forces are fully geared-up for waging third-generation warfare, while Pakistan has since the late 1990s excelled in waging fourth-generation warfare, while Mainland China is perfecting its fifth-generation war-waging skills & expertise (I will dwell upon all this in greater length in a separate narrative in the near future). How else does one explain the totally foolish recent statement by Naresh Chandra, Chairman of the National Security Advisory Board, who is also heading a taskforce on reviewing the country's security architecture, in which he has reportedly claimed that “challenges rising from Pakistan would remain the most serious security test for India over the next decade”. Now, what is meant by fourth-generation and fifth-generation warfare? It is all about degrading India's national (i.e.political) will to pre-empt or retaliate in kind to the adversary's machinations. It means that while India’s existence is not threatened or her military forces degraded, her strategic space is compressed and constrained. For instance, Pakistan's concept of fourth-generation warfare calls for using irregulars of the type employed in 1999 (like the then paramilitary NLI & Mujahideen) to wage positional warfare in a limited area with limited objectives, with the Pakistan Army waiting in the sidelines and not committing itself to full-scale frontal warfare. Consequently, India's regular armed forces were forced (politically) to respond with full military might against the irregulars, were severely constrained in operational terms as they were not told to cross the LoC, and consequently incurred high losses. China's fifth-generation warfare guidelines call for winning the war even before the battles have commenced. We're now seeing this unfold in the South China Sea against the ASEAN grouping. In other words, before undertaking any policy initiative, the first question a neighbouring ASEAN member-country is always compelled to ask itself is: what will China think about it and what will Beijing's response be. Something similar to what the MEA & PMO ask everytime border transgressions along the LAC take place. In conclusion, in an era in which even countries like China are engaging in force modernisations to just cater to futuristic high-intensity 'limited border wars', India remains fixated on the prospect of waging all-out war and that too along two fronts. From doctrinal and operational standpoints, therefore, urgent course corrections are reqd. It also means taking well-calculated risks, calling off the enemy's bluff and having enough psychological resilience and self-esteem so as not to be the one that blinks first.
To SBM: For the Akash missile to be effective against TBMs, it would involve drastic re-engineering. For instance, it would have to be equipped with an imaging infra-red terminal seeker and the missile itself would have to be a hit-to-kill round, instead of having an on-board proximity fuze. At the command-and-control level the Akash’s Battery Command Centre would need to be interfaced with the BM/C³I network and the Rajendra L-band engagement radar’s fire-control algorithms would need to be modified. The PC-7 Mk2 deal is likely to be approved, thanks to the Army surrendering the bulk of its unused allocations for capital spending this fiscal year.
To Unknown: The SPG is only for ensuring proximate security for VVIPs. There’s nothing elitist about it.
To Anon@7.45PM: The deployment configuration of any ground-based air-defence system depends on the types of threats to be encountered. There is therefore no need to blindly adopt the deployment patterns that prevails in Europe or elsewhere. What matters most is the fielding of an in-depth and hierarchical and highly mobile air-defence umbrella. The AASM family of PGMs are included in the Mirage 2000 upgrade package.
To Anon@10.44PM: The X-band telemetry tracking radars were developed and fabricated by Larsen & Toubro in the late 1990s and are mounted on three Indian Navy AOPVs.
Please post FINSAS article next for the sake of all your fans...
Has IA selected the vendor for 300,000 modular BP jacket and ballistic helmet deal ? If not who is the favorite ?
How did Arjun mk2 performed against Singapore Leopard 2 in summer trails (you said they will compete last summer)?
US is bringing their tanks in yudh abhyas this year. Is there some plans to test Arjun mk1/mk2 against US Abrams ?
When is the P17a and P15b project likely to start ?
Appreciate that response.
However, take that out of the equation for now. Can an existing Akash system engage a SRBM with say a 33% chance of success ?
Three proximity fused rounds bracketing a target should do something.
Prasun @ 11.19pm,
Isn't the AASM considered to be a pretty expensive piece of kit compared to some of the smaller Paveway offerings? I wonder how it would stack up in an SEAD role compared to specialised weapons like the HARM.
On a related note, some media outlets are talking of an MMRCA announcement on 24 January-is there any credence to this?
Hi Prasun isn't the no of L-70 in service with the IAF and the IA number around 700 because so many of them have recently been upgraded by BAE? Also according to Wikipedia there are around 100 Tunguskas in service with the IA. Also will not more no of highly mobile tracked SPAAG be purchased fir providing air cover for the armoured formations during it's penetration into hostile territory? What about the Skyranger system? Also according to DRDO scientists the Akash mk2 will possess a terminal seeker. Isn't the Barak 2 & LRSAM efficient for intercepting massed NLOS-BSM strikes? Also will not the LRSAM serve as a base defense weapon for Western airbases?
Which SAM is IA gonna deploy for safety of its various bases ?
Why did IA issued RFI for MRSAM if barak 8 is there ? Is IA not gonna wait and go ahead with the purchase of MRSAM from some other country ?
I heard MBDA is fielding Maetri SAM in two indian contracts. Which one are those ?
BMD's control will come under which service ?
Shaurya is a hypersonic quasi ballistic missile, is there some other similar missile with longer range planned ?
Is there a tracked carrier for IA's Spyder SAM ?
Is India also working on Supercavitating torpedo ? Or is there a plan to purchase Russian VA-111 Shkval ?
CAn you throw some light on Shtil VTOL UAV ?
Prasun, unless I am wrong, aren't there no fewer than 30 AD regiments operating the L70 with 48guns each and an additional number with ZU-23-2 numbering about 1000 guns ?
Aren't these solely with the army ?
Wasn't an enhanced on-weapon sight involving an optronic pedestal developed for both guns (TI, LRF etc) enabling the guns to be used as stand-alone weapons day or night ?
To the Akash Mk.1 - repeat that I appreciate and share your views on the modifications needed - but consider that the Buk-1M (even the old SA-2) has intercepted missiles in trials shouldn't the Akash have about the same capability against
say M-11s or Hatf-1 ?
Again, not a good capability but as I say a 33% capability ?
There are reports that IA has selected Force Motors Trishul lsv for its lsv requirements ? Is it true ? If yes then how many of these will be purchased ?
Also last year IA inducted mitsubishi pajero in the NE sector. How many of these are purchased ?
Whats the progress of IA's t72 modernization program ? Has it been awarded yet or not ? Apart from LnT-Raytheon and OFB, who else is offering t72 upgrade for indian army and who is the favorite ? How is the upgraded t72 looks like ? Will they be fitted with APS ?
Is it final that IA will now be inducting newer T-90AM MBTs ? If yes how many of these will enter in service ?
Has the L72 upgrade been awarded to someone ? If not who is the favorite ?
Tata is offering Skylark fitted on its all terrain truck. Will there be a track based Skylark entering the service ?
When is the Skylark production going to start ?
Is someone building 155/52 caliber artillery or not ?
Can we expect wheel based 155mm artillery deal to be signed this year ? Or someone is building that too in India ?
Hey,
Can you tell what is the likelihood the IA will go for the US Stryker? As when it was fielded in India in 2009 there were reports the IA was very interested in it especially as it can be transported in the C-130J/C-17 the IAF procuring. Is the process sitll on? As news on this front has gone quiet and I've not heard much for a while. And if so when would we be looking at induction?
And how do you rate the V-22s chances for the IAF/IN? Apparently India (especially IN) has shown some serious interest in the platform.
And can you tell me the status of plans for IA's SOAR (Special Operations Aviation Regiment)? As back in 2009 (I think) the IA announced plans to raise a SOAR with Dhruvs but I think nothing has really been done on this front.
And can you tell me what weapons/tech is being given to all Indian SOFs these days as recent pics have shown a significant increase in quality of kit and higher degrees of proficiency in SPEC OP roles.
To SBM: Even with the proximity-fused rounds, the Akash’s SAM round will have to rely on the Rajendra L-band engagement radar for targetting cues. And the Rajendra’s fire-control algorithms have not been optimised for tracking high-speed inbound targets like TBMs. Only if such modifications are carried out to the Rajendra will it be possible to engage the inbound TBMs with a salvo firing of the SAM rounds. AS for AAA, the number of L-70s with the Army’s AD Regiments has depreciated since 1999 and instead, post-OP VIJAY, several one-for-one replacements in the form of ZU-23-2s were acquired. The earlier upgrade package for the L-70, comprising an upgraded (by Ericsson of Sweden) Super Fledermaus system, was discarded by the mid-1990s. Instead, a customised version of the Flycatcher is now employed. The Reporters too will be employed by the ZU-23-2 Regiments.
To Anon@11.38PM: Yes, the AASM is more expensive than the Paveway, but the AASM has its unique advantages, such as a choice of terminal guidance seekers and a greater standoff range.
To Anon@12.11AM: The L-70s have been diminishing in terms of deployed numbers as the ZU-23-2s have been found to be more effective. In fact, the Skyrangers now being sought will replace the L-70s, while the ZU-23-2s will continue to remain in service. The original reqmt for Tunguskas was for 72 units, but only 24 were ordered in two batches of 12 each, starting from November 1993. Also, the 48 Schilkas, instead of being decommissioned, have since been upgraded with help from IAI/ELTA Systems. So there’s no need for additional Tunguskas (which cost about $30 million per unit). The Akash Mk2 round will have the same kind of seeker as the Mk1. Yes, the Barak-2 MR-SAM & Barak-8 LR-SAM can effectively intercept the kind of NLOS-BSMs produced and exported by China.
To Anon@12.25AM: For terminal/point defence for its ground installations away from the battle area, the IAF will provide air-defence. The SpyDer-SRs & Akash Mk1 are meant for providing air-defence for the Army’s manoeuvring mechanised and motorised infantry formations. The Army too wants MR-SAMs like the Barak-2 in order to neutralise the threats posed by NLOS-BSMs and land-attack cruise missiles. The Maitri SR-SAM as of now exists only on paper and will therefore not be able to compete with the likes of SpyDer-SR or even the VL-MICA. IF deployed, the BMD’s command and control will rest with the IAF.
To Anon@12.27AM: There are no such plans.
To Anon@2.14AM: I’ve no idea about the procurement numbers.
To Anon@4.04AM: No progress has been made on the T-72 MBT upgrade’s Phase 2. The T-90AM MBts are earmarked for procurement and the numbers are still being finalized. In addition, the first batch of T-90S MBTs are now due for a mid-life upgrade.
To Unknown: There are other wheeled options available from Spain & Australia other than the Stryker. The Stryker & Piranha have both had severe mobility problems when it comes to operating in mountainous terrain where roads at best don’t exist and where mudslides are common. A far better option would be to obtain BTR-80/90 APCs off-the-shelf from Russia and then equip them with OTO Melara’s HITFACT turrets. As for the V-22’s chances in India, those days are still in the distant future. There’s been on operational interest shown on this machine by any of India’s three armed services. The SOAR too remains just a dream. Most of the high-tech gear in service with the Para (SF) formations are of US and Israeli origin, with the US providing SATCOMS gear and the Israelis providing small arms, tactical situational awareness hardware and Tadiran-built tactical radios.
What tactical situational awareness hardware is used by Paras ?
Hey can u pls tell whether the L-70 is operated manually? Is the gun laying in the vertical plane and horizontal plane done manually by people by turning the levers or the firing sequence from gun laying and firing is done automatically by electrical and hydraulic means? Pls explain. I possess the idea that they ate fired manually as they used to do during WW2. Also what's the case with the ZU-23-2? How are they operated? Pls explain the entire firing sequence from target detection and engagement.
Has the IA purchased the IMI APAM round for the T-72,T-90? What are the different 155mm &130 mm shells? Are these shells in license production in India? In most of the MBT like the M1A1/2/3 Abrams, Challenger 2, Leopard 2 the sides of the tank are protected by thick slabs of armor may they be composites or conventional steel. As a result these tanks are well protected from the sides. But on case of T-72 and T-90 there is only a thin sheet of metal above the tracks and on the sides. In the T-90 there are 3 metal plates of very low thickness in the front portion of the sides. Why aren't our tanks heavily protected like the rest on the sides with additional laminate armour . As a result they are very vulnerable on the sides. Is anthing been done to overcome this problem? Also will not the previous T-90S be upgraded to T-90 AM standard? Generally ERA can withstand only one hit and after that it becomes useless. Will the Relikt ERA on T-90AM has multihit capability? Also what is the difference between Kontakt 5 and Relikt?
Hi PRASUN what's the point in having such a sophisticated multilayered radar network to detect, indentify and track hostile air targets when nothing is being done to shoot them down apart from the Akash mk1 with it's limited 25 km range and absence of a terminal seeker. This missile is close to obsolete . Nowadays short-range arms are available like the Panstir having 22 km range. What will the IAF do with this poor range when good no of standoff PGMs have been acquired by our enemies. They all have 60+ range. How can one hope to shoot down modern jets with such a missile having no terminal seeker. During delivery of airlauncher PGM the delivery platform will remain well out of range. Why is the IAF leaving the defence of it's bases only in it's hands. Also a few years back it came out on the newspapers that BAE is upgrading about 700 L-70 with modern fire control systems in association with OFB. So why are there only 400 L-70 guns?
To Anon @ January 23, 2012 12:31 PM
Akash will be complement SPYDER SR system in very near future and two to three years time BARAK 2/8 will be part of the air defense. Hope fully with the induction of PDV-AD-1/2 in next five year, India will have a comprehensive layered air defense in a decade or less on all its northern and southern borders. Also please note not all adversity that this air defense is expected to counter is state of the art hi-fi system, so Akash has its role in it.
Hi, the S-300 PMU 1/2/3 & S-400 PMU are not only meant for shooting down lumbering bombers but also cruise missiles, NLOS BSM, highly manuverable strike aircarfts and air superiority fighters, helicopters and IRBM. In fact the 48N6E round is even more manuverable than Akash Sam and possess a range of 200 km. India should buy such systems. Also u said that the TEL can be configured to suit operational conditions with regard th Spyder SR Sam. So what I want to ask is that if the IA wants can it increase the no of rounds from 4 to 8 per TEL? Also u said the IA is purchasing 2 such regiments. Will more such systems be ordered? Can this systems be used for cruise missile and NLOS BSM defense?
Hey Prasun,
Can you tell me where IN VBSS teams are trainined and by whom? As I had seen a YT vid a while back showing some training by IN MARCOs. Also is there equipment being upgraded as Sten guns and Tin helmets are useless today especially given international standards. (to be fair some more recent pics do show some improvement in helmets and uniform but not to the full extent of say USN).
Is there a drive within IN to enhance the capabilities of these guys/give them what they need? As in the maritime field they are essential and need to be highly trainined, competent and well equipped.
Thanks.
I have to ask a question, how much a G550 SEMA and G550 MARS cost ? How are their performance in comparison to Raytheon ASTOR/Sentinel ?
thanks a lot prasunda for the detailed explanation :)
im veering out of topic a bit but
i was going through a few articles off late and came across a few mentions where it was said that INDIA might possess nuclear warheads with yields lesser than that of pakistan.
in this context i would like to know if you can tell us
1. which country possesses better nuclear delivery mechanisms in all aspects?
2. what are the yields of the warheads that currently INDIA have vis-a-vis pakistan?
3.i was also reading about how a possible conflict might pan out between china and INDIA, and the measures that the chinese might take to out do INDIA. the threats emanating from chinese cyber warfare and information operations capability were listed very prominently. so i would like to know what measures are our services taking now and will take in the future to gear up towards such an eventuality where the chinese before or in conjunction with their offensive against us, use cyber attacks to neutralise our satellites and networks and launch cyber attacks on our railway netwroks and also television networks,etc.?
To Anon@6.01AM: Embedded ground sensors, HHTIs, manportable IRSTs, to name a few.
To Anon@12.12PM: Hun-laying for both the upgraded L-70 & ZU-23-2 is done electro-hydraulically. That’s why I clearly explained above in my earliest comments in this thread the various elements of the upgraded ZU-23-2.
To Anon@12.18PM: Has the IA purchased the IMI APAM round for the T-72,T-90? YES. What are the different 155mm &130 mm shells? Are these shells in license production in India? CHECK OUT THE OFB WEBSITE. In most of the MBT like the M1A1/2/3 Abrams, Challenger 2, Leopard 2 the sides of the tank are protected by thick slabs of armor may they be composites or conventional steel. As a result these tanks are well protected from the sides. But on case of T-72 and T-90 there is only a thin sheet of metal above the tracks and on the sides. In the T-90 there are 3 metal plates of very low thickness in the front portion of the sides. Why aren't our tanks heavily protected like the rest on the sides with additional laminate armour. As a result they are very vulnerable on the sides. Is anthing been done to overcome this problem? THE ARJUN MBT HAS ADD-ON ARMOUR PLATES ON ITS SIDES. THEY ARE FITTED ON THE BATTLEFIELD JUST PRIOR TO THE CONTACT BATTLE. THE T-72M1s HAVE ERA TILES ON THE SIDES. THE T-90S NEEDS ADDITIONAL PROTECTION ON ITS SIDES. ADD-ON ARMOUR PLATES OF THE TYPDE DEVELOPED FOR THE ARJUN IS ONE OPTION NOW BEING CONSIDERED. Also will not the previous T-90S be upgraded to T-90AM standard? THAT IS ONE OPTION BEING MULLED BY ARMY HQ. THE OTHER OPTION IS TO EQUIP THEM WITH IRON FIRST APS & A NEW COMMANDER’S PANORAMIC SIGHT DEVELOPED BY BEL ORIGINALLY FOR THE ARJUN Mk1. THIS SIGHT WILL BE FIELD-TESTED IN MARCH THIS YEAR. Generally ERA can withstand only one hit and after that it becomes useless. Will the Relikt ERA on T-90AM has multihit capability? Also what is the difference between Kontakt 5 and Relikt? ALL THIS WILL BE BEST ANSWERED BY AUSTIN, IF HE WANTS TO.
To Anon@12.31PM: As pointed above, the Akash Mks1/2 and SpyDer-SRs will in future be
Joined by MR-SAMs like the Barak-2 and LR-SAMs like the Barak-8. There will be a hierarchical and in-depth SAM-based air-defence umbrella for not just the IAF, but for the Army as well. The PDV/AD-1 & AD-2 combination will ensure near-foolproof air-defence against NLOS-BSMs, IRBMs and MRBMs.
To Anon@1.25PM: Yes, the S-300PMU 1/2/3 & S-400 can not only meant for shooting down lumbering bombers but also cruise missiles and NLOS BSMs, PROVIDED they’re deployed over flat terrain of the type prevalent along the Sino-Russian border, Sino-Kazakh border and the Russia-Ukraine border. Over mountainous terrain devoid of plains and plateaux, the target detection and acquisition systems of such Russia-origin SAMs & even their Chinese clones suffer from obvious deficiencies. And no matter how manoeuvrable the SAM may be, all that the targetted airborne platform has to do is duck below the engagement envelope of the radar illuminators of these missiles, and it is safe. The threat that then emerges is that from MR-SAMs and E-SHORADS, for which again the targetted platform must then adopt either terrain-hugging flight profiles, or activate its self-protection jamming pods. Therefore, it emerges that the main mission/role of a layered and in-depth SAM network is not so much to shoot down hostile airborne intruders, but to force the latter to abort the offensive sortie altogather. The number of TELs can be increased any time depending on the type and intensity of the threat, for as long as they’re fully networked with the accompanying command-and-control system & related target detection/engagement radars. Additional SpyDer-SR Regiments will be raised by both the IAF & Army in the years to come. Such systems can indeed be employed for targetting cruise missiles & NLOS-BSMs in their terminal stages of flight. This was demonstrated way back in January 1991 over Baghdad when a few T-LAMs were destroyed by Roland SHORADS.
To Unknown: IN’s VBSS teams are trained both in-house as well as by the navies of the US, the UK & France whenever the bilateral naval exercises are conducted. Various variants of the Tavors are now replacing the 9mm carbines and US-origin sniper rifles too have been procured. And by the way, kudos for pointing out to BROADSWORD his goof-up about the Su-30MKI’s ‘old cockpit with analogue instrumentation”. Folks like him do need to get themselves educated & corrected on such matters.
TO ABS: As for “INDIA might possess nuclear warheads with yields lesser than that of Pakistan”---not true. In fact, it is the exact opposite. Right now, it is Pakistan that possesses better nuclear delivery mechanisms (of Chinese origin) in all aspects. India’s warhead yield can go up to 150kT with boosted fission. On how a possible conflict might pan out between china and INDIA, and the measures that the Chinese might take to out-do India, I will upload next month the article which will appear in the February 2012 issye of FORCE dealing with this very topic. Regarding cyber attacks, the threats are to India’s financial institutions (like the Stock Exchanges) and utility-providers, and not so much to military assets.
HI Prasun,
Is it possible that IA will select the whole soldier modernisation suite rather than selecting individual equipments like from France (Félin) or Italy (Soldato Futuro) or Israel or wait for drdo's FINSAS ? Finmeccanica is offering their system and so is Thales for Indian FINSAS...
If they will go for individual equipment then how are they going to manage the system integration ?
Also i was looking at Italian Soldato Futuro system (italian version of Future Soldier) and Beretta's ARX-160 was equipped with a key pad. What is that keypad for ?
Why is t72 modernization program stopped ? What is upgrade 2 ? How MBTs come under that program ?
Is something else is happening like induction of more arjun or t90 instead of up-gradation of t72 ?
Just 2 years ago Indian army chose SAAB's LEDS APS for t90, why do you want to add iron fist to this ? (no offence intended) I mean is LEDS not good enough to protect t90 from sides ?
Anon @ January 24, 2012 3:50 AM and Prasun:
If I'm not wrong I read in one of your comments that SAAB's LEDS APS for t90 whereas IAI's Iron Fist is for the Arjun as each of them are optimised for the fifferent shape of the turret - t-90 circular, Arjun rectangular.
You're right. LEDS-120 is for the T-90S while Iron First is for the Arjun.
thanks a lot prasunda
given INDIA's proactive war strategy which envisages launching swift offensives across the border and occupying shallow territories on the other side of the border could you tell us exactly how the pivot corps and the strike corps and the 8 IBGs would be brought into play and when, and their roles and functions within the new hyperwar strategy for pakistan.
also if you could tell us as to what are INDIA's china specific plans?? are there anything similar to the proactive war strategy that INDIA has vis-a-vis pakistan, when it comes to china, cuz i read in some article that the upcoming MSCs would be tasked to launch an offensive in tibet and occupy certain territories in tibet in the event of a war.
thanks :)
Hi PRASUN , what I want to ask that whether IA can increase the no of missile rounds on it's Spyder SR TEL from 4 to 8 . The no of TELs per battery can be varied according to the operational requirement. When will the Elta 2082 enter service?
Hi , u said that the gun laying of the L-70 and ZU-23-2 is done electro hydraulically . Is the target detection to tracking and engagement automatic process? What I meant to say is that suppose the radar attached to an AAA battery detects a hostile ac. Then it tracks it. When the ac comes within the firing range of the guns then the fire control system on the radar will automatically pass input to the electro-hydraulic system on the gun which will then do the gun laying and open fire on the target or an operator has to perform this? Pls explain the process. What are the present no of AD AAA regiments in the IA? Has the nos gone down since 1999 or has there been replacements? Also cannot a L-70 or ZU-23-2 battery shoot down an ALCM or LACM?
Hi, I have visited the IMI website . I have visited the tank ammo section. The APAM round is available in 120 mm & 105 mm versions. There is no 125 mm round and the 24A6M gun on the T-72 & T-90 is 125mm. So how can the APAM round go on the T-72. Has IMI produced a 125 mm version exclusively for India? Also pls tell that the additional armor plates fitted on the sides of Arjun are composite armour or conventional steel plates. Generally ERA can withstand only one hit and after that it becomes useless. Will the Relikt ERA on T-90AM has multihit capability? Also what is the difference between Kontakt 5 and Relikt? Pls reply to this. Also are there any plans of fitting composite appliqué armour on the T-72 & T-90 ? The sides of the T-72 will not provide any protection after hit once. Pls reply.
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