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Monday, October 2, 2017

Why CHHAMB Continues To Matter: A Historical Perspective

Unless we derive lessons from our past mistakes, we are condemned to repeat those very same mistakes in future. This is what we can learn after conducting critical appreciations of the all of India’s wars and near-war situations with Pakistan since 1965. Publicly available critical literature (see the books below) now enables us to go back in time to map out as well as draw objective inferences from the past military campaigns of the subcontinent in a chronological manner with a reasonable degree of accuracy—all of which will serve to dictate the inevitable next round of military hostilities between India and Pakistan in the time to come. And these in turn will dictate the nature of India’s future war directives/rules of engagement (to be issued during peacetime to India’s armed forces by the executive branch of the Govt of India), and these in turn will dictate the articulation of both the joint warfighting doctrines and tactics of India’s three armed services, plus their respective force modernisation plans.
For any war planner to understand plan an integrated AirLand warfighting campaign aimed at liberating Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir, the first and foremost task is to study and analyse the military campaigns of the Indian Army’s Western Theatre Command that were conducted in 1965 and 1971, starting with the UN-sponsored/sanctioned 1948 Karachi Agreement and the limitations it posed on India’s military options with regard to Jammu & Kashmir, followed by an appreciation of Chhamb’s terrain/topography.
1948 Cease-Fire Line Explained
Terrain/Topography of Chhamb Sector
Military Options in 1965
Military Balance
Operation Gibraltar & Its Aftermath
Pakistan’s OP Grand Slam
Indian Army Ripostes
Awesome Power of Defence: How IA’s 2 Independent Armoured Brigade Decimated PA’s 1 Armoured Division in Asal Uttar Between September 8 & 11, 1965
IA’s XI Corps Battle Plan.
IA’s 4 Mountain Division Battle Plan.
IA’s 3 Cavalry Regiment stages forward to Chabal Kalan & moves up to Bhikkiwind/Patti at 6am on September 8.
PA 1 Armoured Division’s Battle Plan.
IA’s Armoured Outflanking Movement.
With boggy terrain to the east & the centre held by the IA in Asal Uttar, PA’s 4 Armoured Brigade had only one route open: from the west. Upon getting information of enemy MBT build-up around Bhura Karimpur, Salim selected his ‘Killing Ground’ to trap the enemy.
IA’s 3 Cavalry Regiment, deployed in two concentric semi-circles, awaits the enemy. The trap is now set.
PA’s 4 Cavalry Regiment is completely destroyed in detail.
On September 11, two Squadrons of PA’s 4 Cavalry Regiment are destroyed while the remnants are captured at Mahmudpura, including the Commandant and two Squadron Commanders. The PA’s 3 Armoured Brogade withdraws.
 The End-Result
First, it is obvious that the war directives (Higher Directions of War) were NEVER clearly spelt out by the then Govt of India. When it was the stated policy of India even then that Jammu & Kashmir was an integral part of India and Pakistan was illegally in occupation since 1948 of vasr areas of J & K, the Govt of India should consequently have directed both the Indian Army and Indian Air Force to plan their respective war campaigns in a manner that would have ensured the recapture of maximum territory within PoK, while ensuring the territorial inviolability of India against any offensive AirLand war campaigns waged by the Pakistan Army and Pakistan Air Force (see the original 3-point directive that was issued on September 3, 1965 below). 
Had such directives been issued by 1963 itself, then the Indian Army would not have been required to wage OP RIDDLE and OP NEPAL inside Pakistan, all of Pakistan’s initial military gains in Chhamb would have been reversed, and at the subsequent post-war negotiations in Tashkent India’s principled stand would have made it impossible for the USSR to demand that all captured territory by either warring side be returned unconditionally.
Second, it is evident that the UNMOGIP’s military observers had given ample advance warning to India about the Pakistan Army’s concentration of forces around Chhamb. Consequently, the Indian Army had at least 30 days of warning time to shore up its ground defences and finalise its joint warfighting plans with the Indian Air Force. The failure to do the latter cost India dearly in the early hours of OP GRAND SLAM.
Third, it remains a mystery why two of the Indian Air Force’s four Mi-4 helicopters that were armed were never used for immediate air-support on the battlefields. Had they been used, then by 1971 additional armed Mi-4s would have been available in the western front for helping India achieve the desired decisive results. Though the Indian Air Force was never found wanting when it came to providing close air-support, these were ineffectual in fluid battlefields where it was impossible to chart out the forward line of own troops (FLOT). And this is exactly why there were several blue-on-blue engagements in 1965 where the Indian Army was often at the receiving end of the Indian Air Force. Had the armed Mi-4s been fully integrated with the Indian Army’s combat net radio grid and had they been co-located as integral assets with the Army’s ground formations, then valuable lessons on the intricacies of delivering immediate air-support would have been learnt then itself, and consequently, by 1971 the Indian Army could well have possessed its own fledgling fleet of armed helicopter-gunships! 
Fourth, as the slides below reveal, there was virtually no joint forces training between the Indian Army and Indian Air Force, as a result of which the Army was devoid of immediate air-support whenever required, while the Air Force was devoid of actionable situational awareness inputs from the Army whenever it came to mounting ‘search-and-destroy’ counter-surface force operations’ (CSFO). Actionable situational awareness inputs could have been forthcoming had the Indian Army used its covertly-inserted special operations forces (SOF) inside hostile territory for the sake of monitoring and reporting enemy logistics-related movements through major road/railway junctions.
Fifth, the infantry-heavy formations of the Indian Army were motorised/lorried and therefore could never keep up with the fast-moving armoured cavalry formations. The absence of mechanisation was galling. 
1971 Operations Conducted in Chhamb & Chicken’s Neck Sectors
The above-mentioned narrative of HQ Western Command clearly indicates that detailed war directives from Indian Army HQ were not issued till November 1, primarily because Indian Army HQ itself had not been briefed on the politico-military objectives by the Govt of India. As the pages below will reveal, the various Corps HQs and their field formations of the Western Command were busy planning their respective tactical offensives, until December 1 when Indian Army HQ issued its military directives that mandated the conduct of strictly defensive operations. This in turn resulted in the Jammu-specific formations having to conduct last-minute tactical and logistics-related re-orientations, all of which enormously helped the Pakistan Army realise its offensive war-plans for the Chhamb sector.
Chicken’s Neck Sector Operations
Analysing The Chhamb Sector Operations
The above-descriptions of the battles are official accounts that are devoid of critical appraisals. A far more objective assessment of the prevailing ground realities and shortcomings at the operational-level can be found below.
Other Armoured Campaigns on the Western Front
IAF Air Campaigns on the Western Front
Again the politico-military objectives were never articulated to the optimal-level by the Govt of India. While the eastern sector got the attention that it deserved (resulting in an overwhelmingly successful OP CACTUS LILLY), the western front was glossed over. The then Govt of India should have mandated that while the Indian Army was free to conduct minor tactical offensives aimed at straightening certain bulges (like the Shakargarh Bulge and the Chicken’s Neck), top-most priority should have been accorded to: 1) staging major armoured offensives in the Chhamb-Sialkot sectors, and 2) capturing as much territory as possible throughout northern and north-western PoK, going so far as Skardu and the Deosai Plains. In fact, the Indian Army at that time did possess enough numerical superiority and offensive firepower for achieving these objectives. Yet again, it was only the myopic political leadership of that time that failed to spell out the desired PoK-specific war directives for the benefit of the Indian Army and Indian Air Force. 
Consequently, there arose a lack of doctrinal clarity within the Indian Army, which in turn prevented the much-needed institutional re-structuring in terms of increased mechanisation and the introduction of immediate air-support rotary-winged platforms within the Army Aviation Corps.
After 1965, the Indian Air Force had greatly reformed its CSFO operating protocols and these were highly successful on the eastern front, where the Indian Army’s offensive ground formations never operated in a vacuum and always enjoyed excellent synchronisation with the Indian Air Force. This was primarily due to the invaluable actionable situational awareness inputs coming from the Bangladeshi Mukti Bahini.
As a result, the Air Force’s Su-7BMK and Hunter interdictor/strike aircraft deployed on the eastern front were each able to able to mount three CSFOs on a daily basis. However, this feat could not be replicated on the western front since, once again, the Indian Army was unable to provide actionable situational awareness inputs.
It was due to this that over a period of 12 days, the Indian Army’s 1 Corps managed to advance a bare 13km against Pakistani covering troops.
The 1972-1998 Period
Common-sense would have dictated that after 1971, the Indian Army ought to have been authorised to raise its own Army Aviation Corps that would be equipped with recce-and-scout helicopters (RSH), attack helicopters, and medium-lift utility helicopters for casualty evacuation. Instead, the Indian Air Force continued to oppose the Army’s procurement of different types of helicopters, even after the Army Aviation Corps was established in 1986. At that time, in the Joint Implementation Instructions, it was mandated that the Army Aviation Corps would operate only helicopters below 5 tonnes in weight. Since then, the Air Force has successfully cited this document to block the expansion of the Army Aviation Corps. The blame lies with the Ministry of Defence (MoD), which has consistently avoided a decision, preferring to refer to this contentious issue as being “a family affair”. Whenever the Army Corps Aviation sent up a proposal relating to aviation assets, the MoD would send it to Air HQ for comments, knowing full well that the Air Force would effectively kill the proposal.
The Indian Army’s in-house think-tanks, which after OP Parakram in 2002 had been hard at work aimed at turning the lumbering Army into an agile, lethal, versatile and networked force capable of matching the PLA’s on-going force-modernisation efforts through re-organisation, restructuring, force development and relocation (all these being based on 13 transformation studies carried out so far), had by 2011 come up with a firm plan for expansion of the Army Aviation Corps whose main elements were: Creation of integral Combat Aviation Brigades (CAB) for each of its three Strike Corps and 10 Pivot Corps over a 15-year period between (2007-2022), with each CAB attached to the Strike Corps comprising two squadrons each with 12 attack helicopters, one squadron with 10 ‘Rudra’ helicopter-gunships (for armed tactical battle reconnaissance and casualty evacuation) and five single-engined RSHs. The CABs attached to the Pivot Corps were to comprise two squadrons with 24 ‘Rudra’ helicopter-gunships and one squadron of 15 Mi-17V-5 helicopters configured for Battalion-level armed air-assaults and casualty evacuation. Even this plan has since been short-changed, with the Army being allowed to operate only the ‘Rudra’ helicopter-gunships and RSHs.
While in May 2011 the Air Force had offered to surrender its sovereignty over the Mi-25/Mi-35P attack helicopters, this was not acceptable to the Army, which at that time also insisted on raising its integral Combat Aviation Brigades (for conducting vertical envelopment air-assault operations) equipped with armed medium-lift utility helicopters—something which the Air Force objected to. And this, despite the fact that in neighbouring Pakistan, it is the Army’s Aviation Corps that has had since the mid-1980s as its integral assets the fleets of AH-1S HueyCobra helicopter gunships, AS.350B3 armed light observation helicopters and Mi-171 medium-lift utility helicopters.
However, from in the mid-1970s till the late 1980s, the Indian Army did receive authorisation to massively upgrade and expand its land-mobile air-defence artillery network, which on January 10, 1994 led to the creation of the Corps of Army Air Defence. By the mid-1990s, therefore, the Army was well-equipped with two land-mobile Air-Defence Groups equipped with 36  ZRK-SD Kvadrat MR-SAM TELs, 80 OSA-AK and 80 Strella-10M SHORADS TELs, 96 ZSU-23-4 Schilka SPAAGs, 40 mounted ZU-23-2s (out of the 468 ordered), 200  Oerlikon Contraves Super Fledermaus LLAD-FCS, 80 Flycatcher LLAD-FCS, and 40 Reporter LLAD tactical air-control radars.
In addition, the long-overdue process of mechanisation of of the Army’s lorried infantry formations began in earnest since the early 1980s, once service-induction of the 14.3-tonne BMP-1/2 ‘Sarath’ tracked infantry combat vehicles (ICV) began. The first 700 BMP-2s were ordered off-the-shelf in 1984 from the Soviet Union and were delivered by Kurganmashzavod JSC between 1987 and 1991.
An additional 1,000 BMP-2s were ordered in 1985, these being licence-produced in India between 1992 and 2003 at the OFB’s Medak-based facility in Telengana. Yet another 123 BMP-2K ICVs were ordered in 2006 from Russia and were delivered between 2007 and 2008. Another 289 BMP-2Ks—ordered in 2009 and 2011—are now being delivered by OFB Medak. Finally, In October 2014 the MoD gave its nod to OFB Medak to produce 362 more BMP-2s, including 116 NAMICA-2 vehicles.
Against the authorisation of 2,827 and 323 BMP-2s respectively, the Mechanised Infantry and the Corps of Electrical & Mechanical Engineers are today holding only 2,521 and 170 vehicles in various versions that include the. BMP-2 ICV, the armoured amphibious dozer, armoured engineering and recovery vehicle, armoured ambulance, CBRN recce vehicle, carrier command post vehicle, carrier mortar tracked vehicle (198 units), and communications vehicle.
Earlier in 1987, the Indian Army—being acutely aware of the T-72M’s vulnerabilities, had decided to undertake Project Bison—an ambitious upgrade project in cooperation with Yugoslavia’s state-owned Yugoimport SDPR, under which all its T-72Ms would be fitted with the SUV-M-84 digital fire-control system that incorporated a Hughes-built gunner’s sight that was stabilised in two axes and included a thermal imager and laser rangefinder. The gunner’s ballistics computer—developed by Banja Luka-based (in today’s Bosnia-Herzegovina) RUDI ČAJAVEC Rudi Cajevec—was designed to automatically download cross-wind data, vehicle cant, azimuth tracking rate and range, while the gunner manually inputted the data for air-pressure, air temperature, barrel wear, barrel droop and ammunition type. Also planned for retrofit was the 12-cylinder water-cooled V-46TK 1,000hp diesel engine, that would have given the T-72M a power-to-weight ratio of 24.10 hp/tonne (thereby replacing the V46-6 engine that was rated at 780hp). A procurement contract was signed with Yugoimport SDPR in early 1989 and an advance down-payment was made as well, but by 1991, Project Bison had to be scrapped in its entirety as by then civil war had broken out in Yugoslavia, and the country was subjected to an UN-mandated universal arms export/import embargo.
Under Nuclear Overhang
When, as a consequence of the Wangdung/Sumdorong Chu Incident in 1986, the Govt of India a year later authorised the commencement of weaponisation of India’s strategic nuclear deterrent arsenal, it was also incumbent then upon the Govt of India to take the country’s armed forces in to confidence so that a comprehensive ‘Strategic Defence Review’ be conducted in order to re-orientate the military warfighting doctrines and the consequent force modernisation efforts of India’s three armed services. Sadly, this was not done (until late 2002), with the Govt of India choosing to instead rely only on the scientists and technocrats of the country’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and the Defence R & D Organisation (DRDO) for strategic guidance on operationalising India’s nuclear deterrence posture, little realising the dangerous consequences this was to have in future in terms of diminishing India’s conventional military deterrence—which became evident 12 years later.  
By 1989 India was buffeted by economic crisis, political and social demoralisation, and communal polarisation, while Punjab was still gripped by an active rural insurgency/urban terrorism, while Pakistan was then of the firm belief that the fruits of the decade-long Afghan Jihad could be replicated with success inside Jammu & Kashmir (J & K) by whipping up revisionist/distorted religiosity. Consequently, after the V P Singh-led government was sworn in on December 2, 1989, the kidnapping of 23-year old Rubaiya Sayeed (daughter of the then Indian Union Home Affairs Minister Mufti Mohd Sayeed) by the Pakistan-based Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) took place on December 8. This incident, along with overt Pakistani raising, funding and arming of various Pakistan-based terrorist ‘tanzeems’ (like the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen or HuM) opened the floodgates of terrorism inside J & K. By January 1990 a concentrated and venomous campaign by the JKLF and HuM was initiated against J & K’s minority Kashmiri Pandit community throughout the Kashmir Valley through toxic hate-preaching systematically emanating from several Mosques inside the Valley, This on January 18, 1990 reached a fever-pitch, which in turn led a day later to the mass-exodus of some 300,000 Pandits from the Valley to safer areas in Jammu and elsewhere outside J & K. On February 5, (when the then PM of Pakistan and Benazir Bhutto and the then Chief Minister of Pakistan’s Punjab province Mian Mohd Nawaz Sharif were trying to outdo one another when it came to supporting the ‘Kashmir cause’) a thousands-strong crowd of Pakistanis tried to forcibly cross the LoC and they were fired upon by India’s Border Security Force, which led to several casualties. A few days later, yet another attempted crossing was also fired upon. On March 13, at a rally in Muzaffarabad, Benazir spoke about waging a 1,000-year war for the sake of Kashmir, while India retorted by stating that if it came to war, Pakistan would not last for even 1,000 days. While Benazir was dismissed as PM in August 1990, the V P Singh-led government fell in November 1990. In February and late March 1992, attempted crossings the LoC—this time by the JKLF—was thwarted by Pakistan’s then PM Nawaz Sharif. In mid-October 1993 a group of terrorists holed themselves up inside the Hazratbal Shrine in Srinagar (a similar incident had taken place in 1963) along with 150 pilgrims who were held as hostages, and demanded safe passage, threatening otherwise to kill the hostages, blow up the mosque and destroy the relic of the Holy Prophet that housed inside the shrine. Though this crisis was resolved peacefully by mid-1993, India clearly interpreted as this as being nothing but an overt re-enactment of 1965’s OP GIBRALTAR.
This was what made India undertake a national endeavour on February 22, 1994 when India’s Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution that firmly declared that the State of J & K has been, is and shall be an integral part of India and any attempts to separate it from the rest of the country will be resisted by all necessary means, and that Pakistan must unconditionally withdraw from PoK, which it had forcibly occupied through military means. This parliamentary articulation of a position hitherto implicit or left understated was, in fact, a tectonic change that many ar that time had failed to grasp. But the Indian Army had grasped and understood the full politico-military implications of this resolution, and therefore it began the process of revisiting its force modernisation plans. Consequently, in March 1994 Army HQ formulated its GSQR for tracked self-propelled howitzers (T-SPH) SP by using the 152mm 2S19M1/MSTA-S T-SPH as the baseline performance parameter benchmark. In response to a subsequently-issued RFI, proposals were received in December 1994 from five OEMs and subsequently, field mobility-firepower trials on a no-cost no-commitment basis of four different hybrid T-SPHs (from France, the UK, Russia and South Africa) were conducted between April and July 1995. During these trials, the option of using the T-72M hull for mounting the turret-mounted howitzer proved to be a failure due to powerpack-related mobility deficiencies and thus IA HQ rejected all four offers.
What was required at this stage from the P V Narasimha Rao-led government were new war directives that emphasized the importance of waging limited high-intensity conventional wars of limited duration under a nuclear overhang, which would have replaced the then warfighting doctrine of all-out wars based on overwhelming retaliation—which was conceived in the early 1980s and was based on Gen Krishnaswami Sundarji’s  (who was the Army’s COAS from February 1, 1986 till April 30, 1988, or 820 days) Combat Papers I and II (that were published when he was Commandant of the College of Combat in Mhow in 1980-1981).  In fact, Gen Sundarji himself revisited his classic expositions of the Army’s thinking on this subject in his novel, titled ‘Blind Men of Hindoostan’—a suggestively fictional account of his own thoughts on the subject—in 1993. However, India’s ruling political elite at that time had no stomach the glaring objective ground realities, and instead continued to repose more faith in the country’s scientists and technocrats, while totally ignoring the well-meaning operational inputs from the armed forces. Due to this, the end-users of military hardware were forced to accept what the DRDO had to offer, such as liquid-fuelled rocket artillery assets developed by the DRDO’s Hyderabad-based  Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL) Research Centre at Imarat (RCI). Subsequently, the Indian Army raised its 333 (in June 1993 and commissioned in October 1995), 444 (raised in October 2003) and 555 Missile Groups (operational by January 2005), each equipped with a total of 60 liquid-fuelled, conventional warhead-armed, 150km-range Prithvi SS-150 surface-to-surface battlefield support missiles (SSBSM), including reserve rounds.
Each SS-150 Missile Group was made up of two Sub-Groups that in turn were made up of two Troops. Each Troop had two SS-150 mobile autonomous launchers (MAL). Thus, each Group had 8 launchers and almost 24 support vehicles (including the Fuel Carrier, Missile Transporter, Oxidiser Carrier, Warhead Carrier), while the number of MALs was then expected to eventually treble to 24. In times of hostilities, the missiles were required to be pre-fuelled (the shelf-life of the liquid propellant while in storage was 10 years) before being deployed to their launch sites where only three vehicles—the MAL, power supply vehicle and one Mobile Command Post (MCP)—would need to be employed. The Prithvi SS-150—officially described by the DRDO as a tactical surface-to-surface missile and by the Army as a battlefield support missile--was fuelled by a liquid propellant (a 50:50 combination of isomeric xylidine and trimethlyamine), with the oxidizer being inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA). The propellant had a 260 specific impulse—as specified by the Army, which required a range fluctuation between 40km and 150km—and this, according to the DRDO, could only have been achieved by a variable total impulse best generated by liquid propellants. When it achieved operational status, the SS-150, equipped with a strap-down inertial navigation system, had a CEP of 300 metres. Warhead options for the SS-150 included the standard high-explosive unitary warhead (weighing 1,000kg), pre-fragmented and cluster munitions, an incendiary warhead, and a fuel air explosive warhead.
Following its launch, the SS-150’s semi-ballistic trajectory took it to an altitude of 30km following which it adopted either a steep downward trajectory at nearly 80 degrees, or a lift-augmented descent trajectory. As far as the latter option went, there were six flight-path variations available (which were pre-programmed prior to launch) in order to defeat or confuse hostile air-defence systems. It is evident from all this that the SS-150, during, hostilities, was envisaged by the DRDO to be meant to be employed for massed, but not effects-based, fire-assaults against largely static targets like troop concentrations, plus railroad and POL junctions, this being done in order to severely degrade the hostile force’s theatre-level conventional force reserves before they could become effective in the forward tactical battle areas. The Indian Army, however, never intended to use the SS-150 in such a manner simply because its warfighting formations were required to have situational awareness only out to a distance of 50km within the tactical battle areas.
Similarly, the Indian Air Force too was forced to induct the liquid-fuelled, single-stage, 250km-range, 8.56 metre-long Prithvi-250 into service in 2003. The SS-250 was first test-fired on January 27, 1996 and again on March 31, 2001. Subsequently, the DRDO and the MoD unsuccessfully tried their best to force the Air Force to view such SSBSMs as substitutes for interdictor/deep-strike combat aircraft and induct the 350km-range Prithvi-2 (test-fired on  May 23, 2008; October 12, 2009; March 27 and June 18, 2010; June 9, 2011; December 20, 2012; August 12, 2013; and December 3, 2013) and the 600km-range, solid fuelled, RLG-INS-equipped Prithvi-3 (test-fired on May 19, 2016; November 21, 2016; and June 2, 2017) into service, along with the  150km-range, solid-fuelled Prahar SSBSM (developed in a span of less than two years and test-fired only on July 21, 2011). Such SSBSMs simply had no operational value-addedness, given their inability to deliver actionable, high-accuracy fire-assaults and their large, on-ground deployment footprints.
As a result of these above-mentioned mis-steps on the part of successive governments since 1987, when India conducted the Shakti-2 series of weaponised nuclear devices on May 11 and 13, 1998 (which were followed on May 28 and 30 with similar tests being conducted by Pakistan), the conventional warfighting strategies of the Army and Air Force were totally out-of-touch with the new emerging ground realities, which have since then meant that: 

1) Neither India nor Pakistan could any longer wage all-out AirLand wars of overwhelming conventional retaliation deep inside each other’s sovereign territories, since both possessed the type of nuclear WMDs (with yields not exceeding 4 kT) that could be used defensively within each other’s own territories in order to blunt large-scale conventional AirLand offensives.

2) This consequently will henceforth render the Strike Corps formations of both countries largely ineffective all along the international boundary (IB).

3) Waging limited high-intensity conventional warfare became a distinct possibility for as long as such campaigns were conducted within disputed territories, since this does not constitute any violation of international law.

4) Such warfare has be initiated at relatively short notice by India, since Pakistan is geographically linear (with its north-to-south roads and railways running close to the IB) and therefore the latter can mobilise and deploy its warfighting formations using solely its interior lines of communications within 48 hours.

5) The Indian Army, whose offensive strike formations are located deep in the hinterland, is therefore required to restructure its warfighting formations in such a manner so as to keep them permanently deployed at forward locations (within 100km of both the IB and LoC).

6) This in turn requires the pre-positioning of war-waging hardware and their end-users in up to 10 newly-built cantonments close to both the LoC and what Pakistan refers to as the Working Boundary (WB).

7) The Indian Army’s restructured integrated manoeuvrable battle groups ought to be highly mobile, possess far shorter teeth-to-tail ratio, and possess force-multiplier assets when operating in a fluid battlefield where the operational plans are based on real-time situational awareness.
It is now important to understand the various territorial boundary/frontier references. The State of J & K has 734km of the LoC running through Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh regions from Kargil to Malu (Akhnoor) in Jammu district, while it has 190km of IB from Malu to the Punjab belt running through Jammu, Samba and Kathua districts. The IB between India and Pakistan spans 2,175km. The WB spans 202km, the LoC spans 797km, and the Line of Actual Contact (LAC)—which India calls the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL)—from map-grid reference NJ-9842 till Indra Kol—spans 108km. The LoC runs from a place called Sangam close to Chhamb (which lies on the western bank of the Munnawar Tawi River) all the way up north to NJ-9842 in Ladakh, following which the AGPL takes over. The WB lies in Jammu Division between Boundary Pillar 19 and Sangam i.e. between Jammu and Sialkot, which was part of the erstwhile princely state of J & K. It is this stretch that Pakistan refers to as the WB, since it maintains that the border agreement of 1947 (the so-called standstill agreement) was inked between the princely state of J & K and Pakistan, and not between India and Pakistan.
Even if the then NDA-1 government had by May 1998 publicly announced its intention to conduct a comprehensive strategic defence review aimed at restructuring India’s three armed services in order to address the new ground realities associated with the conduct of limited high-intensity conventional warfare, the chances of Pakistan launching OP BADR against India in northern J & K would have been slim. Given the total ratio of land forces of India and Pakistan, which then was about 2.25 : 1.2 the Pakistan Army’s Military Operations Directorate had then concluded that the initial Indian military reaction would be to rush in more troops inside J & K, thereby further eroding the Indian Army’s offensive capabilities against Pakistan. As a consequence, the MO Directorate concluded that India would not undertake an all-out offensive against Pakistan, since by doing so she would run the risk of ending in a stalemate, which would be viewed as a victory for Pakistan. It is for this reason that the Pakistan Army had then concluded that war, let alone nuclear war, was never a possibility. The Pakistan Army’s consequent operational plan envisaged India amassing troops along the LoC to deal with the threat at Kargil, Drass and Batalik, thereby resulting in a vacuum in the rear areas. By July, the Mujahideen were required step up their sabotage activities in the rear areas, thereby threatening the Indian lines of communication at pre-designated targets, which would have helped isolate pre-determined pockets, forcing the Indian troops to react to them. This in turn would have created an opportunity for the Pakistani forces at Kargil, Drass and Batalik to push forward and pose an additional threat. India would, as a consequence, be forced to the negotiating table. While it is useless to speculate on whether it could in fact have succeeded, theoretically the plan for OP BADR was faultless, and the initial execution, tactically brilliant. But at the strategic-level the Pakistan Army was caught totally off-guard by India’s vertical escalation (by involving the Indian Army through OP VIJAY and the Indian Air Force through OP Safed Sagar) that lasted from April 29 till August 3, 1999.
However, what totally bemused Pakistan’s military leadership at that time was the totally defensive mindset and a total lack of strategic visioning on the part of India’s then ruling political leadership. This was subsequently articulated by none other than Lt. Gen. Javed Hassan—who as the then GOC Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA) had played a key role in commanding both Pakistan Army and the then paramilitary Northern Light Infantry (NLI) forces during OP BADR in 1999. He had in the mid-1990s been commissioned by the Pakistan Army’s Faculty of Research & Doctrinal Studies to produce a guide to India for serving officers of the Pakistan Army. In ‘India: A Study in Profile’, published by the military-owned Services Book Club in 1990, Lt Gen Hassan had argued that the ruling Indian ‘baniya’ is driven by “the incorrigible militarism of the Hindus.” “For those who are weak,” he had gone on, “the Hindu is exploitative and domineering.” A highly intelligent and well-read officer, he was more of an academic than a commander, and bore that reputation. He, therefore, was the best-placed with a point to prove in a subsequent military appreciation of OP BADR—this being that OP BADR had provided India with a splendid opportunity to enact its February 22, 1994 parliamentary resolution by embarking upon a prolonged high-intensity AirLand offensive across the LoC that could eventually have resulted in the capture of almost the entire district of Baltistan (inclusive of Skardu and the Deosai Plains) at a time when both the Pakistan Army and Pakistan Air Force were clearly unable to give high-intensity battle for more than a week, since the US, by invoking the Pressler, Glenn-Symington and Solarz Amendments since October 1990 had stopped providing product-support for all US-origin military hardware in service with Pakistan’s military, and also because Pakistan was holding only 48 hours worth of military POL stockpiles at that time.    
This inexplicable defensive mindset of India’s ruling political elite was again in full display during OP PARAKRAM, which was launched in the wake of the December 13, 2001 terrorist attack on India’s Parliament, and was the first full-scale mobilisation since the 1971 India-Pakistan war. It began on December 15, 2001 after the Cabinet Committee on National Security’s (CCNS) authorisation and was completed on January 3, 2002. It finally ended on October 16, 2002 when the CCNS belatedly recognised that the law of diminishing returns had been operative for many months already. In the snow-bound areas of J & K the Indian Army had by then relatively few options to launch offensive operations across the LoC, while in the plains of Punjab and Rajasthan the climatic conditions were ideal, but the nuclear overhang became the inhabiting factor. By that time, approximately 52,000 hectares of land along the IB, WB and LoC had been mined with about 1 million landmines. Till July 2003, the Indian Army had suffered 798 casualties due to mishaps in minefields, mishandling of ammunition and explosives, and traffic accidents. The cost of sustaining OP PARAKRAM was pegged by India’s National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) at Rs. 7 crore a day. This worked out to approximately Rs.2,100 crore over 10 months and did not include the cost of mobilisation and de-induction. India’s Parliament was informed in October 2002 that OP PARAKRAM had cost Rs.6,500 crore, excluding the Rs.350 crore paid as compensation to people residing in border states where Indian troops were deployed. The Army was the biggest contributor to the expenses. Figures collated by Army HQ indicated that the cost of mobilisation of 500,000 troops, including pay and allowances, field allowance for one year and transfer grant alone was Rs.700 crore. The wear-and-tear cost of equipment added up to Rs.1,300 crorem while the depletion of mines, ammunition and warlike stores was around Rs.550 crore. Transport and fuel costs together added up to Rs.850 crore.. The total figure for the Army stood at Rs.3,860 crore and did not include the cost of withdrawal of troops (estimated at around Rs.500 crore) and the cost of demining one million mines for which new demining equipment had to be bought from Denmark. Nor did this figure include the cost of deploying (and redeploying) the Navy, the Indian Air Force and the Coast Guard, which was estimated to be another Rs.1,000 crore.
The only one to voice the Indian armed forces’ intense frustration over the continued myopia of India’s then ruling elite was none other than Gen. Sundararajan ‘Paddy’ Padmanabhan, who had served as the Indian Army’s Chief of the Army Staff from September 30, 2000 till December 31, 2002. Going on-the-record on February 6, 2004 (see:, he explicitly stated that problems with India’s then prevailing (or obsolete) military doctrine and a lack of clarity within the then Union Cabinet and on its war objectives had undermined OP PARAKRAM at the very outset. Gen. Padmanabhan argued that significant military gains could have been achieved in the first quarter of January 2002, had India’s ruling politicians made the decision to go to high-intensity limited conventional war. These objectives, he said, could have included the “degradation of the other force, and perhaps the capture of disputed territory in J & K. They were more achievable in January, less achievable in February, and even less achievable in March. By then, the balance of forces had gradually changed.” Pakistan, the Indian Army planners had then believed, had an interest in taking the conflict towards a nuclear flash-point as soon as possible. The Indian Army on the other hand believed that the best prospects of avoiding such a situation was having forces in place that could rapidly secure limited war objectives across the LoC. “If you really want to punish someone for something very terrible he has done,” Gen Padmanabhan said, “you smash him. You destroy his weapons and capture his territory.” “War is a serious business,” he continued, “and you don’t go just like that.” Doctrinal baggage, he accepted, had crippled India’s early options in 2002. “You could certainly question why we are so dependent on our strike formations,” he said, and “and why my Holding Corps don’t have the capability to do the same tasks from a cold start. This is something I have worked on while in office. Perhaps, in time, it will be our military doctrine.”
From India’s perspective, the most important lesson that emerged from this standoff was that political and military instruments of national power must work together in a synchronised manner. Deciding to adopt a pronounced forward and aggressive military posture to coerce/compel Pakistan was basically a political decision, and India’s armed forces, excluded from the decision loop, could not immediately adopt the posture its political masters desired. Admiral Sushil Kumar, the Indian Navy’s Chief of the Naval Staff till December 30, 2001, later opined that OP PARAKRAM was the most punishing mistake for the armed forces because the government of the day then lacked any political aim or objective for deploying the Army along the India-Pakistan borders. “There was no aim or military objective for the OP PARAKRAM. I don’t mind admitting that OP Parakram was the most punishing mistake for the Armed Forces. When the Parliament strike took place, in the (CCNS) board-room it was a super-charged atmosphere, as you are aware in the CCNS board-room, the three Service Chiefs sit opposite the Union Cabinet. In the end, PM (Atal Bihari) Vajpayee turned to me and said ‘aap khush nahi lag rahe hain Admiral Sahab’ (You don’t seem to be happy). I said I beg your pardon, Sir, can you give us what is your political aim? We need to derive a military aim from it. That is the whole principle of war. What is the aim, you need an aim and military objective.”
Holding that little attention was paid to the maritime dimension during the Kargil conflict in mid-1999, Admiral Kumar said: “There was no focus on the maritime dimension and the focus was only on the LoC. I had said that Kargil will once happen in the sea and nobody believed me. Eight years later 26/11 happened, but we have never learnt from our mistakes.” Referring to nuclear versus conventional war fighting capabilities, Admiral Kumar explained that nuclear deterrence should not be considered as the replacement for conventional warfighting capabilities of the country. “The problem is that the nuclear mindset we have is a false sense of security. Nuclear deterrence is required but it does not replace conventional deterrence. Conventional deterrence is the real deterrence, it gives you a credible response capability,” he said.
While the conflict in mid-1999 led to the death of 527 Indian soldiers, shockingly, without going to war, 798 soldiers were killed during OP PARAKRAM. In the initial phase itself, around 100 soldiers were killed and 250 injured during mine-laying operations. In the armed forces, there was seething anger against the then government having achieved so little with so much. Hollow now sounded Vajpayee’s rhetoric of “aar paar ki ladaai” and several such allusions to a decisive battle. Those with a sense of history had then asked: is 2002 to Vajpayee what the 1962 debacle with China was to Nehru? Vertical escalation, it calibrated and maintained, would not have spiralled out of control. But after the initial weeks, the strategic surprise was lost by early February 2002. Matters were imprecisely conceived, and that there was no clear political objective to the mass military mobilisation. The subsequent military deployment became a losing gamble of meaningless brinkmanship. No informed cost-benefit analysis about the contours of the available military responses was undertaken. Nor were they preceded by politico-military war-gaming. It came about suddenly, and reeked of ad hocism. In developed countries, such war-gaming is a continuous process, enabling military planners to factor in the strains the political system could come under during wartime, and ways in which it could affect the operation. Of what use then was New Delhi's bluster and sabre-rattling?
The verdict: the 2001-2002 total military mobilisation was a disaster, perhaps the biggest since 1962. Political masters of that time never issued orders to realise any tactical objective, thereby underlining that the military mobilisation was never intended to launch attacks against Pakistan. But this inactivity ultimately extracted a tremendous price. Firstly, it bolstered the assiduously-cultivated Pakistani myth that strategic deterrence has worked for it. Secondly, India’s armed forces seriously degraded their operational reserve of combat hours. What would have happened if India was faced with a repeat requirement in three months? New orders for weapons had to be placed, with consequent lag-times in terms of delivery schedules. Thirdly, as a consequence, India would have had to open herself to new strategic vulnerabilities, thereby getting squeezed in the process. Fourthly, since all combat and support equipment, especially air-defence hardware and precision-guided munitions, have a defined storage life that is measured in terms of hours, once taken out to the field and exposed to uncontrolled environment, such hardware quickly begins to degrade and become useless for combat purposes. This applies across the board, which if kept revved up for 10 months in the desert, would have had their functional abilities impaired.
And what about the alleged overhaul of the national security system post-Kargil and the then Defence Minister George Fernandes’ tall claims of India’s ability to wage a limited war? In reality, what the country got from the ruling political class since then has been a dubious result of less than pyrrhic value. For instance, sample the so-called Cold Start warfighting doctrine of the Indian Army, which was vaguely explained by the then COAS of the Indian Army, Gen Nirmal Chander Vij, on April 28, 2004. According to Army HQ, the reconfigured ground combat formations at each level will be task-oriented in terms of varying composition of armour and infantry elements, with integrated attack helicopters of the Army Aviation and the Air Force, besides battlefield air interdiction (BAI) support coming from the Air Force. Also, there was then much hype about integrated Army Aviation surveillance helicopters, plus command-and-control helicopters.  As per Army HQ, the future battlefields along India’s western borders would involve the use of eight permanently forward-deployed ‘integrated battle groups’, meaning Brigade-sized integrated armoured/mechanised infantry forces with varying composition of armour, field/rocket artillery, infantry and combat air-support that are available to the Army’s Pivot (Holding) Corps-level formations. These ‘integrated battle groups’ would be mobilised within 48 hours and will be operating independently and will thus have the potential to disrupt or incapacitate the Pakistani leadership’s decision-making cycle. As per this school of thought, when faced with offensive thrusts in as many as eight different sectors, the Pakistan Army would be hard-pressed to determine where to concentrate its forces and which lines of advance to oppose. In addition, having eight ‘integrated battle groups’ capable of offensive action will significantly increase the challenge for Pakistani military intelligence’s limited exploration/exploitation assets to monitor the status of all the tactical battle areas, thereby improving the chance of achieving surprise. Furthermore, in a limited war, India’s overall politico-military goals would be less predictable than in a total war, where the intent would almost certainly be to destroy Pakistan as a functional state. As a result, Pakistan’s defensive ripostes against Indian attacks would be more difficult because the military objectives would be less obvious. Lastly, if Pakistan were to use nuclear weapons against the advancing Indian ‘integrated battle groups’, such dispersed formations operating over narrow frontages would present a significantly smaller target than would Corps-level formations.
In reality, the Indian Army’s declared ‘Pro-Active Strategy’ involving the cold-starting of the forward-deployed ‘integrated battle groups’ WRONGLY PRESUPPOSES that in the next round of military hostilities with Pakistan, the politico-military objectives will be clearly spelt out far in advance. And there is no credible evidence on the ground about this being the case as of now. Any military offensive strategy hinging on high-intensity limited war can only be successful if India’s political leadership at the given time of operational execution of this strategy has: the political will to use offensive military power; the political will to use pre-emptive military strategies; the political sagacity to view strategic military objectives with clarity; the political determination to pursue military operations to their ultimate conclusion without succumbing to external pressures; the political determination to cross nuclear thresholds if Pakistan seems so inclined’ and the determination to not shy away from enunciating India’s national interests from which flows all military planning. If any of the above are missing, as they have been from 1947 to till now, the Indian Army’s ‘Pro-Active Strategy’ will not add up to anything.

So, how does go about enunciating India’s national interests vis-à-vis Pakistan? For that, one needs to develop a deep understanding of the nature of the beast. Sample these:

(to be concluded)


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DAshu said...

Good to know all these facts

Millard Keyes said...

I don't know much has changed since because it still appears Pakistan is following the same format- guerilla/terror attacks followed by regular Pak offensive. India seems to still rely on reactive response instead of proactive response. Thanks to the US supply of weaponry during cold war era and now direct access to Chinese arsenal Pakistan can muster equipment at a lot quicker notice than India where red tape is only cut once invasion has begun.
My question is: seeing India had the upper hand in 1948 after the initial Pak attack, WHY did India accept Karachi agreement seeing it was such a handicap? Was India threatened of a multinational invasion if the forward offensive was carried on?

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To DASHU: VMT. Will upload later today the 1971 installment, followed by explanations on how/why were the lessons STILL NOT LEARNT by mid-1999 & again during OP Parakram in 2002, & what was the price that had to be paid for such crimninal negligance that was & continues to be displayed by India's ruling elite. All this will in turn clearly explain why India continues to arm without first taking aim.

Abhinav said...

Also please do explain how 10th Inf division recently converted to RAPID Division will be utilised in future conflicts.We have deployed 2 armoured regiments in Chummb Jauriyan sector. Also the Current ORBAT of Pakistani army in Chumbb sector.


Share this blog post article to dumbass morons of defence ministry to develop some war skills.....any way I do appreciate your effort to bring it out in a manner easy for us to understand the nitty gitties if this....btw how much time it took for creating this post

Anmol Chaudhary said...

This is a great read.
Have an unrelated question. Why hasn't or doesn't the Indian army shift to different digital camos ? Aren't they substantially better than its current camos ?

Anonymous said...

There was also another factor in POK. One of the main reasons IA did very well in the Srinagar valley and Jammu area was that the locals didn't want to join Pakistan at the time. They infact acted with the IA to stop the PA. Provided intelligence, Logistics etc... The POK is different beast. They are more fundie, more militaristic and hate India.

At the time IA did not have the resources that it does today. The airforces were more balanced too. Hence it limited the use of limited number of heli's. IAF shot down number of PA heli's. There is one other factor, which many will not like but the IA general staff had a factor when it came to PA. PA to this day has an offensive-defensive strategy. This means that if they attack first, they will take Indian territory and that is where most of the war will be fought. They also have much much shorter tail and can get to the jump-off point within 48 hours. We take much much longer and its still the case. How do we shorten this?


Anik said...

Considering the evolving threat perception, the Indian Air Force has decided to raise night flying by its combat jets from the current around 30 per cent in all its frontline bases to have a major tactical advantage over its adversaries.

Our current night flying fleet is 30% what are the future designs, to what level it will be/needs to be increased to.



Subho Bijoya to you & your family.

Came across this recent article on NSA, Ajit Doval. Basically describes how he fights insurgents & carries out tradecraft. Would really appreciate your views on Ajit Doval.

Thank You

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To ABHINAV: The above-uploaded slides dealing with 1971 clearly reveal how the PA used its armoured, mechanized & field artillery assets. To devise countermeasures should now be easy even for a layman, PROVIDED common-sense is used. If the country’s political mindset still continues to regard the LoC as sacrosanct (as was the case in 1965, 1971 & again in 1999 & even now) & refuses to understand that it is only a TEMPORARY cease-fire line & not a permanent border, then not even the Almighty can come to India’s rescue. The same goes for India’s citizens as well, especially who gloat & go ga-ga over the cross-LoC raids of 29 September 2016! Chest-thumping by all those over just one such raid carried out by the 1.16 million-strong IA only reveals the kind of low self-esteem levels of such folks at a time when public opinion must FORCE the country’s ruling elite to once & for all stop over-estimating the PA & PAF, & instead authorize the IA & IAF to undertake a six-month-long non-stop cross-LoC raiding campaign.

To AMIT BISWAS: Speaking of ‘dumb-arse morons of the MoD’, the new RM recently chaired a meeting of the DAC when she was never reqd to do so (DAC meetings are always chaired by the Defence Secretary) & in that meeting she bizzarely asked the MoD to call for new bids (meaning entirely new contract negotiations & their terms/conditions) for a follow-on order for KLUB PGMs for the IN!!! Someone should educate her on such matters by explaining that whenever follow-on orders are placed, all terms & conditions of the first ‘mother’ contract apply & only the price quotes are different. Hence, follow-on orders are always known as SUPPLEMENTARY CONTRACTS. So, it looks like this new RM is following the footsteps of here predecessor (now the CM of Goa) who too was clueless about MoD procurement norms & practices.

Conducting battle-studies is a long & continuous process. Co9llation of mayerials for this thread took me only 3 days.

To ANMOL CHAUDHARY: The IA began the transition to digital pixilated camouflage patterns in the previous decade itself. Haven’t you seen the IA’s T-72M1s on parade during Republic Days featured pixilated camouflage patterns?

To ANIK: As more LDPs of the Litening family become available, there will be a corresponding increase in the number of night-flying by the IAF.

To BUDDHA, VIKRAM GUHA, SUVO, SUMANTA NAG & SUJOY MAJUMDAR: The very same to you & all your loved ones.

To PIERRE ZORIN: Only 2 words describe the reason: DIPLOMATIC FATIGUE. And this in turn crops up due to the Indian political elite’s (both past & present) low sense of self-esteem. Self-confidence is totally lacking. And they are always helped by those overwhelming masses who are always too willing to be dragged by their noses. What else can explain why the then PM A B Vajpayee in mid-1999 prevented the IAF & IA from crossing the LoC & capturing vast quantum of real-estate when he along with his fellow Parliamentarians had unanimously passed a resolution on February 22, 1994 which stated that undivided J & K was an integral part of India? What are we to make of this gimmickry? On one hand PoK is an integral part of India & on the other every Indian was then expressly forbidden to cross the LoC in order to go insides PoK! Such are the ‘Bharat Ratna-quality leaders’ that India has been blessed with!!!

Millard Keyes said...

May be the name Atal Behari or Atal Bihari is to blame: Biharis or Mulkis in WB are synonymous with being moronic and utter clueless. Someone unmovably clueless might better explain such decisions. That's why I said nothing has changed - there is NO clear objective on the Indian side as to what the threat is. The Ministers and even military heads are too busy planning how to repel an attack when they should be planning to do away with any attack in the first place! That little segment you have with the Lt Gole explains it all - the entire futility. I asked about the Karachi agreement- now that I read the Tashkent one it was even worse considering the USSR not the USA brokered such a deal! If you can call it a deal from an Indian perspective. Extremely disappointing given the potential of India. They are all playing the musical chair - not sure when the music will stop so too scared to move away from the nearest chair...

sam said...

Recently some defence related fb pages have been showing press brefing of ISPR of pakistan, where it shows footage (alleged) of indian bunkers being destroyed by them. How far this claim is true and why mainstream media is not reporting?
Also, we have been hearing about surgical strikes for a year now. Whats your take on why IA didn't penetrated more inside paki territory and punished the real people behind all this stuff who were sitting behind n providing cover n support to terrorists upfront.
Finally, how do you view the recent approval of 66 reforms by min of def will effect our armed forces. Are these reforms just superfecial and cosmetic or do they really pack a punch.

Appreciate your efforts & hv become a regular viewer of this blog page.


SUVO said...

Good to know all these facts.
Here from Larry Pressler:

Prranshu Yadav said...

Dear Prasun sir,
I have read on DRDO website that they have developed runway penetrating submunitions for use in pritvhi missile. Why are these submunitions not used in much longer range Shaurya missile too? If I am right Shaurya can carry a 700 kg payload over a distance of 1000 km. So it could enable us to take out runways deep inside enemy territory. And I think that's essential as many of China's modern fighters like Su-30 and J-20 have very long ranges. Shaurya could also be fitted with anti armour submunitions to take out air defence sites before our fighter jets enter enemy territory.

asd said...

Dear Prasun,

Can I trust your words that after September 2018 India is going to capture PoK by making a high intensity limited war?

Millard Keyes said... Apache review- note the number of Apaches that were downed. Nothing mentioned about Mil Mi-28NM or KA-52 being attacked....
CH-53K largest US helicopter - K21 IFV and K-21 105 light tank

Millard Keyes said...

Read your article October 23,1026 about acquiring Knowledge based warfare where you mentioned converting Vijayanta and T-55 tanks into breech loaded mortars etc. Whilst not quite the 4th and 5th generation equipment like the new types, your suggestions if taken, could have provided a LOT of benefits and financial savings whilst providing close enough products to those existing in developed nations' armed forces around the world. Nothing has moved as usual and it appears either these necessities would be completely overlooked or as situation would demand then ad hoc off the shelf purchases would be made!

Ankit Singh said...
quite old article but a great read
Out of all these things suggested by CEMILAC what are the modifications that were carried out by ADA and if not will these modifications be carried out by HAL in LCA MK1A and if still not what were this folks doing from 2009 till now?
These modifications can surely reduce a lot of weight which will in turn solve the internal SPJ problem and as you always say there will requirement of a lot of sound common sense.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To PIERRE ZORIN: Why single out just A B Vajpayee? As I’ve explained above, the longstanding issue of empowering the IA’s Aviation Corps has consistently been sabotaged since 1972, so Morarji Desai, Charan Singh, Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, V P Singh, S Deve Gowda, I L Gujral, Dr Manmohan Singh & NaMo are all to be held responsible for the sorry state of affairs. But the malaise runs far deeper, as no self-respecting country will ever allow its innocent citizens to become sacrificial lambs. Agsinst this, what has India done so far? Here are the results: terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir has claimed 41,000 lives in the past 27 years, an average of 4 deaths per day in the state, or 1,519 casualties every year. The casualties include 14,000 civilians, 5,000 security personnel and 22,000 terrorists between 1990 and March 2017. In all, there have been 69,820 terrorism-related incidents during the period; that’s like the state witnessing 2,586 incidents every year, for which India blames cross border terror from Pakistan. Although not on the same scale as in the 1990s or early 2000s, such incidents have been increasing after 2014. From 2014 to March this year, there have been 795 incidents in which 397 terrorists were killed, while 64 civilians and 178 security personnel lost their lives. Compared to 222 incidents in 2014, there were 322 incidents in 2016. In 2014, 28 civilians and 47 security personnel and 110 terrorists were killed in these incidents. In 2016, these numbers were 15, 82 and 150. As per the data, 2001 was the most volatile year and saw the killing of highest number of terrorists and security forces. While 2,020 terrorists were gunned down, 536 security personnel 996 civilians were also killed in the year that registered the highest number of 4,522 terrorism-related incidents as well. But in terms of civilian casualties, 2002 was the worst with 1,008 deaths. Besides 1,707 terrorists, 453 security personnel were also killed that year. Terrorism had reached its peak during the previous BJP-led NDA government when Atal Bihari Vajpayee was the PM. From 1999 to 2003, 7,820 terrorists, 2,055 security personnel and 4,519 civilians were killed in J & K. The National Conference was then in power in the state with Farooq Abdullah as the CM. Post-1990, the second most tumultuous phase in the state was between 1993 and 1997 when 6,522 terrorists were eliminated, while 4,910 civilians and 1,012 security personnel lost their lives. Terrorism witnessed a steady decline from 2004 onwards till 2014 with a sharp decrease in the number of killings. In 2013, there were only 170 incidents in which 67 terrorists, 15 civilians and 53 security personnel were killed. From 2004 to 2014, the Congress-led UPA government was in power at the Centre while the Peoples’ Democratic Party-Congress alliance ruled J & K from 2002 to 2008. In 2008, the National Conference and the Congress formed a coalition government and CM Omar Abdullah remained at the helm till 2014.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To SAM: All those installations shown being blown up ARE NOT posts of the IA. That’s because all IA0manned posts along the LoC always sport the Indian tricolor & in all the ISPR-related footage the Indian tricolour is nowhere to be seen. As for more cross-LoC raids after September 29, 2016 my view is that they should have been carried out & announced on a regular basis, but the targets should not have been just the launch-pads, but also the PA’s adjoining posts because without the PA, there would be no jihadis. So, the principal target that sustains the jihadi infrastructure needs to be targetted. Why this hasn’t been done? Simply because India’s political decision-makers have always OVER-ESTIMATED the PA’s retaliatory capacities/capabilities for reasons best known to these political nitwits. Lastly, NONE of the so-called ‘reforms’ approved by the MoD for the IA pertain to enhancing either the combat effectiveness or the immediate war preparedness of the IA. They all pertain to the rightsizing of the IA’s internal non-combatant bureaucracy.

To ANMOL CHAUDHARY: LoLz! Lives can be saved in J & K ONLY IF the principal sponsorer of terrorism, i.e. the PA, were to be punished by exacting a heavy cost from it. The same goes for the Red Corridor. If the Grey Hounds Police Force of Andhra Pradesh could completely wipe out the naxal menace from both AP & Telengana, there’s no reason why such success cannot be replicated in Odisha or Chattisgarh or Bihar or Jharkhand. It’s like talking about ‘survival’ in the Siachen Glacier when the issue is all about ‘habitability’, i.e. stop procuring equipment & clothing meant for arctic warfare when the reqmt is for high-altitude warfare.

To PRRANSHU YADAV: And you believed it, did you? If a Prithvi’s CEP is 140 metres at max range, then where the hell is there any chance of a runway being hit? The Shaurya’s CEP at max range is more than 400 metres, which makes it far worse & no way can be become a precision-strike missile.

To ASD: Looks like you’ve decided to join those masses who constantly clamour for readily-available/readymade options just for the sake of one’s mind not being taxed. If that’s the case, then I’m afraid I will have to disappoint you, for I’m no GODMAN. Neither am I a prophet. Instead, I do my calculations & draw conclusions based on objective ground realities. As for the future round of definitive hostilities, it will take place NOT BECAUSE India’s ruling political elites need it or can appreciate its need, but because UNCLE SAM will drag India by her nose & make her do it, rest assured. And here are 2 indicators: First, the US for the first time has declared the CPEC to be illegal since it passes through PoK (see this: Immediately after this, the PA held its Corps Commanders’ meeting at GHQ in Rawalpindi yesterday for 7 hours, at the end of which there were NO statements or tweets from ISPR.

To ANKIT SINGH: Most of those suggested mods were for reducing aerodynamic drag & weight. But despite all this, the agility metrics of the LCA were not improved simply because the wing redesign had not been carried out. Refer to my thread on the LCA-AF Mk.2 in which the optimum wing design as suggested by GE Aero Engines is shown. Without this modification, the max AoA, instantaneous turn rate/sustained turn radii cannot be improved. Meanwhile, here are some new videoclips on ‘desi’ firearms:

Joint Venture Protective Carbine

AMOGH 5.56 x 30 carbine:

OFB Kanpur:


Level 4 BPJ:

Pay close attention on the weight of this BPJ. Even that moron from INDIA TODAY (who like another moron from NDTV) had always ASSUMED that BPJs for combat soldiers can be lightweight has at last come closer to grasping the reality.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To EVERYONE: Since this thread contains an analysis of issues pertaining to strategic visioning & its consequent institution-based structural reforms & warfighting issues of a doctrinal nature, kindly refrain from asking off-topic questions in this thread, & instead post them in the previous thread, so that I can answer them in this thread. This will help conserve space for comments & discussions related to the subject-matter of this thread.

panic said...

Sir instead of having a tug of war with each other, why dont our Army & the Airforce collectively pool in their resources to procure such Air assets like Attack , Recce, medium, heavy lift choppers Jointly.
i.e to procure,maintain & use it jointly. If they can have such an arrangement,duplication of such resources can be better avoided.

dineja said...

Hi Prasun,
Why is there more urgency now for india to attack pakistan ???? Because US influence there is reduced and if Pakistani will feel more vulnerable then US will have a good chance to create influence.


Anonymous said...


1) Are we assured of gaining territory in POK once the definitive round of hostilities begin ?

2) How can we be sure that PRC would not intervene for the sake of the CPEC? Only if our deterrent is fully credible vis a vis PRC can we ensure this without depending on the U.S.


Anonymous said...

Prasunda, this is a amazing work of compilation of the operations and their implications on the ground. Gives very pointed and focused attention to the aspects of ground realities and the results of the 65 and the 71 wars. Thank you.

I have a few of these books but most of the time I wished I had a full wall screen of google Earth while reading them to understand the ground and the terrain and the approaches of the confronting forces. It is also difficult to relate an action in say, the Chhamb sector, from different officers involved in the operation and their unique individual perspectives.

One thing though I felt was missed out in your otherwise brilliant compilation narrative.

Its the operations of the Packet and AN-12 transports role in the war. My brother a pilot in the Packet squadron was the first plane to land in Dhaka airport, with others following his, with a contingent of troops who were to take over the Dhaka airport. He expected to be blown out of the air while landing. These troops secured the Dhaka airport from Pak army units controlling that vital installation. This successful action was one of the biggest pieces of the jigsaw that led to the biggest surrender of the "mighty" Pak Army in the world, using the tiny force of Indian Army in East Pakistan.

I would appreciate vastly a few slides on them if you have in your encyclopedic collection and the role that they played in the 2 wars.


Anonymous said...

I like everybody being optimistic about present GOI ordering our forces to regain the lost POK next yr but on ground we can see present GOI is incapable of taking such tough decisions and following exactly what NDA-1 has doing i.e. doing surgical strikes when we got attacked n doing chest thumping it....on UNCLE SAM dragging IND to hostilities may be next decade when PAK will be balkanised internally but not from external forces i.e. IND,US and UK.
Sir internally has present GOI passed any directives to armed forces regarding regaing lost POK?


joydeep ghosh said...

@prasun da

thanks for the exhaustive blog (didnt read all) on such a topic btw regarding the same i have about the Plan CJC or Chhammb juarian corridor plan of indian army to rest back the entire area as well as sialkot, ca you shed some light on that.

instead of talking about what could have been done in past isnt it better to devise how to go about in future, in that sequence i percieve rather than chhammb, resting back Haji pir is for me a better deal as it will help join uri and poonch directly, your views


joydeep ghosh

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To PANIC: In the history of mankind, no institution has ever been generous enough to resort to the kind of resource-sharing that you are alluding to. Only when instructions are issued from the TOP are all differences made to reconcile. Thjis is the entire point & thrust of this thread: i.e. identify all possible shortcomings & fix institutional accountability, i.e. who is to be held responsible for existing dysfunctionalities.

To DINEJA: Looks like you’ve not been following the various debates in the past few threads of this blog. What ever makes you say that the US influence opver Pakistan is reduced or reducing or will reduce? AFAIK Pakistan still counts its forex reserves & inbound foreign remittances in US$ denomination, the children of most Pakistani senior military officers are undertaking higher studies in the US, all financial loans from China WRT CPEC projects are US$-denominated, & the PAF & PA have not offered their F-16s & AH-1J/F HueyCobras for sale. Furthermore, once Pakistan yet again goes for IMF-bailouts the money sought will all be in US$-denomination. Pakistan annually imports US$32 billion worth of goods & services & exports only US$20 billion worth of goods. So, I don’t see even a micron of China’s Yuan or Russia’s Rouble in existence anywhere inside Pakistan. Hence, how have you concluded that US influence or clout over Pakistan has reduced?

To SATYAKI: 1) Yes, because no one can deny or challenge the contents of UNSC Resolution No.47, which recognises the Instrument of Accession & by consequence also acknowledges PoK being an integral part of India. 2) Even the PRC can no longer ignore or violate UNSC’s resolution. It copuld do so for as l;ong as it wasn;t a UN member. But not anymore.

To KANE: VMT, but this thread & its contents ARE NOT about covering the entire wars of 1965 & 1971. Instead, the focus is ENTIRELY on the Chhamb-Sialkot sector, which will yet again be the area of the inevitable future round of hostilities between India & Pakistan. As for the role of An-12Bs, I had already uploaded slides about it above. Do browse through once again & you will find them.

To BUDDHA: The IAF’s CAS stated yesterday that the ASQR for the 83 Tejas MK.1As is now being finalized (surprising he said that, since HAL has already issued RFPs calling for bids of various sub-systems & it now appears as if HAL had placed the cart before the horse!). Here’s his press-briefing:

As for ‘locate, fix and strike across the border’, it all depends on: strike what & where. Only then can the ‘how’ be explained, something which I will do sop in this very thread itself.

Amardeep said...

Sir, as per this NDTV per china is constructing road in doklam with 500 troops stationed there. What was the idea of truce that was reached previously between two parties ? What india is going to do next.


Anonymous said...


It is ``jiski lathi uski bhains" as always. What matters is whether the differential in military power vis a vis pak is so tilted in our favour that we are certain to seize back a large chunk of territory in the event of hostilities. If so, we get to keep what we seized back because of the resolutions. If it is a stalemate, UN resolutions are meaningless.

What prevents PRC from initiating hostilities along the LAC (Doklam or elsewhere) on some other pretext so as to divert our attention from recovering territory in POK ?


Kaustav said...

The media seems to thrive on creating Issues and Disputes where there are none. The IAF Chief is asked open-ended question about what the Force could do regarding Pakistani TNWs. His reply is presented before the Pakistani Minister for his inevitable response. The dokla widen existing roads near Doklam in their controlled area and the defence spokespersons give their stock responses and voila...Why did India withdraw it's troops!!!! Almost like wishing for a small war

Anik said...

Excerpts of Drop trials of DRDO NGARM & SAAW in the Official IAF vedio released on 85th anniversary.

There is a lot of confusion regarding the type of warhead used in SAAW. EMP or explosive type?

Can you please confirm that NGARM used CL20 warhead.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To AMARDEEP: LoLz! These ‘desi’ patrakaars have just discovered that, diod they? For those who don’t know, construction of that road from Yadong till the present-day roundabout in Doka La began in 2007 & has continued since then. The past Govts of India should have protested & intervened the moment the road touched Sinche La, which lies to the north of Doka La. Procrastination on India’s part since 2011 has led to this. Nor are the PLA troop-levels now anything new. Such troop-level;s were FIRST found way back in 2013, especially in Photegang PLA Camp (LW 4673 Camp No 32) and Bimari Gompa PLA Camp (LR 6302), locally known as Richipoto—both of which are inside territory claimed by Bhutan. All the ‘desi’ patrakaars are therefor only now reporting what had taken place in 2013!

To SATYAKI: Then let the PLA initiate hostilities anywhere along the LAC & you will finally get to see what’s the outcome. For, despite me repeatedly stating that the PLA has only 3 Infanmtry Brigades for the territorial defence of that portion of TAR which faces the LAC (versus the 10 IA Mountain Divisions), somehow you have consistently chosen to ignore this ground reality & have in stead raised all kinds of ridiculous suppositions that have nothing to do with prevailing objective ground realities, & that too after the recent disengagement by the PLA after all the huffing-n-puffing! I therefore fail to understand what the reasons.motivations are behind all such scenarios conjured up by you & am therefore not interested in such outrageous & uncalled-for assumptions.

To RAD & ANIK: VMT, but one wouild have expected that film’s producers to be a bit more professional, instead of labelling the LCH as the ‘Rudra’. The film also confirms that the IAF’s Barak-8 MR-SAM variant will use the EL/M-2074 Arudhra S-band MPR for post-boost & mid-course fire-control. And as I had stated in the Aero India 2017 thread, there are 2 versions of the SAAW. The one carrying EMP-generators is now known as the Standoff Anti-Airfield Weapon (SAAW) that will be a SEAD-type weapon using FOG-type gyro for inertial navigation. The second SAAW is the JDAM-type Smart Anti-Airfield Weapon, which uses a FOG coupled to a PY-code receiver for GPS-based terminal guidance. The NG-ARM also uses FOG-type inertial navigation system (the same as that on Astra-1 BVRAAM). CL-20 is the new-generation HE chemical compound that is used by all warheads designed for blast-fragmentation & so both types of SAAW, the NG-ARM & even Astra-1 make use of CL-20 chemical compound.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To KAUSTAV: Watch how Kiren Rijiju avoids going into specifics WRT tardy road construction in Arunachal Pradesh, clearly shirking away from responsibility/accountability:

And this is the newly-opened Lhasa-Nyingchi Highway:

Latest IAF Mi-17V-5 Crash:

If we are to believe that news-report, then a palletised cargo’s parachute getting entangled with the tail rotor hub is neither the helicopter’s fault nor the piloting aircrew’s fault. Since the helicopter moves forward when dropping such parachute-aided pallets, it is highly probable that the last pallet to be air-dropped gushed out of the helicopter’s interior at a higher-than-specified velocity, which caused the parachute harness to open prematurely, leading to this abnormal situation. The deceased loadmaster of the helicopter is likely to be held responsible for this mishap.

And here’s Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Khawaja Muhd Asif blaming the US for all of his country’s ills, while repeatedly parroting that the US lost in both Vietnam & Afghanistan:

Small wonder therefore that the US is enormousl;y pissed off with Pakistan & will remain highly pissed off unless & until Pakistan repents & becomes penitant.

Lastly, folks at LRDE & CABS still toy around with mechanically-scanned radars for MPA & UAS platforms, Bangladesh has already ordered AESA-MMRs for its Do-228 MPA platforms!

Millard Keyes said... - TOR - BUK
In your report above you mentioned the 1970s vintage OSA and Strella, but how is it that the IA did not procure the TOR or replaced the OSA with BUK? Is Akash reengineered BUK or S-125?

Anik said...

Ex RAW chief AS Dulat agrees with Ex DG ISI, says GoI has messed up Kashmir in last few years. He said that dialogue with Pakistan is the only way to solve Kashmir. Can you tell us what kind of chief AS dulat was.... His statements appear more to be politician type.

Also if you remember him calling ISI world's no. 1 Intel Agency.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To RAD: The terms CA & PY are specified by the Geneva-based International Telecommunications Uniopn (ITU), & not by the US. Hence, the same terms apply to all the different GPS satellite constellations. EMP is one way of achieving SEAD & the CEP extends as far as the horizon. The JDAM-type SAAW is DIFFERENT in all respects when compared to the EMP-generationg SAAW. They are totally different designs. The JDAM glides to its target, whereas the EMP-generating SAAW is rocket-powered & does not glide. Astra-1, NG-ARM & QR-SAM all use the SAME baseline airframe, with minor modifications. Why should India require any ‘base’ in Djibouti when near-identical facilities are available to India in The Seychelles? Only those countries with inferior deep-strike interdictor aircraft (like China) have no other choice but to invest in EMP-generating BMs. SAAW-type PGMs are always far more stealthier than BMs.

To INTOLERANT PERSON: 1) No it hasn’t. 2) That’s a AESA-based battlefield surveillance radar integrated with a thermal imaging sight & laser rangefinder. It was shown at Aero India 2017 & I had uploaded its pix. 3) All DPSUs are the same. Only the quality of available human resources makes them good or bad. Even HMT & BSNL were good but they were driven towards bankruptsy by bad human resources.

To PIERRE ZORIN: The OSA-AK & Strella-10M were more than adequate for the type opf adversaries faced by India. BUK is the successor to the KUB, whose export designation is KVADRAT. The SpyDer-SRs are meant to replace the OSA-AK & Strella-10M.

To ANIK: As a person ages , the degree of senility also increases & A S Dulat is no exception. Perhaps he needs to utter such nonsensical stuff because there are folks abroad who are willing to pay to listen to such delusional mumbo-jumbo. All that he has to do is to browse through the school text-books of Pakistan dealing with history & he will realise exactly how Pakistanis from their school-going days are taught to hate all that is India & Indian citizens. That’s how almost every average Pakistani citizen since the late 1970s has become irreconcilable with today’s India, thanks to the religiosity-inspired brainwashing. In many ways, therefore, today’s Pakistan is no different in any manner from North Korea. And Lt Gen Ehsan-ul-Haq himself is one such brainwashed byproduct. Just listen to what he really thinks & says inside his own country in 2 successive interviews in the recent past:

Of course folks like A S Dulat will next feign ignorance about such mindsets inside Pakistan—this being his escape-clause when confronted with reality!

Raman said...

Excellent Post..........very detailed, informative and....simple for any layman to understand.

looking forward to the concluding post....that should bring us to the present day.......and hopefully with some solutions as to what we should be doing.....

Parthiv said...

Hi, very informative post. Could you please consider making a post on the Isro cryogenic engine issue from the 90's. About the engines bought from the Russians and the Americans opposing the transfer of tech.

Anik said...

MoD calls for fresh Carbine bids. Is there any scope for JVPC?

3 Terrorists killed in Kashmir today.

Pakistani jernail talks of befitting reply to india:

Akash SAM at Tezpur Airbase:

Sanjay Sharma said...

Dear prasunji

1) This is a rather old article that I came across about illegal migration from Bangladesh (2007 vintage).

The figure the author (a retired military commander based in mizoram) came up with is staggering. He says that there are 22-26 million Bangladeshis staying illegaly in India, and that was in 2007!!!!
In that case why the hell did they even split away from India?
How many Bangladeshis are there in India right now prasunji? Do you have any figures?

2) Is there anything being done to stem this tidal wave of people coming into India?

3) How about repatriation of the ones already here?

4) How much truth is there about anti national activities in kerala that the bjp is harping about? Is there any danger of kerala falling into chaos like kashmir? Are our intelligence agencies siezed of this issue?

5) Off topic - you once said that the precise dates of the mahabharat war was given in the scriptures (through astrology).
But the dates vary widely between 3000 to 9000 bc.
Obviously this casts a doubt on the authenticity of the epic as during the war the armies consisted of 18 akshauhinis in total (7 pandava and 11 kaurava). That's 3.94 million men.
Needless to say that such a figure is impossible given the sparse population of that day.
This leaves us with two choices, either the epic was just a fantasy or the war in question was a relatively minor one probably around the 8th to 9th century bc but was then deified into a war of epic proportions. Do you agree sir Ji?


Vijender said...

Dear Sir

I Do Believe ( Others would not agree ) that the State of No War No peace
that we have with Pakistan since Kargil has infact Benefitted India
and Hurt Pakistan

This is why Musharraf went for Peace with India

Today Pakistan is in a very Bad shape Socially ; Economically ; Politically
and even Internationally ;courtesy Trump

All this is the Result of Tension with India
And their Desire to Secure Afghanistan from Indian influence

Siva said...

Hai Prasun,
What happened to General Paddy. He is out of news ever since he released the book about India checkmates US, a quazi fiction. While the generals before him do write articles, there was no article written by him is avialablein the news papers. Where is he now? What pushed him away from public life?

Pratap said...

Hi Prasun

Is there really anything significant that the UK can offer to India?

Meanwhile Pakistan is building a Berlin wall style fence along the Durand line

Sidharth said...

Prasun da,

Is it correct to believe that Pakistan has foreseen a blitzkrieg upon himself.

Manu Singh said...


Can you elaborate on the type of canopy being used in the Tejas MK1 ? The rear side's elevation is relatively flat so I wonder how is its rear view quality?

Compared to, F-16's canopy looks very different and one can assume that the front and even back view in that canopy would be quite open and wide without any hindrance. Similar elevation is visible in Rafale as well.

Has ADA/HAL ever sought to install a different canopy in this regard? Who supplies current canopies of Tejas and Sukhoi and other aircraft??

Kapil said...

This will now be used by Pakis to buy goodwill in Washington and presents its case of being a partner in war against terror. Hope Trump will be smart. Lets see -

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To KAPIL: LoLz! You haven't heard what POTUS had to say about Pakistani compliance with US demands: So, watch & hear this:

To the US, this is further proof of the Haqqani Network's entrenched existemce inside Pakistan.

To MANU SINGH: How can a raised canopy like that of the F-16 offer any advantages in air combat? Will the single pilot ever have the time to look over his back for bogeys lurking in the rear? Canopies for Tejas Mk.1 all come from the UK, while those for Su-30MKI come from Russia. None of them are buiolt in any manner in India.

To SIDDHARTHL Perhaps. Perhaps also from the contents of this blog.

To PRATAP: Are you aware of the huge quantum of sub-systems flowing in from the UK for platforms like warships, submarines, combat aircraft & armoured vehicles of India's armed forces?

To SIVA: This is what has happened to him:

To RAD: How can the local SAR seeker be flight-tested when its carrier-missile (BrahMos-NG) has not yet been test-fired? BrahMos-1/Yakhont was designed for 550km-range. And no missile flies straight as the crow flies. Especially for ASCMs, the path is dictated by various en-route waypoints. No one in India (except INDIA TODAY & the cretins working for it) is interested in Heron-TP. How can a sonar dome made of Titanium (as claimed by some peddlars of fake news) ever be damaged? Furthermore, does anyone in this world make sonar domes from titanium? Or are they made of fibre-glass? So why are you & SATYAKI inclined to believe such horse-shit???

To PRRANSHU YADAV: 1) Are you convinced that in the whole of India there will be one solitary air base housing all such SAAWs & their carrier combat aircraft platforms??? Back in 12991 there were no MALE-UAVs in existence for SCUID-hunting. Had they been available then, then the results would have been totally different. You thus cannot compare the 1991 scenario with the one prevailing now or in the near-future. 2) Nirbhay LACM will be able to carry both nuclear WMD & conventional warheads. 3) That was the PAD & since then iot has been kinked in favour of the all-new-design PDV.

To ANKIT SINGH: 1) What has changed? The answer was given by the IAF’s CAS on October 5 itself: if the IAF has not yet finalized its ASQR for the Tejas Mk.1A, then what makes one ASUUME that the ASQRs for the Tejas Mk.2 have already been drafted? Without the ASQRs being available, it is IMPOSSIBLE to derive any aircraft’s avionics & weapons-load architecture. 2) That remains to be seen. What is certain beyond doubt is that whichever turbofan is sel;ected for the LCA-AF Mk.2, the air-intakes will have to be redesigned & their dimensions too will drastically change.

tracer said...

Prasun, Looks like the additional LCA orders for 83 aircraft will boost indigenous manufacturing. Since you are a big supporter do you feel import lobby might suffer and how can indigenization continue at a quicker pace

Anik said...

JVPC police trials:

In the vedio:

1)9×19mm vs 5.56×30mm test against armour plate.

2) Firing JVPC with sound suppressor/silencer.

MoD has recently issued fresh RFI for Carbines needed by Army. Any scope of JVPC ?? ?

asd said...

Dear Prasun,

Again the Augusta Westland case is raking up. What's your say??? I am getting confused.

Manu Singh said...


What is your opinion on Chinese shipbuilding and its quality? See this:

The section on submarines is incorrect. There are studies done on load quotient of the Bohai structure and its been confirmed that they are for building general ships not submarines. But this Bhatt guy seems overconfident. Whats your opinion??

Anonymous said...

Hi Prasun,

Any idea on what happened during the recent visit of Mattis to Delhi? Were there any disagreements that caused this sudden 180 degree turn by trump towards Pakistan?


capricorn said...

Is india developing any loitering munitions like ISARELI DELILAH MISSILE?

2>what is status of KALI-5000?

3>status of DRDO man portable ATGM?

4>Is there further development on shaurya missile?

5>at present how can india defeat chinese HQ9 and s400?

Unknown said...

Good Morning Prasunji!
Just heard tge news that that Snowden fellow leaked documents saying that NSA and MI6 spied and even hacked Israeli drones and their critical informations like cruising waypoints.I have a question can China spy like that?I mean if China do have that capability,can they hack Indian UAVs?

2.It's very long time since never heard about SLBM test.After the launch of Aridhaman,can we expect an SLBM test?

Kapil said...

This happened a few days back. Pakistan's economy is in such a bad shape that Bajwa publicly expressed his concern about it

Looks like they will be returning to IMF with a begging bowl in 3-4 months time.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To ASD: Why should you get confused? Has your common-sense taken flight? I can understand the CBI refusing to take heed of common-sense due to political pressures, because the CBI has yet to officially figure out that when twin-engined helicopters are pitted against three-engined platforms, the latter always wins, period. But it seems you are not the only one getting confused. There’s another one fella as well, who happens to be India’s Environment & Science Minister & who has once again made his country the world’s laughing stock by asking his fellow citizens to develop zero-pollution fire-crackers:

So what comes next? He will probably insist on developing nmopn-combustible fire-crackers that don’t make any use of oxygen!!! BTW, this buffoon was also the one who had promised to make the Saras fly again (thanks to some tactful brainwashing being done by NAL) last year! And now we have this latest instance of his Ministry becoming yet again the killer of all innovations. Watch this:

This buffoon does not understand that the DGCA does not possess the capacity or human resources for certifying any aircraft. DGCA is only an endorsing authority, i.e. it endorses the AoC issued by either the FAA or EASA. In India only the CEMILAC can certify any aircraft & since the CEMILAC is DRDO-owned (which in turn is govt-owned) . the CEMILAC will NEVER provide any help to any private party & will always provide assistance only to the DPSUs nor to NAL. That’s precisely why Mahindra Aerospace had its experimental piston-engined aircraft certified in Australia, while TATA Power SED had to import certified UAS from Slovenia in order to sell them to India. And that’s also why NOT A SINGLE UAS developed by private-sectopr companies in India has received any flight certification from CEMILAC to date. But when it comes to erecting giant statues, there’s no dearth of money in either UP or Maharashtra:

When the country is full of such morons & buffoons, how can that country even dream of becoming a hub for techno-industrial innovations? No wonder tens of thousands of crores are available for erecting statues, while only 1 Paisa or 10 Paisa is available for waiving farmers’ loans!!! But don’t worry, it is only folks like you who will at times get confused by sich conflicting narratives. But the ones who are giving birth to such narratives in several parts of the country are extremely focussed when it comes to realizing their objectives through utterly uncalled-for & wasteful expenditure.

To TRACER: For the record, NO ONE in India has as yet placed any order for the Tejas Mk.1A, sibce the IAF’s CAS on October 5 had clearly stated that this aircraft’s ASQR has not yet been drafted in full & without the ASQR, prototype development can’t take place & without evaluating any prototype the IAF cannot place any firm orders. The door therefore is only hald-open/half-shit & if the Tejas Mk.1A does not comply with the IAF’s ASQRs, then the IAF will definitely have all the reasons for rejecting the Tejas Mk.1A. So let us not count the chickens until they’re first hatched.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To ANKIT SINGH: The lesson is: never entrust aircraft design to a bunch of rookies who are only adept in playing Solitaire on their PCs! In the meantime, if the image below is to be believed, it looks like the MoD is gearing up for placing long-overdue orders for the Arjun ARRV:

To RAD: Later this month a test-firing of the Nirbhjay will take place & this will be powered by an indigenously-developed & built turbofan.

To INTOLERANT PERSON: 1) Such hacking is possible ONLY IF the hacker has physical access to the ground-control station of the UAS. Not otherwise. 2) SLBM test-firings won’t take place this year. Only the Nirbhay LAC<’s next test-firing is due.

To ARITRO DATA: 1) No, but India already possesses quite a few loitering PGMs like the HARPY & HAROP. 2) Such products exist only in one’s dreams. 3) Still awaiting technical firing-trials. 4) Shjaurya project was terminated in the previous decade itself. 5) By disrupting their fire-control systems through EMP-generating cruise missiles like SAAW.

To RAJ: I’m not aware of any turns, whether 1 degree or 180 degrees. The US wanted India’s help in extending product-support for those Russia-origin & Ukraine-origin weapons that are i9n service with the ANA & India has reiterated its firm commitment to the sustenance of such product-support. On the other hand, the US is putting intense pressure on Iran during the ‘de-certification tantrums’ of POTUS just so that Iran agrees to provide a secure air-corridor for US transport aircraft en route to Afghanistan from Bahrain. Chances are that Iran will eventually buckle & even if Iran do9es nopt, then the US is putting in place a contingency plan with India’s help for creating a no-fly zone over Baluchistan that will prevent any PAF combat aircraft from interdicting those US transport aircraft that are flying from the Persian Gulf into Afghanistan. But all such contingency plans won’t be implemented if Pakistan caves in, & all chances are that it will do so, given its mounting economic crisis that even China can’t resolve. Here are the details of the crisis:

To MANU SINGH: That artciel you’ve highlighted is full of inaccuracies. The number of principal surface combatants built by China’s various shipyards is much higher, but this quantum has no bearing on India’s security because the PLAN has 3 large fleets to counter the US Navy, the JMSDF, the ROC Navy and the ROK Navy. Hence, it is extremely stupid to benchmark the IN’s fleet strength with that of the PLAN. Lastly, no person claiming to have an army background can be considered as a credible commentator on naval or air force affairts, rest assured.

Unknown said...

Sir this is really blood-boiling state of affairs....

Anonymous said...


1) When can we expect the next SLBM test firings ? Will they be of the K-4, or of a MIRVed follow on ?

2) Will any Agni series missiles undergo routine tests in the next few months ? The pace of such missile testing appears to have slowed down even since the UPA days. Hope GoI takes the need for credible deterrence seriously.


Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To INTOLERANT PERSON: Why indeed are you surprised! Wonder what your reaction will be when you come across these:

Despite Fines And Subsidies, Haryana Farmers Continue Burning Crop Stubble:

Varanasi's Pollution Woes:

Country's Oldest Running University in Varanasi Rotting Away:

So, it looks like even the so-called spiritual capital of India nis not being spared, despite all the delusional rhetoric of fostering cultural nationalism! All this just provesx my earlier point, i.e. all those propagating cultural nationalism are just hustlers, period, especially in UP & Haryana. And to top it all, we have this:

PM Modi Scolds SPG:

If the PM is so pissed off with the SPG's SOP, then he shopuld appoint a team of folks whose only job will be to handle such silly/nonsensical giveaways during such functions/events. Why blame the SPG? Isn't the practice of exchanging such giveaways just a waste of taxpayers' money & a discredited formality? For as long as politicians shy away from applying common-sense in their day-to-day affairs, they can NEVER be expected to solve far greater macro-level problems, like the economic slowdown or cracking down on black-money or exacting a heavy price from those adversaries that always extract a heavy price from India through terrorism. There is no more time for 'Mann ki Baat'. Instead, there should be 'Kaam ki Baat'.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To ANIK: OFB-made sniper riofles for Kolkata Police:

To RAJ: Looks like Uncle Sam was greatly incensed by your assumptions about a 180-degree turn toward Pakistan, & therefore decided to prove you wrong through this drone-strike inside Pakistan yesterday:

Anonymous said...

Hi Prasun,

I am glad my interpretation was wrong.


Anonymous said...


Jasgill said...

sir, why Kolkata police accept this world war 2 era OFB made junk, even Bangladesh police have better equipment

rad said...

hi prasun
OFB may produce sniper rifles at 1/3 rd the cost of a german psg-1 . BUt what about the accuracy in MOA??They have nicely not mentioned that?? I bet it is 3 times worse than the psg-1. In our society we have been made to believe that cheapness is all that counts and not quality and performance .

why the sudden interest in the raytheon star?. dont we have the israeli equal? is the star much better ? how will they integrate their system into out air army IACCS?

Unknown said...

Hello Prasunji!
Few questions wandering in my mind:

1.What is Status as-well-as state of Development of Hypersonic Weapon's Technology in inside India?

2.I know it's never going to happen but still-
Suppose if POK or GB residents refuse to be India's part after Indian Army captures it, then what can we do?

Thanks and Happy Dhanterus!

RAJ said...

@jasss gill LOL....Small arms operating mechanism is similar to what it was during WW2. And who says these sniper rifles are junk. CRPF & BSF already operate similar bolt action sniper rifles imported from Italy. If you want to çompare the looks of bolt action sniper rifle with DMR, I think DMR will surely win but for accuracy bolt action sniper rifles are best.

Amardeep said...

Hello sir,

Why these kamorta class ships are poorly armed at 3400 tons? At 3400 tons these ships should be classified as frigates rather than Corvettes else then also it lacks no SAM systems and Anti SHIP missiles and we are calling it ASW Corvettes ? It doesn't even has ATAS sonar system also. It should at least have short-range barak point defense system.


Sanjay Sharma said...

Dear prasunji,

1) How would the acquisition of rajapaksa airport in Lanka benefit us?

2) How much of an embarrassment is this development to our mighty neighbour, china?
Pretty sure they thought they had this one in the bag too like hambanthotta, till Lanka decided to pull the rug from under their feet.

If you have time,
I would like to know your opinion on the upcoming international container transhipment terminals in south India. (Vizhinjam and enayam)

3) What are the strategic implications of these terminals? Can they out do Colombo? Where does hambanthota come in to the picture?

4) What kind of economic benefits will these projects bring to the respective states and the country at large?

5) Very important question prasunji,
you said the revisionist elements exist in sangh parivar and they hail from the gangetic belt. Are there forces resisting this group?
If unchecked what kind of damage can these revisionist groups cause to Indian unity especially in the religious and linguistic theatres?


Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To RAJ: LoLz! VMT & looks like another drone-strike followed the next day. Meanwhile, here’s a good recent interview of the Afghan Ambassador to Pakistan:

Analysis of Pakistan’s structural economic problems:

To JASSS GILL: Have you already test-fired that OFB-made sniper rifle & verified whether or not it is a piece of junk? Are are you just ASSUMING this to be the case purely going by external looks of that rifle?

To INTOLERANT PERSON: 1) Status? It is all still ‘work-in-progress’. Most bof the ground-breaking work is being done in labs in Russia & Israel for India. 2) That will always be only a supposition. In reality, everyone there, unlike their Indian counterparts inside J & K, does not want to remain disenfranchised as they have been for the past several decades.

To AMARDEEP: They are all awaiting the SR-SAM, 10-tonne NMRH & ATAS suites. These 3 are the main missing systems. Barak-1 SAMs should have been installed on all of them from the outset, along with Atlas Elektronik-supplied ATAS. Similarly, the delivery of INS Kalvari to the IN has been postponed by 1 month.

To SANJAY SHARMA: 1) No one has offered that airport to India. Only the construction of the airport & its maintenance will be given to an Indian party. 2) It is not any embarrassment at all. 3) The terminals in Kerala will render the ones in Colombo irrelevant & they will become white elephants. 4) The terminal at Hambantota was originally meant to service the East African countries. 5) Rervisionist elements exist all over India, not just in the Gengetic Belt. The brainchild of such elements exists in Nagpur, Maharashtra, while several othger affiliated groupings exists in southern India & western India as well. If left unchecked, they will prevent the emergence of clarity of thought & unity of mission objectives. For instance, instead of wasting taxpayers’ money on statues or temples in UP, the CM should travel to that place in his own constituency (Gorakhpur) that houses the CIQ facilities used for India-Nepal l;and-border trade. He will see just how dilapidated these facilities are & how they cause enormous hardships to India traders entering Nepal & Nepali traders entering India! Such CIQ facilities—which are always the 1st point of contact for any person entering a foreign land—are critical towards creating a favourable/positive impression on the minds of any foreigner & therefore need to be swanky, clean & super-efficient. But along the India-Nepal border entry-points it is exactly the opposite. Small wonder therefore that the Nepalis are almost always pissed off with such Indian attitudes, & they instead go ga-ga over all the infrastructure built by China along the China-Nepal borders.

What I’ve stated above isn’t rocket science, but elementary common-sense the kind of which is now non-existent in both Delhi & Gorakhpur.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To RAD: That sniper rifle was extensively evaluated by several CAPFs, State Police Forces & even the IA & ALL have decided to induct it into service. Its principal advantage is that it can accommodate various types of telescopic sights—both of the day-time as well as NVD-based.

As for ISTAR platforms, the 2 from Israel are NOT properties of the IAF & are instead owned by ARC of the NTRO. Secondly, when used by the military, such pl;atforms are reqd to be used in conjunction with several ground-stations. Here’s how it all worlks out: Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition & reconnaissance (ISTAR) aircraft provides mission commanders with high-resolution imagery of an area of operations, including details of vehicle movements, by day or night, largely unaffected by the weather. Raytheon’s ground-surveillance radar—comprising 2 antennae—employs a passive phased-array design. The belly-mounted dual-mode SAR/GMTI radar—thanks to the two different antennae— has a low-resolution wide-area swath mode, and a spot mode for high-resolution imaging of specific targets. Best resolution in spot mode from operating altitude is under 30 centimetres (1 feet). The antenna is electrically steered, though it has a narrow ‘blind spot’ in front of and behind the aircraft. The Bombardier 5000A carries a crew of just five: two pilots, two image analysts and an airborne mission commander responsible for the planning and execution of surveillance tasks. The SAR suite has a maximum surveillance range of between 250km & 300km. Up to 8 ground stations receive all imagery data and analyses and distribute it in near-real time. The Bombardier 5000A can fly significantly higher than 40,000 feet (12,200 metres]–against a 51,000 feet maximum for the Global Express–and of delivering an unrefuelled mission endurance of over 11 hours. Cruise speed at altitude is maintained at between Mach 0.74 and 0.87 and the aircraft has a ferry range of over 9,250km (5,000nm). Two V/UHF radios and UHF SATCOM suite, all of which can be operated in secure mode, are also on-board.

And here are some videoclips of it:

SK said...


1) Boeing P-8 also has few sensors which mounted can bring additional ISTAR capabilities to
this platform. I am not suggesting them as replacement to the IAF's proposed Raytheon
ASTOR/Sentinel's (they have their own advantages such has high cruise altitudes
therefore better coverage etc as highlighted by you). If IN goes for few additional
sensors for their existing fleet, then they can bring higher ISTAR capabilities in
covering Pakistani Coastal and inland installations flying out of IN West Coast bases.

2) For IAF won't two ISTAR platforms be grossly inadequate to meaningfully cover both
Western and Eastern borders. At least half-dozen are needed. Will IAF be acquiring
additional platforms in future in follow-on orders.

Anonymous said...

Wishing you a happy Diwali. The leaks about the EMALS and the nuclear power unit for IAC Vishal, siting unnamed sources, seems to have some substance in it, would you agree? If yes then the choice of aircrafts for Vishal seems to have broadened and not limited to MIG 29K. Does these developments have the financial / budgetary plan in place or are they still up in the air.

It would be great if you could come up with a comprehensive article on the IAC Vishal at this point based on the proposition of the EMALS, CATOBAR and Nuclear power plant. Is it no longer a question of if, rather than when or are these speculations still?


Sid said...

Hi Prasun,

Looks like all the ground work is complete and the deal is going to be signed within this fiscal.

In your thread on S-400, you had said that Russians had offered us 77N6 and 77N6-i missiles of the S-500 family. But in this report the author says we are going for only 48N6 and 40N6 missiles. The legacy S-300 PMU-3 series missiles.

What happened to the hypersonic anti ballistic missile 77N6 series?

There isn't any mention of the offer from IAI to integrate their Elta-2090 Ultra family with our variant of S-400.

Lastly, the author mentions that each of the 5 regiment will have two batteries each with 4 launchers for a total of 40 launchers and 1200 missiles are going to be procured.
5-6 billion dollars for just 40 Tel and their associated search and FCR?
Won't the number of Tel to be procured be higher?

Pls clarify.


Prasun Da,

Wishing you & all your loved ones a blessed Kali Pujo & a Happy Diwali.

Just one question about special forces.

Given your decades of experience do you recon that the Israeli SFs training is the best ? It is said even India's SFs (Black Cat etc) are send to Israel for training.

However, some other commentators suggest that Russian Spetnaz training is so difficult that soldiers have died during training on a regular basis.

Please do shed some light on SF training.

Many Thanks,


Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To SK: 1) The Boeing P-8AGS has a belly-mounted SAR sensor & its videoclip is available in YouTube. It is employed mostly in support of coastal recce prior to undertaking SEAL Team insertions from the sea. 2) Thje IAF’s total reqmt is for 7 such ISTAR platforms. That’s because in future any large-scale ground hostilities to the west will be limited to only 2 areas: the IB, WB & LoC along Punjab & J & K. There will be ZERO ground skirmishes along the IB in Rajasthan & Gujarat. The PA’s deployment of its frontline T-80UDs & Type-90II Al Khalid & Type 59II Al Zarrar MBTs is proof of this. Within Punjab, the PA is likely to operate along the Sharargarh Bulge/Khem Karan sector & the Chicken’s Neck Area /Sialkot-Chhamb sector. So it is within these 2 areas that maximum ground movements & cross-movements/switchings of warfighting assets from one sector to another will take place. This & only this is what will be interested in monitoring in real-time as this in turn will enable the IAF to plan for tactical interdiction sorties to disrupt the adversary’s battlefield logistics network. For doing this, no less than 4 ISTAR platforms are reqd to maintain 24/7 surveillance in these 2 areas for a 14-day period.

To RAD: The Professor has been saying more-or-less exactly what I have been saying, i.e. the wing-design of the LCA Mk.1 is a no-brainer, as are the existing air-intake designs. Hence, it is no use getting angry with what the professor states, since his arguments are irrefutably backed-up by the laws of physics. And here’s some vintage videoclips of the employment of armour by the IA in 1948 in northern J & K:

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To SID: LoLz! Firstly, it was the very same magazine that had last year as part of its MAKS 2016 show report stated that the 77N6 and 77N6-i missiles had been specified by the IAF. So, secondly, the latest report is totally off-the-mark & is erroneous. Thirdly, no one can contradict the laws of physics, meaning an LR-SAM will be guided to its target only as long as target illumination is provided by terrestrial sensors like fire-control radar. So, given the Earth’s curvature, there’s no way a ground-based target illuminator will be able to illuminate a target flying 400km away. Only if the fire-control radar is sitting atop a high mountain will it be able to illuminate targets like AEW & CS platforms. Fourthly, the PAF’s AEW & CS will never fly on the eastern extremities of Pakistan; instead their flight-routes will always be as far west as possible, meaning they will be able to look barely 100km inside India’s airspace. In any case, there’s no need to look beyond this because the PAF does not possess any twin-engined deep interdiction aircraft & the PAF’s single-engined Mirage-3/5 & F-16 will at best target only the forward IAF air bases just as it had done so in 1965 & 1971. Fifthly, due to this reality, LR-SAMs are definitely not cost-effective AEW & CS killers. Instead, the best killer is a stealthy loitering PGM that can generate EMP pulses when in close proximity to the airborne AEW & CS platform, since the location of any AEW & CS platform can be localised by any on-board RWR sensor on any IAF combat aircraft. Lastly, the Nasr/Hatf-9 is an MBRL that launched unguided rockets, not ballistic missiles. This means the rockets will fly at depressed trajectories & will be powered right up to the warhead impact-point. One doesn’t need LR-SAMs for intercepting such MBRL-launched rockets. Even the Barak-8 will suffice, since such rockets, if armed with tactical nuclear warheads, will be preprogrammed to explode 1km away above the surface so as to maximise the radiation footprint. Hence, to claim that a mid-air interception of such rockets will lead to premature detonation of the nuclear warhead is total hogwash. In conclusion, therefore, that article you’ve quoted is factuially incorrect, it seems to have been written in great hurry & hence the absence of deep research on the subject-matter of TNWs, & is therefore the ultimate insult to the laws of physics.

To KANE: I had already stated several times before that all plans for the IAC-2 have been deferred indefinitely. So where’s the need for any deep analysis on this subject matter? It will be a waste of time to dwell any further on this topic.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To VIKRAM GUHA: VMT & the very same to you. Training regimes for various SOF forces depends entirely on their employment protocols & the depths & types of terrain over which they are reqd to operate. Therefore, an Israeli SOF team will find it almost impossible to operate over terrain like high altitude mountains or tropical monsoon forests, Similarly, an Indian SOF team will face the same difficulties when operating over highly urbanized terrain. The NSG’s Bl;ack Cats isn’t exactly SOF. It is more of a counter-terror SWAT force. If you really want to know how the Israeli SOF teams operate & with what kind of support from other specialized teams, then do watch these:

MOSSAD on Russian Hacking:

IDF Unit 8200:

IDF Unit 869:

IDF Unit 504:

IDF Unit 669:


Also, do watch these recruitment ads:

Canadian CSIS



CIA Hiring


And here’s an excellent documentary on how Vladimir Putin exercises national power:

And some more interesting presentations:

Defining US Relationship with India for the Next Century: by US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson

Future Choices for Pakistan:

PA’s Fencing of the Durand Line:

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

For my weekend reading:

G Manoj said...

Hi Prasun,

I have a question about the revisionist policy of GOI that you referred to in response to a poster.

There have been rumours for several years now that a closed coterie of North Indian & Western Indian leaders ensure that the country is run by people from their region only.These leaders also ensure that max number of Lok Sabha seats are from the North & West to ensure they do not lose their grip over the political affairs of the country.

For instance in the IAS, IFS, IPS exams the overwhelming majority of candidates are selected from Hindi heartland. This explains why marksheets for these exams are not published. I see most IAS, IFS etc are from UP & Bihar.

Will you please clarify if these rumours are true?


Sanjay Sharma said...

Dear prasunji

Thanks for your replies.
1) You mentioned that the terminals in kerala will turn Colombo into a white elephant. But then why is India building two such terminals (enayam and vizhinjam)?

Won't they turn each other into white elephants? Is there enough market for both to survive? Or are they geared towards different markets like hambanthota?

2) The economic consequences of revisionist elements are well known sir. What i am more concerned about is the consequence of cultural imposition by such elements like linguistic imposition.

In your opinion, can those types of imposition be challenged? Are they being challenged already? And if not what may be the consequences for national unity? (considering the fact this very issue led to two civil wars in our neighbourhood already)


buddha said...
Can Indian made assault rifles and other small amra will help to solve issue ...

buddha said... .Will the situation improve .
Is 2018 winter great game on..Just casual talk.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To MANOJ G: Those are rumours by & large now, simply because different govts-in-power have different preferences. For instance, at a time when there were not too many states, the bulk of the MPs in Parliament came from those areas that were already orgfanised as states. As the number of states grew, the spread of MPs became more widespread. Despite this, big-sized states like UP do present a lop-sided picture of representation in Parliament because that state alone send 70 MPs to Parliament. There is therefore a need to break up UP into 3 different states. As for most administrative officers hailing from UP & Bihar, it is due to the subject of Hindi in the UPSC entrance exams, meaning even if the prospective entrant scores low in some of the critical papers, his/her overall scores can still remain higher if he/she manages to score high marks in Hindi. This is what gives those excelling in Hindi an undue advantage.

As for prevailing dominant influences within the present-day GoI, the Uttarakhand faction seems to have emerged out of nowhere, despite the disastrous performance of caricatures like Murli Manohar Joshi in the previous decade. Take for instance, the appointment of former CNS of the IN, Admiral (Ret’d) D K Joshi, as the Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands. I fail to understand how a person who was thoroughly incapable of heading the IN & he admitted his defeat as a leader when he resigned as the CNS, can even be considered for the post of a Lt Governor. And we are also seeing the emergence of greater importance being accorded to religious sites in Uttarakhand, which, rest assured, will further destroy the fragile ecological balance of that state. All this is happening because the citizens of India are more than happy to taken for utopian joyrides that always end up as nightmares. For instance, while there was much hoo-haa about the firecrackers ban in NCR, what nobody bothered to explain is that the Supreme Courtt had banned ONLY the sale of firecrackers within the NCR; & the ban was NEVER on the usage of firecrackers. So, anyone from the NCR was totally free to venture out of the NCR & buy the firecrackers from neighbouring states & bring them inside the NCR!!! The only smart guy therefore appeared to be the PM, who decided to stay away from the NCR on the day of Deepavali by giving the excuse of spending that day with Indian troops in J & K.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To BROWN DESI & BUDDHA: VMT & the very same to you & all your loved ones. And this is the BSR procured by the PA for deployment along the Durand Line:

Interview of DCIA Mike Pompeo:

How China Hides Its Debts:

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

Two sides of a story:

Australia's Mine Games:

Mundra Port:

RISHI said...

Dear Sir

Is there any hope Left for PAK FA / FGFA Deal

How will Russia React If we Walk Out of this Deal

Will It affect Our Other Purchases and Deals such as Nuclear Submarines
S 400 ; Su 30 UPGRADE ; Brahmos 2

Will they Give Su 35 to Pakistan

G Manoj said...

Hi Prasun,

Based on the information that you have provided, isn't this a very dangerous situation?

Previously Congress ruled India for 60 yrs simply by winning Hindi heartland + Maharashtra only . Now BJP doing exactly the same. In other words, around 60% of the population has no voice.

Millions of migrants from cow belt are in any case streaming into other states & now BJP is enforcing Hindi across non Hindi speaking states so that it becomes easier for cow belt migrants.

Dividing UP like you said might not help, already Uttrakhand was carved out & Jharkhand from Bihar, yet these states remain largely lawless.

In fact the BJP is now proposing to raise the number of lok sabha seats in Hindi heartland suggesting that population has increased so seats should also increase.

Just like several North Eastern states require that outsiders need to get a permission to enter their states & J&K, Uttrakhand, Himachal prevent outsiders from purchasing land in their state, should't other non Hindi states also impose restrictions on the large scale entry of migrants from Hindi heartland? Else the culture of these states will completely be wiped out.


Rahul said...

We had deployed Akash SAM at Tezpur airbase during Dhoklam standoff--> Slowly Google Map is getting updated & we will soon know the actual ground position at the standoff point.

Unknown said...

Hello sirji!

1.I wonder what is the future of FGFA.On one hand,there's a story running that Russia tested new engine and on the other hand, rumours are there that IAF's officials are frustated enough to close the deal.Your opinion?
2.I knoq that this question is very much out of the box,but I wonder who would assasinate our scientists. Many nitwits follow the crazy theory of "CIA ki saazish" but I think it could be FSB since it's the Russia who gains highest peofit by doing it.Your opinion?
Thanks.And by the way, Happy belated Diwali to you.

Technology, Photograpy and Travel said...

Prasun Da,

Do we really have any way out to both preserve the nature and continue our development .

Anik said...

Ghani accuses Russia, Pakistan of aiding Taliban.
What is the truth Prasun Da?

Unknown said...

3.Not being jazbaati but sometimes I feel what a mess we are in.I mean,pakistan is today manufacturing high-class small arms and exporting to many countries.On the other hand,we mand weapons like INSAS and when we exported,it became laughing stock all over the world.Even in missile systems,countries like DPRK can successfully make clown of S-300 locally.And here,even after so many years, we can't even make a decent cannister-based SAM by our own.Sir what's the main issue here?

Pratap said...

Anti-Pakistan protests held across POK to mark 'Black Day' when Pathan barbarians invaded the then princely state of J&K

These people protested despite knowing what Pakis can do to them and their families. Hopefully we will liberate them one day.

Anonymous said...

Greetings prasun sir

1) What did you mean when you said different governments have different preferences???

Does that mean bias toward any one region is present in the upa and nda or not??

2) I second another query posted here about the possible divisions that may arise due to the bjp's
aggressive imposition of culture on others.
What is your take on this sir? Especially with respect to the south? Is there resentment building up?

3) Back in the 90s there was a belief in southern states that many development projects meant for the south were either not given due importance by Delhi or were transferred to hindi states.
I've met a few industrualists who claim that the south only developed economically when the liberalisation policies of the 90s loosened the centres grip on state economies.
Is that true?

Raman. T

Ram Bharadwaj said...


1. Bharat karnad claims that the INS Chakra met with an "accident" and has to be repatriated to Russia for repairs. Hr claims that the Russians are aggrieved with India and fear that the secrets of their Akula class sub will be compromised if left with the IN. They plan to take back the Akula. Is this true and has the INS Chakra met with an accident?

2. What was the outcome of James Mattis visit? Any progress in Tech transfer under DTTI?

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To RAMAN T & RAM BHARADWAJ: Will explain in detail later tonight. Meanwhile, here's yet another example of 'classic' yellow journalism:

সুমন্ত নাগ said...

Will she going to be the next Robin Raphel or Madeline Albright ?

Kindly share your views Prasun Da ?

Thanks in advance.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To SUMANTA NAG: LoLz! On the contrary, we should welcome her assertions & pledges PROVIDED she commits to 'fairplay' (about which the Brits pride themselves) by first apologising to India about the Jalianwallah Bagh Massacre & the man-made Food Famine of the early 1940s in India's Bengal & paying compensation for these, followed by explaining to India what were British citizens like Omar Sheikh (set free by India after the IC-184 hijack drama in December 1999) doing inside J & K during the 1990s along with Masood Azhar & why has Omar Sheikh not been extradited to the UK from Pakistan till this day to face terrorism-related charges & be punished under British laws. After all these have been dispensed with, anyone from the UK is more than welcome to discuss matters of 'human rights abuses' with any Indian official. In other words, this has to be a two-way street, not one-way as some Brits would like it to be. It needs to be told to suchg Brituish politicians that 'human rights abuses' by India's erstwhile colonial masters have been taking place in India since the early years of the previouis century, & not from 1947 or 1984.



I have a question about Psychological Operations or PSYOP.

Even today 25 yrs after the dissolution of the Soviet Union I meet kids, young adults across India who are convinced that Russia is a friend of India.

Truth is neither USSR & modern day Russia are India's fair weather friends. They pretended to be friends to reap the benefits & the KGB's PSYOP division ensured that millions of guillible Indians believe that USSR/Russia is indeed India's friend.

So, why is it despite all these years so many people in India continue to believe in this lie. In other words how did the KGB so effectively brainwash Indians to make generations after generations of Indians believe that USSR/Russia is India's friend.



Unknown said...

4.Your comment on this shocker:

Anonymous said...

Prasun sir,

One query I forgot to ask with the other 3,
4) Since most of the ias officers comes from the hindi belt, there is a belief that this puts the states at a severe disadvantage when it comes to protesting or struggling against the cultural imposition of the centre, since the ias officers will never give the necessary information to the states to fight the centre.

This may be due to fear for their careers or due to regional loyalties.

Is this true? If so can the states counter this and how?

5) You said splitting UP will help but even if this happens, I don't see how this will stop cultural and linguistic imposition by centre since the newly formed three states who all be culturally identically to each other and hence would support hindi imposition.

Raman T

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To INTOLERANT PERSON: LoLz! Did you really fall for this FAKE NEWS? In 1965 the PAF had US0supplied combat aircraft. Do you think Poland then being a member of the Warsaw pact was also flying F-86 Sabres & F-104 Starfighters? Cm’on, use the common-sense inside you.

To RAMAN T: 1) What I mean is this: the UPA prefers to accord names to its various Centre-sponsored schemes starting with Indira or Rajiv. The presen t-day Govt on the otgher hand prefers to do the same, but just change the names to Deen Dayal or Pradhan Mantri. 2) Mt take on it is elementary: all those citizens who abide by & respect the law of the land are the only genuine nationalists since they are fulfilling their end of the social contract. And all those chest-thumping fellas who are shouting like headless chicken about any form of nationalism but who at the same time are violating laws of the land (like doing illegal car-parking or avoiding paying taxes) are the real traitors. Such traitors always tend to distort narratives & make unimaginable complexities out of simple solutions. 3) Yes, it is true to a moderate extent. Because the laws of nature dictate that all thosze coastal states that are blessed with ports/harbours are always the ones likely to develop the most due to maritime trade practices. Despite this, heavy industrialisation never took place until the late 1980s in any of the southern states, or in Maharashtra ior in Odisha.

To TECHNOLOGY, PHOTOGRAPHY & TRAVEL: Yes, it is very much possible while also creating tens of lakhs of jobs in the rural areas of India, PROVIDED common-sense is applied. These will help you further understand how it is to be done:

You may be aware that as per the Govt of India, a village is today defined as being electrified if only 10% of the rural households of any village receive electricity!!!

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

SUJOY MAJUMDAR: Why? Simply because Indians by & large have LOST the divine gift of SOUND COMMON-SENSE. That’s the short answer. And to find out exactly how much stupid they already are, do read this:

Example-2: Anyone with a basic knowledge of economics will tell you that banks/financial institutions can’t lend money unless & until the non-performing loans are at a bare minimum. And yet, the present-day NDA govt-in-power took 3 full years to realize this! I mean, how much more stupid can anyone get other than Jaitley & Co???

Example-3: All mother countries EXCEPT India declare on the last day of events like aerospace/defence expos on what date the next expo will be held. This enables them to undertake almost 2 full years of marketing of expo space. And in India till this day NO ONE from the MoD is even sure when & where the next DEFEXPO expo will be held! There’s no official website up as yet, nor have the potential exhibitors been told to proceed with their travel/accommodation plans. And the RM of this country has the gall to go galavanting in various military bases/sites inside India & abroad as if she is on a picnic at the Indian taxpayer’s expense!

Example-4: After lots of chest-thumping & puffing, this GoI has done EXACTLY what all previous govts since 1998 have done: appointed yet another interlocutor to supposedly talk with all sections of society in J & K. And what about all the previous interlocutors & where are all their reports? Why have they all been junked? What new chapter will this Dineshwar Sharma open? On one hand the GoI have full clearance to the IA’s COAS to make statements about getting a grip on domestic unrests inside J & K. Now suddenly the Union MHA has woken up from its deep slumber! Why in the first place should there be an extra-constitutional interlocutor when a duly-elected State Govt of J & K is already there to interact with all residents of J & K? Can there be anything more IDIOTIC than such a state of affairs? Looks like the cretins/buffoons like Ram Madhav & Co have finally decided to throw in the towel & beat a hasty retreat!

Do you want me to give more examples of the degenerated, regressive kind of mindsets prevailing among India’s ruling elite?

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

Snippets on India's developmental activities inside Afghanistan:

Project Azorian, the greatest maritime salvage expedition (involving the sunken K-129 submarine of the USSR Navy) of the 20th century:

Technology, Photograpy and Travel said...

yes Prasun da even the village where i have the farm; where the single phase is only on for 14 hours and 3 phase is on for only 9 hours a day ... looking to change to solar power generation and looking to find any fellow who would like to set up a mobile tower for some telecom operator so that i can make some money to keep the monthly expenses on that farm lower ...

rad said...

hi prasun
what is this existing torpedo that has been fired from the kalvari according to the naval group? the german stuff of the hdw 209 ? how did they integrate it into the cms??

how good is baba kalyanis version of the m777. I heard that US input has made it efficient in weight ? will the mod take cognizance of it and not taken it for firing trials?

can the RM in her power, by pass all the rubbish bureaucracy and order much wanted weapons like the ATAS for warships , carbines, torpedoes etc??

why mot engage the Taiwanese in full flow an dask them to invest in hi tech to counter china as china has not respected the disputed Kashmir and building roads in it?

Anik said...

Chinese troops are amassed near Doklam plateau, satellite images show.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To ANIK: LoLz! That article's headline itself is the classic piece of yellow journalism, since all the imagery purpotedly is of September 6 vintage, & today is not that daym but rather it is October 27! Hence, to claim that the PLA formations 'ARE' amassed is totally misleading & factually wrong. But why did the PLA deploy to the location north of Sikkim's Finger Area? Elementary, as I had explained before the IA's offensive options WRT Chumbi Valley, i.e. through the Finger Area's Sora Funnel, it is extremely easy for the IA's Sikkim-deployed Armoured Brigade to just roll down into the plateau & then turn south-east towards Yadong. It is for this reason that the PLA had stationed another blocking force north-east of Yadong. In other words, the PLA was absolutely petrified by the number of offensive options available to the IA & IAF in that entire area that had the capacity to maul any deployed PLA formation there. It is for this very reason that the PLA during the standoff had deployed its layered air-defence artillery network in the Chumbi Valley close to Yadong. Had the PLA seriously considered its offensive options, then one would have seen the deployment of its armed aeroscout & attack helicopters, especially since the PLA has quite a few helipads in those areas. Yet the PLA did not do so. Hence, don;t get carried away by such misleading stories emanating from individuals of dubious credibility.

To PRAVIN: Not only Afghanistan, but even the US & Japan are, because no one believes Pakistan, which lies even about its own citizens:

The untold stories of Zeenat Shehzaadi:

Tortured Pakistani Bloggers:

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To RAD: The HWT was the SUT & it weas NEVER fired from the Kalvari, but was only subjected to torpedo-tube ejection tests. If Kalyani Group’s version of the UFH is that good, then the company should have identified its OEM. Which company designed it? It certainly ain;t Kalyani Group, since that company does not have any in-house design expertise WRT field artillery howitzers. So please don’t blindly lap up all that the ‘desi’ press vomits out from time to time. Whether any weapon system needs to be procured ASAP is not up to the RM, but it all boils down to the Union Finance Minister. India is already fully engaging with Taiwan/RoC in several high-technology fronts. Meanwhile do watch for the very first time how Type 877EKM/Type 636 SSKs are made:

And here’s the Project 667BDRM Delfin SSBN, on which the IN’s projected S-5, S-6 & S-7 SSBNs will be based:

And finally, the BMP-T Terminator FSCV:

I was going back through my military-industrial activity archives & came across paperwork of early 1990s vintage when the IAF wanted to entrust a private-sector party with the entire upgrade/maintenance of its Canberra PR.57 recce aircraft. At that time, the IAF had more than 25 Canberra airframes in flightworthy condition. The IAF then wanted to refurbish 11 of the airframes, re-engine them (preferably with either the GE F404 or theGarrett TFE-1042 turbofan, the latter now being known as the Honeywell F125) & fill up its empty internal bomb-bay with EL/M-2060P synthetic aperture radar sensor package. Had this project been seriously pursued, then by 1999 the IAF would easily have had such all-weather standoff ISTAR platforms & there would not have been any need for procuring Sentinel/ASTOR-type platforms today.

rad said...

hi prasun
the canberra recce version you mentioned would have been a fantastic recce platform with the new engines and 2060 sar radar. But would the air frame be capable for flying for another 15 years given the obsolesce and lack of spare parts ?

the UFH was made in collaboration with US mandus if i am right . But what stops MoD for looking for a desi build in india and sending it fore trials? there seems to be a road block every where for then private players?especially after the high price for the m777?

the video of submarine building is awsome ! do we have the huge machines for plate bending etc? after the scorpene deal? why is MOD shy to order the french F21 which is suppose to be better the german torpedoes?

how capable are the gulf stream Israeli SAR planes compared to the sentinel astor? are they equal?

is there any chance that xi will try to attack india in a another area to dispell the doklam retreat? are we capable od holding out . Further we can always tell them that w we can also get involved in the south sea future war which will def scare them . All it takes is just one large exercise with vietnam with indian boots there on Vietnamese soil!!

Black box said...

Hi prasun,
Regarding Project 667BDRM Delfin SSBN .Why is it based on the above class. Does Arihant class design have any shortcoming? Please elobarate.

kargil said...

Dear Prasun,

Greetings of the day!!

Excellent article from Frontline supporting your assertions on OFB made Dhanush Artillery system

Eargely waiting for the concluding part of this thread.

Pinkal Shah

Gessler said...

Any comments on this, Prasun ji?

Something doesn't click as far that article is concerned^^. Love to hear your views on going for conventionally-powered IAC-2 over a nuclear one.

joydeep ghosh said...

@Prasun da

1. do you remember when britain was selling its 4 sentinels I said we should go for it, but then yo said india doesnt need them, but now you have confirmed we are indeed buying similar ones

2. cant read russian but the 1st video seems to be of Alexander Nevsky ssbn

3. heard INS chakra II has suffered damage and it might be sent back to russia, but will that mean include/exclude time lapse for repair in the lease term, also heard one russian navy officer is always inside the sub even when its docked in vizag

4. do you anything on plan CJC the chhammb juarian corridor plan thats presumably meant to rest back chhammb and sialkot

5. do you really feel getting back chhammb is of more importance than direct linking of uri with poonch by grabbing haji pir pass forever

6. the BMPT look deadly but why cant we do the same of vijayat tanks that are in reserve

hope to get answers this time


Joydeep Ghosh


Millard Keyes said... - is there a possibility to source WLR from S Korea and place along Indo-Pak border? I thought India only had a limited number of these from Israel...but the Korean one might be cheaper and easier for MiI initiative?

ramb_1977 said...


1. Bharat karnad claims that the INS Chakra met with an "accident" and has to be repatriated to Russia for repairs. Hr claims that the Russians are aggrieved with India and fear that the secrets of their Akula class sub will be compromised if left with the IN. They plan to take back the Akula. Is this true and has the INS Chakra met with an accident?

2. What was the outcome of James Mattis visit? Any progress in Tech transfer under DTTI?

Ankit Singh said...

Thank u for the reply Prasun da,
1. But if LCA MK2 was to be redesigned won't it take more time for the development as ADA is already being working on MK2 from a long time.
2. How much truth does the Indian Pressurised Water Reactor(IPWR) holds?
Is it really in works because the BARC scientists have been saying that they have designed the Arihant reactor and mastered the PWR tech and based on that they will be scaling it on bigger reactors.

Anik said...

LOL...Do read this tweet by PA DG ISPR ,please note the word DJI written on it:

sandy said...

Hi Prasun,

Read recently in a defence blog that Indian has dropped plans for nuclear powered air craft carrier because BARC cannot deliver on reactor front.Something you have mentioned all along. But the blog also goes on to say that the conventional carrier will have EMALS .
Is it possible for EMALS to be on a conventional carrier?
Has india built a 190 MW reactor for submarines ?
Doesn't make sense when the blog says India had 190 MW reactor for submarines but cannot build one for ships because its more complex and require more power ? I remember Enterprise class AC had eight reactors on board.


Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To RAD: The Canberra upgrade pl;ans then had even called for installaing a DARIN-2-type nav-attack system with GPS-aided inertial navigation, plus a SATCOM uplink-downlink suite. As I had explained before, the airframe’s TTSL can always be extended & re-lifed several times, but not that of the engine/gearbox. That’s why we still see B-52s, C-47s/DC-3s & KC-135s still flying after re-engining. Plate-bending machines are available with L & T, Reliance/Pipavav Shipbuilding & MDL Shipbuilders. The SAR package from IAI & Raytheon are identical in terms of technology, but it terms of product maturity, the Raytheon package is far better & cheaper. Lastly, if China wants to attack India anywhere along the LAC, it is more than welcome to do so, because the PLA can muster only 3 acclimatised Brigades for such an operation & facing them will be 10 IA Mountain Divisions & three Armoured Brigades. So, kindly do the math now & see if the PLA can prevail over India when all possible numerical combinations state that the PLA will LOSE hands-down against India anywhjere along the LAC.

To BLACK BOX: Do you reckon the IN is happy with Arihant-type SSBNs capable of launching just eight 700km-range SLBMs? Or does the IN want larger SSBNs each capable of housing 12 SLBMs capable of attaining ranges of 8,000km? Slides presented by Dr V K saraswat on India’s envisaged inventory of MIRV-armed ICBMs & SLBMs have clearly stated that such missiles will be able to go as far as 8,000km. So why are such doubts cropping up in your mind?

To JOYDEEP GHOSH: 1) As you may know, the UK never sold any of its Sentinel/ASTOR p0latforms. Why? Because they were NEVER for sale. That’s why I had stated that India never needed them. 2) It is the same SSBN-type that I had stated yesterday. 3) Can you kindly specify what kind of structural damage has INS Chgakra suffered & how? Because if no one is supplying such back-up data, then it only means these are all rumours. In fact, that SSGN early this year edmerged from a successful periodic refit done at Vizag itself. The only Russian navy officer on-board that SSGN is the PWR Safety Officer. 4) Why should Sialkot be wrested away from Pakistan? 5) Without taking back Chhamb India cannot capture those areas like parts of Poonch, followed by Muzaffarabad, Kotli etc. Unless one can capture the belly of PoK, one will find it extremely difficult to capture Gilgit & Baltistan, since all transportation routes to those areas pass through areas close to Chhamb & Muzaffarabad. Do check up the land transportation route-maps of Pakistan. 6) Good question that should be put forth to all those imbeciles who have been previous Defence Ministers of India.

To PIERRE ZORIN: LoLz! The IA has 12 TPQ-37 Firefinder WLRs from RaytheonTHALES, plus another 29 ‘Swathi’ WLRs that BEL is now supplying.

To RAMB_1977: 1) Great! Now we have an ‘Uttam Bandalbaaz’ yet gain making delusional claims. 2) No one transfers any technology. One can only share them, but only in such a way that the recipient cannot replicate them or their IPRs. So, along with the Sea Guardian UAS, the Raytheon-built IRCCDs reqd for the DRDO-developed MP-ATGM will be supplied to BDL for final-assembly of the MP-ATGM’s DRDO-designed IIR seeker.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To GESSLER, RAJ & SANDY: LoLz! Looks like the ‘desi’ Bandalbaaz’ is hell-bent upon certifying himself as a ‘Maha Bandalbaaz’! Wasn;t he the very same nitwit who couldn’t figure out the differences is turbofan TTSLs & therefore had ASSUMED that the TTSL’s of the F404-IN-20 & AL-31F were the same & therefore each LCA Mk.1/Tejas Mk.1 would require 3 F404-IN-20s in its service lifetime??? Now let’s contextualize the issue & derive sane, credible conclusions.

Firstly, all IN-sponsored seminars over the past 2 years have cleared stated during the Q & A sessions that the Govt of India will not part with even 1 Paisa for IAC-2 unless & until the IAC-1 is officially commissioned into service. That still remains the case.

Secondly, in terms of budgetary priorities, therefore, as of now the topmost priorities are to acquire the 6 projected SSNs, followed by the four LPHs.

Thirdly, since the IN’s concept of operations calls for aircraft carrier battle groups to operate ONLY within the IOR, there’s simply no need for super carriers of 90,000 tonne displacement & at-sea endurance of 6 months, meaning the IN’s aircraft carriers will be able to access IN naval bases along India’s coastline for re-supply/replenishment, whenever reqd. Hence, a 550mWT PWR for a 90,000-tonne carrier isn’t what the IN desires, but rather a 200mWT PWR for powering an E-MALS-equipped 65,000-tonne IAC-2.

Fourthly, it is a metter of published record now (by Retired Admiral Arun Prakash in an article he wrote for FORCE magazine in 2010) that the idea of a 200mWT PWR (& not 190mWT as claimed) was first suggested by him in an audit- report he was commissioned to draft for the then Indian NSA M K Narayanan, which dealt with 2 topics: future developmental directions for the IN’s projected SLBM families; & future naval nuclear propulsion reqmts. This was because the DAE had informed Narayanan about its intention then to develop a 800mWT PWR for civilian applications within a 15-year timeframe & the DAE also wanted to solicit the IN’s views on spinoff applications of this developmental effort. Hence, the 15-year gestation period the ‘Maha Bandalbaaz’ is speculating about has its starting point in 2008, not 2017. Arun Prakash had proposed the 200mWT PWR for two platforms: the IAC-2 & for the larger & heavier S-5/S-6/S-7 SSBNs of the IN.

Fifthly, the S-2/Arihant S-72 possesses an 83mWT PWR, & not a 550mWT PWR. The ‘Maha Bandalbaaz’ just ASSUMED that since the Nimitz-class carriers have 550mWT PWRs on-board, so then should the IAC-2! In fact, the figure of 190mWT for a PWR again is due to the Maha Bandalbaaz’s ASSUMPTION about the IN’s projected SSNs being powered by such PWRs just because the K-152 Nerpa/INS Chakra/Project 970 is also powered by a similar PWR. Littgle does he realise that the IN has already decided to go for smaller SSNs of a Russian design, & not for the larger SSGNs!

Lastly, no one in this world is developing conventionally-powered E-MALS, not even Russia & China. The successive surge-power reqmts of E-MALS are such that only high-density PWRs can provide the desired power outputs.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To ANKIT SINGH: 1) Not quite, since the airframe has already been designed, but only that fuseklage section’s interior that houses the powerplant will need minimal redesigning, since the existing design is meant for accepting the GE-F414 tuerbofan, whereas if the final decision is for an M88-derived, locally-built turbofan, then such an engine will have different engine mounting configuration. 2) That presentation clearly states that “Development of IPWR is culmination of--Expertise available for design, construction and operation of PHWRs; & Experience gained in commissioning, operating and maintenance of LWRs.”

Nowhere is it mentioned that the DAE has benefitted from the Russia-origin IPRs of the Afrikantov OKB-designed/developed 83mWT PWR. The 123 Nuclear Agreement EXPLICITLY forbids the sharing/transfer of all MILSPEC nuclear-related activities & IPRs into the civilian nuclear applications domain. In addition, civilian PWRs are not of the high-density type that is mandatory for naval applications.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To PINKAL SHAH: VMT. Nowadays, the ‘desi’ presswallahs are spreading lots of ‘red herrings’. Sample these:

Claim: Alok Prasad, Deputy Director General (Weapons), OFB, said: “Issues of quality have occurred mainly because of three categories of items: fasteners, rubber springs and seals. It is difficult to find a source in India that can match the quality levels that we are looking for in these items. It is a problem that exists in Indian industry. If we want the kind of quality we need, we have to look overseas. But our procurement process [with contracts necessarily going to the lowest bidder] currently does not allow that. In order to address this lacuna, the OFB is in the process of tweaking the procurement process.”
Reality: If fasteners, rubber springs and seals sourced from TATA or Kalyani for the ATAGS are good enough, then how come they are not good enough for the Dhanush-45? And if such components are being imported for ATAGS, then why can’t they be imported for Dhanush-45? And what have India’s successive Defence Ministers been doing when such problems (about the lowest bidder issue) have been highlighted since the previous decade itself?

Claim: “The Army has been changing the goal posts. The methodology of trials have been changed. We conceived Dhanush as accepted by the Army, but as in the case of the Arjun tank, since there were no written-down qualitative requirements, the Army kept changing them. In Dhanush, there is a GSQR [General Staff Qualitative Requirements], but it is hardly a few pages and there is plenty of room to read between the lines. The Army had two trial teams and each of them had different requirements.
Reality: There are always, globally 2 steps to product development: 1) technology demonstration. 2) life-cycle management of weapon. In case of imported weapons, a GSQR is the only document reqd because the foreign OEM has successfully both phases of product development & therefore becomes liable for all performance/lifespan shortcomings in future. This isn’t the case with OFB & hence OFB needs to embrace all the global best-practices of its foreign OEM counterparts.

Claim: The OFB is piqued over the Army’s decision to use a different process of qualification, vis-a-vis foreign manufactured artillery guns, with additional trials (termed as user exploitation) being introduced for the first time in the case of Dhanush. Dhanush is a major system development, and we at the OFB are learning a whole new philosophy in artillery gun development. The Army has been insisting on a six-gun battery user exploitation trial. Under user exploitation, you have to maintain and put more guns on a trial, thereby exponentially multiplying the chances of something going wrong. When foreign guns are not put through this, why should Dhanush be?”

Reality: User-Evaluations concerns the IA’s Directorate of Field Artillery. User Exploitation on the other hand concerns the Army HQ’s master-General Ordnance (MGO) Branch that deals with life-cycle costs & life-cycle inventory management. The 2 cannot be merged into 1 when a weapon is being locally developed. The same problem had taken place with Arjun Mk.1 when User Exploitation Trials by MGO Branch were not mandated at the outset & consequently, AFTER the successful user-trials, the MGO Branch insisted on the inclusion of 93 additional modifications/improvements that led to the birth of Arjun Mk.1A. At least the IA has now learnt from this experience & is therefore taking a more mature approach to both the Dhanush-45 & ATAGS. Foreign OEMs who offer their products to the IA (like K-9 Vajra) have already completed user trials/user exploitation trials with the armed forces of their host countries & all the results are readily available as various types of manuals that are in turn seamlessly endorsed by the IA’s MGO Branch.

Anik said...

Pics of Pak Army's Subedar Abdul Majid (Retd.) 3 storey house which was destroyed during last year's surgical strikes at PoK.Pictures were uploaded by a local PoK resident after SS. Was discovered by @Nexoft000

Rookie said...

Prasun da,
What is your take on this?

It seems rather exorbitant.
$4 billion for only 4 frigates.
Could there be something on the side to sweeten the deal?

rad said...

hi prasun

why is it necessary to go on ordering frigates from russia at a whopping 1 billion per ship ? why cant we build it here after all we have designed and commissioned the far more advanced destroyers with aesa radar, mr sams and brahmos, torpedoes ,ew systems etc ?

is there a quid pro?

are the 10 mountain divisions acclimatized ? then what was the motive of china to say they can enter at any point on the border etc fully knowing our ability .?

how do those fencing type of Armour found on tanks and bmp nowadays, defeat the rpg warheads? by getting stuck in between? do u understand russian?

Kapil said...

Prasun da, here's how P-17A frigate will look like The design looks inferior to BAE's Type 26 & Ficantieri's FREMM class frigates. It also carries less missiles than these two. What do you think?

bhoutik said...

* lots of chinese hype about quantum comm. and now news in india about ISRO tying up with an institution for a putting up a payload. what is the cuurent state of maturity of this technology and where are the major countries at including India?

* could there be an internal revolt against the saudi reforms they are rolling out?

* will the larger Indian SSBNs based on Delta class, or the SSNs, have pump jet propulsion?

* how plausible is the BFR concept? -

* the recent story about some sort of sonic attacks in cuba on us embassy staff. what the story there prasun bhai?

* the frigate Dunagiri rendezvous’d the Chakra in the South China Sea to escort her homeward (during her arrival) - monitoring from afar with sensors is one thing - but escorting her homeward from the south china sea - wasn't this behavior a little to hostile and crude?

* Admiral Hiranandani writes in transition to guardianship - p73 "It was disconcerting to note that there was a clear quid pro quo in these dealings as evidenced by Burmese willingness to allow China to build a surveillance and communication facility in Coco Island" - now prasun bhai i know you've debunked this a number of times - but why did Hiranandani say this? was there a willingness but it didn't eventually happen?

* about another incident mentioned in the book - "The US launched a mission to terminate general Aidid and his senior officers. The mission backfired badly and the notorious “Blackhawk Down” incident resulted in the death of 18 US soldiers and ignominy for the US forces. Within 3 days, America abandoned Somalia. Thereafter, conditions in Somalia deteriorated steadily and the Security Council ordered withdrawal of UN forces from Somalia. By the middle of 1994, the Indian Brigade, which had completed its tenure of duty with honour, was overdue to be relieved. It was obvious that the withdrawing UN forces would require offshore and air support. But neither relief nor support was forthcoming from the Western members of the UN Security Council." - why was it not forthcoming?

Anup said...

Indian Army only creating plan to purchase new weapons. Yet another plan

ConcernedCitizen said...

The fencing type of armor you are talking about might be slat armor. You can read more about it here

Technology, Photograpy and Travel said... you words parson Da, hope you are doing great

Thehundered said...

Is this true Prasun? when was the order for additional 42 Su-30 mki placed and will these be the super Su-30 mki versions?

"IAF has already ordered 42 more Su-30MKIs increasing the number of fighter from 272 to 314. The plane will be the mainstay of the IAF for the next decade. India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) is building the twinjet multirole air superiority fighter under licence from Russia’s Sukhoi."

Anonymous said...


1) Would Dr. V. K. Saraswat still be privy to what is happening with our ICBM/SLBM projects ? He retired in 2013 from DRDO; and showed some slides in IIT Bombay around Feb. 13 that depicted a different A-6 an a different SLBM.

2) Did the sacking of Dr. Avinash Chander end up slowing down our progress on the missile front ? Testing of IRBMs/A-5 's has slowed since even the UPA days. Does this slow down have to do with currying favour from the U.S?


Millard Keyes said...

Anup you are reading a mix of real and fake news. PKS has said repeatedly that the Assassin AR will be very much inducted and I am guessing the Joint Carbine too and what failed miserably is the writer not the rifle.

Anonymous said...

Prasun sir

1) According to news reports, the US wants us to join a 4 way alliance with Japan and Australia. But we are not that keen. Why?

2) Recently released photos of design of p17a shows what I believe to be an integrated mast with 2 radars.
Since you had earlier said that the the mast of the type 55 has 3 radars putting it a generation above the p15a&b, this is a welcome development, is it not?

3) You mentioned in a previous comment that the 123 agreement puts certain restrictions on sharing of tech between civilian and military nuclear plants.
Aside from this are there any major restrictions on the military use of nuclear technology?
There were rumours at the time of signing the treaty that our deterrent had been compromised. Is that true?
Is our deterrent still fully functional and outside of US interference?

4) How big a development is the recent wheat shipment to Afghanistan through chabahar?
Is this another piece falling in place in your theory of eventual nuclear disarmament of pak?

Thank you.

G. N. S


Hello prasunda any chances of signing BLACK SHARK HW torpedo after this visit??

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To ASD: Surprise! Surprise! Pakistan now wants to talk to India about Afghanistan-India Transit Trade Treaty! Pakistani traders are now wailing about Afghanistan’s lessening dependence on Pakistan’s overland trade routes, especially since India’s wheat shipment from Kandla is due to arrive at Chah Bahar (whose Phase-1 is now operational for processing 8 million tones of cargo per annum) later today. Listen to all the Pakistani wailing here: ( from 019:27 onwards)

And watch this latest docu on the Pakistan Navy:

To PRIMORDIAL PETE: The proce-levels are way off the mark. The plan as of now is to build the warship hulls in Baltisky Zavod & then ferry them to India only for fitting-out of weapons & electronics.

To RAD: As I’ve explained above, all talk about pricing for the four FFGs is FAKE NEWS. All those Infantry Divisions that engage in mountain warfare are always fully acclimatized, hence they are all known as Mountain Divisions. The PLA entering at any point is not for the sake of waging warfare, but for coming in, staying put for a few hours or days & then withdrawing, just as it had happened in April 2013, September 2014 & last July. SLAT arnour stops the RPG’s shaped-charge warhead from coming into touch with an armoured vehicle’s RHA armour tiles. Idiots like Karnad are self-destructgive in nature & that’s why he no longer gets invited to any of Delhi’s lecture circuit nor does he secure any invitations to any TV talk shows in either privete or DD channels.

To KAPIL: LoLz! That artist’s conception shows a warship equipped with THALES’ integrated mast & China-built 76mm naval gun! Surely the IN won’t fall for it & so you too refrain from surfing through those dubious websites that specialise in publishing FAKE NEWS.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To BHOUTIK: LoLz! You seem to be overlooking the fact that whenever any submarine transits any strait like the Sunda, Lombok or Malacca, as per UNCLOS the submarine cannot be submerged & must stay afloat on the surface. Hence the need for an accompanying warship as an armed escort for protecting the submarine. And Admiral Hiranandani did not step on Coco Island chain to see for himself what was the truth. Whereas I did, & I overflew the island chain several times since then. And it is Gen V P Malik himself who has debunked all such speculation in his memoirs. Where the Indians were mistaken was in assuming that Chinese cargo vessels & Chinese product-support personnel spotted on the island chain were personnel on deployment there, whereas in reality they were merely supplying & erecting coastal maritime surveillance radars for the Myanmar Navy in the island chain & they left as soon as the work was done. Back in the latter half of the 1990s that area in the Andaman Sea was the favourite transit ground for arms shipments being ferried from China/North Korea to various Myanmarese separatist groups via both Cix’s Bazaar & the Rakhine/Arakan coastline. Recall India’s OP LEECH in early 1997 on Landfill Island?

To ANUP: LMGs & GPMGs being imported? Could well be the case. But not SLRs or carbines, rest assured.

To TECHNOLOGY, PHOTOGRAPHY & TRAVEL: VMT. The visuals have at last confirmed what I had predicted. In fact, the rigging of the jerry-can pallets with the parachutes was faulty & standard SOPs were clearly violated by the IA. Because even in Siachen such jerry-cans are always para-dropped but such fatal incidents have never taken place there. Within valleys there’s always unexpected turbulence & hence it is better if the helicopter drops further altitude to come closer to the surface that is earmarked as the drop-zone. But for that, the helicopter needs to be equipped with a ground proximity warning sensor (GPWS), which clearly wasn;lt fitted on to that ill-fated Mi-17V-5. So I hope that the IAF too draws lessons from this mishap & makes it mandatory for all Mi-17V-5s earmarked for air-maintenance via para-dropped cargo to be retrofitted ASAP with GPWS kits.

To THE HUNDRED: LoLz! That’s FAKE NEWS, rest assured.

To GSLV: 1) He’s still with Niti Ayog & is therefore very much privy to all that’s going on within the DRDO. 2) No, it did not. There exists enough institutional data & resources to ensure continuity as far as product development.improvement goes.


Prasun Da,

Today the MoD approved 111 naval utility helicopters for the Navy.Navy will now send tenders to foreign vendors(like Airbus, Bell, Kamov etc) for their offering for the utility chopper need.

I have a question regarding the selection process.

If the lowest bidder offers less ToT but the highest bidder offers more ToT. Who will be selected?

The one who offers less ToT & therefore offers a low price or the one who charges high because they are providing a lot more ToT? IOW, is there a formula that is used by MoD to select the winner ?



Anup said...

Indian MoD approves procurement of 9 active towed array sonars at a cost of ₹450 crore. 9 ATAS for which AoN was cleared today are for the Kolkata-class destroyers and Shivalik & Teg class frigates.
So contact should be done soon?

Anik said...

I was expecting Navalised Dhruv as NUH but it looks like NUH will be a imported one under strategic partnership model.

An Israeli delegation led by Major General Yakov (Kobi) Barak called on the Northern Command's General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Lt Gen Devraj Anbu to discuss matters of mutual interest.
What were the Israelis doing in Kashmir?

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To VIKRAM GUHA & ANIK: LoLz! This is a typical example of an utterly clueless MoD being led by the nose by vested interests! Firstly, where is the definitive ‘Strategic Partnership’ policy document that should ideally be uploaded in the MoD’s website in PDF format? Since such a policy does not even exist, then how can any ‘Make in India’ project be carried out? This is the 1st example of how the MoD makes a mockery opf India. 2nd example: worldwide, navies use 2 types of flight-training helicopters: single-engined & twin-engined. Singled-engined ones are used for ab-initio flight-training, while twin-engined are used for pre-operational conversion flight-training. No one lumps the 2 reqmts into 1 unified reqmt. So why is the MoD saying that only 1 type, that of a weaponised, twin-engined light helicopter with tricycle undercarriage is reqd? Because in this category, only 2 offers are available: Bell 429WLG & Airbus AS.565 MBe. And why should such helicopters be shipborne when the helo decks of ALL IN-operated NOPVs, corvettes & FFGs are built to accommodate 10-tonne NMRHs while those of the DDGs are built to accommodate 12-tonne NMRHs? The ideal solution therefore is to go for the HAL-developed single-engined LUH’s navalised version for shore-based ab-initio training, while the Naval ALH with folding main rotor-blades should be the twin-engined flight-training helicopter. No other option makes commercial or operational sense, if one makes use of common-sense.

Then there’s the Ka-226T offer, which this Govt stupidly committed itself to. How can a helicopter that is serving with none of the world’s armed forces ever be even considered for India’s armed forces? Till today, no one can provide any convincing answer to this common-sensical question. The armed forces too clearly are against the Ka-226Ts acquisition since they prefer the offered high degree of hardware commonality between the ALH & LUH as this will reduce life-cycle costs for both helicopter-types & will also offer simplified product-support logistical solutions. So, it’s high time this Govt named & exposed the ‘WIZARD’ who had proposed the bizarre Ka-226T solution to NaMo, for it is he who is now the cause of much embarrassment for this Govtm just like those ‘WIZARDS’ who had proposed that the IAF go for mixed fleet of BTTs comprising the PC-7 Mk.2 & the HTT-40. And if indeed this Govt is so enthusiastic about the idea of ‘Make in India’, then by now it should have already selected a OEM from abroad as the strategic co-developmental partner of HAL for the 12-tonne NMRH that was unveilled last February at the Aero India 2017 expo. Since this hasn’t happened as yet, all bombastic soundbytes emanating from various govt functionaries are just meaningless, deceitful & delusional mumbo-jumbo.

To ANUP: The contract can be concluded within 15 days IF the MoD treats it as a supplementary contract, i.e an extension of the first contract for six ATAS from ATLAS Elektronik. But if the present RM insists on a new round of global bidding in the so-called interests of transparency, then it will be a long-drawn affair. At the same time, no decision has as yet been taken on upgrading the existing Sea King Mk.42B NMRHs. This too is long overdue & ideally, this contract should have been awarded to LEONARDO Group of Italy by now.

To ANIK: There’s a lot of Israel-supplied hardware deployed along the LoC & the IDF is interested in learning from the IA’s operational experience since the IDF can apply them to its northern borders along the Golan Heights.

Rajesh Mishra said...

MMRCA with 6 contenders went on for many years and failed. Now we have to see that the competition for 7.62X51 Assault Rifle with perhaps 21 contenders takes how much time.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To RAJESH MISHRA: Lolz! Even back in 1999 the IA had 5.56 INSAS SLRs & LMGs while the PA had 7.62 G-3s & G-33s. The heavens didn't crash that time nor will it now or in future, rest assured. Meanwhile, do lap up this latest scam revelation:

Looks like the dragnet is supposedly closing in on the NCP's Praful Patel, Minister of State of the Ministry of Civil Aviation during UPA-1, meaning he was not a member of the Union Cabinet. So who was the person/official handling & deciding upon civil aviation matters at the Union Cabinet-level?

To BUDDHA: UFOs & Nukes:

Black box said...

Hi prasun,
Israel Weapon Industries launches the 7.62X51mm TAVOR 7 AR rifle.ofb 7.62*51 is it better than it ?

Ved said...

Dear Prasun,
So has the IN settled for SUT or is there a possibility of Integrating Takshak or any other heavy weight torpedo in the Kalvari class. What are the future options?

Will OFB developed 7.62*51 rifle compete with foreign rifles or has it been discarded?

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To BLACK BOX: Here's the data on Tavor-7:

Compared to the OFB's SLR design, the Tavor 7 definitely has superior features as it is a derivative of an existing mature design. In addition, IWI has already tied up with Punj Lloyd to co-produce it in India.

To VED: How can the SUT arm the Scorpenes or any other SSK or SSBN when its fire-control system is not compatible with the combat management systems of the CMS suites of the IN's Scorpenes or Type 877EKM SSKs? If the SUT was supposedly compatible, then why did the IN not order additional SUTs, choosing instead to go for Black Shark or F-21 HWTs? I had already explained the systems integration/fire-control non-compatibility problems several times before, so why is this question cropping up time & again? Are the laws of physices that difficult to understand & accept? Or is there a prevailing mindset that believes in some India-specific 'Chamatkaar' (miracle) eventually taking place to decisively overcome the universal laws of physics?

sbm said...

A question if I may: if the Tejas without a quartz radome was able to fire a Derby missile (albeit in unguided mode) and given that the Derby/radar combination is compatible and working (as evidenced by the test earlier this year), don't the SP aircraft even now theoretically have a limited BVR capability with the Derby?

I wish to state that I fully concur with all your statements and analyses on the Tejas thus far. This question is only to satisfy my curiousity.

Anmol Chaudhary said...

This may or may not be stupid. You tell me.

What's stopping Indian navy from taking a S-400 battery and put it aboard an Indian navy ship(larger frontline ships). Would that be able to provide a credible air defence system ?

Gessler said...

Hi Prasun ji,

Regarding your reply to KAPIL (about the supposed P-17A CGI), LOL it appears someone was really desperate to show something new and came up with that. This image is over 4 years old and was created probably to market the Thales I-Mast 400 to the Brazilian Navy (if you look closely, you'll see the ship in fact has the Brazil flag aft of the helo deck. This is the first known instance of this image, from 2013:

However, the sad part is that the someone who was desperate to show something new was GRSE itself! This cheap photoshop was done & published on the cover of GRSE's Annual Report 2015-16!

That is just hilarious.


Prasun Da,

Just watching the video link that you have shared about UFO's & nukes. A question came to mind about alien race.

So in your assessment is it true what Elon Musk has said that there is a one in a billion chance that reality is not real, and a super intelligent race is actually controlling us?

Thanks & Regards,


Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To PIERRE ZORIN: You mistook GHATAK (Assassin) for GHAATAK (Lethal).

To SBM: Regretably, your proposed ‘theory’ will be a total negation of the laws of physics. The questions that ought to be asked are: 1) if your theory was practical, then why was the maiden firing of Derby BVRAAM fired in unguided mode, & why was it not fired against any airborne target drone? 2) Wasn’t this maiden test-firing meant to test ONLY the electrical interfacing compatibility with the launch/ejection pylons & the weapons control computer? 3) Since even a fire-n-forget missile (air-launched or surface-launched) requires mid-course guidance, what exactly provided the mid-course guidance for the maiden test-firing of Derby? 4) From which standoff distance in kilometres does the BVRAAM phase begin? 5) What is the max range of a BVRAAM’s on-board Ku-band seeker & what’s its max field-of-view & do they permit lock-on-before-launch for BVR intercept vectors?

To ANMOL CHAUDHARY: What’s stopping is the very same reason the Russians themselves have not yet attempted such a feat on-board any of their own warships.

To GESSLER: It is both hilarious & utterly shameful, since the IN too till this day continues to show F-15s taking off from its Project 71/IAC-1 illustrations! I guess institutional ineptitude is deeply ingrained within the IN’s NDB & GRSE. Will post some recent updates on the IN later today as comments for all of you.

To VIKRAM GUHA: That is likely to be the case as there are far too many events/developments to be labeled as mere coincidences. It could also be that we are like just one of the several laboratory-rats as part of a grand on-going experiment WRT genetic manipulation/re-engineering.

sbm said...

We now know that quartz radomes were delivered ad Derby successfully tested by LSP3 in guided mode.
Given that quartz radomes are in delivery, are any of the SP aircraft fitted with them?

BS Tracker said...


If S-300 (F/FM) missiles can be installed on Kara and Kirov class cruisers in Russia, then why not S-400 missiles? Theoretically, its quite possible. Russia has not done so far because it doesn't need it. A ship with S-300 on-board is enough for area-domination.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To SBM: ALL SP-series LCA MK.1s do & will have such radomes, without which the on-board MMR cannot function & IOC-2 phase can't be completed.

To BS TRACKER: It is not just about the LR-SAMs, but also the entire shipborne fire-control system that needs an upgrade. Russia doesn't require S-400s with TMD capability because it is a land-based Eurasian power & not a global maritime power & therefore does not require sea-based TMD defence capabilities offered by the newer-generation SAMs of the S-400 system. No matter what the range of the LR-SAM is, the fact remains that such missiles will require mid-course guidance of the type that can only go as far as the horizon if only a mast-mounted target illumination system is available. Nor have the Russians come up with a manned AEW platform that offers CEC-type capabilities to fully optimise an LR-SAM's engagement envelope. Hance, even a 150km-range LR-SAM fired from any Russian warship will at best be able to engage targets out to a distance of no more than 80km. And that also explains why the Barak-8 LR-SAM has a practical target engagement range of 80km, even though it can go out much further.

Gessler said...

Prasun ji,

Something that has been bugging me since yesterday, can you identify the pod being carried by this Mirage-2000H?

All internet research points toward this being a Thomson-CSF ATLIS laser designation pod, however even a simple Google search reveals the ATLIS to look almost completely different. There are few such images of this pod on IAF Mirages.

VMT in advance.

sbm said...

So summarize:

1) All SP in current 45sqn service have quartz radomes.

2) The quartz radome is essential for the proper function of the MMR.

3) LSP-4 with a quartz radome, has successfully fired in guided mode a Derby to hit its target.

4) Therefore following said test - all SPs have a BVR capability with Derby.

Would that be accurate?

Thanks for the answers.

Appreciate it.

bhoutik said...

talking about engagement range of LRSAMs - couldn't a ship stationed forward provide mid-course guidance to missile launched from a platform stationed further back? and what about guidance from Kamov Ka-31s?

Anik said...

DRDO SAAW successfully test fired.

Looks like Nirbhay missile test is scheduled between 7 to 9 November 2017 as per latest NAVAREA warnings issued along East Coast of india.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To GESSLER: The ATLIS-2 LDPs were never shown in public, only during IAF Day celebrations in Gwalior were they shown. In fact, in all Aero India expos since 2005, only the Litening-2 LDP has been shown in public & last February an upgraded Mirage 2000TH was shown with this pod along with the KAB-1500LG-FE laser-guided bomb. This along with Griffin-3 LGB & Kh-29TE & Popeye Lite & Spice-1000 PGM & Kh-59T are the PGMs now in service with the IAF. The KAB-1500LG-FE shown at AI-2017 can be seen here:

As for the new-generation SSN of the Russian Navy & IN, it will have capabilities similar to the Project 705 Lira-class double-hulled SSN, but with important differences. It will be single-hulled, it will have high energy-density PWR using HEU enriched to 90% & it will feature a high degree of sutomation, as was the case withy the Lira when it was introduced into service.

The USSR’s Project 705 Lira was a unique SSN design with titanium hull and a molten lead-cooled fast reactor using HEU-beryllium alloy fuels as a power source. This reduced the size of the reactor compared to conventional designs, thus reducing the overall size of the submarine, and allowing for very high speeds. The submarine could reach 41 Knots. The crew was only 32, compared to 70 or more at vessels of similar classes. The 81-metre long SSN had a displacement of 3,200 tons in submerged position and had a titanium hull in order to produce tolerances necessary for high speed and for extreme deep-diving down to a depth of 2,200 feet—far deeper than any submarine of the time, or today. In all, two types of lead-bismuth cooled fast reactors were used on the seven Lira SSNs—the OK-550 and BM-40 developed by Gidroprosess and OKBM design bureau in Nizhny Novgorod. Both reactors produced about 155mWT of power giving the boat more than 40,000shp. The result was blistering speed and acceleration—but at the price of being extremely noisy (though the SSNs had a pair of 100kW electrical propellers for low speed tactical manoeuvring).

And here are some interesting tidbits about submarine warfare of the 1980s:

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To SBM: No, that will not be correct because as of now the FOC certification has not been granted. Weapons integration does not take place in bits & pieces, but as a whole once all the packages have been tested, as this enables the mission computer, weapons management computer & fire-control radar along with the HMDS to be programmed & synchronized at one go. Hence, unless & until the SRAAM & GsH-23 cannons are also not certified for use, the definitive software algorithms reqd for seamless integration of the final weapons suite won’t be uploaded on to the mission computer & weapons management computer & until this is done, even the final OS for the digital flight-control computer won’t be available.

To BHOUTIK: What you are referring to is the network-centric Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), which now exists only wioth NATO navies & that too CEC is used only for early warning & not for weapons fire-control. The Ruskies have yet to demonstrate such a capability. A forward-stationed warship can’t provide mid-course guidance for a SAM launched from another warship simply because the two-way data-links woerk on the closed-loop principle, i.e. only the warship launching the SAM can communicate via such 2-way data-links & no one else.

To ANIK: That’s the SAAW variant that was first tested on on December 23, 2016, the 120kg-class, 100km-range DEW:

The 500kg Precision Guided High Speed Low Drag (PGHSLD) aircraft bomb meant for attacking HAS installations in hostile air bases was tested between May 22 & 30, 2017 at Pokhran. Here are its specifications:

Millard Keyes said...

when I typed Ghatak this is what I got ghatak English Meaning:
घटक Noun, Masculine
‣ a mediator
‣ ambassador
‣ attorney
घातक Noun, Masculine
‣ a murderer (assassin);
when I typed Ghaatak I got this: घातक {ghatak} = LETHAL(Adjective)
उदाहरण : घातक नरसंहार
Usage : It is a lethal drug. This means it appears there is NO difference in actual Hindi as it could mean either and there is no change in spelling or pronunciation...very confusing

Millard Keyes said... - now with English subtitles same as the second link of the Lira class Sub you mentioned above.

Gessler said...

Hi Prasun ji,

Regarding the LDP, I have been informed by a person who was involved in the French defence industry that the mystery pod I wanted to know about was called 'PATRIC', developed by Thomson-CSF. It was an export-only version of the ATLIS. Since the actual ATLIS was derived from a joint project with Martin-Marietta, Thomson made this PATRIC version to avoid any dispute.

Functionally, PATRIC is no different from ATLIS. However the pod itself is physically different. It has a bulge on the underside (which is reportedly empty) and has a different tail section with small fins (again, not for aerodynamic considerations but merely to make it different) and the protective shroud for the optics which the ATLIS had is replaced with a 'flap' on the bottom section of the optic (possibly to protect against damage to the glass from FOD, not sure).

Thomson CSF-Martin Marietta ATLIS version:

Modified export variant 'PATRIC' developed solely by Thomson-CSF (and used by IAF for day-operations, the PATRIC/ATLIS did not have night-ops capability, leading to usage of the LITENING later on):

And yes - you are right regarding this pod not being seen in public since 2005. The latest (and as far as I know, the ONLY) instance of this pod being displayed in public was from Aero India 2003 :

Since then, it has not been seen in public.

The only other image I could dig up was this No.7 'Battleaxes' squadron Mirage-2000H (from Gwalior, as you said):


Regarding the SSN, I understand that this new single-hulled submarine is being developed for both IN and RusNavy, so can you throw some light on what the operational roles performed by this submarine will be in Russia? Will they also use it in a pure escorter/hunter-killer role or as more of a 'interpcetor' that sets out from base on quick dashes to take care of already-detected threats? From what I've read, the Lira performed a role similar to the latter, and also the reactors suffered certain logistical issues while in dock, not because of any problem but purely due to their nature of operation.

I would guess these issues would be resolved at least to an extent if IN is also to operate such reactors?

Does the projected timeline of first boat launch within 2025 still hold true? I remember reading somewhere (possibly in TRISHUL itself) that the eventual requirement for SSNs within IN could be between 12 and 18. Can you confirm if this will be the case? Obviously 6 won't be enough given our SSBN and CBG-escort requirements and also individual hunter-killer patrols.

Gessler said...

Also, something unrelated to India but still interesting: it appears the Royal Navy is all set to decommission their two LPDs (HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark) as part of cuts to the military, this, combined with the early retirement of HMS Ocean LHD, represents a severe loss of amphibious landing capabilities to the RN, don't you think?

Among the two Queen Elizabeth-class carriers to enter service, do you think they can both operate at maximum capacity? From what I understand, RN has a severe manpower shortage and even then, it's impossible for both of them to remain available on call at the same time. At any given time, only one will be available while the other is undergoing maintenance/refit.

And this one QEC now has to do the role of Carrier + LHD + LPD !!

Anything to say regarding the massive loss of capability to the RN? And to think there are Britishers on online message boards trying to make it seem as if this isn't a loss, as the QEC was designed to support amphibious operations from the design stage up, not paying attention to the fact that these early retirements of LHDs and LPDs does not come as part of planned capability-reorganization, but due to budget limitations!

And no matter how capable a QEC can be, end of the day it's still only ONE SHIP!

VMT in advance!

rad said...

hi prasun
there are no articles that potray the saaw as a emp weapon any where can you explain?

the HSLD bomb has a inertial, gps and laser seeker . Dont you think laser guided bombs are not any more productive in attacking well defended areas like airfield et due to he fact the ac has to come in low and the range decreased dramatically for a low level release?

great link about detection of nukes subs in a different perspective of tracking !

we dont have the tech to build reactors mentioned by you regarding the lira class subs will Russia part with tech? or give us blue prints like the arihant reactor? is there any quid pro?

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To GESSLER: VMT & upon checking my brochure/air show visit note archives of the mid-1980s, I got the following information: France was on the lookout for developing a single unitary day/night navigation/targetting pod & so Thomson-CSF then got in touch with Martin Marietta, which had already developed the twin-pod LANTIRN system. Later, convinced that a twin-pod solution was unacceptableto the French DGA from an operational standpoint, T-CSF developed a single pod under the DGA’s Project PATRIC under which the pod had a bulged underside inside which T-CSF installed a Doppler altitude-finding sensor that was then already developed by Dassault Electronique & was originally meant for installation on board attack & CSAR helicopters of France. On combat aircraft, this sensor was interfaced with the on-board moving-map display for low-altitude (not terrain-hugging) navigation. Such pods, however, were not allowed for export & the export variant MINUS the height-finding Doppler sensor & night sight was designated as the ATLIS-2, which was subsequently exported to India, Iraq & Pakistan in the mid-1980s. The photo showing IAF Mirage 2000 KF-105 at Aero India 2003 shows it with both the ATLIS-2 pod along with Matra/Thomson Brandt BLG-66 Belouga cluster bomb & belly-mounted Matra laser-guided BGL. More details on the Belouga are here:

For the IAF’s Jaguar IS & IN’s Sea Harrier FRS Mk.51s the cluster munitions were imported from Chile’s Cardoen SA:

As for the SSN, it will be ONLY a hunter/killer boat & will not carry any type of LACMs or ASCMs. Its PWR won’t be of the type on the Project 705 Lira SSN. Instead, a nedw-generation PWR using HEU will be used. No liquefied metals will be used as either moderator or coolant, thereby considerably reducing risks to safety. But the Ruskies had resolved all structural load-bearing challenges to on-board electro-mechanical hardware, hydraulics & pipings in the 1970s itself & this very same experience can now be applied at far lower costs for the new-design SSN.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To GESSLER: As for the RN, the UK is being extremely shortsighted when deciding to decommission its LPDs. Here are some observations:

Royal Navy Planned Cuts:

USS Carl Vinson:

Charles de Gaulle:

ITS Cavour:

Admiral Kuznetsov:

Finally, a very interesting videoclip of the PFBR:

To RAD: LoLz! Nor is there any report/article saying the SAAW IS NOT a DEW. The HSLD-based PGM can be launched from distances 30km away. That’s why I had weblinked the slides showing the launch envelope simulations. As for PWRs of Russian design, their sub-sections can always be pre-fabricated in Russia & then be shipped to India for final assembly. And I repeat, such PWRs for the SSNs will be TOTALLY DIFFERENT from those used on the Lira-class SSNs. They won’t use dangerous molten metals as either moderators or coolants.

G Manoj said...

Hi Prasun,

The un official BJP mouthpiece Swarjya magazine recently published a piece proposing Hinduism to be broken up & allow Hindu castes to centrifugally evolve independently of any commonality of “Hinduism” and even if it leads to – towards new religions.

Do you believe this is a sound idea, to break up Hinduism into several parts on the basis of castes as Swarjya magazine suggests ?

Thank You
- Manoj

Pratap said...

Prasun sir, so will our Russian designed 5th gen subs fire only torpedos and no cruise missiles? Whats the thinking behind it? A nuclear attack submarine without cruise missiles is like a tiger without teeth. SSNs world over carry long range cruise missiles fired from torpedo tubes as primary weapon.

buddha said...

sir..terrorist attack has become a norm in kashmir and every news of our brave soldiers' death is very sad and heart-rendering. how long this will go on?what is the use value of weapons if it is stored and not used to make a fruitful result, is there any respite be it political or militarily . or if it becomes Indian controlled all of kashmir state .soon it will become a playing filed for pseudo secularism and ultra nationalism . what good bring it in general.
is there any hope for Islam to be free from fanaticism and false preaching of jihad.
sorry for off bit question...but i see no answers..pls tell us if u can.
thanks and regard.

The Engdoc Society said...

Dada, really really interesting topic and the way you make us understand is also great.

Dada few queries have come up in my mind, now one better than you to provide the answers:

1. How does LCH compares to Apache
2. When we will see service induction of LCH and in how many quantities in Indian Armed forces
3. Current Annual Production Rates of Dhruv, Rudra and LCH
4. Why does we we need LUH or kamov helis, should not we order more proven helis like Dhruv and MI-17s
5. So many reports generating on IAF attaining 42 squadrons in you see this happening or this is unusual chatter cropped by desi media

Senthil Kumar said...

Dear Prasun,

Problem in Saudi Arabia royal family.

Will it affect India-Saudi Relation.

Please comments.

S.Senthil Kumar

asd said...

Prasun just,
Just poking you...if you are to chose one for infantry, which one will you prefer??? INSAS 1C or Ghatak... please reply.

Ankit Singh said...
Two types of rifles for army infantry, can't understand this one.
Seems like another example of yellow journalism

Ved said...

Dear Prasun,
1. Pls clear the airin regard to the HWT for INS Kalvari and its follow on subs.

2. Why SSNs will not have AshM or LACM capability? I believe they should have Nirbhay LACM .

3. Which LMG in your opinion will be best for IA. Do you have list of competing OEM's?

Lastly Ghaatak as per your prediction has started service with paramilitary and some state police forces. Congrats.


SUVO said...


Jammu Kashmir Day in UK Parliament 2017.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To MANOJ G: LoLz! Only morons like those you’ve quoted can hope to mislead orfinary folks through convoluted & delusional narratives. For example, what has religion got to do with caste? Religion is the over-arching & philosophical unifying factor whereas the caste system is a socio-economic hierarchical protocol. They are polar opposites & are not 2 sides of the same coin. Another example: although Hindus in general consider Jainism & Buddhism to be a part of Hinduism, the Jains & Buddhists don’t such beliefs. Even Asoka did not do so & he was known for persecuting the Jains of his time because he could never reconcile his grandfather’s renunciation of material life in favour of monkhood. Similarly, although Asoka embraced Buddhism 3 years before waging war against Kalinga, that did not stop him from butchering the citizens of Kalinga. Therefore, kindly refrain from becoming a victim of such contradictory or factually wrong narratives being circulated by headless chicken, like those who are debating whether Tipu Sultan is a patriot or tyrant. The fact remains that all such erstwhile historical figures were fiercely territorial & weren’t statesmen simply because at that time the concept of nation-state didn’t exist & only civilisational states with defined frontiers (not borders) existed. Prevaling notions & value-systems then were totally different & hence, of course when viewed from 21st century optics, all of them without fail today qualify as tyrants. Just ask the Kannadigas how they perceive the medieval Marathas who had repeatedly invaded Karnataka.

To PRATAP: Those SSNs with 533mm torpedo-tubes can of course fire cruise missiles IF they have a diameter of 520mm & can therefore be tube-launched. It is all mission-specific: if the SSN is tasked to protect friendly SSBNs then they will carry only HWTs. If they’re dual-tasked with both intelligence-gathering & offensive strike, then they will carry a mix of torpedoes & tube-launched LACMs.

To THE ENGDOC SOCIETY: 1) Both are attack helicopters, but the AH-64E Apache is heavier & carries more armament & has better target-seeking sensors. 2) Not until the LCH is fully certified with its armaments & integrated EW suites. It is taking an awefully long time to achieve this & by now even the HAL-developed LUH should have been fluing with such suites. 3) Total no of ALHs produced per annum is not more than 35. LCH & LIH have niot yet entered the series-production phase. 4) There’s no operational need for Ka-226T, HTT-40 & HJT-36, period. 5) For as long as the present-day crop of civilian leadership exists, no such targets will ever be met. BTW the speech given by the present-day RM in Vizag when commissioning the INS Kiltan was 99% word-for-word identical to the one given by Arun Jaitley when commissioning the INS Kamorta. That alone explains the so-called ‘commitments’ being displayed by the present-day political leadership!

To S SENTHIL KUMAR: Those are internal turf wars within the royal family of KSA & these do not affect bilateral or multilateral relations that the KSA enjoys with others.

To ASD: I would have stuck to 7.62mm & would have insisted on the INSAS being developed as a a 7.62mm SLR. This is because ballistics protection vest technologies have progressed over the years & the 5.56mm bullet has loost some of its stopping powers imn such scenarios. Hence, 7.62 makes much more sense for both future variants of INSAS & the Ghaatak.

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To BUDDHA: LoLz! This will go on fvor as long as India’s political leadership continues to wear blinkers, just like it did in 1999 & then tried to hide its failures by forming the K Subrahmanyam Committee, which ought to have recommended the conduct of a Strategic Defence Review, but whose terms of reference were severely limited in a deliberate manner by the NDA-1-led then Govt of India. So, while everyone was yelling about intelligence failure, no one realized that in reality, it was the failure of India’s conventional military deterrent posture (due to lack of force modernization for almost a decade) that had led Pakistan to mount the mis-adventure. Even then, matters could have been salvaged to India’s advantage had India first waged psychological warfare by staging air-strikes inside PoK to attack the PA’s field artillery pits rear-logistics areas between May and June, while issuing repeated wearnings to the PA to withdraw. In that same period, the IA should have been allowed to only pound the enemy with artillery fire-assaults. By late June, AFTER the IA had massed sufficient acclimatized forces in-theatre, a massive cross-LoC AirLandf campaign should have been undertaken, lasting only 1 month, due to which almost the whole of Baltistan & Haji Pir Bulge would have been captured & the LoC would then have to be re-drawn after negotiations. Even an adolescentcould then have concluded that since Pakistan had been sanctioned by the US since 1990, all 3 armed services of Pakisdtan never in no mood for any kind of prolonged conventional hostilities against India & therefore India then had held all the trump cards. And yet, the so-called seasoned npolitical leaders of that time developed fatigue, had no sagacity & were easily frightened by the nuclear overhang. At the same time the internbally-displaced Kashmiri Pandits dare not return back to J & K because all Govts since the early 1990s have failed to bring to justice all the criminal perpetrators of the communal genocide of that time, i.e. the govts have never fulfilled & continue to avoid fulfilling their part of the social contract with the citizens of India. So, if this is the kind & quality of civilian leadership that the country continues to possess, then how can anyone except any improvement? The solutions are therefore purely common-sensical & are not like rocket science.

But don’t get depressed by all this. Instead, watch these far more interesting developments:

Blind Man's Bluff, the Saga of Undersea Espionage:

Latest Russian Navy SSBN:

History of Broken Arrows:

Deciphering Project CARET:

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To ANKIT SINGH: What that article has done is expose (if you read in-between the lines) the stark reality that’s been staring at all our faces all this while & this is exactly what I have tried to explain in this very thread, i.e. any future war with Pakistan will be limited to only high-intensity wars of short duration within a defined geographical area, i.e. along the WB & LoC. All-out conventional wars across the IB are totally ruled out. That’s why the IA is asking for 250,000 lightgweight SLRs like Tavor-7, which will be enough to arm all those IA infantrymen who will be tasked with offensive operations against the PA along the WB & LoC once the order to capture PoK is given. This does not, however, mean that the Ghaatak is second-class. Instead, the procurements of both Tavor-7 & Ghaatak will proceedd concurrently, with the former going to the IA’s South-Western & Northern Command, while the latter will be issued to those Mountain Divisions along the LAC that are China-specific & that come under the Eastern, Western & Central Commands. And as one can now see, the IA’s Southern Command is now totally redundant & therefore its existing manpower & material resources should be re-allocated to the IA’s Western & South-Western Commands. For me, all this had for long been the writing on the wall since late 2002!!!

To VED: 1) Semi-official off-the-record word from IN HQ is that the Kalvari will be commissioned later this month (sice the PM is hell-bent upon doing it himself) & that its HWTs will be the Black Shark, since all political smog/smoks/mist has at last been cleared during the recent visit to India of the Italian PM. In addition, a deal has also been reached on the AW-101 issue under which the Govt of India will acquire only six of the 12 AW-101s for VVIP transportation, albeit under a re-negotiated G-to-G contract that will see those AW-101s already delivered being inducted into service by the IAF. Since the price-l;evels will change & will be reduced now due to only 6 helicopters being ordered, the GoI will find it politically expedient (i.e. political gimmicry) to claim that it has acquired VVIP helicopter transport capability at far lesser costs than the UPA govts had intended to. 2) Those SSNs with 533mm torpedo-tubes can of course fire cruise missiles IF they have a diameter of 520mm & can therefore be tube-launched. It is all mission-specific: if the SSN is tasked to protect friendly SSBNs then they will carry only HWTs. If they’re dual-tasked with both intelligence-gathering & offensive strike, then they will carry a mix of torpedoes & tube-launched LACMs. 3) The ones from Israel’s IWI that are already in-service should be the best ones. 4) VMT.

To SUVO & SUJOY MAJUMDAR: Interesting investigative reporting:

To PIERRE ZORIN: Watch how the Filipinos & Thais combat ISIS-affiliated groups, without the kind of defensive mindset displayed by India’s political elites:


South Thailand:

ConcernedCitizen said...

Hi Prasun,

In the light of potential selection of F16s for IAF, Problems with the procurement of T50s, Emergence of a potential alliance of India, USA, Japan and Australia, Do you feel a case can be made for F35s as a viable future acquisition for IAF? The aircraft seems to have a lot of commonality in terms of its sensor package with F16. Perhaps we can signup for the information exchange agreements which can unleash the full potential of F35's network warfare capabilities. Acquisition of such force multipliers may also serve as a quick way to stymie IAF's loosing air capability due to the ever reducing squadron strength.

Thanks in Advance,

Anonymous said...


Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To CONCERNED CITIZEN: If the F-35 JSF is a desirable acquisition, then the FGFA option will have to be dropped, since there’s no way there will be any money available for acquiring two types of 5th-gen MRCA.

To RAJ: This says it all: Foundation has Directors who are also Ministers in the Union Cabinet, and this is ‘conflict of interest’ “The article in ‘The Wire’ says that the Foundation has directors who are also Ministers in the government, and hence, that points towards Conflict of interest. What is interesting is, the said Ministers who are Directors in the Foundation, have held the position of Director before they even became Ministers. In fact, they became Directors when BJP wasn’t even in power at the centre. Thus, their conflict of interest by virtue of holding both posts has no evidence whatsoever. Also telling that somehow, nobody has made such allegations against Sonia Gandhi, P Chidambaram and Manmohan Singh who were involved in the Rajiv Gandhi Foundation.”

To me, the mere fact that some of the Directors are today/now holding public office within the GoI itself is a direct conflict of interest, since think-tanks are by nature profit-making entitiers & they cannot exist as non-profit entities unless they’re totally financed/sponsored by the GoI. Those Ministers now serving as Directors in any such think-tanks ought to have resigned BEFORE taking their oath of office as Ministers. The mere fact that the likes of Jayant Sinha did so proves this point. And if P Chidambaram & Manmohan Singh too were involved as office-bearers of the Rajiv Gandhi Foundation while holding public office, then they too should to be hauled to the dry-cleaners. But the moot question is: is there any law in India through parliamentary legislation that codifies the conduct & composition of such think-tanks? Why have all the India-based affiliates of US-origin think-tanks recruited relatives of serving civil servants or why have sponsored retired civil servants like Shiv Shankar Menon for writing their memoirs? How & why did a cub-reporter, just after managing to access some personal notations of the late P N Haksar WRT the ATV programme suddenly get invited to a US-based think-tank some 3 years ago & has been based there since then with the promise of being awarded a PhD on this subject? Is he being groomed to become another Dr Ashley Tellis, whose rather dubious role WRT US-India 123 Nuclear Agreement has now been revealed in Shyam Saran’s latest book?

Also, do go through this:

Sanjay Sharma said...


Sorry if this query has been asked before, but did the 123 agreement put any curbs on India's nuclear weapons capabilities by the US.
Do we still have an independent nuclear deterrent without uncle sam's locks and bolts?

Again my apologies on inquiring about this 10 years after the agreement has been signed, but I'm not able to get a convincing answer to this question.



PrasunDa, thanks for sharing those links. Great find.

It might sound offensive to the pseudo nationalist but a country like India that has gone to the dogs (thanks to 6 decades of Congress rule) has frankly no hope of any comeback. The ROT that has set in is irreversible. It's all downhill from here.

Consequently, scoundrels like this guy Shaurya Doval & Co, Robert Vadra etc masquerading as patriots will continue to loot the country. Post independence scumbags like Nehru, Patil painstakingly rebuilt every sinister aspect of British imperialism. Keeping the capital in uncivilised Delhi was the last nail in the coffin.

No wonder then whosoever gets an opportunity to escape this filthy country, will do that immediately.

Just my 2 cents, if you ever get an opportunity to leave this God damn country, forever, do that ASAP.

Thanks & Regards,

Rajesh Mishra said...

"Similarly, although Asoka embraced Buddhism 3 years before waging war against Kalinga, that did not stop him from butchering the citizens of Kalinga."

Surprisingly this I read for the first time. Please let me know the source.


Prasun Da,

Since you are one of those very few people from India who actually travel to foreign countries to learn about military technologies can you please shed some light on the emerging technologies pertaining to Missiles ( air to air, cruise, TBM ) & Missile Defense ?

I don't know, maybe new types of sensors, microchips, nano satellites, warheads, laser weapons etc that advanced countries like US, Israel, EU & maybe even Russia are developing.

Obviously you will know in depth.

Thank You


Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To SANJAY SHARMA: Your best source for credible information is this:

I highly recommend this book for anyone interested in the 123 Agreeement & it also contains extensive data all the fears the US had about India’s fast breeder reactor programmes & how the 123 deal was negotiated & who were the players involved. It is also now confirmed that ALL FBRs to be built in India will be subjected to full-scope IAEA safeguards.

To SUJOY MAJUMDAR: I have no complaints against Shaurya Doval & India Foundation since he isn’t holding any public office & he therefore isn’t required to display public probity. But I have serious problems with all those across the political spectrum who willfully violate their oaths of office & continue to serve as Directors for profit-making entities while at the same time serving as ministers. This, to me, is inexcusable. This explains it all:

To RAJESH MISHRA: Kya yaar! Are you pulling my leg by claiming you’ve never heard or read about it before? Theek Hai, aap ki marzi. For the sake of giving you the benefit of doubt, here are some links:

To VIKRAM GUHA: Just to give you an idea about where the advanced/developed countries now stand, do watch this video:

Deciphering Project CARET:

Shobhit said...

the fast breeder under safeguard shall include future civilian fast breeder reactors but exclude the fast breeder test reactor and the upcoming 500 MWe prototype fast breeder reactor. India is also free to build any fresh military facility apart from the existing ones segregated as per the agreement.

rad said...

hi prasun
i believe that you had projected the f21 torpedo to t o be the future torpedo for the scorpene but after the visit of the Italian pm you are saying that the black shark will be torpedo?? pse explain?

is it not that the f21 is a more modern and recent torpedo than the black shark. Also there were reports that the atlas sea-hake did not meet the requirement of the navy?? how so??

why do we have to place the indigenous new up coming 500 mw FBR to iaea?when did the construction start for the FBR what would be the cost compared to the imported reactors ?. does this complete the thorium cycle of india? wouldnt the powers be worried due to our future Independence from them for nuclear fuel?

it is said that the tavor 7 has been made especially for india? what ever happened to the insas based 7.62 assault rifle that you said will be accepted ?

is the ssn project with russia on, or still in the concept stage ? will it be built in vizag by l&t again ? what wold be the cost . i believe some critical parts of the reactors will be fabricated in russia and sent here . will the others object to that?

ok coming to history , what made ashoka butcher civilians of kalinga when usually war victory is achieved when the enemy army is butchered. What was the blood thirsty ness for

Sanjay Sharma said...


Thank you for suggesting the book sir, I will buy it, but I have 2 quick questions that I urgently need to ask based on your disclosures to my previous query.

I am shocked at your disclosure that all FBR will be under safeguards.
Considering the fact that Cyrus is decommissioned, this means we won't be able to generate any nuclear fuel.

Is there any reactor in the country that we can use to still generate fissile material for our nukes?

So the 123 agreement is a crippling one for us, right?

Why then did we sign it sir? Was there an American damocles sword over us?

Why then do we even bother testing all these ballistic missiles?


dineja said...

interesting read

Anonymous said...


As far as I recall, this is what was committed to. The Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (500 MWe n construction) and Fast Breeder Test Reactor (<40 MWe) are not listed as civilian facilities.

"India has decided to place under safeguards all future civilian thermal power reactors and civilian breeder reactors, and the Government of India retains the sole right to determine such reactors as civilian."

Given the large fissile stockpiles required for a boosted fission arsenal with 250 weapons or so, and given that ABM developments in PRC may increase the requirement for a credible deterrent to beyond that number, any commitment to put all Fast Breeder reactors (including the current PFBR) into IAEA safeguards will be against the national interest.


Unknown said...

Lots of questions.Hope it doesn't annoy you:
1.Are we still importing BCMS?I heard that company named Solar is going to produce it.
2.Except Turbojet Engine,what was new in this test?
3.Some journos are saying that LCH will get FOC in 2022.Is it true?
4.How many more Nirbhay tests will happen?

Anonymous said...

Prasun K. Sengupta said...

To SHOBIT & ASHWATTHAMA: WRT FBTR & PFBR, both of you are DEAD WRONG & are needlessly speculating. Hence, do take the trouble to read Shyam Saran’s book in which all the relevant details are spelt out at length. And if you think that he’s wrong, then do take the matter up with him & the GoI, who’s representative Saran was when negotiating & finalising the 123 Nuclear Deal.

To RAD: F-21 & Black Shark share 90% hardware commonality. For the Scorpenes worldwide, only the Black Shark has been certified for use, whereas the F-21 still awaits qualification-testing. All other HWTs are INCOMPATIBLE with the SUBTICS CMS of the Scorpenes worldwide. All data on the FBTR & PFBR are in the YouTube weblink I had mentioned earlier this week. One cannot run such reactors & their spent fuel reprocessing plants in an unsafeguarded manner when all its raw fuels, i.e. uranium) are going to be imported & processed, since the domestic supply of U-233 is just about enough to cater to only the domestically-built PHWRs. It’s that simple. Even as of now, four 235mW PHWRs are lying shut due to continuing unavailability of fuel. Ghaatak is not INSAS-based. It is a brand new 7.62 x 51 design. What made Asoka butcher Kalinga’s civilians? Elemkentary: to provoke Kalinga into entering into full-scale military hostilities with Magadh.

To SANJAY SHARMA: Why are you shocked? And what is so shocking about it? Why does one require the 40mW Cyrus PHWR when the 100mW Dhruva & other 235mW & 540mW PHWRs are available for burning U-233 for the sake of extracting unsafeguarded Plutonium? Looks like you haven’t done your homework on this issue & hence such bizarre questions are propping up.

To INTOLERANT PERSON: 1) Yes, from Nexter Systems & URENCO. 2) It was NEVER a turbojet, but a turbofan, designed & built locally. 3) No. 5) Five more.

gourav said...

घटक and घातक is how they are pronounced in Hindi. Their English spelling is same.
घातक means lethal. That is intended meaning behind gun's name. Nothing confusing at all.

Anonymous said...


The 220 Mw and 540 Mw PHWRs can produce weapons grade fuel only if the refuelling machinery can be made to reload fuel at a rate of about 7 times the nominal rate, so as to ensure a low burnup of ~1000 MWd/THM against the nominal ~7000 MWd/THM burnup that only gives reactor grade Pu.

1) If the above is possible with domestic PHWRs then the nuclear deal does no harm.

2) If not, it is treason: when we have uranium reserves that are unexploited only due to NGO activism and other such subversion (our estimated uranium reserves are now over 100000 tons, unlike the 30000 tins or so estimated when the deal was struck), it is better to develop our own sources of uranium and keep the deterrent as the primary focus of the nuclear program. In this case, breaking the nuclear deal and using the PFBR for Pu production would be necessary.


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